not rendered free elections possible, and for this purpose an actual duration of only forty-four hours was granted. During the rest of the period of a fortnight or three weeks Prussia reserved to herself the right to continue hostilities, so that the Assembly would have held its deliberations on peace or war while the battle would have been going on which would have decided the fate of Paris. Moreover, the armistice would not have been extended to Metz. It excluded revictualling, and condemned us to the consumption of our provisions, whilst the besieging army would have been chiefly living upon the pillage of our provinces. Lastly, Alsace and Lorraine would have nominated no representatives, for the really unheard-of reason that their fate was to be decided upon in the Assembly itself." is seen. Not all the errors and crimes of which that country has been guilty can blot out the fact that ever since the first great Revolution she it is who, on this side of the Atlantic, has chiefly lifted into the universal air those immortal principles of human right to which M. Favre appeals as the final arbiters of all human policy. In this sense France has exercised a vivifying influence in the world such as not even England, excellent as her practical example has been, can boast, because England has made little assertion of abstract principles such as quicken the general pulse of humanity, but has rather followed a series of local experiments, cautious, fragmentary, and hesitating, from want of faith in any higher standard than what is convenient for the day. If France, with her keen perception of the very elements of political right, had possessed self-control enough to abstain from demagogic violence and theatrical exaggeration, we might at this moment have seen Europe a hundred years in advance of where she really stands. But merely to have uttered great ideas is much. Germany, within the region of politics, has conferred no such service on the world. Her work has been rather that of dull and harsh repression; and as a consummate drill-sergeant, with not even the ambition to be anything better, “I entertain the firm hope that France will be vic- she yet stands before the nations. M. Favre, in The Provisional Government was willing to accept, before France and before history, the responsibility of refusing the Prussian terms. Following, apparently, that noble saying of Socrates, that it is a far happier thing to suffer a wrong than to commit one, M. Favre observes that, were he to choose between the situation of France and that of Prussia, the former rather than the latter would be the object of his aspirations. He preferred the sufferings, perils, and sacrifices of his own land to the inflexible and cruel ambition of her foe. circular concludes: The torious. Were she vanquished, she would still remain so great in her misfortunes that she would stand as an object of admiration and sympathy to the whole world. Therein lies her real strength, and therein she may find her revenge. The European Cabinets which have been making only empty demonstrations of cordiality will, at a future day, perceive it, but it will be too late. Instead of initiating the doctrine of high mediation, advised by justice and interest, they, by their inertness, authorise the continuation of a barbarous struggle, which is a disaster to all, and an outrage to civilisa tion. This bloody lesson will not be lost on the nations. History teaches us that human regenerations, through some mysterious law, are narrowly connected with ineffable misfortunes. Perhaps France required to pass through a supreme trial; she will issue from it transfigured, and her genius will shine with so much the more brightness since it will have comforted her and saved her from deterioration in face of a powerful and implacable enemy." M. Favre has rarely appeared to so much advantage as in this admirable paper. The tone throughout is lofty, dignified, and noble; the argument close and irrefragable; the language haughty, pathetic, pungent, or prospectively triumphant, according as the matter varies, and as the mood of the writer changes with it. It is in the assertion of principles such as those which M. Favre here explains and defends that the real greatness of France pleading the cause of his own country, was asserting principles in which all countries are equally interested; and his moral tone was as far superior to any which his adversary has ever evinced as the instincts of philanthropy are higher than the promptings of selfishness. Another State paper of importance issued during October was a circular addressed by Count de Chaudordy, delegate at Tours of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and bearing date the 8th. The intention of this document was to disprove the assertion of Count Bismarck that France had for many years been the constant aggressor of Europe. M. de Chaudordy admitted that the first Republic and the first Empire, provoked by the attempts of Prussia to put down the new ideas in politics, went too far in their reprisals; but for half a century, under four different régimes, France had forborne from territorial aggrandisement. Since 1864, however, Prussia had let loose on Europe a policy of blood and iron. "Who was it who despoiled Denmark? who openly compelled Austria to make war? who violently annexed Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, &c.? who stirred up again all the passions that had been dormant, and so profoundly disturbed Europe? Throughout those crises France intervened only to hasten and consolidate Mention is made of the warlike tendencies of peace. the nation, and of mean jealousies which the Prussian victories had kindled amongst her people. But on the morrow after Sadowa, at the time of the irritating occurrence about Luxemburg, public opinion in France clearly manifested itself against war, and the German publicists themselves were obliged to confess the fact. Moderation was found on our side. Lastly, when war broke out in the month of July, who could deny that Prussia had been doing all she could for the last four years in order to attain this end? Without insisting on her political conduct, or on her wilful neglect to execute the Treaty of Prague, suffice it to say that she was formidably armed, and ready within eight days to enter the field. Events have shown how far she had been for a long time pushing on her preparations. How much France, on the contrary, had neglected her preparations is but too well known. Not only were the armaments of Prussia complete, but her alliances had been concluded. Evidently her intentions were to drag us into a redoubtable conflict. We can freely speak of this war, for the members of the present Government did everything in their power to avert its horrors from the country. We emphatically declare, in spite of the conduct of Prussia, that the motive itself of the struggle was not justified, and M. de Bismarck cannot seriously retort againt us the declamations of over-excited crowds. These were individual acts, which found no echo in the country, and which had no further importance than those confused agitations which every public excitement arouses in large cities. M. de Bismarck well knows the value of those things. And, besides, where is the people who does not easily yield to excitement at the first war-cry? Governments are always certain to rouse enthusiasm whenever they promise glory and triumphs." indisputable evidence of that fact. And whilst France has made no alteration in her organisation, Germany has transformed herself into the strongest state ever reached by any Power, viz., an absolute military unity, a personal and direct action of the chief who commands, and a military service obligatory upon all. We still ask whether France or Germany is now a menacing Power. Prussia needs no more in 1870 than in 1792 to guard herself against attacks from France. Beyond all doubt, the Prussian Government is seeking facilities for offensive designs, rather than better defensive lines. . . . . And what would be the result of those violent annexations of provinces which do not desire to cease to be French? Not to mention the reluctant feeling with which every honest man would see populations annexed to a nationality not in accordance with their aspirations and their past, suffice it that it would perpetuate war. In fact, can the heart of France ever detach itself from countries which so many misfortunes nobly endured, and so much blood gloriously shed, have united to her by indestructible ties? The consequence would be so disturbed a state of affairs that Europe could not henceforth hope for a single moment of rest. It is clearly to be seen that M. de Bismarck, whilst putting forth such pretensions and asking for such concessions, is himself preparing other wars, which are necessary for his attaining the aim to which he is led by an unbridled ambition. The German people wishes for its national unity and political liberty; and Liberal France has no objection to that. It is a just cause, and we should deny our own past if we opposed it. But an abyss separates those legitimate aspirations from the doctrine advocated and practised by M. de Bismarck. If the events which have been accomplished in Europe during these last that Prussia herself has assumed the part which she six years are considered, it must be acknowledged so unjustly attributes to us." France, argued M. de Chaudordy, was not threatening the integrity of Germany, or meditating conquests. Her interests dictated a peaceful path. The increase and greater diffusion of wealth since To M. de Chaudordy's despatch there was of the beginning of the century, the immense deve-course the one pithy answer that France had lopment of investments in securities, and the adoption of the system of commercial freedom, rendered it necessary for the welfare of the country that peace should be preserved. “Such is the nation against whose incursions M. de Bismarck wishes to protect Germany, and whose territorial dismemberment appears to him to be the sole efficient guarantee for the tranquillity of the German people. The line of the Rhine, according to him, is no longer sufficient; he wishes the line of the Vosges and the Moselle; he now requires Alsace and Lorraine, at the very moment when Germany has just completely altered her internal constitution. After 1815, Europe, already dreading the expansive strength of the Germanic race, exerted herself to give it a constitution the bases of which were calculated for defensive aims only; and France, although the Vienna treaties were directed against her, was left in the state in which she still is. Her frontier on the north side, bordering on Germany, is entirely open. The events of the present war are an attacked Germany in this particular war, and had thus shown that the old spirit of aggression had not died out. But in truth neither side was blameless in the matter, both having encouraged a sentiment of mutual distrust, and indulged in dreams of aggrandisement at each other's expense. The fact of the first blow having been struck by France, without sufficient reason to justify such an act, will always render her defence a difficult task; but it is certain that Germany does not come into court with clean hands, and the relentless spirit in which she pursued the struggle after France had shown a willingness to make amends for the wrong she had done under the deposed Government, threw a deep shadow over the whole of her conduct after Sedan. An interesting account of the state of popular feeling in Germany during the month of October was contained in a letter to the Pall Mall Gazette from Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, who had recently returned from a tour through a considerable part of the country. On the subject of annexation he noticed four distinct parties. First, there was the party which demanded the retention of Alsace and Lorraine on military grounds, the organs of which were the Kreuz Zeitung and the Allgemeine Zeitung. Secondly came the party which required Alsace and a small strip of Lorraine, because the inhabitants are German in race, and which had for its representative in the press the Kölnische Zeitung, Many of the "National Liberals" belonged to this party, a section of which advocated the retrocession of North Schleswig to Denmark on the same grounds of nationality. The third party was that which simply required the cession of Strasburg; and the fourth comprised such men as Jacoby, who objected to all annexation as being contrary to the wishes of the populations concerned. These men belonged chiefly to the Democratic body. "The first opinion," wrote Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, "obtains a fair field and favour from the authorities; the second a fair field, but no favour; the third, and still more the fourth, obtain neither a fair field nor any favour. The seizure of newspapers in Southern Germany occurs constantly, more particularly in Frankfort, where the nonannexationists are very numerous, even outside the Democratic party." The letter made mention of the fact that in the same prison with Dr. Jacoby and Max Herbig there was at that time lying Herr Kryger, the representative of one of the North Schleswig districts in the Prussian and Federal Parliaments, together with four other Schleswigers who had excited the displeasure of the Government by advocating the retrocession to Denmark of their portion of the Duchy, in conformity with Art. V. of the Treaty of Prague. "It is worth noting," remarked Lord Edmond, "that the strong demand for annexation comes from North Germany, and not from South Germany, in the interests of which it is generally advocated. I was profoundly struck by the brutality of the expressed opinion both of individuals and of the press in Germany. The principles of the supremacy of the national will, which is the justification of the German national movement, is forgotten in the case of Alsace and Lorraine, as if it had not already been sufficiently forgotten in North Schleswig. We are told,' said a newspaper the other day, 'that the people hate us. So much the worse for them. We must wait till they are exterminated (vertilgt), and the next generation converted to a proper affection for us.'" The sympathies of Lord Edmond had been with the Germans in July. By October, after what he had seen and heard in Germany, they had been effec tually turned to the side of the French, like those of most Englishmen. Taking advantage of this change of sentiment in the people of Great Britain, M. Arles-Dufour, VicePresident of the International Peace League, and President of the Lyons Committee of Succour for the Victims of the War, issued an address to them, imploring their aid in bringing the war to an endnot by warlike operations, but by active sympathy with a brother in trouble. To justify his appeal, M. Dufour called to remembrance his participation in all the steps of economical and pacific progress accomplished by England from the days of Huskisson to those of Cobden. Again adducing the often-repeated argument that the war ought to cease now that its originator had been removed, he exclaimed, “Awake! stir up those of your Ministers whom our disasters have been so slow to move! Tell them that a day may come when misfortune may be knocking at your doors, and when you will regret the friend, the faithful ally, whom you allowed to be crushed. I heartily pray that so cruel a day may never dawn on Great Britain and its noble people." Such an appeal could obviously lead to no sort of good. M. Dufour himself did not ask us to draw the sword, which, on several grounds, we were not likely to do; and any mere expression of sympathy would have been simply disregarded by the Germans, as was indeed the fact. Another address to the English people, emanating from Louis Blanc, appeared in the Official Journal of October 1st. M. Blanc described the siege of Paris as "a monstrous phenomenon," and "a scandal to history." Civilisation was a prisoner in the French capital, and the King of Prussia was the Attila of the nineteenth century. M. Blanc therefore appealed to the English people, but not for pity, as Republican France had “a right" to the sympathies of all. The Republic, he contended, was in no degree responsible for the war; and it was not true that the French nation had the guilt of the conflict upon its conscience. He wound up by saying:-"If the English people understand that our cause is that of the whole world, being that of justice, it is time for them to act, to ponder on what concerns them, the consequences of leaving the rights of conquest unbridled. nation which by its indifference sanctions the saturnalia of force, deserves to suffer by force. But it is the business of the English people to look to that; ours is to prove to the world that our cause is just, and, this understood, to die for right, which never dies, or conquer with it." The working-class sympathisers with the Republic would A |