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rosefish in the subarea concerned, except that each contracting government with coast line adjacent to the subarea shall have the right of representation on the panel for the subarea.

Article VIII of the convention establishes machinery by which the recommendations of a panel for regulation may be put into effect. The article provides that the Commission may, on the recommendation of one or more panels, and on the basis of scientific evidence, transmit to the United States, as the depository government, proposals for joint action by the contracting governments, designed to keep the stocks of those species of fish supporting international fisheries in the convention area at a level permitting the maximum sustained catch. Such recommendations could provide for the fixing of seasons, size limits, the kinds and specifications of gear, the closing of areas and the imposition of an over-all catch limit. When a recommendation is made by a panel or panels the Commission may transmit it, with such modifications or suggestions as the Commission deems desirable, as a proposal, through the depository government, to the contracting governments, or it may refer it back to the panel for reconsideration. If, following reconsideration by the panel, the Commission is still unable to adopt the recommendation as a proposal, it sends a copy of the recommendation with a report of the Commission's decision, through the depository government, to the contracting governments. If a proposal is accepted by all the contracting governments participating in the originating panel or panels, it shall become effective for all other contracting governments within a specified time with regard to the subarea or subareas to which the proposal applies. The Commission may also transmit its own proposals affecting the convention area as a whole, after consultation with all the panels. At any time after the expiration of 1 year from the date on which a proposal becomes effective any contracting government, represented on the panel for the subarea to which the proposal applies, may give the United States, as depository government, notice of termination of its acceptance of the proposal. One year later, if the notice is not withdrawn, the proposal shall cease to be effective for that contracting government. Thereafter, any other contracting government may terminate its participation in the proposal, effective on the date their notice of withdrawal is received by the depository government.

The contracting governments agree to take such action as may be necessary to make the convention effective, to implement any proposals which become effective under article VIII, and to report to the commission any such actions taken.

The convention provides for two budgets for the Commission: (1) An annual administrative budget of the proposed necessary administrative expenses of the Commission, and (2) an annual special projects budget of proposed expenditures on special studies and investigations. With regard to the allocation of administrative expense in effect, each Government will pay a basic lump sum of $500 and a supplementary fee for each panel in which that Government participates. The amount of the supplementary fee will be determined by dividing the amount of the administrative budget, beyond that part covered by the basic lump-sum payments, by the total number of panel memberships of all governments. The annual special projects budget will be allocated to the contracting governments according to a scale to be determined by agreement among the contracting governments. Each government will pay the expenses of its commissioners, experts, and advisers.

Advisory committees are provided for in article V. At the discretion of the government concerned, it is provided that such committees may be established including fishermen, vessel owners, and others well informed concerning the problems of the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. A representative or representatives of a committee may attend as observers all nonexecutive meetings of the Commission or of any panel in which their government participates, with the consent of the contracting government concerned.

The question of the relationship of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries to other public international organizations with related objectives, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, is covered in the convention by the provision for close collaboration and for consideration being given, within 2 years after entry into force, to the possibility of the Commission being brought within the framework of a specialized agency of the United Nations.

The convention will enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by four signatory governments. Any government which is not one of the signatories may adhere to the convention by a notification in writing to the United States as depository Government. Withdrawals of member governments are possible, after the expiration of 10 years from the date of entry into force of the convention.

(b) Accomplishments from the point of view of United States interest

The conference and the resultant convention are considered to represent significant accomplishments from the point of view of United States interests. The International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference in itself represented an important advance by bringing together the nations interested in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries for the first time to consider steps for the proper utilization of these natural resources.

The convention establishes machinery that will make possible effective measures for the maintenance of these fisheries at a level which will permit the maximum sustained catch. For the first time in this area there will now be an agency for the necessary collection, collation, and dissemination of statistics, and the coordination of investigation. The convention will fill a long felt and basic need in this respect. Moreover, the convention also provides a method by which effective measures for the better management of fishery resources can be put into effect by the governments concerned, as soon as there is clear scientific evidence to support the proposal. This should prove particularly helpful, at the present time, to the fishing industry of New England which has suffered the most from the decline in abundance. In the long run, it provides a means of meeting a situation in the future, with the potential expansion of fishing by other nations in the convention area, before the situation reaches a crisis stage analogous to that at present prevailing in the North Sea.

The importance of this convention, however, is not limited to the particular area and situation with which it is concerned. It should be noted that the convention breaks new ground in international organization for the conservation of fishery resources in view of (1) the number of countries concerned, (2) the fact that it will affect all species of fish which support international fisheries, and (3) the pattern of subareas and panels to meet the problem of biological, managerial, and political variations.

Respectfully yours,




Delegates of the United States of America,

International Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Conference.


Senator GREEN. Have you anything to say about the effects of not ratifying these conventions?

Dr. CHAPMAN. Actually, I didn't state anything definitely on that score. I treated it from the positive side. I assumed that that presented the picture fully.

Senator GREEN. What will be the consequence of not ratifying them?

Dr. CHAPMAN. The consequence of not ratifying them would be that we could not undertake this international action and, therefore, we would have no means of regulating our fishermen. You can very well see that one country's fishermen will not fish on the same fishing banks right alongside of another country's fishermen who are unregulated. There is such an injustice in that that no fisherman would stand for it, and neither would the government. We don't have any means actually of regulating our fishermen where we think regulation is required and where the fishermen think regulation is required until we have some means of regulating the activity of the other fishermen. Senator GREEN. I think you should go further than that. That argument is simply made against our making regulations-I mean the effect on the general public in not having such regulations.

Dr. CHAPMAN. The effect on the general public would be that the populations of fish on the banks would continue their downward course. There would be less fish available for the American consumer.

Of course, if that should happen, you would anticipate that the price of what did remain would be greater.

Senator GREEN. That isn't just a theory, is it? Do you have proof of that?


Dr. CHAPMAN. Well, we know what happened in the case of halibut stocks. We fished them to the point where we could hardly operate a fishery on them any more.

Senator GREEN. That is in your record, is it?

Dr. CHAPMAN. Yes; that is in the record.

Senator GREEN. That I want to be sure of.

Dr. CHAPMAN. Yes sir; we went through this whole experience in full detail with respect to the halibut fishery. We started out fishing the halibut, but pretty soon we found out we didn't have any more fish to catch. Now we have built up the stocks again and we have a production nearly as large as our largest production before, and this is on a constant basis, year after year. We anticipate that we will be able to boost that production further yet. It is a means for safeguarding one of our essential foods.

Senator GREEN. I simply want to know whether these facts are in the record you will submit.

Dr. CHAPMAN. I believe they are in fair detail, sir. I hadn't considered them much from the negative standpoint.

Senator GREEN. Well, thank you. Is that all you have to say? Dr. CHAPMAN. All on the Northwest Atlantic.

Senator GREEN. Then you want to go on to the others?


Senator GREEN. Well, if they are peculiar to the others, you had better finish with the North Atlantic.

Whom did you refer to that was going to supplement your information, Mr. James?

Dr. CHAPMAN. Mr. James, of Fish and Wildlife Service.

Senator GREEN. You may submit your statement for the record and we will hear from Mr. James in a moment.

(Statement submitted by W. M. Chapman is as follows:)


The Department of State recommends earnestly the approval of the three marine fisheries conventions now before the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The three conventions are: (1) The International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries; (2) The Convention between the United States of America and the United Mexican States for the Establishment of an International Commission for the Scientific Investigation of Tuna; and (3) The Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. The

three conventions represent the culmination of long-continued efforts on the part of this Government to negotiate international agreements for the conservation of marine-food resources in areas of the high seas in which the United States has major fisheries interests.

Before undertaking a detailed discussion of the separate conventions, it may be convenient to consider them as a whole, having particular regard to their common purpose, their accord with continuing United States fisheries policy, and the scope and extent of the interests of the American people concerned.


The waters covered by the three conventions are widely separated, reaching over vast areas of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean and, in the tuna conventions, extending north and south for upward of 5,000 miles along the Pacific coast of the United States to below the equator. But the purpose is in each instance the same: to make possible the maximum production of food from the sea on a sustained basis year after year. It can be demonstrated that it is in the general welfare of all mankind to protect the resources of the sea from overfishing to the end that the sea will continue to produce the maximum quantity of food that it can. This is the goal toward which United States policy strives. The aim is to secure a mechanism which will provide for each high-seas fishery of American concern the possibility of management, to the end that the population of fish upon which the fishery works will be kept at that level at which a maximum crop can be harvested year after year, ad infinitum.

Fifty years ago it was considered to be an immutable fact that the resources of the sea were inexhaustible. The sea was a bottomless reservoir of fish; the more fish that were drained from it, the more fish there were to drain. But we have had it forced upon us by bitter experience that it is not true that the resources of the sea are so huge that they cannot be exhausted.

During these 50 years also occurred a number of experiments which demonstrated that it is not necessary to stand helplessly by while the fisheries resources of the seas are depleted or destroyed. Among these are:

(1) The fur-seal herds of the Pribilof Islands, which probably numbered originally 5,000,000 individuals were reduced to less than a quarter of a million seals. Then, by the simple expedients of not killing the seals so rapidly, and of outlawing pelagic sealing, the herds were built back to a level of more than 3%1⁄2 million individuals, while a larger crop was being taken each year.

(2) The halibut fishery of the North Pacific Ocean built up to a peak of yielding more than 60,000,000 pounds of fish a year, then dropped to a point where it would produce by the hardest kind of fishing less than 44,000,000 pounds per year. Again by the simple expedient of not fishing so hard, the halibut populations of the North Pacific banks have been built up until they produce steadily in the neighborhood of 56,000,000 pounds of fish per year, and with about one-third the fishing effort that it had taken to catch the 44,000,000 pounds (appendix I).

From these and other experiments, evidence has continued to mount in recent years to show that the following is true: When you begin fishing on any population of fish, that population begins to decrease in total numbers as the take of fish from it increases.

Up to a certain point, however, the reproductive capacity of the population increases also-whether because there is more food for the fish that are left, or less loss to natural predators, or whether there is some other cause, is not well understood yet.

If the fishing intensity continues to increase, however, you at last come to a point where the population of fish cannot respond, and now the yield begins to drop off no matter how hard you fish, or how many vessels you use, or how efficiently you work.

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The sense of this is that for any particular population of fish there is a point of fishing intensity which will yield a maximum crop of fish from that population year after year into eternity. Less fishing than that is wasteful, for the surplus of fish dies from natural cause without benefit to mankind; more fishing than that is wasteful because it results actually in a smaller crop. This is frequently called depletion.

The determination of this point of optimum fishing intensity is a difficult and expensive task. Remember also that the abundance of the population of fish is still fluctuating due to natural causes beyond the control of man, and consequently this point of maximum production changes as the cyclic changes in the climate of the sea affect the productive ability of the particular fish population. In such important kinds of fish as herring and sardine, it becomes apparent that these natural fluctuations are of major importance; in such fish as halibut, it seems that natural fluctuations are small enough that they can almost be ignored. It is the purpose of these conventions to begin the task of gathering the information from which determination may be made of the effect of man's activity on the fisheries concerned, the need for regulation in the fisheries, and the type of regulation, if any, required. Except in certain circumstances under the Northwest Atlantic Convention, to be later discussed, regulation is not envisaged, and indeed is not possible, under the conventions. Experience has shown that long years of investigation are required before regulatory measures may with certainty be applied. The conventions, then, provide for such investigation. Regulation (except in the Northwest Atlantic area), if it is found desirable, will require further international arrangements.


The proposed conventions represent no new innovation in United States fisheries policy. They are essentially applications in new high-seas fishing areas of long-established principles and practices found effective by the United States in other international fisheries in which its citizens participate. Their provisions

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