port of the action, published in the Carlsruhe numbered 3,600 or 3,800 men; that the French Gazette, said: "General Degenfeld's mission was to clear the country of Francs-tireurs, to prevent the further organisation of those bodies, and to give a severe lesson to the district which was encouraging them. Starting in three divisions, the force was to unite between Raon l'Etape and Etival. The passage of the mountains was to some extent very troublesome, as most of the passages for a considerable distance had to be cleared of passable for vehicles. No direct defence of these passes was, however, attempted, except at Champenay, on the St. Blaise and Belval route, on the 4th, when the vanguard easily dispersed the enemy. On the same day, a reconnoitring force between Calles and Le Trouche encountered some Francs-tireurs, and completely routed them. On the 5th there was a slight engagement at Raon, which the enemy had occupied; but, on the heads of the divisions arriving there simultaneously, the Francs-tireurs attempted no real resistance. After a short fire from the edge of the town and of the wood, as also from the houses of the suburbs, they were dispersed, and a large number of them put hors de combat. On the 6th the third division was attacked on the right flank by a regular French column, hastily collected from the south and the whole region, which arrived from Bruyeres and Ram trees and other obstructions, so as to make the road had at least twice as many, and that their army consisted of troops of the Line, marching regiments, and Mobiles of the Vosges and the Meurthe. Of Francs-tireurs there were hardly any; and the French army, though supplied with eight or nine guns, had no cavalry. The marching regiments had only arrived in haste the previous night from Bordeaux, Marseilles, and some garrisons of the south. On the following day (the 7th), German skirmishers advanced in various directions, and on the 8th the column united, and occupied St. Dié and Raon without molestation. General von Roon, the Prussian Minister of War, afterwards observed that the German troops had no occasion to fear opposition in that part of France. The defeat of the French was not at all surprising, considering the half-formed state of the army thus brought into action; but it had an unfortunate effect in augmenting the general feeling of distrust, and adding to the confidence of the invaders. A slight French success occurred on the 8th. News having been received at St. Quentin on the 7th, that the Prussians were nine miles from the town (which is situated about eighty miles to the north-east of Paris), and were expected to attack it on the following morning, active preparations were made for resistance. The Garde Mobile and the firemen were set to man the barricades, and St. Quentin, although an open town, was enabled, by the courage and resolution of its defenders, to repulse the Prussian assault when it came. The Prefect called upon the population generally to assist in the defence. The workmen demanded arms, and were furnished with them by means of a requisition upon the gunsmiths. They then marched against the enemy; a barricade was raised near the canal, and this was held for five hours against the onslaught of the Germans, who ultimately retreated. Prefect himself (M. Anatole de la Forge, an eminent man of letters) headed the defence, and was wounded in the leg. There were losses on both sides, but the townspeople were naturally much elated at their success. The account of the affair in the Gazette de Cambrai contains some interesting details. It states: bervilliers. A thick fog prevailed in the morning, in consequence of which, on the skirmishers encountering a warm fire at day-break, a halt was made on the heights of Etival. At a quarter past nine it was sufficiently clear for the advance to be continued. Nompatelize, which the enemy had occupied, and where he had erected two batteries, was soon taken; but in the wood beyond there was a warm engage ment. At one P.M. the French appeared dispirited, and their fire slackened, the Germans, however, being also nearly exhausted. Many infantry detachments had scarcely any cartridges left, and two guns, which had been firing incessantly since half-past ten, had hardly any ammunition remaining. About half-past one the enemy was reinforced, his artillery resuming fire, and the infantry renewing the attack on all sides. They were, however, received with equal determination, the German artillery displaying its superiority. The reserves were called up, and at half-past three a general advance was ordered. Drums and trumpets sounding, the steep slopes of the wood were stormed. The enemy awaited the attack, but was pushed back step by step up to the crest of the heights. He then, in wild flight, fled down the mountains towards La Bourgence, being fired on with deadly effect. At La Bour-o'clock, the Prussians were announced to be at a few "On Saturday, October 8th, about half-past ten gence the French attempted another stand, but were driven back, and fled in confusion to Bruyeres and Rambervilliers. The battle-field, the wood, and the line of retreat, were strewed for a long distance with knapsacks, muskets, and equipments. The column bivouacked at night on the field, the burning village of Nompatelize serving as a watch-fire.” The kilomètres distance from the town, on the road to La Fère. The drums beat to arms. The National Guards hastened to their posts. The Prefect, M. Anatole de la Forge, wearing a plain National Guard's uniform, went on to the chief square of the town with a broadsword in one hand and a revolver in the other. He harangued the population, and led them to fight The account states that the Germans engaged Four formidable barricades had been constructed during the past fortnight in the Rue d'Isle--one on the banks of the canal, two others, at 200 mètres distance from each other, in the interior of the town, and the fourth on the road from La Fère to the top of the Faubourg d'Isle. This barricade could be defended for a few moments by ten men only. The fight began at the entrance of the town, close to the Great Canal barricade, which formed, indeed, a very strong position. The Prefect remained in the first post of danger as long as the fight went on. His courage was admirable. "The Prussians, who were about 900 in numbernamely, 600 infantry and 300 cavalry - entrenched themselves in the railway station. Taking advantage of the angles of the houses, as well as of the openings in the railway balustrades, they endeavoured to deploy as sharpshooters. Despite all these combinations, they could not succeed in reaching the National Guard; they even suffered serious losses; every man who showed himself was shot; the celebrated shooter Bosquett, a St. Quentin man, is mentioned, among others, as having killed or wounded six or seven Prussians, one of whom was a superior officer. "The struggle lasted until about two o'clock. At that time the Prussians retreated, taking the road to Marle. The National Guards, boing without quickfiring and long-range muskets, were unable to pursue them. If we had only had 300 soldiers provided with chassepôts, not one Prussian would have escaped.' So the inhabitants of St. Quentin said. The enemy carried away his dead and wounded in carts, which had been procured by means of a requisition; consequently, the number of their loss could not be exactly ascertained. According to the most impartial reckoning, it was about forty or fifty. On our side we had three men dead, and five or six wounded. One of the dead, a modeller workman, was the father of eleven children, who have been adopted by the town of St. Quentin. Three Frenchmen were made prisoners; eleven Prussians remained in our hands. "It is reported that while the fight was going on, and about an hour before the enemy's retreat, the Town Council adopted a resolution, saying that the National Guards had bravely done their duty, but that they could not continne the struggle without the town incurring the risk of cruel reprisals, and that consequently there was reason for entering into negotiations with the enemy. This deliberation was brought to the Prefect behind the barricades. He refused to accept it, saying that he was merely a National Guard, and that it did not belong to him to give orders to his comrades." St. Quentin, however, only escaped for a time. On the 21st of October it was compelled to surrender to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. Several minor movements in different parts of the country took place about the same time, with varying success; the Prussians sometimes occupying small towns, and leaving them in a day or two when they had obtained what they wanted in the way of war-contributions or provisions; and the French occasionally driving back detachments which had ventured too far from their supports. On the 13th of October, for instance, a party of Francs-tireurs attacked some Würtemburg cavalry in the forest of Fontainebleau, and pursued them to Melun, where they captured their barracks and stores. On the other hand, the Germans made their power felt in many directions, and revenged any temporary discomfiture with the utmost rigour. Sometimes the unhappy French were so struck with terror at the appearance of the enemy, that they yielded at once, without any attempt at resistIn this respect the people of Montdidier presented a marked contrast to the citizens of St. Quentin. The former, like the latter, is an open town; and when the Prussians, about 1,200 strong, with eight guns, were seen approaching, it was determined to surrender quietly. The Sub-Prefect, an old military officer, constructed barricades, and wanted to fight; but, on the commencement of the cannonade, the people compelled him to yield. The extreme severity with which the Prussians carried on the war had much to do with these rather abject, but perhaps excusable, submissions. ance. Thionville continued to defy its assailants; and on the 14th of October a gentleman, who had just returned from making a journey in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, communicated to the Prefect of the Department of the Nord some details as to the condition of the fortress, which lies near the frontiers of that duchy. He stated that the town was provided with abundance of provisions and ammunition, and that its re-victualling had not been interrupted. The garrison, which was not numerous before the French disasters, had been gradually increased by the remnants of the defeated armies, especially escaped prisoners. It then numbered more than 8,000 men of all arms, not including a On the 10th of October body of Francs-tireurs. the investing army attempted to establish batteries on a hill commanding Thionville, but was compelled to desist on account of a well-sustained and well-directed fire from the ramparts. A vigorous sortie was made by the garrison, when 300 prisoners were taken, while the French losses amounted only to a few killed and wounded. The resistance of the garrison of Thionville was often referred to during the war, as presenting a favourable contrast, in its determination and reality, to the half-hearted defence which, from whatever motive, was conducted by Bazaine at Metz, only ten miles off. It was in these isolated instances of courage and self-reliance that the French mainly had cause for congratulation. In default of more striking successes, they lent an ear to every idle tale of great achievements that was bruited abroad. M. Gambetta, in a proclamation to the inhabitants of Tours, issued on October 14th, said:"I can announce to you, with unspeak able joy, that I have received news from Paris, dated the 1, that the citizens, becoming more and more heroic and impatient behind their ramparts, require to be led against the enemy; and here is the bulletin of their first victory along the whole belt round the city: 'The Prussians have been dislodged from the positions they occupied during the last three weeks. In the direction of St. Denis they have been driven back beyond Stains, Pierrefitte, and Dugny. On the east, Joineville, Creteil, Bobigny, and the Plateau d'Avron have been taken. The Germans have also been driven out of Bas Meudon and St. Cloud, being forced to retire to Versailles.' The enemy knows now the value of a people resolved and determined to save its institutions and its honour." M. Lefebre, consul of France at Vienna, who escaped from Paris in a balloon, which descended at Barnières, in the Department of the Nord, on the 12th of October, made a number of statements to the same effect. The Prussians had been forced to fall back in all directions, and to considerable distances. Their batteries had been destroyed, and they were obliged to remain on the defensive. The French had re-taken several positions, and the peninsula of Gennevilliers had been cleared of the presence of the enemy by a cavalry reconnaissance, and would be protected from his return. These reports were afterwards contradicted in the flattest terms by the Prussians, who asserted that they still held the same positions as at first. The propagation of such statements, following on a good many others equally baseless, did much towards shaking the credit of the French beyond the limits of their own country. While the Parisians were clamouring for a sortie, the Germans were equally impatient for the commencement of active operations against the French capital. This feeling was so strong that the Prus sian War Minister, General von Roon, found it advisable to send to the Berlin Staats Anzeiger a semi-official note, explaining why it was necessary to proceed with caution. Experience, argued this note, had shown that in a war with France no satisfactory peace could be obtained unless dictated at Paris. The German operations were therefore being directed to that end, and the results of the first part of the campaign were the annihilation of one-half of the French troops, and the shutting up of the rest, so that the Parisians were unable to offer any serious resistance in front of and between the various forts of the enceinte. Although thus deprived of an army in the field, the moral and material resources remaining to General Trochu were of no contemptible kind, and, being wielded by an energetic commander, they rendered the task of the German armies "one of the most difficult recorded in the military history of the world." Paris was scarcely to be regarded as a fortress, but was rather a fortified battle field, with forts covering every point of access. Some of these forts were strong enough to rank as citadels; others exceeded the strength of many fortresses. Behind the forts was a continuous rampart, nearly six geographical miles in circumference. Directly the German generals recognised that reduction by mere investment would not lead to prompt results, preparations for a regular siege were commenced. Although the exhaustion of food might be relied on as guaran teeing ultimate surrender, still, in view of the approach of the inclement season, a partial bombardment, and an attack on some of the advanced forts, might be resorted to as an effective means of accelerating the catastrophe. Yet it was to be borne in mind that the portion of the environs of Paris from which a bombardment could be directed was the most hilly and impracticable of all. It was probable, continued the semi-official note, that the bombardment would not be proceeded with until the fire of several forts had been silenced. The confident belief of the military authorities was, that they would not be long in conquering some of those forts. The investing army had the means of protecting itself against rain and cold; and Parisian winters were generally milder than those of Germany. Paris, on the contrary, would become weaker every day the siege lasted. Provisions would get scarcer and scarcer, and the poor would be likely to rise against the wealthy-"a contingency," adds the writer, with that calm and businesslike way of calculating the most terrific consequences of war which seems peculiar to the Prussian nature, "hastened on by our hindering any fresh supplies from reaching the beleaguered town. Our numerous cavalry is quite competent to carry this out.". The note concludes :-"The French Minister of the Interior, in his latest circular of the 9th inst., assures his countrymen that Paris can be taken neither by force nor surrender, neither by famine nor rebellion. His self-delusion, it must be admitted, is complete. He enumerates the very calamities which will compel surrender, and in his blind confidence draws a false conclusion. Our task is to possess ourselves of the French capital with as little loss of time and life as possible. We are sure |