MAIM. See MAYHEM. MAIN.-See note I.

1. Main Sea.--The common law definition of the main sea was that part of the sea lying outside of the terræ fauces, or points on the opposite shore sufficiently near to enable persons standing on one shore to distinctly see and discern with the naked eye what is doing on the opposite shore. The water within the terræ fauces, although properly called the sea, or an arm of the sea, is not the main sea within the common law definition. 2 East P. C., ch. 17, § 10, p. 804; U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason (U. S.) 290; People Ex rel Morris v. Supervisors, 73 N. Y. 393. Angell on Tide Waters 4. Baker v. Hoag, 7 N. Y. 555; U. S. v. Millberger, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 76; Hamilton v. Frazer, Stuart's Canada Rep. 27.

Main Channel.—The main channel of a river, within the meaning of the act of Congress authorizing the building of a drawbridge over the Mississippi river at Keokuk, Iowa, and requiring that the draw shall be over the main channel of the river and at an accessible and navigable point, is that bed over which the principal volume of water flows. St. Louis & St. Paul Packet Co. v. Keokuk & Hamilton Bridge Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 755.

14 C. of L.-I

Main River.-Where a river is a boundary between states, it is the main or permanent river which constitutes the boundary, and not that part which flows in seasons of high water and is dry at other times.

Middle of Main Channel.-The phrase "middle of the river," when employed to designate the boundary between states, signifies the mean center line of the main channel-or, as it is more frequently expressed, the "thread of the stream," the space within which vessels may and usually do pass. Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 5 Am. St. Rep. (Ill.) 553.

From Main Wall of a House.-24 Q. B. Div. 170.

2. In Rex v. Beare, 1 Raym. 417, the court held that when a libel is produced written by a man's own hand, and the author of it is unknown, he is taken in the mainer, and that throws the proof upon him; and if he cannot produce the composer the verdict will be against him. See also Heard, Ld. Cr. Čas., 440 n.

1

3. Bacon's Abr. 530.

The chief difference is that a man's mainpernors are barely his sureties and cannot imprison him themselves to com

MAINSWORN.-See note I.

pel his appearance, as his bail may. 6 Mod. 231; 7 Mod. 77, 85, 98; Ld. Raym. 706; 12 Mod. 275, 348, 606, 607, 667. Bail are sureties that the parties be answerable for the special matters only for which they stipulate. Mainpernors are bound to produce him to answer all charges whatsoever. 3 Bl. Com. 128; Bouv. L. Dict., tit. Mainpernors.

1. Foresworn, by making false oath with hand on book. Brownl. 4; Slater 7. Franks, Hob. 125; Bacon's Abr. IX, 62.

2. Louisville R. Co. v. Godman (Ind. 1886), 2 West. Rep. 327.

To Maintain.-In Com. v. Kimball, 105 Mass. 467, WELLS, J., observes in his opinion: "The nuisance, in this case, consists in the illegal use of the building or place. Section 7, ch. 87, of the Gen. Stat. Massachusetts, makes any one who 'keeps or maintains such common nuisance' liable to punishment. This phraseology is adapted to the idea of a nuisance resulting from the perversion of the building or place to an illegal use. To keep' may, in its ordinary and more obvious sense, apply only to one who exercises control or proprietorship of the building or place used. But to 'maintain' has no such limited application. The building is The building is not maintained by the occupant, but the nuisance is maintained by prosecuting therein the illegal traffic. The alternative, 'whoever keeps or maintains' will apply therefore either to the one who controls the occupation and procures or permits the illegal use, or to one who engages in the illegal use, and thus maintains or aids in maintaining the public nuisance." See also State v. Main, 31 Conn. 574.

The statute i G. & H. 343, § 15, G. & H. 343, § 15, Indiana, providing that partition fences "shall be maintained throughout the year, equally by both parties," is not limited to repairs simply, but applies as well to the rebuilding of a fence destroyed by fire. Rhodes . Mummery, 7. 48 Ind. 216.

In Moorhead v. Little Miami R. Co., 17 Ohio 340, 353, the court held that to maintain a railroad implies no power to change the location after construction. BIRCHARD, C. J., observes in the opinion of the court: "To build or con

struct a railroad is one thing; to maintain the structure after it is erected or built, is another. built, is another. The word maintenance has reference to the powers to be exercised after the completion. This is the natural force of the expression.

Maintain in Substantial Repair.-An agreement that the working company shall maintain the railway of the worked company in substantial repair and good working order and condition, the worked company being bound to provide at a certain station proper terminal accommodations to enable the working company to carry on and convey the traffic, and being bound to pay to the working company such toll rent or other consideration for the use of a third company's line and station as the working company might have to pay to such third company; it was held that the word "maintain" was limited to the railway of the worked company, and did not extend to the station or any portion of the railway of the third company. Clonmel Traders v. The Water. ford & Limerick Railway Co., 4 Ry. & Can. Cas. 92.

"Maintain an Action."-The auditor of State alone is authorized to maintain an action against officers and trustees of savings banks for violation of their statutory duties. Ryan v. Ray, 2 West, Rep. 323.

In Boutiller, Admr. v. The Steamboat Milwaukee, 8 Minn. 97, an action was brought against the steamboat Milwau kee, by name, to recover damages for the killing of Francis Boutiller, by wrongfully running him down while in a small boat in the Mississippi river. The action is brought under the act concerning boats and vessels, found on page 647 of the compiled statutes, and the act concerning actions by and concerning executors, administrators, etc., page 610 of the same book. In delivering the opinion of the court, FLAND. RAN, J.. observes: "The argument of the counsel that no action can be commenced or originated by the personal representatives, but that they can only carry on one which had been commenced by the injured party before his death, is founded upon the peculiar language used in the statute, which provides that the personal representatives