II. Authority, 960.

1. In General, 960.

2. As Agent, 961.

3. As Supercargo, 965.

4. To Sell Vessel, 966.
5. To Sell Cargo, 968.

6. To Enforce Discipline, 969.
(a) As to the Crew, 969.

(b) As to Passengers, 971.

1. As to Owners, 971.

2. As to Passengers, 972.

3. To the Crew, 972.

IV. Rights, 973.

1. In General, 973.

2. Wages, 974.

V. Liability, 974.

1. On Contracts, 974.
2. Misconduct, 974.

money, and, to secure the payment, hypothecated certain certificates of stock which he held as master, and in trust, the official character in which he held the stock and the trust appearing on the face of the certificates, the lender was decreed to deliver up the certificates to the parties entitled, and for all dividends received. Simons v. Bank, 5 Rich. (S. Car.) Eq.

270.

Authorities.--Daniell's Ch. Pr. (5th Am. ed.); Adams' Equity (7th. Am. ed.)

1. Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 419; Fox v. Holt, 4 Ben. (U. S.) 278.

2. "In this country and in England the law does not interfere in relation to the qualifications or mode of appointment of a master, further than as regards his national character. He is pro hac vice the agent of the owner; and any mode of authorization competent to give power to one man to act for and bind another is sufficient to constitute him master of a ship. The Registry act of the United States requires that the name of the master shall be inserted in the register of the vessel (Act of Dec. 31st, 1792, § 9,1 U. S. Stat. at Large 291); that on a change of ownership, a new register shall be taken out; and that when the master is changed, the register shall be produced to the collector, and a report be made to him, by the

owner, or the new master, of such change, whereupon the collector shall endorse a memorandum of the change on the register, and subscribe his name thereto (Id. § 15; Id. 295). None of these provisions, however, whether complied with or not, affect the validity of the master's authority. They are only designed to secure the revenue against the allowance to foreign vessels, of privileges which only vessels belonging to citizens of the United States are entitled to enjoy." The Boston, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 309.

3. In the Dubuque, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 20, it was held that where there is a master by virtue of the registry, there cannot be in contemplation of law, another master de facto; that another person employed by the owners to navigate, and even discipline the ship, does not become master in either sense. deciding this case the court followed the dissenting opinion in Draper v. Commercial Ins. Co., 21 N. Y. 378.

In L'Arina v. Manwarring, Bee Adm. (U.S.) 199, the ship had a real master, who of his own motion, acting in his capacity as master, hired a man at Havana to lend his name to be used as nominal master to clear the vessel at that place, and to proceed to Charleston and back to Havana. The court held that the person so hired never was master; that the real master had no authority thus to divest himself of his of

fice, and confer it upon another; that this could be done by the owners only. See also the Boston, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 309.

1. Rev. Stat. 4131; Act 7, June 26th, 1884, ch. 121, § 1, 23 Stat. 53. In United States v. Gillis, Pet. C. C. (U. S.) 159, it was decided that a citizen of the United States, resident in a foreign country, may, under the act of December 31st, 1792, command a registered vessel of the United States, without her right to the payment of domestic duties being affected thereby. In ten opinions of Attorney General, it was declared that a freeman of color might be master if otherwise qualified.

2. In the case of the Jacmel Packet, 2 Ben. (U. S.) 107, the authority of a master appointed abroad by an American consul, in place of a master who had absconded, to give a bottomry bond and hypothecate the vessel for advances necessary to save her, was sustained.

3. In the Favorite, 2 C. Rob. 232, SIR WILLIAM SCOTT held that where a person contracts to serve as a mate, it is a part of the contract legally implied in it, that he shall likewise act as master in case of the death or removal of the actual master. See also The Boston, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 309.

In the Ann C. Pratt, i Curt. (U. S.) 340, CURTIS, J., said: When the owners appoint the mate, they are supposed to contemplate such casualties, and to agree that the mate shall exercise all the needful powers of master, in case they occur; and third persons may rightfully treat with him as master, when he has thus become such," citing the Kennersley Castle and The Rubicon, 3 Hagg. 8, 9; The Alexandria, 1 Dods. 280.

4. In the Tribune, 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 144, STORY, J., said: "The next objection is that Dennett was not master of the vessel at the time; and if he was, that he had no authority to make the contract. I am of opinion, that he was

master. He had been master for a whole year before, and his name stood on the ship's papers as master. Being once master, he must be deemed still to continue to hold that character, untii some overt act or declaration of the owners,displaced him from that station." See also Fox v. Holt, 36 Conn. 558; The Swallow, Olc. Adm. 334: Truesdale v. Young, Abb. Adm. (U. S.) 391; Thomas v. Osborn, 19 How. (U. S.) 22; L'Arina v. Exchange, Bee Adm. (U.S) 198; Stringham v. Schloener, 4 Ben. (U. S.) 16; Slocum v. Swift, 2 Low. (U. S.) 212.

When one, claiming under an alleged employment as master for a foreign voyage, seeks to establish such employment, merely by inference from services rendered and acts performed by him, under authority of the owners, in making the vessel ready for sea, the court will require that the evidence shall be so strong as to exclude all reasonable doubt that an employment for the voyage age was intended.. Jones v. Davis, Abb. Adm. (U. S.) 446.

The absolute right of the owners to dismiss is well settled. Thus in Montgomery v. The General Greene, Bee (U. S.) 388, JUDGE HOPKINSON affirmed the right of the owners to dismiss, at their pleasure, a master who had been employed for a particular voyage, whose cargo was on board, for which he had signed bills of lading, and who was all ready and about to sail. In affirming the decree, the court, in 1 Dallas (U. S.) 51, said: "As to the other point, the dismission of the captain, we are of the opinion that, upon a general retainer for no particular voyage, the captain may be dismissed at any time without cause assigned; but that where there is a charter party, bills of lading and a particular voyage agreed upon, though the owners may dismiss the captain, yet they would be liable in a common law court."

In Brown v. Hicks, 24 Fed. Rep. S11, it was held that an agreement engaging

a master for "a whaling voyage not exceeding three years in duration" meant that the voyage was to last three years, unless its purpose should be accomplished sooner, and that the master was entitled to damages if the owners terminated the voyage sooner, because it was not a successful one.

On the power of removal generally, see The Camilla, Swab. 312; Dennis v. Marfield, 10 Allen (Mass.) 138.

As to the termination of the contract by the destruction of the ship, see General Interest Ins. Co. v. Ruggles, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 408.

1. By Rev. Stat. 4250, it is enacted that the majority ownership of a vessel shall have the same power to remove a master, who is also part owner, as such majority, if owners, have to remove a

master not an owner; but this does not apply where there is a valid written agreement subsisting, by virtue of which such master would be entitled to possession. In commenting upon this section of the revised statutes, MCKENNEN, J., in The Clayton v. Emory, 4 Fed. Řep. 342, said: "This not only confers upon a majority of owners the absolute power to remove a part owner from the command and possession of a vessel, because such power is exercisable by them against one who is not an owner, but by the clearest implication it enacts that nothing but a written agreement, entitling a part owner to possession, shall be available against this right of the majority."

The co-owner of a whaling ship, who is also master, and who has contracted for a cruise of four seasons, at a certain lay, and who is is wrongfully deprived of his command at the end of three seasons, has an action against his coowners for his removal. The measure of damages in such a case is the probable value of his lay for the season for which he was displaced. Parsons v. Terry, Low. (U. S.) 60. In Childs . Gladding, 11 Am. L. Reg., N. S. 386, it was held that the

part owner of a ship who is appointed master, is not thereby endowed with any new or additional right as a part owner, such as retaining his position of master against the express wishes of the majority of the owners.

In Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. (N. Y.) 419, the court said: "The right of a master to continue in command of a vessel because he is a part owner, can only rest on a contract made with the owners. Even if such a contract is made with one captain, it is not an assignable right to be transferred with the share, but is personal with the captain with whom it is made."

A part owner, who is a master, is entitled to an official investigation before removal, in_the course of a voyage. Parsons v. Terry, 1 Low. (U. S.) 60.

2. "In cases of necessity happening during the voyage, the master is by law, created the agent for the benefit of all concerned, and his acts done under such circumstances, in the exercising a sound discretion, are binding upon all parties in interest." Miston v. Lord, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 354; The Sarah Ann, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 206; Jordan v. Warren Ins. Co., I Story (U. S.) 342; Soule v. Rodocanachi, Newb. Adm. 504; The E. H. Fittler, I Low. (U. S.) 114; The Henry, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 465; Stone v. Ketland, 1 Wash. (U. S.) 142; Mervin v. Shailer, 16 Conn. 489.

The master has authority to employ the vessel under his command in a salvage service, and to put at hazard the interests of her owner. Waterbury v. Myrick, Blatchf. & H. (U. S.) 34; The Centurion, 1 Ware (U. S.) 477

He may regain possession of the vessel by ransom. Phillips v. McCali, 4 Wash. (U. S.) 141; The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 268.

He may borrow money necessary for the completion of the voyage. The Fortitude, 3 Sumn. (U. S.) 228; Stearns v. Doe, 12 Gray (Mass.) 482; Weston v. Wright, 7 Mees. & W. 396; Beldon v. Campbell, 6 Exch. 886; Des

cadillas v. Harris, 8 Greenlf. (Me.) 298. The powers of masters employed on western steam boats is determined by maritime law. Holcroft v. Halbert, 16 Ind. 256.

1. Implied Authority.-The Ann D. Richardson, Abb. Adm. 499; Miston v. Lord, I Blatchf. (U. S.) 354. It is limited by the express or implied authority derivable from the laws of the vessel's country, or the usage of the trade, or the business of the ship, or the instructions of the owner. The Woodland, 7 Ben. (U. S.) 118. See also The Pacific, Brown & L. 243.

The master has no implied authority to borrow money for work previously done. Beldon v. Campbell, 6 Eng. L. & E. 473. Nor to make insurance. Foster v. United States Ins. Co., II Pick. (Mass.) 85; Holcroft v. Wilkes, 16 Ind. 373; Patterson v. Chalmers, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 595.

2. Master as Agent.-"The master of the ship is the confidential servant or agent of the owners, and they are bound to the performance of all the lawful contracts made by him relative to the usual employment of the ship, and the repairs and other necessaries furnished for her use." The Aurora, 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 96. See also The Gulnare, 24 Fed. Rep. 487 (contract for coal); The Queen, 28 Fed. Rep. 755 (repairs); The Eugene Vista, 28 Fed. Rep. 762 (employment of tug); The Senator, 1 Brown Adm. (U.S.) 544 (employment of tug); The North Carolina, 15 Pet. (U. S.) 41 (settlement of claim for salvage); Ross v. The Active, 2 Wash. (U. S.) 226 (sale of cargo); The H. D. Bacon, 1 Newb. Adm. 274 (salvage services); Stocker v. Corbett, 1 Const. Rep. 81; Pope v. Nickerson 3 Story (U.S.) 465 (carrying money for hire); The New World v. King, 16 How. (U. S.) 469; Citizens' Bank v. Nantucket Steamboat Co., 2 Story (U. S.) 16; Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Peters (U. S.) 675; McDaniel v. Emanuel, 2 Rich. (S. Car.) 455; Nelson v. Belmont, 21 N. Y. 36; Purvis v. Tunno, I Brev. 14 C. of L.-61

(S. Car.) 260; The Eolian, 1 Biss. (U. S.) 321 (pilotage); Brown v. Lull, 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 443; The Grand Turk, I Paine (U. S.) 73; The Phebe, 1 Ware (U. S.) 263 (contract on bill of lading); The Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. (U. S.) 180; Glading v. George, 3 Grant (Pa.) 290; The Flash, Abb. Adm. 67, 71; Gen. Ins. Co. v. Ruggles, 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 40S; Grant v. Norway, 10 C. B. 665; The Gen. Worth, 30 Miss. 703; Ward v. Green. 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 173; Smith 7. The Creole, 2 Wall. Jr. (U.S.) 485, 519; Oakland etc. Mfg. Co. v. Jennings, 46 Cal. 176, 184. As to the master being a special agent, see The Irma, 6 Ben. (U. S.) 1; Webb v. Peirce, 1 Curt. (U. S.) 104; Mitchelson v. Oliver, El. & B. 419; The Thetis, 22 L. T. Rep. 272.

In Cases of Necessity the Master Is the Agent of All Parties Concerned.—In Miston v. Lord, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 354, the court said: "In cases of necessity happening during the voyage, the master is, by law, created the agent for the benefit of all concerned, and his acts done under such circumstances, in the exercise of a sound discretion, are binding upon all parties in interest." In this case it was held that the agency of the master on behalf of the shipper at the port of distress, arising out of the necessities occasioned by the disaster, was limited to the sale of the cargo. See also The Sarah Ann, 13 Peters (U. S.) 387; 2 Sumn. (U. S.) 206; Copeland v. Security Ins. Co., Woolw. (U. S.) 278; The Velona, 3 Ware (U. S.) 139; The Gratitudine, 3 C. Rob. 240. The nature of the master's authority as agent is carefully considered by JUDGE STORY in the leading case of Pope v. Nickerson, 3 Story (U. S.) 465.

In Peters v. Ballister, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 495, the owners of the ship and cargo sent them to the West Indies, directing the master to sell the cargo, and bring or send home a return cargo, the principal object of the voyage being the freighting business among the islands, and also directing him to manage the

voyage in such a manner as in his opinion should be most advantageous. The master sold the outward cargo, and purchased a return cargo, but found no opportunity to send it home. A creditor of the owner threatened the master to detain the vessel and cargo by legal process unless his debt was paid. The master accordingly sold the cargo to the creditor for the payment of the debt. The court held that the sale, not being in the ordinary course of business, was void and could be disaffirmed by the owners.

Ratification.—If a master exceeds his authority, his acts may be ratified by the owners. Thus in Lyman v. Redman, 23 Me. 289, a master of a vessel bought, without authority, a cargo of plaster on credit for the benefit of the vessel and owners. The owners received the vessel and cargo from the master, and sent them under charge of another master to another port for the purpose of selling the plaster. On this voyage a part of the cargo was thrown overboard for the security of the remainder and of the vessel, and the residue was sold at the port of destination and the proceeds thereof applied to the repair of the vessel. Held, that the owners were liable to those who had furnished the plaster to the first master. See also Hathorn v. Curtis, 8 Me. 356. In Davis 7. Marshall, 4 Harr. (Del.) 64, HARRINGTON. J., in charging the jury, said: "If it be proved that it was customary for the captain of this vessel to buy wood for transportation and sale, and pay for it on the return from market, it is evidence that Mr. Wilson knew of, assented to, and au thorized such contracts on the part of his captain, and he is liable accordingly for the price of the wood. But if the usual business of this vessel was to carry the wood of others for freight, and not to buy it on account of the vessel, then Wilson, the owner, would not be liable to Mr. Marshall for a contract made with the captain."

1. Hiring of Seamen.-"By the general rule of the maritime law the personal contract of the master for the wages of seamen binds the owners, and the seamen may have their remedy against either." Baker . Corey, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 496. See also Luscomb v. Osgood, I Sprague (U. S.) 82; Pickering v. Holt, 6 Me. 160.

In Sherwood v. Hall, 3 Sumn. (U.

S.) 127, the owners were held liable in damages for the tort of the master in shipping a lad under age.

The master may engage seamen on a whaling voyage on shares. Whalen v. The Silver Spring, 32 Hunt's Mer. Mag. 711. But he cannot after hiring a crew bind the owners for increased wages. Neilson 7. Laura, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 242. Nor for the payment of wages for three months after the term of service. Canizares 7. The Santissima Trinidad, Bee Adm. (U. S.) 353

2. Authority to Receive Consignments. In Freeman v. Buckingham, 18 How. (U. S.) 182, it was decided that under the admiralty law of the United States contracts of affreightment, entered into with the master in good faith, and within the scope of his apparent authority as master, bind the vessel to the merchandise for the performance of such contracts, wholly irrespective of the ownership of the vessel, and whether the master be the agent of the general or special owner. See also The Eolian, 1 Biss. (U. S.) 321; Poland v. The Spartan, I Ware (U. S) 134; Jackson v. Julia Smith, 6 McLean (U. S.) 484; The Hendrik Hudson, 7 L. R., U. S. 93; Murfree v. Redding, I Hayw. (N. Car.) 276; Boucher v. Lawson, Abb. on Ship. 119; King 7'. Lenox, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) 236; Walter v. Brewer, II Mass. 99; Fisher v. Willing. 8 S. & R. (Pa.) 118; The Grand Turk, 1 Paine (U. S) 73; Sheppard v. Taylor, 5 Peters (U. S.) 675. When an owner is on board and exclusively attending to the shipment of the cargo he is not bound by the master's contract. But to relieve himself of liability, he must show the fact that he was exclusively attending to the shipment of the cargo; and he must show this, though he was on board as supercargo. Ward v. Green, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 173.

The liability of the owners will not be affected by the fact that no bill of lading was signed. Fox . Holt, 36 Conn. 558.

3. Demurrage. - In Alexander v. Dowie, 1 Hurl. & N. 152, the plaintiff, the owner of a ship, entered into a charter party with the defendant, containing stipulations as to demurrage. The ship was detained in South America beyond the time stipulated for captain was in possession of the ship, and was to be paid freight and demurrage by bill in South America. After

The