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the defendant as for an original invention, are void ab initio." It must, however, be remembered that these remarks were obiter dicta, and that in this case the application was not made as required by the Patent Office. The grant of the patent was not asked for as a communication, but as for an original invention. An applicant who uses the form of application before referred to will not come within the facts of this case, for he will have to sign an express statement that the invention has been communicated to him from abroad.

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As to the alleged misrepresentation conveyed by the use of the words "first and true inventor in the form of declaration required with the application for patent for an invention communicated from abroad, the reader is referred to the notes on "communications" (v) and on "importers" (w). From a reference to these notes it will readily be seen that "the first and true inventor" is a technical term, when used in connection with letters patent, equivalent, in these instances, to the words "first introducer" or "first importer" within this realm. This has been established by many legal decisions. These referred to, and no doubt resulted from, the general desire of the British public to become possessed of the knowledge of many manufactures, the secrets of which foreigners desired to keep for

(v) Note (b) to s. 4, p. 11.

(w) Note (c) to s. 5, s. 2, p. 15.

themselves (x). Anyone extracting the secret from them incurred great expense, and very often risk of personal injury, and therefore was considered to have been as much deserving of a patent for his importation as an inventor who had been fortunate enough to strike on an idea without much labour or expense.. That this is all the applicant is understood by the grantor (the Crown) to affirm is evident by the insertion in the form of the grant of letters patent-1st, a reference to the above declaration; 2nd, a proviso that if" the said invention is not a new invention as to the public use and exercise thereof within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Isle of Man, or that the said patentee is not the first and true inventor within

(a) In discussing this matter in the case of Marsden v. The Saville Street Company, Sir George Jessel expressed the following opinion: "It is difficult to say, à priori, on what principle a person who did not invent anything, but who merely imported from abroad into this realm the invention of another, was treated by the judges as being the first and true inventor. I have never been able to discover the principle, and although I have often made inquiry of others, and of some who are more familiar with the patent law than even I am, although I cannot pretend not to possess a considerable familiarity with it, I could never get a satisfactory answer. The only answer was, it has been so decided, and you are bound by the decisions. But it is an anomaly, as far as I know, not depending on any principle whatever. It has never been declared by any judge or authority that there is such a principle, and, not being able to find one, all I can say is that I must look upon it as a sort of anomalous decision which has acquired by time and recognition the force of law."

this realm as aforesaid, these, our letters patent, shall forthwith determine and be void to all intents and purposes, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained." It is therefore conceived that an attempt made to set aside the aforesaid form and the patents rule 27 as ultra vires, on the abovementioned grounds, would be unsuccessful, and that those who have secured patents by communications from abroad need be in no fear as to the validity of their letters patent.

ceedings.

In addition to the before-mentioned changes in Legal prothe legal proceedings before the law officers, some important changes are made in the trial of patents actions. The cumbrous procedure for the repeal of letters patent known as scire facias, so far as letters Scire facias. patent for inventions are concerned, is abolished, and the revocation of a patent may be obtained on petition to the court by such persons and in the mode prescribed by s. 26 (y).

(y) A reference to Hindmarch on Patent Privileges, chap. x. sec. 6, which exhaustively treats of scire facias, will show how very complicated the procedure was. The change is one of practice, and all the grounds on which a patent might have been attacked by this method are still available in an action for the revocation of a patent. The principle upon which the law is based is that the Crown, which acts in the public interest, grants protection on the ex parte statements of the inventor, and if it appear that the Crown has been deceived or its subjects prejudiced, it has a right to proceed by scire facias to cancel or revoke the letters patent. This is very clearly put by Coke in the fourth institute: "When the

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Assessor.

Jury.

The court, in any action for infringement or revocation of a patent, or the Privy Council, on a petition for extension, may-and the former must -at the request of either party to the suit, call in the assistance of a specially qualified assessor at such remuneration as they may determine.

Patents actions have been mostly tried without the aid of a jury; but this is now made compulsory, unless the court expressly orders that it shall not be so (z).

King granteth anything that is grantable upon a false sug-
gestion, the King by his prerogative, jure regio, may have a
scire facias to repeal his own grant. When the King doth
grant anything which by law he cannot grant by jure regio,
for the advancement of justice and right, may have a scire
facias to repeal his own letters patent."

The cases on which these propositions are founded are :
The King v. Butler, 3 Lev. 220, 221.

The Magdalene College Case, 11 Coke, R. 74.

Legatt's Case, 10 Çoke, R. 113.

As to the position of the Crown when the grant is made on the passing of an Act of Parliament, see judgment of Eyre (L. C. J.) in Boulton v. Bull, 2 H. Bl. 500.

(z) See s. 28, sub. 1. The late Master of the Rolls, in the case of Downes v. Hughes & Co. (Limited), when considering the advisability of trying a complicated patent case before a jury, said that this was an action which as an ordinary rule would be tried before a judge of the Chancery Division without a jury; but the plaintiff had, notwithstanding that he had marked it for his court, chosen to give notice of trial before a jury. The defendant said this was not a proper case for a trial before a jury, and he relied on several grounds. The first was, that the question of novelty, involving as it did

The particulars in which the trial of patents actions differs from ordinary actions are dicsussed under the sections of the Act which relate to legal proceedings and especially from ss. 26–33 (a).

the consideration of various previous patents, was not a fit one for a jury. As a general rule juries were not able to understand these questions properly, and in effect there was no fact in dispute, and the whole question was one of applied mechanics. In his opinion that issue was not a proper one for a jury. The second issue was also an extremely difficult one as to the sufficiency of the specification, and it was one which he did not consider a jury would be competent to deal with. Then the other issue, as to infringement, was also most complicated and difficult, having regard to the character of the two machines. This, no doubt, was in a sense an issue of fact, but it really would almost entirely depend on expert evidence, and was not an issue which a jury could satisfactorily deal with. In his opinion the action was one that ought clearly to be dealt with by a judge of the Chancery division, and he ought not to be afraid to say so. was, moreover, this remark to be made, as to a trial at the assizes, there might not be sufficient time to try the case, and it might be made a remnant, or the judge might not think it a case fit for a jury, and might send it for trial to an official referee. Anything more unsatisfactory than either of the last events happening he could not conceive, and in mercy to the parties he thought the present order would be the best.— 24 S. J. 653.

There

(a) In the case of Birch v. Mather, 52 L. J. Ch. 292, it was held that ordinary rules of discovery apply to patents actions. Therefore, when in an action for the infringement of a patent the defendants had delivered particulars of objections, including a statement that the inventions claimed by the plaintiffs had, prior to the date of the letters patent, been used at places named, and the plaintiff desired to obtain

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