6. FAILURE TO RECITE GUARDIAN'S APPOINTMENT IN CONDITION OF BOND
filed by him does not vitiate it. Id.
7. COURT OF EQUITY HAS JURISDICTION TO COMPEL NON-RESIDENT GUARDIAN
AND SURETIES TO ACCOUNT for a balance due his ward.
8. GUARDIAN OF IDIOT OR LUNATIC CANNOT EXCEED ANNUAL INCOME OF HIS
WARD'S ESTATE, in expenditures for and on account of his ward, with-
out the permission of the court. Patton v. Thompson, 222.
9. GUARDIAN OF INFANT WAS AUTHORIZED TO APPEAR FOR HIS WARD and
consent that partition should be made, under the partition act of 1820,
2 Chase's Statutes, 1162. Lessee of Merritt v. Horne, 298.
1. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL BE GRANTED upon prima facie case showing
that petitioner is entitled to discharge or bail. It issues upon probable
cause for discharge. Williamson's Case, 374.
2. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL BE DENIED when it appears upon the peti-
tion that applicant is legally confined, and must therefore be remanded.
Id.
3. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL BE DENIED to one who admits that he is
in legal custody for an offense not bailable, such as contempt, etc. Id.
4. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS LIKE WRIT OF ERROR, which the court or judge
is bound to allow if there be reason to suppose that an error has been
committed, and equally bound to refuse if it be clear that the judgment
must be affirmed. But it is not a writ of error. Id.
5. ALLOWANCE OF HABEAS CORPUS BY COURT OR JUDGE IS JUDICIAL ACT, and
not a ministerial one. This is true both at common law and under
statutes imposing a penalty for refusal of the writ. Id.
6. HABEAS CORPUS IS SOMETIMes Used to Obtain Custody of Children,
but in such cases it proceeds upon the principle that the children are
restrained of their liberty who are in a custody disapproved by their
lawful guardians. Id.
7. POSSESSION OF APPRENTICE, AS SUCH, cannot, as a general rule, be re-
covered on habeas corpus. Id.
8. SLAVE CANNOT BE RESTORED TO HIS MASTER ON HABEAS CORPUS. No
court is justified in issuing the writ for such a purpose. It was intended
to secure the liberty of the subject, not to try the rights of property. Id.
9. HABEAS CORPUS IS NOT AVAILABLE REMEDY TO RESTORE TO MASTER HIS
APPRENTICE when illegally detained from him. The object of the writ
is not to enable persons to assert a right to property, or to the services
of another, but to protect the liberty of the subject. Lea v. White, 599.
10 APPEAL FROM DECISION OF CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS WILL NOT BE ENTERTAINED by the supreme court of Tennessee. Id.
11. SENTENCE FOR INDEFINITE TIME, EVEN IF ERRONEOUS, CANNOT BE REVISED
ON HABEAS CORPUS. This writ was not intended to provide a remedy
against the unjust judgments or sentences of the higher courts; and when
it is asked for such a purpose, it ought to be refused; unless, possibly,
when it is asked from a court that may officially revise and correct the
proceedings. Williamson's Case, 374.
See CONTEMPT, 1-3, 5; JUDGMENTS, 5; PROCESS, 1.
See BOUNDARIES, 1-5; CORPORATIONS, 16, 17; INJUNCTIONS.
1. HOMESTEAD IS NOT LOST BY DEATH OF WIFE OF OWNER, so long as he con-
tinues to make it his residence with his servants and family if he have
any, or without them if he have none. Taylor v. Boulware, 642.
2. HOMESTEAD IS NOT ABANDONED BY OWNER'S ABSENCE for six or seven
months without any intent to change his residence, leaving his family
and servants upon the premises. Id.
3. EXTENDING CORPORATE LIMITS OF TOWN OVER HOMESTEAD by act of the
legislature, without any act of the corporation extending the plan of the
town thereto, by providing for laying out streets, or the like, will not
affect its character as a homestead, under the Texas constitution. Id.
4. LAND WITHIN TOWN IS NOT TOWN LOT UNTIL STREETS ARE EXTENDED SO
as to include it in the plan of the town. Id.
5. MORTGAGE OF HOMESTEAD BY HUSBAND AND Wife, to be VALID, must be
conditioned with a power of sale by the mortgagee upon default of pay-
ment; and without this condition, her assent to the mortgage is without
any effect, and neither adds to nor diminishes the force and effect of the
mortgage by the husband. Stewart v. Mackey, 609.
6. MORTGAGE OF HOMESTEAD BY HUSBAND HAS FORCE AS LIEN as soon as
property mortgaged is abandoned and another homestead is acquired. Id.
7. THERE IS SUFFICIENT ABANDONMENT AND CHANGE OF HOMESTEAD to ren-
der mortgage of homestead by husband effectual, where the husband two
years previously ceased to occupy the mortgaged property as a home-
stead, and since then occupied his present residence as a homestead, which
is different from the property mortgaged, and where no question is raised
as to the rights of the wife. Id.
8. MORTGAGE BY HUSBAND OF HOMESTEAD IS NOT INHIBITED BY CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROVISION that husband may not alienate homestead unless by
consent of the wife, but the mortgagee will take subject to the contin-
gency that the homestead may not be changed, or that the wife may not
assent, and that in the mean time his claim inay be barred by the statute
of limitations. Id.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 11; JURY AND JURORS
1. HUSBAND IS COMPETENT TO REPRESENT WIFE IN MATTER OF RUNNING
BOUNDARY LINE, where it is done fairly and honestly, and she acquiesces
in it, semble. George v. Thomas, 612.
2. CONVEYANCE TO HUSBAND AND WIFE AND THEIR HEIRS AND ASSIGNS
created such an estate as upon the husband's death would vest in the
widow as survivor, in Pennsylvania, before the act of 1848, and the wife
had, therefore, a right to mortgage the property, which would not be
restricted by a provision in her husband's will that it be sold for the
payment of debts, nor would her mortgagee be bound to examine the
will as to question of title. Martin v. Jackson, 489.
3 WHERE WIFE PURCHASES SET OF MINERAL TEETH, AND HER HUSBAND
PERMITS HER TO KEEP THEM after he discovers that she has made the pur-
chase, and does not repudiate the contract, this raises an implied contract
on his part to pay for them what they are reasonably worth. Gilman v.
Andrus, 713.
4. WIFE, IN HUSBAND'S ABSENCE, HAS IMPLIED AUTHORITY to take care of
the community property, and to make contracts respecting it for her owr
support, where no one else is left in charge of the property. Cheek v.
Bellows, 686.
5. LEASE BY WIFE OF FUGitive from JUSTICE who has fled the state, of a
hotel which is the joint property of the husband and wife, given for one
year for a full consideration, is valid and binding, especially where she is
destitute of means, and the rent is necessary for her support. Id.
6. HUSBAND'S MARITAL RIGHTS CANNOT ATTACH TO SLAVES belonging to a
estate, of which his wife is a distributee, until division of the slaves.
Harris v. Taylor, 576.
7. HUSBAND'S CREDITORS CANNOT LAY HOLD OF WIFE'S SLAVES FOR SATIS-
FACTION OF THEIR DEBTS until the husband's marital right is complete
by a reduction of the slaves into possession, or what is equivalent thereto.
11.
See HOMESTEADS; TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, 10-19.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 4-6.
1. TRANSFER OF CHATTEL BY PURCHASER TO INFANT SON OF DEBTOR, upon
debtor's refunding purchase money and interest to such purchaser, who,
as he was not a creditor, and purchased bona file, acquired title to the
property at a sheriff's sale thereof as the property of the debtor, notwith-
standing he allowed the debtor to retain possession of it, is not fraudulent
as to creditors, and does not subject the property to execution for the
debtor's debts in the absence of proof of actual fraud; and the debtor's
possession prior to the transfer is subject to the purchaser's title, and his
subsequent possession will be intended to be that of a guardian. Garrett
v. Rhame, 557.
2. REUFSAL OF LEAVE TO PLEAD INFANCY AFTER ANSWER TO MERITS, and
when the parties are about to go to trial, is not error. Moke v. Fellman,
3. TIMBER SOLD TO INFANT TO BE USED IN BUILDING HOUSE IS NOT NEC-
ESSARY for which the infant can be bound. Freeman v. Bridger, 258.
4. INFANT CANNOT BIND HIMSELF FOR NECESSARIES WHEN LIVING WITH
PARENT OR GUARDIAN, unless it is shown that the parent or guardian
was unable or unwilling to furnish him with necessaries. Id.
5. INFANT ACQUIESCING IN SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARIES AFTER COMING OF
AGE WILL BE BOUND BY IT, semble. George v. Thomas, 612,
See GUARDIAN AND WARD; PARENT AND CHILD.
SUIT TO ENJOIN CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROAD ALONG CITY STREET can-
not be maintained by one who does not own real property on the street,
to which the proposed railroad will be specially injurious; that he is a
resident and tax-payer in the city does not give him a right of action.
Davis v. Mayor etc. of New York, 186.
See NUISANCE, 3; INJUNCTIONS, 3.
1. IN ACTION ON CASE ON "CUSTOM OF THE LAND," INNKEEPERS ARE TREATED
AS INSURERS, and are liable without proof of negligence for the loss of
goods or animals left in their charge by guests. Neal v. Wilcox, 266.
2. ACTION ON CASE ON CUSTOM IS RESTRICTED TO GUESTS, AS DISTINGUISHED
FROM BOARDERS who sojourn at an inn on special contract. Id.
3. IN ACTION ON CASE ON CUSTOM, LIABILITY OF INNKEEPERS IS RESTRICTED
TO SUCH GOODS OR ANIMALS as the guest has with him for the purposes
of the journey. Id.
4. IF PERSON LEAVE AT INN PROPERTY WHICH INNKEEPER CAN DERIVE NO
GAIN FROM KEEPING, it is termed "dead property," and if he goes
away himself, and the property is stolen in his absence, he has no action
against his host, for the reason that he was not a guest at the time. Mc-
Daniels v. Robinson, 720.
5. BY LEAVING HORSE WITH INNKEEPER AFTER GUEST HAS DEPARTED, RELA-
TION OF INNKEEPER and guest is not continued so as to render the former
liable as such for a sum of money left with him by the latter while stop-
ping at his house. Id.
1. WIDOW MAY MAINTAIN ACTION ON POLICY OF INSURANCE EFFECTED FOR
HER BENEFIT by her husband although there is an executor. Myers v.
Keystone Mut. L. Ins. Co., 462.
2. THOUGH INSURANCE POLICY EXPRESSLY REQUIRES COUNTERSIGNING BY
AGENT OF COMPANY, where the intention to execute it is sufficiently
plain it may be dispensed with. Id.
3. INSURANCE COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE ON POLICY, where its agent agreed with
a person on terms of insurance, subject to ratification by the company,
and the company issued a policy on different terms, forwarding the same
through the agent to the insured, with a request for its return if he did
not comply with its terms, which policy he retained, but without com-
plying with its terms. Id.
4. BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW INSURANCE AVOIDED BY ALTERATION of the
insured premises, whereby the risk is increased, contrary to a stipulation
of the policy, is on the insurance company. Padelford v. Providence M.
5. ALTERATION OF INSURED PREMISES BY "ACT OF PROPRIETORS," so as to avoid
the insurance, within the terms of the charter of the insurance company,
is an alteration by the owner himself, or authorized by him, or adopted
as his before a loss accrues. Id.
6. ALTERATION OF INSURED PREMISES BY TENANT IS NOT ALTERATION BY
"PROPRIETOR," within the meaning of the prohibition in the charter of
the insurance company, unless the proprietor authorized or adopted it. Id.
7. JURY ARE JUDGES WHETHER PROPRIETOR" AUTHORIZED ALTERATION OF
INSURED PREMISES, within the prohibition of the charter of the insurance
company, and must determine the same from all the surrounding circum-
stances, where the alteration was made by a tenant. Id.
8. LEGAL EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT, IN SENSE IN WHICH IT IS USED IN POLI.
CIES of marine insurance and in the law regulating that subject, is to oper
ate as a transfer to the underwriter of the property insured, but only to
the extent of the indemnity contemplated by the policy. Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Duffield, 339.
9. IN CASE OF ABANDONMENT, Proceeds oF WRECK INURE TO BENEFIT OF
PARTIES BEARING LOSS: to the underwriters in proportion to the parts by
them severally insured, and to the owner in proportion to the part
remaining uninsured. Id.
10. LEGAL EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT IS NOT CHANGED BY INSERTING THIS
CLAUSE in a policy of marine insurance: "In all cases of abandonment, the
assured shall assign, transfer, and set over to said insurance company all
their interest in and to the said steamboat, and every part thereof, free
from all claims and charges whatever." This clause was merely intended
to prescribe the form in which the transfer should be made to the under-
writers of the interest which they derive by law from the abandonment,
and to point out the mode in which the intention to abandon should be
unequivocally expressed. But it cannot have the effect of discharging
the insurers from their legal liability to account to the assured for his
proportion of the proceeds of the wreck after abandonment. Id.
1. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT PRECLUDES PARTY FROM USING, FOR PURPOSE
OF REDUCING DAMAGES, TESTIMONY which would have defeated the ac-
tion had plea in bar been interposed. Garrard v. Dollar, 271.
2. JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT ADMITS TO BE TRUE ALL MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS
PROPERLY SET FORTH IN DECLARATION. Id.
3. AFTER JUDGMENT RECOVERED BY ONE PARTY IN HIS OWN NAME, AND
PAYMENT OF SAME TO HIM, another person who claims a portion of
the sum recovered cannot have a trial of his right thereto by moving
the court in which the judgment is entered to direct the payment of
such portion to him, and that the judgment be marked for his use to
that extent, and jurisdiction would not be conferred upon the court to
decide the matter in that way by agreement of the parties to consider
the money in court for the purpose of the motion, nor would the fact
that the money was actually in court alter the application of the rule.
Hudson's Appeal, 445.
4. UNSATISFIED JUDGMENT MAY BE MARKED BY COURT FOR USE OF EQUI-
TABLE CLAIMANT so as to give defendant notice not to pay it to the legal
plaintiffs, but such determination would not be conclusive, especially on
third persons, and the facts in such case, whether proved or admitted,
are not part of the record, and no appeal lies from the order of the court
allowing or refusing a motion to so mark a judgment. Id.
5. JUDGMENTS, EVEN OF SUBORDINATE STATE COURTS, CANNOT BE ATTACKED
UPON HABEAS CORPUS, however erroneous they may be, on appeal or
writ of error, where jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter has been
acquired; and this principle is applicable a fortiori to the judgment of a
federal court. Williamson's Case, 374.
6. VOID JUDGMENT IS NO JUDGMENT AT ALL; AND EVERY JUDGMENT IS VOID
which clearly appears on its own face to have been pronounced by a
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