Missouri. A new Bible, two new suits of clothes to be worth $50, and $20 in money. Nevada.-Two suits of clothing, each suit being of the value of not less than $25, and $100 in money to a male bound to serve five years or more; and two full suits of wearing apparel and $50 in money to a female bound to serve four years or more. New York.-A new Bible to children bound out by a superintendent of the poor of a county or overseers of the poor of a city or town, and to all apprentices a certificate in writing stating that apprentice has served a full term at a specified trade or craft. North Carolina.—A certificate in writing stating that apprentice has served a full term at a specified trade or craft. North Dakota.-A new Bible. Ohio.-A new Bible and two good suits of new clothes. TO TEACH, OR CAUSE TO BE TAUGHT, TO APPRENTICE THE TRADE, ETC., TO WHICH INDENTURED. North Carolina.-Such apprentices only as, being over 14 years of age, are bound out to learn a trade or calling. LAWS FROM WHICH THE PRECEDING DIGEST WAS COMPILED. Alabama.-Code of 1886: Sections 1474 to 1485, inclusive, 3756, 3759, and 3760. Acts of 1890-'91: Act No. 51. Arkansas.-Digest of the Statutes of 1894: Chapter 4, and section 1463. California.--Deering's Codes and Statutes (1885): Volume II, Civil Code, pages 58 to 62, inclusive. Colorado.-Annotated Statutes of 1891: Chapters 6 and 26. Connecticut.-Code of 1887: Sections 30, 1484, 1738 to 1744, inclusive, 3631 and 3677. Delaware.-Revised Code of 1852. Edition of 1893: Chapter 79. Florida.-Revised Statutes of 1892: Sections 2112 to 2116, inclusive, and 2404. Georgia.-Code of 1882: Sections 1871 to 1884, inclusive. Illinois.-Revised Statutes of 1891: Chapter 9. Laws of 1893: Page 29. Indiana.-Annotated Statutes. Revision of 1894: Sections 7299 to 7317, inclusive, and 8285. Iowa.-McClain's Annotated Statutes of 1880. Edition of 1884: Sections 1378, 1649, and 2280 to 2306, inclusive. Kansas. Statutes of 1889: Chapter 5; chapter 79, section 28; and chapter 99, section 568. Kentucky.-Statutes of 1894: Chapter 84. Louisiana.-Voorhies's Revised Laws of 1870: Sections 70 to 84, inclusive. Acts of 1895: Chapter 28. Maine.-Revised Statutes of 1883: Chapter 24, sections 21 to 28, inclusive; chapter 62, sections 1 to 7, inclusive; and chapter 142, sections 11, 20, and 21. Maryland.-Code of Public General Laws of 1888: Article 6 as amended by chapter 8, acts of 1890, and article 27, sections 324, 346, 367, and 380. Code of Public Local Laws of 1888: Article 1, sections 3 and 4, and article 20, sections 29, 30, and 31. Massachusetts.-Public Statutes of 1882: Chapter 149, sections 1 to 23, inclusive. Michigan.-Howell's Annotated Statutes of 1882. Edition of 1883: Sections 6352 to 6378, inclusive. Acts of 1887: Act No. 192. Acts of 1895: Act No. 33. Minnesota.-General Statutes of 1894: Sections 1966, 3523, and 4750 to 4767, inclusive. Mississippi.-Revised Code of 1892: Chapter 100. Missouri.-Revised Statutes of 1889: Sections 369 to 396, inclusive. Montana.-Codes and Statutes, Sander's Edition, 1895: Civil Code, sections 360 to 369, inclusive; and Penal Code, section 1154. Nevada.-General Statutes of 1885: Sections 611 to 626, inclusive. New Hampshire.-Fublic Statutes of 1891: Chapter 84, sections 4, 5, and 6; chapter 85, section 7; and chapter 180. New Jersey.-Revision of 1877: Page 30, sections 1 to 16, inclusive: page 838, section 12; page 949, section 8; and page 954, section 10. Acts of 1892: Chapter 230. New Mexico.-Compiled Statutes of 1884: Sections 1069 to 1078, inclusive. North Carolina.-Acts of 1889: Chapter 169. North Dakota.-Revised Codes of 1895: Sections 2831 to 2849, inclusive. 3947. Pennsylvania.-Brightly's Purdon's Digest (Edition of 1894): Page 95, section 6; page 117, sections 1 to 15, inclusive; page 998, sections 8 and 25; and page 1704, section 45. Rhode Island.-General Laws of 1896: Chapter 79, section 14, and chapter 198, sections 1 to 20, inclusive. South Carolina.-Revised Statutes of 1893: Chapter 85. South Dakota.-Compiled Laws (Territorial), 1887: Sections 2165 and 2656 to 2674, inclusive Tennessee.-Code of 1884: Sections 2129 and 3422 to 3437, inclusive. Vermont.-Revised Laws of 1880: Chapter 126, sections 2511 to 2535, inclusive, and chapter 204, section 4350. Virginia.-Code of 1887: Sections 2581 to 2596, inclusive. Washington.-Annotated Statutes and Codes of 1891: Section 3091. West Virginia.-Code. Edition of 1891: Chapter 45, section 98c-XI, and chapter 81. Wisconsin.-Annotated Statutes of 1889: Sections 1511, 1527, 1528, and chapter 110. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE UNDER THE COMMON LAW. The relations existing between employers of labor and their employees, and the reciprocal duties, obligations, and rights growing out of those relations, are, in the absence of legislative enactments, governed by the common law in regard to master and servant, the words "master" and "servant "being legally synonymous with the words "employer" and "employee." The common law consists of principles, usages, and rules of action, applicable to the government and security of persons and property, which have grown into use by gradual adoption, without legislative authority, and have received, from time to time, the sanction of the courts of justice. The great body of the common law fo the United States consists of the common law of England, and such statutes thereof as were in force prior to the separation of this country from England, and applicable to circumstances and conditions prevailing here. These laws have been adopted as the basis of our jurisprudence in all the States except Louisiana, and many of the most valued principles of the English common law have been embodied in the constitutions of the United States and the several States. In many details, however, the common law of the United States now differs widely from that of England by reason of modifications arising from different conditions and established by American adjudications. That branch of the common law governing the relation of master and servant has undergone some changes, although in the main it is the same in this country as in England. It is not the purpose of this article to point out such changes or differences, but to state the principles and rules of the common law now prevailing throughout the United States, except where they have been changed or modified by legislative enactments. The statement which follows is derived from articles in the American and English Encyclopedia of Law on the subject of "Master and servant" and kindred topics, and from standard legal works treating of the subject under consideration. The reader should bear in mind that any rule or principle of the common law, as given in this statement, conflicting with a statute which has not been declared invalid or unconstitutional by the courts, is modified or changed by the statute, and that the statute instead of the common law now governs. MASTER AND SERVANT: DEFINITIONS.-A master is variously defined as one who has in his employment one or more persons hired by contract to serve him either as domestic or common laborers; one who has the superior choice, control, and direction, whose will is represented not merely in the ultimate result of the work in hand, but in all its details; one who is the responsible head of a given industry; one who not only prescribes the end, but directs, or may at any time direct the means and methods of doing the work; one who has the power to discharge; a head or chief; an employer; a director; a governor. A servant is one who is employed to render personal service to his employer otherwise than in the pursuit of an independent calling, and who, in such service, remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter. THE RELATION: ITS CREATION AND EXISTENCE.-The relation of master and servant is created by contract, either express or implied, where both parties have the requisite legal qualifications for entering into a valid contract. The relation exists only where the person sought to be charged as master employs and controls the other party to the contract of service, or expressly or tacitly assents to the rendition of the particular service by him. The master must have the right to direct the action of the servant, and to accept or reject his service. The relation does not cease so long as the master retains his control or right of control over the methods and manner of doing the work, or the agencies by which it is effected. Furthermore, the relation exists where the servant is employed, not by the master directly, but by an employee in charge of a part of the master's business with authority to engage assistance therein. The THE CONTRACT OF SERVICE.-A contract of employment is one by which an employer engages an employee to do something for the benefit of the employer, or of a third person, for a sufficient consideration, expressed or implied. authority of a subordinate to employ an agent or servant includes, in the absence of restrictive words, authority to make a complete contract, definite as to the amount of wages, as well as to all other terms. Ordinarily, when an adult person solicits employment in a particular line of work, the solicitation carries with it an implied assertion that the one seeking employment is competent to perform the ordinary duties of the position sought; and it is an implied condition of every contract of service that the employee is competent to discharge the duties of his employment. A servant is presumed to have been hired for such length of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages; for example, a hiring at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; at a daily rate, for one day; a hiring by piecework, for no specified time: but such fact does not, in the absence of other evidence, necessarily fix the period of hiring. Where an employee has been hired to work by the week or month, the burden of proof is upon him to show any change in the contract of employment as to the term of service. It is a general rule that where a person enters into a contract of service for a fixed compensation, he, prima facie, agrees to give his employer his entire time; but this rule is not inflexible. A contract for service running for a longer period of time than one year, to be valid, must be in writing and signed by the party against whom it may be sought to be enforced, or by his authorized agent. In the absence of an express contract of hiring, a person may recover compensation for services where the same were rendered under such circumstances as to show that he expected such compensation as a matter of right, and that the person for whom they were rendered was bound to know that he claimed compensation, or was legally entitled thereto. Where one person performs labor for another, a request and a promise to pay the reasonable worth of such labor are presumed by law, unless it is understood that the labor is to be gratuitously performed, or it is performed under such circumstances as to repel the presumption of a promise to pay. Where there is an express contract the servant must be furnished with employment by the master during the period covered by its terms. If by the terms of the contract the servant is employed to work by the day, week, month, or year, and nothing is said as to the time of payment for his services, the wages are due and may be demanded at the close of each day, week, month, or year, as the case may be; but in such case, as upon all questions relating to the interpretation of contracts, custom has a strong bearing. A man can contract to furnish his own services and those of his wife, and if she makes no separate claim can sue for them; and if such contract needs ratifying, the testimony of the wife in support of his demand will be a sufficient ratification. A wife is not responsible for the wages of her husband's employee, notwithstanding the fact that she sometimes pays such wages. When a master agrees to pay his servant what he considers the servant's services to be reasonably worth, or, where he agrees to pay the same wages as shall be paid to other men in his employ filling similar positions, and there is no showing that the master has other employees in similar positions, the servant is entitled to recover, in a suit for wages, what his services were actually worth. And where the master and servant agree as to the existence of the contract of service, but disagree as to the wages to be paid, the question of compensation must be left to a jury. Unless otherwise agreed, the wages of an employee must be paid in cash. The master has no right to handle, or invest, or in any manner apply such wages, whether beneficial to the servant or not, but must pay them directly to him. An employer may discharge an employee before the expiration of the term of service stipulated in the contract for good and sufficient cause, as for incompetency. The discharge must be couched in such terms as to leave no doubt in the employee's mind of the employer's desire to terminate the relation. In a majority of the States a contract for service for a specified time is considered apportionable, and an employee who has been discharged for cause is entitled to compensation for the work he has actually performed. When one has contracted to employ another for a certain period of time, at a specified price for the entire time, and discharges him wrongfully before the expiration thereof, the wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to recover an amount equal to the stipulated wages for the whole period covered by the contract, less the sum earned, or which might have been earned in other employment during the period covered by the breach. Upon dismissal a servant, under the law, must seek other employment, but extraordinary diligence in such seeking is not required of him. He is only required to use reasonable efforts, and he is not bound to seek employment or render service of a different kind or grade from that which he was engaged to perform under the violated contract, nor to seek employment in a different neighborhood; and if he fails to secure employment and works on his own account the value of such work can not be deducted from his claim. Where an employee for a fixed period, at a salary for the period, payable at intervals, is wrongfully discharged, he may pursue one of four courses 1. He may sue at once for the breach of contract, in which case he can only recover his damages up to the time of bringing the suit. 2. He may wait until the end of the contract period, and then sue for the breach. 3. He may treat the contract as existing, and sue at each period of payment for the wages then due. 4. He may treat the contract as rescinded, and sue immediately for the value of his services performed, in which case he can only recover for the time he actually served. An employee is entitled to recover damages from a person who maliciously procures his discharge, provided he proves that the discharge resulted in damage to him. An employer is entitled to maintain an action against anyone who knowingly entices away his servant, or wrongfully prevents the servant from performing his duty, or permits the servant to stay with him and harbors such servant with the intention of depriving the master of his services. COMBINATIONS AND COERCION OF SERVANTS.-Everyone has the right to work or to refuse to work for whom and on what terms he pleases, or to refuse to deal with whom he pleases; and a number of persons, if they have no unlawful object in view, have the right to agree that they will not work for or deal with certain persons, or that they will not work under a fixed price or without certain conditions. The right of employees to refuse to work, either singly or in combination, except upon terms and conditions satisfactory to themselves, is balanced by the right of employers to refuse to engage the services of anyone for any reason they deem proper. The master may fix the wages, and other conditions not unlawful, upon which he will employ workmen, and has the right to refuse to employ them upon any other terms. In short, both employers and employees are entitled to exercise the fullest liberty in entering into contracts of service, and neither party can hold the other responsible for refusing to enter into such contracts. It has been held, however, that employers in separate, independent establishments have no right to combine for the purpose of preventing workmen who have incurred the hostility of one of them from securing employment upon any terms, and by the method commonly known as blacklisting debarring such workmen from exercising their vocation, such a combination being regarded as a criminal conspiracy. On the other hand, a combination of employees having for its purpose the accomplishment of an illegal object is unlawful; for instance, a conspiracy to extort money from an employer by inducing his workmen to leave him and deterring others from entering his service is illegal; and an association which undertakes to coerce workmen to become members thereof or to dictate to employers as to the methods or terms upon which their business shall be conducted by means of force, threats, or intimidation interfering with their traffic or lawful employment of other persons is, as to such purposes, an illegal combination. Unlawful interference by employees, or former employees, or persons acting in sympathy with them, with the business of a railroad company in the hands of a receiver renders the persons interfering liable to punishment for contempt of court. EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY FOR INJURIES OF EMPLOYEES.-Where a person employs an independent contractor to do work for him and retains or exercises no control over the means or methods by which the work is to be accomplished, he is not answerable for the wrongful acts of such contractor; and the same rule governs as between a contractor and a subcontractor. Under these circumstances an employer would not be liable for an injury sustained by a workman in the course of his employment for which he would have been liable had the work been performed under his own direction. An employer is ordinarily liable in damages to his employee who sustains an injury through the employer's negligence. Such negligence may consist in the doing of something by the employer which, in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, he ought not to have done, or in the omission of any duty or precaution which a prudent, careful man would or ought to have taken. An important duty on the part of a master is to furnish his servant with such appliances, tools, and machinery as are suited to his employment and may be used with safety; and if a master fails to use ordinary care in the selection or care of such appliances his ignorance of a defect therein will not excuse him from liability for an injury caused thereby; he is responsible for all defects in machinery or appliances of which he should have known, but failed through negligence to learn of, or which, having learned of, he has failed to remedy. A railroad company is liable for injuries to its employees occasioned by the company's negligence in failing to keep its track or roadbed in proper condition; but such company is not bound to furnish an absolutely safe track or roadbed, its duty only being to use all reasonable care in keeping them in safe condition. A railroad company is likewise liable if it fails to keep its track clear of obstructions and structures dangerously near the same; but such company is not negligent because it erects and maintains structures and contrivances for use in the operation of its road merely for the reason that they may be dangerous to employees operating the company's trains. It is negligence for such a company to fail to use safe and appropriate engines; or to have the boilers of its engines properly tested; or to furnish suitable freight or passenger cars, and proper and safe attachments and appliances to be used in connection therewith; and such company can not divest itself of its duty to use due care and diligence with respect to the cars of other companies to be moved and handled by its employees, in seeing that such cars are in safe condition to be so moved and handled, by contracts with such other companies that they shall keep their cars in repair. It is negligence in such a company to permit its employees to disobey its orders, and it is liable for injuries arising from the careless or reckless running of its trains, or the starting thereof without notice, or the running of its trains at immoderate speed. Railroad companies, and employers of every description, are negligent if they fail to protect a servant who is exposed to danger; but such a company is not absolutely bound to take all possible precautions against storms, or against washouts, landslides, or other obstructions which may be dangerous to its employees. And if the mill of a manufacturing corporation is properly constructed for the carrying on of its ordinary business, the corporation is not liable to an employee who has been injured by a fire, not caused by the negligence of the corporation because it failed to provide means of escape from the fire; nor is such corporation liable for an accident resulting in injury to an employee from its failure to fence the ordinary machinery used in the servant's employment; if, however, there is a custom in reference to the adoption of certain safeguards in a given business, so general that the employer is presumed to have knowledge of it, he is guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt such safeguards. A master is not chargeable with negligence when an employee is injured through the use of a machine for an improper or dangerous purpose, for which it was not intended or provided, but is guilty of negligence when he exposes an employee to dangers not obvious or fairly incident to the employment, or where he |