that the point of this invention is that it enables a process which has been discovered since, to be carried out in a machine which alone is adapted for that purpose and process, and when you observe the marked and beneficial effect, and the commercial and the scientific success of the new machine, you can only answer the question whether there has been ingenuity in one way. I think, not only that there has been ingenuity, but I think myself that there has been very great ingenuity in it, and none the less because it is easy afterwards, as has been pointed out, to say other people might have seen the result."

In the case of Steiner v. Heald (f), in the Exchequer Chamber, the head-note is inexplicable and erroneous. If the case itself is read, it will be found to be in accordance with the other decided cases on this subject: In the ordinary process of dyeing, by means of madder, the colouring matter was obtained from fresh madder by the application of hot water; the refuse, after boiling, was called spent madder. It had long been known to dyers, that a portion of the colouring remained in the spent madder, but it was not known how to extract it, as it remained in combination with the plant; recently it was discovered that by means of acid and hot-water the pure colouring matter of madder, called garancine, could be obtained from fresh madder, and that this process extracted the colouring matter of the plant. The plaintiff obtained a patent for the new manufacture of garancine, by applying the same process of acid and hot water to the spent madder; since his invention the spent madder, which was previously worthless, became valuable.

At the trial Chief Baron Pollock directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant, upon the ground apparently that there was no subject for a patent; in reversing this decision Mr. Justice Pearson said: "Now spent madder might be a very different thing from fresh madder in its properties, or it might be in effect the same thing as fresh madder in its properties, chemical and otherwise, with the difference only that part of its colouring matter had been already extracted. Again, the properties, chemical and otherwise, might or might not have been known to chemists and other scientific persons, so that they could

(f) 20 L. J. Exch. 410.

find out whether fresh madder and spent madder were different or substantially the same things. The points appear to us to be questions of fact, and materially to affect the validity or invalidity of a patent." It will appear, therefore, that the Court were of opinion that it was a question of fact whether spent madder and fresh madder were the same thing in their chemical properties; if they were, no patent; if they were not, the validity of the patent would be sustained, but the fact must be decided by the jury.

In Bamlett v. Picksley (g), Blackburn, J., said: “There may be cases in which a thing is used which would be identically the old one to produce a new product altogether, but applied to something so totally different that there is an obvious invention in it. Take this example. It was discovered that by taking flour and making it into tough dough by means of machinery you could spin it into a pipe known as macaroni pipe. An ingenious man knowing how to spin flour into a pipe, it occurred to him to take red-hot iron, and spin that into pipes by machinery in the same way as flour was spun into a pipe for macaroni. That was not an invention as it turned out, but had that been so, and had he been able to spin the iron in the same way as flour was spun into pipes for macaroni, few men I think would deny that there was an invention there, it being a product so completely new, and that it would be an invention for making a new manufacture which others did not make, because the result was so totally different, even although in fact the machinery which was used for the purpose, except that it was made stronger, would be identically the same as the machinery originally used for the purpose of making the macaroni."

Lindley, L.J., in Gadd v. The Mayor, &c., of Manchester, after an elaborate review of the authorities, expressed the law

(g) Griff. P. C. at p. 42; see also Hayward v. Hamilton, Griff. P. C. 115; Dangerfield v. Jones, 13 L. T., N. S. 142; Hills v. London Gas Co., 5 H. & N. 312; 29 L. J., Ex. 409; Penn v. Bibby, L. R., 2 Ch. 127, 136; Ehrlich v. Ihlee, 5 P. O. R. 437; Thomson v. The American

Braided Wire Co., 5 P. O. R. 113; 6
P. O. R. 518; L. R. 44 Ch. D. 274;
Moser v. Marsden, 10 P. O. R. 350;
Legge v. Wakelam, 10 P. O. R. 379;
Pirrie v. York Street Spinning Co., 10
P. O. R. 34; 11 P. O. R. 429.

upon this subject by the two following propositions: "1. A patent for the mere use of a known contrivance, without any additional ingenuity in overcoming fresh difficulties, is bad, and cannot be supported. If the new use involves no ingenuity, but is in manner and purpose analogous to the old use, although not quite the same, there is no invention: no manner of new manufacture within the meaning of the Statute of James. 2. On the other hand, a patent for a new use of a known contrivance is good and can be supported if the new use involves practical difficulties which the patentee has been the first to see and overcome by some ingenuity of his own. An improved thing produced by a new and ingenious application of a known contrivance to an old thing, is a manner of new manufacture within the meaning of the Statute (h)."

In Gosnell v. Bishop (i), Bowen, L.J., said: "Where there has been for some time a long unsatisfied demand, and then suddenly an article springs into existence and satisfies it, the length of time during which the demand has remained uncomplied with is matter from which it may be inferred that it is ingenuity alone which has enabled the inventor to surmount the obstacle that otherwise would seem, from the mere existence of the long unsatisfied demand, to have existed somewhere or in some shape."

And, in Hinks v. Safety Lighting Co. (k), Jessel, M.R., said: "Where a slight alteration in a combination turns that which was practically useless before into that which is very useful and very important, Judges have considered that, though the invention was small, yet the result was so great as fairly to be the subject of a patent; and, as far as a rough test goes, I know of no better."

In the case of Longbottom v. Shaw (1), Lord Herschell said: "Great reliance is placed upon the fact that when this patent was taken out and frames were made in accordance with it, there was

(h) 9 P. O. R. 524.

(i) 5 P. O. R. 158; see also Moss v. Malings, 3 P. O. R. 378; The American Braided Wire Co. v. Thomson, 5 P. O. R. 125.

(k) L. R., 4 Ch. D. 615.

(1) 8 P. O. R. 336; see also Blakey v. Latham, 6 P. O. R. 187; Gosnell v. Bishop, 5 P. O. R. 158.

a large demand for them . .

I do not dispute that that is a matter to be taken into consideration; but, again, it is obvious that it cannot be regarded in any sense as conclusive. I think that its value depends very much upon certain other circumstances. If nothing be shown beyond the fact that the new arrangement results in an improvement, and that this improvement causes a demand for an apparatus made in accordance with the patent, I think that it is of very little importance."

In Dowling v. Billington (m) the patent in question was one for a method as distinguished from a patent for a machine to carry out the method, or for the manufactured article. It was admitted that the "method" required no novel machinery, but consisted in the use, by the workman, of an existing machine in a way which was novel and the result useful, it was held that this was good subject-matter.

A new combination is an invention consisting of the discovery that two or more, new or old, processes, materials, or implements, when used together, will become applicable to a new purpose, or will effect an old purpose in a better, cheaper, or more expeditious manner than it had before been done.

In Huddart v. Grimshaw (n), Lord Ellenborough said: "I suppose it will not now be disputed that a new combination of old materials, so as to produce a new effect, may be the subject of a patent." There may be a valid patent for a new combination of materials previously in use for the same purpose (o).

In Foxwell v. Bostock (p), Lord Westbury said: "If a combination of machinery for effecting certain results has previously existed and is well known, and an improvement is afterwards discovered, consisting, for example, of the introduction of some new parts, or an altered arrangement in some particulars of the

(m) 7 P. O. R. 191.

(n) Dav. P. C. 267; 1 Web. P. C. 86; see also Tindal, C.J., in Crane v. Price, 1 Web. P. C. 408; 4 M. & G. 580; Vickers v. Siddell, 7 P. O. R. 292.

(0) Hill v. Thompson, per Lord Eldon, 1 Web. P. C. 237.

(p) 12 W. R. 725; see also Harrison v. The Anderston Foundry Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 574; Hayward v. Hamilton, Griff. P. C. 115; Moore v. Bennett, Griff. P. C. 158; Wenham Gas Co. v. Champion Gas Lamp Co., 8 P. O. R. 320; Boyd v. Horrocks, 9 P. O. R. 77.

existing constituent parts of the machine, an improved arrangement or improved combination may be patented."

Bovill's patent consisted of a combination of a blast with an exhaust of air to millstones, for the purpose of preventing the heat generated in grinding corn and saving the dust generated. It was proved that a blast and an exhaust had been used separately, but that the combination was a substantial improvement. The patent was held good (q).

In Crane v. Price (r), the patentee, in his specification, after specifically disclaiming the use of the hot blast or the use of anthracite coal, proceeded: "What I do claim as my invention is, the application of anthracite or stone coal or culm combined with the using of hot air blast in the smelting and manufacture of iron from ironstone, mine or ore as above described." The patent was held valid for the combination.

In his judgment in this case, Lord Chief Justice Tindal said: "We are of opinion that if the result produced by such a combination is either a new article, or a better article, or a cheaper article to the public than that produced before by the old method, that such a combination is an invention or manufacture intended by the statute to, and may well, become the subject of a patent" (s).

This exposition of the law has been approved of by the Court of Appeal in the cases Murray v. Clayton (t) and Lyon v. Goddard (u).

A combination may be patented which consists in the omission from an old process or machine of some part which had previously been considered to be essential (x), or in the substitution for some part of an old process or machine of a mechanical equivalent which was not known before to be a mechanical equiva

(a) Bovill v. Keyworth, 7 E. & B. 7251; 29 L. T. 194; Brunton v. Hawkes, 4 B. & Ald. 550; Lewis v. Davis, 1 Web. P. C. 488; 3 C. & P. 502; 1 Carp. P. C. 471; Carpenter v. Smith, 1 Web. P. C. 538; Allen v. Rawson, 1 C. B. 551; Lister v. Leather, 8 E. & B. 1004; 27 L. J., Q. B. 295; Dangerfield v. Jones, 13 L. T., N. S. 142.

(r) 1 Web. P. C. 377; 12 L. J., C. P. 81; 4 M. & G. 580.

(s) 1 Web. P. C. 408.
(t) L. R., 7 Ch. 584.

(u) 10 P. O. R. 334, 346.

(x) Booth v. Kennard, 1 H. & N. 527; 2 H. & N. 84; 26 L. J., Ex. 23, 305; Russell v. Cowley, 1 Web. P. C. 457; 1 Cr. M. & R. 864.