TAXATION-Continued.

plaint that can be made is that the proceedings in their levy
and collection have been irregular, the remedies by review or
appeal being adequate to afford redress. Id.

6. Under a statute limiting the amount of a tax to five per cent.
of the valuation of any parcel assessed, and under proceed-
ings which authorized the collection of one-fifth of the entire
special tax for paving the first year, an installment of $18 is
payable on the first assessment by an owner of premises as-
sessed at a valuation of $1,800, who cannot, however, recover,
where a tender had been made of the excess collected. Id.
321.

7. The portion of an excessive levy for a village paving tax, con-
sisting of the fees and expense of making a levy by the tax
collector, is not recoverable from the village in the absence of
evidence that such amount was reported to the village or be-
came a part of the public fund. Id.

8. The amount of personal property of an estate subject to inher-
itance tax under Act No. 195, Pub. Acts 1903, is determined
by deducting mortgage and other debts from the personal
estate. In re Fox's Estate, 154 Mich. 5 (117 N. W. 558), over-
ruled. In re Fox's Estate, 420.

9. The form provided by Act No. 195, Pub. Acts 1903, which in-
dicates that debts against the estate secured by mortgage are
to be deducted from real property of the estate, does not
change the effect of other sections of the law. Id.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7, 9-11); EVIDENCE (2, 17); JUDG-
MENT; MANDAMUS (1, 2); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1);
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS (3).

TAX STATEMENT-See EVIDENCE (17).

TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES-See CORPORATIONS (5).

TENDER OF DEED-See LAND CONTRACTS (1, 3).

THEATERS-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (6–9).

TITLE—See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2); INSURANCE (7,
12, 14); TRIAL (8).

TITLE OF ACT-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13).

TITLE TO CROPS-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (1, 2).

TITLE TO PERSONAL PROPERTY-See SALES (17).

TORNADO INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (12, 13); PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT (5).

TORTS-See DAMAGES (4).

TOWNSHIP OFFICERS-See MANDAMUS (4); TAXATION (1).

TRADE MEANING-See STATUTES.

TREATIES-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1, 2).

TREES See HIGHWAYS AND Streets (1, 2); MALICIOUS PROSECU-
TION (2).

TRESPASS-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (8).

TRESPASS ON THE CASE-See DAMAGES (4).

TRESPASS TO PERSON.

1. In an action of trespass for throwing stones at the plaintiff
and injuring him and for an assault with a shovel, the evi-
dence showing that the plaintiff did not get out of the rig in
which he rode, it is not a justification that the plaintiff drove
out of the beaten track upon that portion of the highway
cultivated by the defendant. Ulmer v. Seelman, 253.

2. Where a party claims in defense to an action of trespass for an
assault that he was afraid of the plaintiff, because of the lat-
ter's reputation and quarrelsome disposition, it is error to ex-
clude questions, on cross-examination of the defendant, which
tend to show by specific instances his own disposition and
reputation as to the same matters. Id.

3. Testimony is improperly excluded which tends to show that
the defendant bore ill will towards the plaintiff and his
brother. Id.

4. A question by defendant's attorney as to the defendant's con-
dition and appearance since the death of his son by drowning
attempts to introduce improper evidence. Id.

5. Error was committed by the trial judge in charging the jury,
as requested by the defendant, that the owner of land along
a highway is entitled to its use to the center, subject to the
usual rights of travel by the public, under evidence which
showed that the defendant was not attempting to eject
plaintiff as a trespasser or to defend his premises against a
trespass. Id.

See EVIDENCE (15).

TRESPASSERS-See NEGLIGENCE (5, 6).

TRIAL.

1. The trial court may properly refuse to give to the jury instruc-
tions upon abstract questions which could in no way aid the
jury in coming to a conclusion as to the facts. Fors v. Fors,
156.

2. A charge which informs the jury that if a notary who testified
in the case made certain alterations in a deed after its execu-
tion, he is guilty of forgery and perjury, erroneously empha-
sizes the opinion of the trial court upon a question of fact, and
omits the theory that the notary might be mistaken in his
recollection, or have believed he was entitled to change the
instrument, or that he might have attempted to correct a sup-
posed mistake in the conveyance. Id. 157.

3. Improper conduct of a party with the jury, known to the other
party to the action during the trial and not brought to the
attention of the trial judge by objection or otherwise, is not
ground for a reversal. Ulmer v. Seelman, 253.

4. In an action for injuries caused by defendant's alleged negli-
gence, the court, in reviewing a judgment on a verdict
directed for defendant, must give to the plaintiff's evidence
the most favorable construction it will bear in his favor.
Schmidt v Michigan Coal & Mining Co., 308.

5. The exclusion of testimony, on cross-examination of the plain-
tiff, offered to show a conspiracy by proving an agreement to
divide the proceeds with one witness, is not prejudicial error
where the question had been previously asked and answered
and the purpose was not indicated to the trial court. Sisson
v. Lampert, 509.

6. Incorrect statements of the law made by the plaintiff's attor-
ney in argument were cured by the prompt action of the
trial judge. Reese v. Detroit United Railway, 600.

7. The action of the trial judge in asking of a witness who advised
the landlord as to his exemptions and who had also acted as
attorney for plaintiff, as to his theory of the right to exemp-
tions, was not prejudicial, in view of the charge which in-
structed the jury that the acts of such witness were not bind-
ing on the plaintiff except to show the acts done by them in
conjunction. Grand Rapids Brewing Co. v. Pettis, 679.
8. The plaintiff's right to a judgment, in an action of replevin in-
volving its title to the property, could not be affected by the
defendant's omission to prove that the costs for which the
execution was issued were properly taxed. Id.

9. In cases which involve the good faith of a party, the extent of
cross-examination bearing on the question is discretionary.

Id.

10. Inquiries as to immaterial matters, which are answered favor-
ably to the appellant and not objected to at the time or pre-
sented on motion for a new trial, do not constitute reversible
error. Id.

See APPEAL and Error (10); CRIMINAL LAW (1, 5); EVIDENCE
(6, 15, 16, 18); HUSBAND AND WIFE; INTOXICATING LI-
QUORS (4, 7); NEGLIGENCE (9); SALES (14).

TROVER AND CONVERSION-See ATTACHMENT (2); DAMAGES
(3); ESTOPPEL (1); EXECUTION.

TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY—See PARTNERSHIP (5).

TRUST MORTGAGES-See FRAUD (2).

TRUSTS.

To create a trust by a parol declaration, where the donor re-
tains the property, it must be executed by acts and words of
a clear and unequivocal character, constituting something
more than a mere declaration of intention. Mitchell v. Bil-
derback, 483.

See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF (2).

UNDUE INFLUENCE.

1. Undue influence is largely a matter of inference from facts

UNDUE INFLUENCE-Continued.

and circumstances, including the character, disposition and
mental condition of the person influenced, and the oppor-
tunity to influence him. Andrews v. Lavery, 27.

2. A finding of undue influence is sufficiently supported by testi-
mony that the grantor left his wife, who was insane and had
only a small amount of property, without any of his estate
for her support, and transferred it all to his daughter who
was married and sufficiently provided for, that he was en-
feebled by disease, was away from the wife and within the
influence of his daughter, that no ill feeling towards his wife
existed, and no other means of influencing him to make the
transfer of insurance to the daughter were disclosed. Id.
See WILLS (6).

USER-See ADVERSE POSSESSION (1, 2); EASEMENTS (1-4).
USURY.

1. Every written agreement to pay interest in excess of the legal
rate, however well disguised, is in violation of law and usu-
rious. Rosen v. Rosen, 72.

2. A contract by which one partner agrees to purchase the in-
terest of another and to pay him an amount computable
under the terms of the agreement, and, if payment shall not
be made in a given time, to pay an additional sum, more than
seven per cent. of the principal, is void as usurious. Act No.
207, Pub. Acts 1899, 2 Comp. Laws, § 4856 et seq. Id.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-See LAND CONTRACTS (1, 3);
RAILROADS; SALES (16, 18).

VENUE.

1. On a motion for a change of venue alleging local prejudice,
which was denied by the finding and return of the circuit
judge, the framing of an issue of fact will not be compelled
by writ of mandamus, and the trial delayed until its deter-
mination. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co. v. Cheboygan Circuit
Judge, 210.

2. Setting a cause for trial on a day certain at the relator's re-
quest operates as a waiver of the right to review a previous
refusal to grant a change of venue. Id.

3. The statutes authorizing a change of venue on motion do not
require the granting of the motion as an imperative right.
Act No. 67, Pub. Acts 1909.

See ACTION; WILLS (1).

Id.

VICIOUS CHARACTER─See ANIMALS; PRINCIPAL AND Agent (2).
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-See LANDLORD AND TENANT (2).
WAIVER-See INSURANCE (8, 9, 14); PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (2);
SALES (3-5); VENUE (2).

WALLS, RIGHT TO USE OF See LANDLORD AND TENANT (4).
WARNING SIGNALS-See NEGLIGENCE (7).

WARRANTY-See SALES (1).

WATERS AND WATERCOURSES-See EASEMENTS (7).
WAYS OF NECESSITY-See EASEMENTS (8-12).

WILLS.

1. The will of a person who is domiciled in another State at the
time of his death must be admitted to probate in the State of
the testator's domicile, before it can be admitted to probate
here. In re Corning's Estate, 474.

2. A will executed by the testator in due form and properly wit-
nessed, may not be shown to be inoperative by testimony as
to declarations of the deceased that he did not intend it to be
a final disposition of his estate. In re Kennedy's Estate, 548.
3. No publication of a will is required to give it effect in Mich-
igan. Id.

4. Placing the will out of the possession of the testator does not
place it beyond his control to revoke by another instrument.
Id.

5. The mere failure of a subscribing witness to remember whether
or not the will was subscribed by him in the presence of the
other witness does not raise a question of fact for the jury,
where he states that he has no recollection at all about the
transaction, but that the signature is genuine. Id.

6. Statements made by the testator that he was being hounded to
make the will are inadmissible to prove undue influence. Id.
7. A deed containing a clause providing that it shall not become
operative until the death of the grantor, when it is to have
full force and effect, interpreted in the light of surrounding
circumstances indicating such intent, is a testamentary
disposition of property, revocable by a subsequent will.
Moody v. Macomber, 657.

8. No estate passes with the delivery of a will to the devisee. Id.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (2).

WITNESSES.

The claimant's wife who cooked food for her father and assisted
in caring for him is not an agent of the claimant in making
or continuing the contract, under Act No. 30, Pub. Acts 1903,
which excludes the testimony of the agent. Weessies v. Van
Dyke's Estate, 180.

See CRIMINAL LAW (4, 7); EVIDENCE (17); TRIAL (9).

WORDS AND PHRASES - See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8); CON-
TRACTS (2); FOOD (2, 3); RAILROADS; STATUTES.

WORK AND LABOR-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (3).

WRIT, NATURE OF-See APPEAL AND ERROR (7).

WRONGFUL SALE OF CORPORATE‘ASSETS - See CORPORA-
TIONS (6).