RETURN OF JUSTICE-See CRIMINAL LAW (14); JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE (2).
REVOCATION-See WILLS (4).
RIGHT OF WAY-See EASEMENTS.
RIGHTS OF ABUTTING OWNER-See HIGHWAYS AND STREETS
(1).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS-See BOUNDARIES (1, 3).
RIVERS AND LAKES-See BOUNDARIES; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(3).
ROLLING STOCK-See RAILROADS.
ROOF, RIGHT TO USE OF-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (3).
RULES-See MASTER AND SERVANT (4).
SAFE PLACE-See MASTER AND SERVANT (5, 7, 10.).
SALE OF REAL PROPERTY-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (4);
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (1).
1. Machines furnished under a contract which specified that the
design, material, and labor should be the best of the several
kinds for their respective uses, and that the workmanship
and material should be strictly first class for the purpose and
in the place where used, and that the final payment was to
be made thirty days after successful operation, are required
to operate successfully for defendant's purpose known to the
seller, before payment can be compelled in an action of
assumpsit. Bellows Falls Machine Co. v. Munising Paper
Co., 45.
2. Upon the default by a vendee of personal property in making
specified payments, the vendor is entitled to possession on
declaration of forfeiture. National Cash Register Co. v.
Richards, 128.
3. The seller may elect, under a conditional contract of sale re-
serving title, to waive the default and continue the contract
in force Id.
4. A letter advising the purchaser that the contract of sale will be
held by an attorney until a specified date, after which posses-
sion will be demanded, is an election to waive the default un-
til the date named, and continue the contract in force. Id.
129.
5. No new consideration is required to render such waiver
valid. Id.
6. A sale of personal property with reservation of title to the
seller, gives the purchaser only the right to possession, but no
lien or special property in the subject-matter. Id.
7. A purchaser of shrubbery who cancels the order after the
seller has dug up and set aside the property for him, is not
liable for the entire purchase price, but for damages for the
breach merely. Mayo v. Latham, 136.
8. After the constructive delivery of timber from seller to buyer,
the defendant having failed to pay for it and a suggestion
being made that a new contract be executed to meet the sit-
uation, the parties failed to come to an adjustment, and the
letters between them including their negotiations are held not
to amount to a rescission of the original contract by plaintiff.
Watson v. E. E. Naugle Tie Co., 174.
9. Rescission of a contract of sale is not shown by testimony that
the seller demanded that defendant either pay for or release
the timber, and the latter's agent stated they would see about
it, and the seller could not get them to release the property,
but that the defendant later informed a prospective pur-
chaser of the timber that he might take it and that the defend-
ant made no claim to it. Id.
10. Testimony is admissible under a notice in defense of an action
for the price of goods sold, admitting delivery and acceptance
and charging that the contract was secured by fraud; it be-
ing possible that the fraud was discovered after acceptance.
Providence Jewelry Co. v. Bailey, 285.
11. Representations of an agent who sells goods under a written
contract, that the terms of the agreement give the purchaser
fifteen days in which to accept the property, do not consti-
tute such representations of existing material facts as to con-
stitute an inducement on which reliance might be placed,
and evidence of the statements is incompetent to vary the
terms of the agreement. Id.
12. That the purchasers of lumber represented it was a cash deal,
but did not pay for the merchandise, and were hopelessly
insolvent, that the lumber was immediately turned over to a
creditor of the purchaser, at a price lower than cost, and
that the purchaser had no reasonable expectation of being
able to pay, tends to show a fraudulent intent which gives
the seller a right to rescind and recover the property. Weid-
man v. Phillips, 380.
13. A charge to the jury that to constitute fraud the buyer must
have had no reasonable expectation of being able to pay the
price within the lifetime of the account, is not error and is
unduly favorable to the defendants when coupled with fur-
ther instructions that an intention not to pay, or to cheat
and defraud the owner, must have existed. Id.
14. It was not error for the trial court to refuse a request to in-
struct the jury that the defendants' contention was correct,
and that if they, in good faith, intended to continue in busi-
ness, such intention would legally rebut any inference that
they did not intend to pay for the lumber. Id.
15. Under a contract of sale providing that the purchaser should
have "two per cent. off within ten days" or "two per cent.
off net bill for cash on arrival of car" the question of the
time when the account matured, was not a question of fact
for the jury. Id.
16. Under an agreement which provided that the consignee of the
plaintiff's pianos might sell for cash or to responsible pur-
chasers on credit, reserving a lien, no title passed to a pur-
chaser who paid no cash but exchanged other property for
the piano, in the absence of evidence tending to show that
plaintiff is estopped to recover the property. Starr Piano
Co. v. Morrison, 583.
17. Possession of personalty is merely prima facie evidence of own-
ership. Id.
18. The terms of a contract which clearly and explicitly give the
consignee of a piano authority to sell, may not be extended
by proof of a custom of piano dealers to make exchanges. Id.
584.
See ATTACHMENT (2); DAMAGES (2); ESTOPPEL (2); FRAUD (1);
PLEADING; USURY.
SAVING QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW — See APPEAL AND ERROR
(3, 10); EVIDENCE (6, 23); LAND CONTRACTS (2).
SCAFFOLDING-See MASTER AND SERVANT (1).
SCIENTER-See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT (2).
SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT-See MASTER AND SERVANT (2).
SELF DEFENSE-See TRESPASS TO PERSON (2, 3).
SELF-SERVING DECLARATIONS-See INSURANCE (6).
SENTENCE-See CRIMINAL LAW (8, 9).
SET-OFF AND RECOUPMENT-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (9).
SHERIFF'S SALE-See ATTACHMENT (2).
SIDEWALK IMPROVEMENTS See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(1).
SIGNATURE, GENUINENESS OF
PAL AND AGENT (3).
See EVIDENCE (18); PRINCI-
SIGNS ON LEASED BUILDING See LANDLORD AND TENANT
(4, 5).
SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS-See EVIDENCE (2); MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS (1); TAXATION (3-5).
SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT-See CONTRACTS (1).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
An oral contract of a parent not to convey real property
owned by him, but to permit the land to descend to his heirs,
in consideration of the executed conveyance by his wife to
him of other real property, is enforceable in equity against a
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-Continued.
second wife, to whom he deeded the real property without
consideration, in violation of his parol agreement, of which
she had notice, relief in equity not being barred by the stat-
ute of frauds. Ruch v. Ruch, 231.
STATE LEGISLATURE-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10); MUNICI-
PAL CORPORATIONS (6).
STATEMENT TO ATTORNEY—See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (2).
STATE TREASURER--See EMBEZZLEMENT.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS--See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS--See LIMITATIONS, STatute of.
STATUTES.
In construing Act No. 193, Pub. Acts 1895, 2 Comp. Laws,
§ 510 et seq., the court will adopt the meaning of the word
sausage which is generally understood and intended, not a
meaning peculiar to the trade or to certain manufacturers.
Armour & Co. v. State Dairy & Food Com'r, 1.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3-6, 11-13); CORPORATIONS (2-4);
CRIMINAL LAW (8); EASEMENTS (10); EMBEZZLEMENT (4);
ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (4); EVIDENCE (17); EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS (2); FOOD (1, 2); HIGHWAYS AND STREETS
(1); INSURANCE (11); INTOXICATING LIQUORS (2); JUSTICES
OF THE PEACE (3); MANDAMUS (1); MECHANICS' LIENS (4);
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (6); NEGLIGENCE (4, 11); RAIL-
ROADS; STREET RAILWAYS (1); TAXATION (9); VENUE (3);
WITNESSES.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
STATUTORY OFFENSE-See EVIDENCE (20); INDICTMENT AND IN-
FORMATION; RAPE.
STAY OF PROCEEDINGS-See APPEAL AND ERROR (11, 12);
INJUNCTION (7).
STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS-See EMBEZZLEMENT (5); FRAUD
(3); LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
1. A consolidation of domestic street and electric railways is not
authorized by Act No. 143, Pub. Acts 1901, which applies to
the consolidation of companies in adjoining States with cor-
porations in Michigan. Green v. Michigan United Rys. Co.,
2. A consolidated corporation is estopped to set up the invalidity
of its consolidation as against the claim of a creditor of one
of the constitutent corporations. Id.
3. A general allegation that the defendant consolidated with
the corporation which was indebted to the plaintiff is suffi-
cient to permit a recovery against the consolidated company.
STREET RAILWAYS-Continued.
4. A street sweeper working on a street car track, in the midst
of a noise sufficient to deaden the sound of the gong of a car, is
guilty of contributory negligence for placing reliance on his
hearing only, and cannot recover for injuries sustained
because of the motorman's failure to stop a car, which ap-
proached from the rear, running at ten miles an hour, and
on which the gong was sounding. Stenzhorn v. City Electric
R. Co., 82.
5. In the operation of cars on the public street it is not negli-
gence to assume that a person standing on the track will
hear the usual signals, until it becomes apparent that he is
paying no attention to them. Id.
6. It is error to submit to the jury the question of defendant's
negligence in backing the car off the injured street sweeper,
dragging him back several feet, where the evidence showed
that the car backed because the current had been reversed to
avoid the collision. Id. 83.
7. Advice to the person operating the car, given after the acci-
dent, is inadmissible. Id.
See CARRIERS (2); DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT; MANDAMUS (5).
STRIKING OUT PORTIONS OF ANSWER - See EMINENT Do-
MAIN (5).
SUBCONTRACTORS—See CONTRACTS (2).
SUBSCRIBING WITNESSES-See WILLS (5).
SUPREME COURT-See APPEAL AND ERROR (9, 12); ATTORNEY
and Client (3).
SURETIES' LIABILITY-See EVIDENCE (24).
SURVIVAL OF ACTION-See DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT.
1. A void tax for the expenses of fence viewers and repairs to a
partition fence under 1 Comp. Laws, § 2415 et seq., paid by
the owner to whom it was assessed to the township treasurer
under protest, is recoverable in assumpsit against the collect-
ing officer in person. Brown v. Warner, 274.
2. A tax collector is protected from all personal liability in col-
lecting a tax under a warrant fair on its face. Id.
3. Assessments for special or local purposes, not being within the
rule, an action lies against the collector personally, where
no other remedy at law exists. Id.
4. In an equitable action for money had and received, brought
against a village to recover the amount of a special paving
tax paid under protest, the plaintiff can only recover the ex-
cess above the amount properly assessed against his property.
Long v. Village of Dundee, 320.
5. A suit will not lie to recover taxes paid when the only com-
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