the books of the Detroit Cycle Company, Limited, and has refused complainants access thereto for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of the subscriptions to the stock of the Detroit Cycle Company, Limited, not yet paid up.

The bill proceeds upon the theory that the property transferred to the Gormully & Jeffery Manufacturing Company and Atkinson, and the amount of the unpaid subscriptions to the capital stock of the Detroit Cycle Company, Limited, are chargeable for the payment of the Detroit Cycle Company's debts. The defendants severally demurred, upon the ground of multifariousness. These demurrers the court sustained.

Bowen, Douglas & Whiting (Otto Kirchner, of counsel), for complainants.

Russel & Campbell and Atkinson & Atkinson, for defendants.

GRANT, J., (after stating the facts). The single purpose of this bill is to impound all the assets of the defendant, the Detroit Cycle Company, to pay its debts. It is alleged that all its property has been dissipated and conveyed in different parcels to the various defendants, with the common object of preventing its application upon the debts due to the complainants and its other creditors. It would certainly be a reproach upon equity jurisprudence if a creditor were compelled to institute a separate suit against each person to whom a debtor has fraudulently conveyed his property. This would be true even if there were no common purpose among those to whom such conveyances are made. The cases upon this subject are very numerous, and many of them are cited in Torrent v. Hamil ton, 95 Mich. 159. The firmly-established rule is that in such cases the creditor may make all such parties defendants, and thus avoid a multiplicity of suits. It has been held that, though the matters set forth in the pleading are distinct, yet, if justice can be administered between the parties without a multiplicity of suits, the objection

of multifariousness will not prevail. Bowers v. Keesecher, 9 Iowa, 422. The correct rule is stated in Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 511, that where a creditor seeks to set aside all conveyances made by the debtor, in order to accomplish a single object, viz., the satisfaction of his judgment out of the property so conveyed, the bill is not multifarious. See, also, Wait, Fraud. Conv. §§ 54, 150, 151; Hill v. Moone, 104 Ala. 353; Collins v. Stix, 96 Ala. 338; Pullman v. Stebbins, 51 Fed. 10.

The decree of the court below is reversed, and the demurrers overruled, with costs of both courts. The case will be remanded, and the defendants given the usual time to answer.

The other Justices concurred.

ATTORNEY GENERAL, ex rel. BLANCK, v. HOWCROFT.

ELECTIONS-VALIDITY OF BALLOTS-DISTINGUISHING MARKS. Election ballots are not invalidated by distinguishing marks fraudulently placed upon them after they have been deposited in the ballot box.

Quo warranto by the Attorney General, on the relation of William Blanck, against George Howcroft, to determine the title to the office of supervisor of the township of Hamtramck. Issues of fact were tried in the Wayne circuit before Judge Carpenter, and the findings of the jury duly returned. Submitted October 23, 1895. Judg. ment of ouster entered November 7, 1895.

Fred A. Maynard, Attorney General (Elbridge F. Bacon and John G. Hawley, of counsel), for relator.

T. E. Tarsney and W. W. Wicker, for respondent.

LONG, J. This action is brought to oust the respondent from the office of supervisor of the township of Hamtramck, in Wayne county. At the annual township meeting of that township held in April, 1895, the relator and respondent were candidates for the office of supervisor. The vote, as canvassed by the township board, gave the respondent 181 votes, and the relator 177. The respondent thereupon took the oath of office, and claims the right to hold the same.

The information was filed in this court, to which respondent answered, and an order was thereupon made on June 20th that the issues of fact raised by the pleadings would be set for trial in the Wayne circuit court. A jury was thereupon impaneled, and its findings have been returned into this court, as follows:

"First question. How many legal votes were cast in favor of said relator, William Blanck, for supervisor, in the township of Hamtramck, at the April election, 1895? "Answer. 218.

"Second question. How many legal votes were cast in favor of said respondent, George Howcroft, for supervisor, in said township of Hamtramck, at the April election, 1895?

"Answer. 181.

"Third question. Did any of the ballots containing votes cast in favor of said relator, William Blanck, bear distinguishing marks, that is to say, letters, initials, words, or marks so made thereon as to distinguish each of the same, respectively, from the other ballots cast at that election?

"Answer. Yes.

"Fourth question. If so, how many such ballots were cast, and of what did such distinguishing marks consist? "Answer. 41; pencil marks.

"Fifth question. Were any letters, initials, words, or marks fraudulently placed on any of the ballots cast for relator after such ballots were deposited in the ballot box?

"Answer. Yes.

"Sixth question. If so, on how many of such ballots were such letters, initials, words, or marks so placed?

"Answer. 41.

"Seventh question. Did any of the ballots containing votes cast in favor of said respondent, George Howcroft, bear distinguishing marks,-that is to say, letters, initials, words, or marks so made thereon as to distinguish each of the same, respectively, from the other ballots cast at that election?

"Answer. No.

"Eighth question. If so, how many such ballots were cast, and of what did such distinguishing marks consist? "Answer. None."

It is the claim of the relator that, when these 41 ballots were cast, none of these distinguishing marks were on them, but that they were placed on the ballots after they were cast, and after the ballot box was opened; and we think this, in effect, is the finding of the jury. The township board threw them out, and thus found the whole number of votes cast to be 358, giving the respondent 181, and the relator only 177, while the whole number of votes cast by the finding of the jury in this proceeding is 399, of which relator had 218 and the respondent only 181; and the jury also find that there were 41 ballots bearing distinguishing marks, and that all of such marks were fraudulently placed on the ballots after such ballots were deposited in the box. The return of the jury settles conclusively that the relator was elected by a majority vote of all the electors. voting on this question, and a judgment of ouster must be entered. The other Justices concurred.

BURKE v. PARKER, WEBB & CO.'

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-DANGEROUS PREMISES. It is not negligence per se for an employer to keep a barrel of paint containing benzine upon his premises, for use in connection with his business.

2. SAME TIME OF PERIL-ATTEMPT TO EXTINGUISH FIRE.

An employer is not liable for injuries to his employé from the explosion of a barrel of paint, which had taken fire without the fault of the employer, occurring while the employé and others, at the request of the employer, were endeavoring to extinguish the flames, since the peril was such as to justify the instruction given.

Error to Wayne; Frazer, J. Submitted May 2, 1895. Decided November 19, 1895.

Case by Thomas Burke against Parker, Webb & Company for personal injuries, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Reversed.

Keena & Lightner (John Atkinson, of counsel), for appellant.

P. J. M. Hally and James H. Pound, for appellee.

MCGRATH, C. J. Plaintiff was a laborer in defendant's employ, and was injured by the explosion of a barrel of paint, which contained benzine, during a fire which he was called upon by the foreman to assist in extinguishing. The barrel of paint had been placed in the press room by the order of the superintendent. A workman used a lighted candle while drawing paint from the barrel, igniting the fluid. The barrel, after it had taken fire, was drawn from the press room out upon the platform into the open air, and while plaintiff, with others, 'Rehearing denied, but new trial granted, January 14, 1896.