their conversation was not the conclusion of peace, After consultation with the military authorities, but the settlement of an armistice. "As to our terms of peace, I expressly declared to M. Favre that I should state the frontier we should and having taken the King's commands, Count Bismarck submitted to M. Favre the following alternative :-" Either the fortified places of Paris are to be given into our hands by the surrender of a commanding portion of the works-in which case we are ready to allow Paris renewed intercourse with the country, and to permit the provisioning of the town; or, the fortified places of Paris not being given into our hands, we shall keep them invested during the armistice." Without such an arrangement, Paris would, at the conclusion of the armistice, be reinforced by fresh supplies, and strengthened by new defences. M. Favre at once declined to hand over any portion of the Paris burg garrison as prisoners of war; but he promised to take the opinion of his colleagues at Paris respecting the other alternative under which the military status quo before Paris was to be maintained. claim only after the principle of cession of territory had been publicly conceded by France. In connection with this, the formation of a new Moselle district, with the arrondissements of Saarbruck, Château Salins, Saargemünd, Metz, and Thionville, was alluded to by me as an arrangement included in our intentions; but I have not renounced the right of making such further demands as might be calculated to indemnify us for the sacrifices which a continuance of the war would entail. M. Favre called Strasburg the key of the house, leaving it doubtful which house he meant. I replied that Strasburg was the key of our house, and we therefore objected to leave it in foreign hands. Our first conver-works, and also refused the surrender of the Strassation, in Château de la Haute Maison, near Montry, was confined to an abstract inquiry into the general characteristics of the past and present ages. M. Favre's oddly pertinent remark on this occasion was that they would pay any sum-all the money we have rather than cede any territory. Upon my declaring such cession to be indispensable, he said that "Accordingly, the programme which M. Favre in that case it would be useless to open negotia- brought to Paris as the result of our conversations, and tions for peace; and he argued on the supposition which was rejected there, contained nothing as to the that to cede territory would humiliate-nay, dishonour future conditions of peace. It only included an armis-France. I failed to convince him that terms such tice of from a fortnight to three weeks, to be granted as France had obtained from Italy and demanded from on the following conditions, in order to enable the Germany, without even the excuse of previous war-election of a National Assembly to be held :-Firstly, terms which France would have undoubtedly imposed in and before Paris the maintenance of the military upon us had we been defeated, and in which nearly status quo; secondly, in and before Metz the continevery war had resulted down to the latest times-could uance of hostilities within a circle hereafter to be more have nothing dishonouring in themselves to a country accurately defined; thirdly, the surrender of Strasburg vanquished after a gallant struggle; and that the with its garrison, and the evacuation of Toul and honour of France was of no other quality or nature Bitsche, their garrisons being accorded free retreat. than the honour of all other countries." I believe our conviction that this was a very acceptable offer will be shared by all neutral Cabinets. If the French Government has not availed itself of this opportunity for having a National Assembly elected in all parts of France, those occupied by us not excepted, this indicates a resolve to prolong the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a valid peace, and to ignore the voice of the French people. From all we see here the conviction is forced upon us, as it no doubt is likewise upon the rulers of Paris, that free and unbiassed general elections would yield a majority in favour of peace." The conversation took a more practical turn at the Château Ferrières, where reference was made to the question of an armistice. It was agreed by the two diplomatists that an armistice might be concluded, so as to allow of the election of a French Assembly; but Count Bismarck added that an armistice is always injurious to an army in the midst of a victorious career, and that if, by such an arrangement, the Germans were to be detained in France longer than was absolutely necessary, they must insist upon increased means of bringing up provisions that is to say, the surrender of those fortresses, such as Strasburg, Toul, and some less important places, which obstructed their communications with Germany. As regarded Paris, they could permit its renewed intercourse with the rest of France only if the importation of fresh provisions thereby rendered possible did not weaken their own military position, and retard the date at which they might hope to starve out the place. However absurd it may have seemed to the icy intellect of Bismarck that the French Government should have refused his offers, it is difficult to deny that M. Favre and his colleagues interpreted in this respect the general and natural feeling of their countrymen. A great nation, with centuries of illustrious history at its back, cannot exhibit an alacrity in confessing itself vanquished. It must continue to struggle, even after repeated defeats, and must refuse to succumb while there is yet a distant hope of success. At the period of M. sign. The acceptance of such terms by France Favre's interview with the Prussian Minister, the would have been tantamount to confessing herself prospects of France, though gloomy, were not thoroughly beaten, and to placing her fate unreabsolutely desperate; and the guardians of the servedly in the hands of her enemy. When, morenational honour would not have been justified in over, it is borne in mind that the armistice thus consenting to an armistice coupled with terms which fashioned was to be the preliminary to a peace by would certainly have placed Germany in a position which France was to be deprived of a considerable of further advantage, and France in a position of portion of her dominions, and of several fortresses. still greater disadvantage, when the time of truce of great strength, it becomes still more obvious had reached its limits. The surrender of a commanding portion of the Paris fortifications, or, failing that, the continuance of the investment so as to prevent the revictualling of the city, and thus to weaken the defence, while the powers of the Germans for offence were in no degree impaired; the continuance of hostilities in and before Metz, the surrender of Strasburg and its garrison, and the evacuation of Toul and Bitsche; were all stipulations of a most one-sided character, having rather the nature of contrivances for ensuring ultimate victory to Prussia than the qualities of an equitable arrangement with a view to the conclusion of a peace such as both countries might honourably that the Provisional Government could not have assented to such terms on their own undivided responsibility, unless they had been reduced to a much greater extremity than that in which they then found themselves. It is easy to say that five months later they were compelled to accept very similar conditions. The argument is not pertinent. In September, 1870, it yet remained to be seen whether Paris could withstand and repel a siege; whether the provinces could raise armies of sufficient size and discipline to vanquish the enemy in the open field; whether Bazaine could break out of Metz; whether other fortresses in the east of France could hold out against the assaults of the Germans; and whether the Republic could obtain science; and that she had a natural right to take allies. All these possibilities may have been ex- priority of the nations. No doubt there was a tremely problematical; but a small band of self-measure of truth in all this. The French character appointed men, precluded by the very conditions has some weaknesses and vices from which the in dispute from consulting the nation, would have Germans are comparatively free; and the latter incurred a great responsibility had they laid their can boast of solid virtues which it would be country prostrate at the feet of the invader, while folly or envy not to admire and respect. But the the resources of an active defence were as yet German Kingdoms possess no monopoly of goodimperfectly developed. During the late autumn ness; and the French disposition has many amiable and early winter, there were times when success and noble features, such as humanity cannot afford seemed possible. With advancing January, however, to depreciate or deny. We are too apt to condemn the chances of the French rapidly and irretrievably the French for the faults of Paris; and even Paris declined; and the humble submission which would has its heroic and luminous side. In September, have been voluntary in 1870 became scarcely avoid- 1870, however, there was a fashion of worshipping able in 1871. the Germans and spurning the French; and the Germans turned the feeling to profitable account in advancing their demands and magnifying their pretensions. Quietly secluded at Wilhelmshöhe, the Emperor Napoleon must all this while have revolved such matters in his mind, and may perhaps have congratulated himself that the burden of continuing the war had passed from his own to other shoulders. He lived very unassumingly, but was not seldom On the side of the Germans it may be said that, feeling themselves in a position of superiority, they did but endeavour to make the best bargain they could, as an indemnity for the cost and sacrifices of a war in which they believed their country to be right, and which they had not nominally commenced, however apparent it may be to impartial observers that they contributed to the causes which brought it to pass. Yet it is obvious that the war was no longer with them an act of simple self-seen by the people of the surrounding country, his defence, but an attempt to gain territory, and to exalt Germany by the depression of France. The pretences about guarding against future attack, and rendering France powerless for mischief in the European system, were simply the decent veils with which diplomacy always conceals its purposes. France was willing to give guarantees for the future by paying a large money indemnity, dismantling the eastern fortresses, and sacrificing a portion of the fleet. What was really wanted, however, was not so much protection as aggrandisement and supremacy. Fanatical writers lost no opportunity of preaching that the French were a wicked, Godabandoned race, and that the Germans were the divinely appointed instruments for their humiliation. Anecdotes were told of the devotion of the German troops in church, and of the indifference of the French soldiers to all sacred considerations; of hymn-books being found in the knapsacks of the one army, and of light stories and wanton photographs being discovered in those of the other. It was argued that the French were wholly given up to frivolity, vicious indulgence, and unscrupulous ambition; that French literature was corrupt, that French art was tawdry, that French science was behind the age, that French learning was shallow, that French society was debased. On the other hand, it was maintained that Germany was sound, virile, pure, truthful, and religious; that she was at the head of the world in arms, arts, literature, and movements being free within a radius of several Owing to the her arrival, had a long interview with the Emperor, and returned to England the same evening. Towards the end of September a correspondent of the Standard reported in that paper a conversation which he had had with the Emperor. Having been conducted into a room where Napoleon was sitting privately, he was received with much courtesy. "If" (he writes) "I am asked what was the predominant impression left on me by the conversation which followed, I reply unhesitatingly the strong feeling of the Emperor with respect to England. Almost the first words that passed his lips were an expression of gratification at the numerous letters of condolence and sympathy he had received 'since his misfortunes' from persons who were perfect strangers to him, and there was nothing on which he seemed to dwell with so much pleasure as on the advance which has been made during his reign in the cordial understanding between the two countries. When I came to Paris, he said, 'there were still great remains of the old illfeeling;' and he dwelt with marked gratification on the change that had since taken place. He was much interested, too, in the condition of English feeling at the present time, questioning me closely on the subject, and expressing his regret at the tone assumed by a portion of the London press. The monstrous state ment of his having appropriated some fifty millions of the army votes seemed particularly galling to him. 'As if,' he said, 'I could possibly have done such a thing, even if I had desired it.' The assistance given by England to his wounded soldiers had evidently made a great impression upon him. Speaking of France, and of the present condition of affairs there, his tone-which in dealing with other matters had been earnest, but not uncheerful-saddened visibly, and he sighed heavily as he spoke of the state of things at Lyons and elsewhere, and of a not impossible future in store for Paris. There was not the slightest appearance of resentment in the way in which he spoke of the changes that had recently taken place, but a terrible foreboding of what might come. I ventured to express a hope that all might yet go well, and that before long we might see him once more at the Tuileries. He sat for some moments silent; then, with a sigh, turned again to me, and said, 'No one can tell-no one can tell, sir, what may happen now."" An offer by the King of Prussia to allow the Empress and the Prince Imperial to reside at Wilhelmshöhe was declined; and the illustrious lady and her son, after quitting Hastings (which was on the 24th of September), took up their abode at Camden Place, Chislehurst, Kent an oldfashioned mansion in a small park adjoining the west side of the common. Chislehurst is famous as the birthplace of Sir Francis Walsingham and of Sir Nicholas Bacon, father of Lord Bacon. Camden Place was the seat of the Camden family, and the great antiquary of the time of Elizabeth lived and died there. Fifty years ago it was the residence of Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador; and it has now acquired a fresh distinction as having been the place of refuge of the Empress Eugénie during the convulsions consequent on the Franco-Prussian War. The surrounding country, which is in the general direction of Bromley, is beautifully wooded, and characterised by all the most charming features of English rurality. The greater part of the Empress's money, valuables, clothes, &c., found at the Tuileries, was sent after her Majesty; but a portion of the money was kept back until it could be ascertained whether it belonged to the Empress personally or to the Civil List. Many of the documents found at the Tuileries were published by the Provisional Government, with a view to prejudicing the character of the Emperor and his Ministers. Some scandalous matters were thus revealed, but nothing of firstclass importance, or worse than would probably come to light if the private affairs of other Royal and Imperial houses were brought before the public by successful revolutionists. To mitigate in some measure the inconveniences of isolation, the ingenious Parisians organised a service of balloons, which kept up a degree of communication between the city and the outer world, and enabled the two Governments-that of Paris and that of Tours-to hear of one another from time to time. In the latter part of September the French post-office authorities announced that they would despatch balloons with private correspondence as regularly as the weather would permit, beginning from the 28th of the month. The letters were to be written on very thin paper, and each was to be open, and not to weigh more than three grammes. These were conveyed at the ordinary rates, prepaid; and many will doubtless be preserved to distant times, as memorials of the great siege. M. Jules Durnof, one of the aeronauts who guided these balloons, gave an interesting account of his adventures on a certain occasion. This was summarised in one of the English papers, where it was stated that M. Durnof "left the Place Saint Pierre Montmartre at eight in the morning of September 23rd. A strong east wind was blowing. He rose to the height of 3,000 yards, and was then driven in the direction of the Arc de Triomphe. Going still westward, he perceived the Prussians in clusters like bees below him, and, with a telescope, could distinctly see them pointing cannon at him. He saw the balls ascend almost perpendicularly in the air, exhaust their impetus, and then fall to the ground. Some of the balls arrived high enough |