"connected with the use and operation" of the railroad, within the meaning of section 1307, making the company liable for injury to an employee through the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1887, Nelson v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company, 73 Iowa, 576.)

An employee of a railroad company whose duty it is to assist in loading and unloading gravel cars, and to perform any other service, as required, in or about the work in hand, and to ride back and forth on the cars between the gravel pit and the places where the gravel is distributed on the track, is a person employed in the operation of the road within the meaning of section 1307, which gives to such employee a remedy for injuries caused by the negligence of coemployees. (Supreme Court, 1887, Handelun v. Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Northern Railway Company, 72 Iowa, 709.)

Where a mechanic from one of defendant's shops, acting under the orders of his superiors, was working, as commanded, upon a ladder leaning against defendant's train, it was negligence for the trainmen to move the train without signals, or notice to him; or, if his position was not such as to be readily observed by the trainmen, it was negligence for the foreman, under whom he was acting, not to give notice to the trainmen of his dangerous position.

Whether, in such case, the negligence be regarded as that of the trainmen, or of the foreman in not giving them the requisite information, it was, in the language of section 1307, connected with the use and operation of the railroad, and was the negligence of someone employed on it, so as to make the defendant liable under said section for injuries sustained by the mechanic on account of such negligence; and it makes no difference that he was not engaged in the operation of the road. (Supreme Court, 1887, Pierce v. Central Iowa Railway Company, 73 Iowa, 140.)

Plaintiff and others were section hands of defendant, engaged in removing snow and ice from the track. While so engaged, a train of cars loaded with slack came along, moving slowly, and the conductor and others in charge of the train directed them to get upon the train to unload the slack. They requested that the train be stopped, but were told that, if stopped, it could not be started again. In attempting to obey the order, plaintiff was thrown down with a jerk of the train and injured. Held, that the plaintiff could maintain his action against the company, under section 1307, for injuries resulting from the negligence of an employee of the defendant engaged in operating the train upon its road. (Supreme Court, 1888, Rayburn . The Central Iowa Railway Company, 74 Iowa, 637.)

Where a "wiper " has temporary charge of an engine in making up a train, the railroad company is liable for his negligence resulting in injury to a brakeman engaged in coupling cars. (Supreme Court, 1888, Whalen v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, 75 Iowa, 563.)

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a snow shoveler in clearing its track of obstructions by snow, and was required to ride from one obstruction to another in defendant's caboose. Held, that he was an employee engaged in the operation of the railroad, within the meaning of this section, and therefore entitled to damages for an injury, received while in said employment, if the defendant was negligent and he was not. (Supreme Court, 1889, Smith v. The Humeston and Shenandoah Railway Company, 78 Iowa, 583.)

An injury sustained by an employee while riding on a car propelled by hand power, through the negligence of a coemployee riding on the same car, is an injury sustained in connection with the use and operation of the railway, under section 1307. (United States Supreme Court, 1890, Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Company v. Artery, 137 U. S., 507.)

A railroad employee whose business is to remove ashes, cinders, and fire from locomotives, to supply them with water and sand, and to aid in moving engine tanks, in the railroad yard, is engaged in work connected with the operation of a railway within the purview of this section. (Supreme Court, Butler v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 54 Northwestern Reporter, 208.)

Where a section hand is injured while propelling a hand car by a collision with a flat car used by the section men, caused by the negligence of the foreman, the wrong causing the injury and the employment are connected with the use and operation of the railway, within the purview of this section. (Supreme Court, 1894, Larson v. Illinois Central Railway Company, 58 Northwestern Reporter, 1076.)

A foreman of a railway gang employed to keep the track in repair is engaged in the operation" of a railway, so as to render the company liable to him for

injuries due to the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1894, Haden v. Sioux City and Pacific Railroad Company, 60 Northwestern Reporter, 537.)

A stipulation, in a certificate of membership in a benefit association organized by a railroad company, to which it contributes, and the expenses of which are paid by it, that in case suit is brought against the railroad company by the member or by his representatives to recover for injuries or death, and it is prosecuted to judgment or compromised, recovery under the certificate shall be precluded, is not against public policy. Nor is such a stipulation invalid under this section [1307] in that it "restricts the liabilities of railroads " for the negligence of their employees. (Supreme Court, 1895, Donald v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Company, 61 Northwestern Reporter, 971.)

This statute, which provides that railroad companies shall be liable to their employees for damages resulting from the negligence or willful wrongs of their agents and servants, renders them so liable to any employee engaged in work which exposes him to the dangers peculiar to the operation of a railroad; therefore, a railroad company is liable for the death of an employee who, while engaged in building a retaining wall along the embankment, was killed by the wreck of a freight train, resulting from the negligence of an engineer in running the train at a high rate of speed across an adjacent unfinished bridge. (Supreme Court, 1895, Keatley v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 63 Northwestern Reporter, 560.)

ACTS OF 1884, CHAPTER 21.—Coal mine regulations and inspection. (a) Section 15 of this chapter was designed to prevent intermeddlers from doing the things therein prohibited, and not to prevent employees from performing duties which are included within the letter of the statute. Accordingly, it is not unlawful for the conductor of a train of cars in a coal mine to ride thereon in the performance of his duty. (Supreme Court, 1886, Crabell, administrator, v. The Wapello Coal Company, 68 Iowa, 751.)

[The two following decisions were not rendered under any law published in this volume, but, being of interest, are here included:]

Where there is a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose, as the forcible driving out of newly-employed miners by old miners on a "strike," and the means to be used are not specifically agreed upon or understood, each conspirator becomes responsible for the means used by any coconspirator in the accomplishment of the purpose in which they are all at the time engaged; and when a homicide is thus committed, each is responsible for it, the same as if done by himself. (Supreme Court, 1887, The State v. McCahill, 72 Iowa, 111.)

Where a receiver petitions for a reduction of employees' wages, the employees concerned should be notified, and accorded a hearing. Where the wages paid to faithful and competent employees of a railroad in the hands of a receiver are not shown to be excessive for the labor performed, and are not higher than the wages paid to like employees on other lines of similar character, operated under like conditions through the country, the court will not, against the protest of its said employees, reduce their wages because of inability of the railroad to pay dividends or interest, even though present opportunity exists for securing other employees for less wages. (United States Circuit Court, Southern District of Iowa, 1894, United States Trust Company of New York v. Omaha and St. Louis Railway Company, 63 Federal Reporter, 737.)

KANSAS.

GENERAL STATUTES OF 1889, CHAPTER 23, PARAGRAPH 1251.-Liability of railroad companies for injuries of employees. (b)

A trackman, whose principal duty consisted in repairing the track of the railway, was injured while in the line of his duty, through the misconduct of other employees: Held, that he was entitled to recover from the company, under the provisions of this statute, for all damages received by him in consequence of the negligence or mismanagement of his coemployees. (Supreme Court, 1881, Union Trust Company v. Thomason, 25 Kans., 1.)

This statute is not in conflict with any of the provisions of the constitution of the State.

a See Law, page 317.

b See Law, page 332.

This act was adopted by the legislature of Kansas from the statute of Iowa, and the judicial construction given to the statute in that State follows it to this State; therefore, within the Iowa decisions, it embraces only those persons engaged in the hazardous business of railroading. The care or diligence the statute exacts toward the employee, is that degree of diligence which men in general exercise in respect to their own concerns, and contributory negligence of the injured employee bars a recovery under the statute, as in other cases.

A person employed upon a construction train to carry water for the men working with the train and to gather up tools and put them in the caboose or tool car, is within the provisions of the statute. (Supreme Court, 1881, Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Haley, administrator, 25 Kans., 35.)

A railroad company can not contract in advance with its employees for the waiver and release of the statutory liability imposed upon every railroad com pany organized or doing business in this State by this paragraph, and a contract in contravention of this paragraph is void, and no defense to an action brought by an employee of a railroad company for damages done to him in consequence of the negligence or mismanagement of a coemployee. This paragraph does not abolish the rules of contributory negligence. (Supreme Court, 1883 and 1885, Kansas Pacific Railway Company v. Pearey, 29 Kans., 169, and 34 Kans., 472.)

This statute has changed the rule of liability for the negligence of employees, and made the railroad company liable to one employee for injuries caused by the negligence of a coemployee. It gives to an employee, the same as to a stranger, the right to hold the company responsible for the acts of agents or employees. But the act or conduct, knowledge or notice for which the company is responsible must be that of some agent or employee having authority or duty in the premises. (Supreme Court, 1883, Solomon Railroad Company v. Jones, 30 Kans., 601.)

This paragraph does not deprive a railroad company of its property without due process of law; and does not deny to it the equal protection of the laws; and is not in conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in either of these respects. The alleged hardship and injustice of this paragraph consists in imputing liability to the railroad company for injuries of its employees, where no personal wrong or negligence is chargeable to it or its directors. But the same hardship and injustice, if there be any, exists where the company, without any wrong or negligence on its part, is charged for injuries to passengers. Whatever care and precaution may be taken in conducting its business or in selecting its servants, if injury happen to the passengers from the negligence or incompetency of the servants, responsibility therefor at once attaches to it. The utmost care on its part will not relieve it from liability, if the passenger injured be himself free from contributory negligence. This paragraph extends this doctrine and fixes a like liability upon railroad companies, where injuries are subsequently suffered by employees, though it may be by the negligence or incompetency of a fellow-servant in the same general employment and acting under the same immediate direction. The passage of this paragraph was undoubtedly within the competency of the legislature. (Supreme Court, 1885, Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Mackey, 33 Kans., 298. and United States Supreme Court, 1888, Same v. Same, 127 U. S., 205.)

A section man employed by a railroad company to repair its roadbed, and to take up old rails out of its track and put in new ones, who is injured, without his fault, by the negligence of his coemployee in permitting an iron rail, intended to be placed in the track, to fall upon him while he is assisting in removing the rail from a push car on the track, is entitled to recover damages from the company for the injury, under this paragraph. (Supreme Court, 1885, Union Pacific Railway Company v. Harris, 33 Kans., 416.)

An employee of a railroad company, engaged on the track and in the yard of the company, assisted in loading a car with iron rails which were to be taken to other portions of the company's road; while engaged in this service he received an injury, through the negligence of coemployees, from the effects of which he died. Held, that the character of his employment and services, at the time of the injury, placed him within the provisions of the statute which makes railroad companies liable to their employees for damages resulting from the negligent acts of other employees, which statute is held to be valid. (Supreme Court, 1887, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Koehler, administratrix, 37 Kans., 463,)

This paragraph applies to every railroad company organized in this State and to every railroad company doing business in this State; but its provisions do not include firms, partnerships or individuals having servants or employees engaged in work upon the road or trains of a railroad corporation. A firm or partnership composed of private persons, not being a railroad corporation or a de jacto railroad corporation, having a subcontract to construct a part of the road of a railroad corporation organized under the laws of this State, and operating cars and trains on the road in the prosecution of their work, and having servants and employees at work upon the road and in charge of their trains, are not within the terms of this paragraph. (Supreme Court, 1890, Beeson et al. v. Busenbark, 44 Kans., 669.) A section man employed by a railroad company suffered an injury while unloading ties from a car for the purpose of repairing the company's track. It was claimed that the injury was caused by the negligence and mismanagement of a coemployee. Held, in an action against the railroad company, that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the claim of the person injured, and that the employment and work in which he was engaged brings the case within the statute making a railroad company liable for the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1893, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Brassfield, 51 Kans., 167.) A bridge carpenter employed by a railroad company in loading timbers on a railroad car for transportation to another point on the company's line may recover damages from the company under this paragraph, for injuries received while so employed, occasioned by the negligence of a coemployee. (Supreme Court, 1893, Chicago, Kansas and Western Railroad Company v. Pontius, 52 Kans., 264; also United States Supreme Court, 1895, 157 U. S. Reports, 209.)

The right of a baggage man, under this paragraph, to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of other train men is in no wise affected by the fact that the railroad is at the time in the custody of a receiver, and operated by him. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1893, Hornsby v. Eddy et al., 56 Federal Reporter, 461.)

This law having been construed by the supreme court of the State as not limited to injuries caused in the movement of trains, is properly applied, in the Federal courts, to a case where one employee was injured by negligence of another while both were engaged, in a roundhouse, in putting a recently arrived engine in condition for immediate use. (United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1894, Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company v. Stahley, 62 Federal Reporter, 363.)

This statute applies to a receiver operating a railroad, and his liability to an employee who is injured in the service, through the negligence of a coemployee, is determined by the same rules of law as the liability of the railroad company would be. (Supreme Court, 1895, Rouse v. Harry, 40 Pacific Reporter 1007, and United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1895, Rouse v. Hornsby, 67 Federal Reporter, 219.)

A crew of section men, consisting of a foreman and two others, were carrying a rail which weighed about 243 pounds, for the purpose of substituting it for a defective one in the railroad track. The foreman and one of the men supported it on their left shoulders, and the other, who was at the rear end of the rail, supported it upon his right shoulder. When they reached the place where it was to be used, the foreman, who had been in the center. came back, and took a position in front of the rear man, for the purpose of relieving him, so that he might step aside before the rail was thrown down; and, before he had stepped to a place of safety, the foreman gave the word to throw, when the rail was thrown against the leg of the rear man, breaking and otherwise seriously injuring it. The court held. in an action to recover for the injury, that the foreman was guilty of negligence, and that the character of service in which the injured section man was engaged, being necessary to the use and operation of the railroad, brings him within the provisions of this statute, which makes railroad companies liable to their employees for damages resulting from the negligent acts of other employees. (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1896, Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Company v. Vincent, 43 Pacific Reporter, 251.)

ACTS OF 1891, CHAPTER 114.-Hours of labor—Public works. (a)

This law does not apply to the employees of the State penitentiary. (Supreme Court, 1891, State v. Martindale, 47 Kans., 147.)

a See Law, page 345.

KENTUCKY.

CONSTITUTION, SECTION 244, and Statutes OF 1894, CHAPTER 36, SECTION 1350.— Payment of wages. (a)

A mining company paid its employees once each month in lawful money, for the past month's labor, and at any time during the month, upon their application, issued checks to them payable in merchandise at the company's store. The amount of checks so issued to each man was deducted from his wages on every pay day, and he was paid the balance in cash, but no money was paid for outstanding checks. Held, that such an arrangement was not in violation of the act providing that wage earners shall be paid for their labor in lawful money, nor of section 244 of the constitution. (Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1894, Avert Beattyville Coal Company v. Commonwealth, 28 Southwestern Reporter, 502.)

LOUISIANA.

CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 255, AND ACTS OF 1880, ACT No. 76.-Unlawful employment of foreign sailors, etc. (b)

The above constitutional provision and statute do not prohibit the crews of foreign vessels from loading and unloading their ships, such services being an implied part of every sailor's contract of employment, and within the jurisdiction of the United States courts in admiralty. If said constitutional provision and statute are intended to prohibit the rendering of such services by crews of foreign vessels, they are void, as regulations of commerce with foreign nations, because in contravention of the provisions of Article I, section 8, paragraph 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (United States Circuit Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1895, Cuban Steamship Company, Limited, v. Fitzpatrick, Mayor, et al., 66 Federal Reporter, 63.)

VOORHIES' REVISED CIVIL CODE OF 1870, EDITION OF 1887, ARTICLES 2673, 2675, AND 2745 TO 2750.—The letting out of labor or industry. (c)

If an overseer be employed for one year, but discharged without cause before its expiration, he may at once sue for his wages. But if he be reconciled with his employer and resumes the management of the plantation, he can not sue until the expiration of the year. (Supreme Court, 1831, Chevalier v. Borie, 2 La., 191.)

When an overseer, hired for a stipulated sum, by the year, abandons his employer before the expiration of the term of employment, on pretense of sickness in his family, when he is not prevented personally by bad health from performing his duty, he will lose all the wages he has earned. (Supreme Court, 1837, Hays v. Marsh, 6 La., 233.)

Where a person is employed by the year, he can not quit the service of his employer, without forfeiting his salary, nor can he be dismissed ad libitum, and thereby be deprived of it.

So, where the plaintiff was employed by the year, to superintend a cotton press, at a fixed salary, and after his year had commenced, was dismissed because he refused to submit to a diminution of his salary: Held, that he was entitled to recover it for the entire year. (Supreme Court, 1838, Beckman v. New Orleans

Cotton Press Company, 6 La., 418.)

Where a laborer hired for a certain time, is discharged by his employer before the time for which he was engaged has expired, without any serious ground of complaint, he will be entitled, under this article, to the whole amount of wages he might have claimed had the full term of his service arrived. This right accrues as soon as he is discharged; and the fact that he immediately after engaged his services to another employer, for the remainder of the term, can not affect his right to recover the full amount from his first employer. But this article speaks only of wages due the laborer, and should not be extended to anything else, as to an allowance for board, lodging, etc. (Supreme Court, 1842, Shea v. Schlatre, 1 Robinson, 319.)

a See Laws, pages 353 and 358. b See Laws, pages 369 and 378. 2352

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c See Law, page 371.