It is clear that the law cannot concede to organizations of this character the powers and immunities claimed for their associations by these defendants, and retain its own power to protect the individual citizen in the free enjoyment of his capital or labor. The case stands upon grounds which are inconsistent with the allowance of exemplary damages; for damages of this nature, if ever recoverable against several defendants, are recoverable only where all are shown to have been moved by a wanton desire to injure.

APPENDIX No. 12.

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING INJUNCTIONS IN MASSA

CHUSETTS.

During the past five years no cases of injunctions in labor disputes have occurred in the following counties: Nantucket, Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes, Franklin, Hampshire, Berkshire, Norfolk. The clerk of courts of Franklin County writes: "From my observation, injunction is a process that the courts dislike to use in this Commonwealth. I never knew of a justice of our courts issuing one if any other feasible course could be adopted, and then only if great hardship seemed about to be inflicted by reason of delay."

The clerk of courts of Middlesex County writes: " During the past five years no injunctions have issued for restraining strikes and boycotts. The last case was from Stoneham, 1897. No injunction issued in that case, but upon a hearing in the supreme judicial court a decree was entered, of which I enclose a copy. Order of notice in one or two cases issued to show cause why injunctions should not issue, but the cases have been settled before any decree became necessary. There has not been any case, within my knowledge, where persons have been found guilty of contempt, or punished by fine or imprisonment."

The substance of the decree mentioned in the Stoneham case is given for the purpose of showing the scope of the same. It was as follows:

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the said defendants and each of them are hereby strictly enjoined from interfering with the plaintiff's business by persuading or attempting to persuade any one in the plaintiff's employment to leave his employment, or by obstructing or interfering with any person who now is or may hereafter be in the plaintiff's employment, or who may desire to enter the same, as he is approaching or leaving the plaintiff's premises, or by intimidating or attempting to intimidate, physically or morally, by threats or otherwise, any such person, with a view to prevent him or to prevent other persons from entering or continuing in such employment.

The clerk of courts of Plymouth County writes: "The only case in this county pertaining to boycotts and strikes that I remember is a bill in equity filed last month [October, 1903], on which no hearing has as yet been had."

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The clerk of courts of Hampden County says: During the past five years there have been two cases, Chapman Valve Co. v. John P. O'Connell et al.. and Bausch and Harris Machine and Tool Co. v. John M.

Hannon et al., in which injunctions were asked. No one has been found guilty of contempt, and no persons have been punished by fine or imprisonment in either of these cases. There was in this county a controversy between two labor unions, in which there was a hearing upon the question of contempt. This county has had but very few strikes.”

The two injunctions referred to were substantially the same, as follows:

We, therefore, in consideration of the premises, do strictly enjoin and command you, the said respondents, and all and every the persons before named, to desist and refrain from interfering with the plaintiff's business by patrolling the sidewalk or street in front of or in the vicinity of the premises occupied by the plaintiff as described in said bill, for the purpose of preventing any person or persons who are now or who may hereafter be in its employment, or desirous of entering into and continuing in the same, or by obstructing or interfering with such persons or any others in entering or leaving the plaintiff's said premises, or by intimidating by threats, threatening gestures or otherwise, any person or persons who are now or who may hereafter be in the employment of the plaintiff or desirous of entering into or continu. ing in the same, from entering in or continuing in the same, or by any conspiracy among themselves or with others, organized for the purpose of annoying, hindering, interfering with or preventing any person or persons who are now or who may here. after be in the employment of the plaintiff, or desirous of entering the same, from entering or from continuing therein.

The clerk of courts of Worcester County writes: "The only case we know of or can find is Francis A. McCauliff v. The Fitchburg Branch Stone Cutters National Union et al., and I send you a copy of the injunction in that case."

The following is the substance of said injunction:

We, therefore, in consideration of the premises, do strictly enjoin and command you, the said respondents, and all and every the persons before named, to desist and refrain from patrolling the streets near or about the premises occupied by the plaintiff in the operation of his business in said Fitchburg, or alongside or closely following the plaintiff's employees as they come from or go to their work; from using indecent language or opprobrious epithets to the plaintiff's employees; from threatening, assaulting, intimidating or in any way attempting to intimidate the plaintiff's employees, or from obstructing or interfering with such persons or any others in entering or leaving the plaintiff's premises in said Fitchburg; from persuading or attempting to persuade any person in said Fitchburg to boycott the plaintiff's employees from securing food and lodging in said Fitchburg, or from conspiring or continuing by threats or intimidation to annoy, hinder, interfere with or prevent any person or persons, firms or corporations from entering into business relations with the plaintiff or from continuing therein.

The clerk of courts of Essex County replies that during the past five years there have been twenty-three cases involving disputes between employers and employees; that no persons had been found guilty of contempt for violating injunctions or punished by fine or imprisonment; and he enclosed two copies of interlocutory decrees. The more comprehensive, of these decrees is as follows:

Thereupon, upon consideration thereof, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed, that a temporary injunction issue, restraining the respondents and each and every of them except the respondents John T. Bradley and John Fleming from patrolling the streets in front of or near the complainant's place of business, workshops and foundry, or alongside the complainant's employees as they come from and go to their work in the complainant's place of business, workshops and foundry, for the purpose of interfering with the complainant's conduct of its business; and from using indecent language

and opprobrious epithets to the complainant's employees; from detaining, threatening, assaulting, intimidating, or in any way attempting to intimidate the complainant's employees; from persuading or attempting to persuade such of the complainant's employees or any of them who are now under contract of employment to break such contract and to leave the employment of the complainant, or in any way interfering with the conduct of the business by the complainant as now carried on and conducted by it; and from annoying, hindering or preventing any person or persons who now are or may hereafter become employees of the complainant from entering into any contract relations with it or to deprive it thereof; or from entering into, joining or continuing in any scheme, conspiracy or combination one with another or with any other person or persons, with a view of injuring or interfering with the complainant in the conduct of its business, to annoy, hinder, threaten or intimidate such persons as may be desirous of entering the complainant's employ from so entering it, and from annoying, hindering, threatening or in any way intimidating such intending persons, in pursuance of such scheme, combination or conspiracy; or from obstructing or interfering with such persons or any others in entering or leaving the complainant's premises; and from conspiring or contriving, by threats or intimidation, to annoy, hinder, interfere with or prevent any person or persons, firms or corporations from entering into business relations with the complainant or from continuing therein, all until the further order of the court.

The clerk of the equity session of the superior court for Suffolk County writes: "During the past five years there have been about thirty cases, fourteen having been brought by different breweries against the same defendants. About ten cases have been heard from surrounding counties. In most cases the issue enjoining the respondents is substantially a final decree, no further relief being prayed for.

"Few persons have ever been found guilty of contempt for violating a 'strike' injunction. Many petitions for contempt proceedings have been heard, but the breaches relied upon and alleged have not been proved. In the case of the American Woolen Co. v. The Weavers' Union of Fitchburg, two respondents were found guilty and sentenced to two and four months respectively in the jail at Fitchburg, but before the expiration of the term imposed were discharged by the court upon their own petition. A capias is now out for the arrest of a respondent found guilty by reason of his default for failure to appear in a Lynn

case.

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Bills seeking injunctions in strike cases have been rare. More have been brought during the year 1902 than during the five or six years preceding, or since. Such injunctions are not issued ex parte, but only upon the return of an order of notice served on every one interested, and after hearing thereon; in some instances counsel for the parties have assented thereto before the injunction was decreed. It is the disposition of the court to give parties the most speedy hearing possible to their respective rights; and when such hearing cannot be given by the court, a master is appointed, with instructions to proceed forthwith, and it is only after a full hearing upon such report that the injunction issues.

"There are no strike cases not heard now in the superior court [November 27, 1903].

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'It is difficult to say there has been any growth to bills in equity seeking injunction in strike cases in this Commonwealth. Troubles have arisen from time to time that seem to have occasioned such bills, but they have not been numerous, and there has been no perceptible increase from year to year. The year 1902 was peculiar to itself. Strikes

were in the air everywhere. The newspapers were filled with the subject, and more than two-thirds of all strike cases on the docket in Suffolk County were brought that year. That condition, however, has hardly continued, if the absence of such actions in 1903 on the court docket is any criterion.

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In the issue of such injunctions the court has substantially followed the similar actions decided by the supreme judicial court of Vegelahn v. Guntner and Plant v. Woods."

The copies of decrees for injunctions and injunctions submitted were not essentially different from those given above, except that "persuasion and attempting to persuade" are not enjoined against.

The clerk of the supreme judicial court for Suffolk County informs us that there have been but two cases during the past five years in which injunctions were asked for against striking employees, one of which was recently entered, and that such cases are generally brought in the superior court of that county.

APPENDIX No. 13.

AN ACT TO GIVE TRIAL BY JURY AND APPEAL IN CERTAIN CASES OF CONTEMPT OF COURT.

SECTION 1. Contempts of court are divided into two classes, direct and indirect, and shall be proceeded against only as hereinafter prescribed.

SECTION 2. Contempts committed during the sitting of the court or of a judge at chambers in its or his presence, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice, or by neglecting or refusing to obey the mandate of any lawful subpoena to attend any court, or before a judge, commissioner or other magistrate and testify as a witness, or produce books, documents or records, or by neglecting or refusing to obey the mandates of a lawful summons or subpœna to attend and serve as a juror in any court, are direct contempts. All other contempts are indirect contempts.

SECTION 3. A direct contempt may be punished summarily without written accusation against the person arraigned, but if the court or judge at chambers shall adjudge him guilty thereof, a judgment shall be entered of record, in which shall be specified the conduct constituting such contempt, with a statement of whatever defence or extenuation the accused offered thereto, and the sentence of the court thereon; but when the alleged contempt consists in neglecting and refusing to obey the mandates of the subpoena or summons to attend as a witness and give evidence, or produce books, papers or documents, or to attend as a juror, due proof of the lawful service of such subpoena or summons shall first be filed, and the contumacious witness or juror allowed to file written

proofs by affidavit, denying such service or giving excuses for the neglect or failure to obey such mandates, and thereupon the court may proceed to a hearing on the alleged contempt.

case.

SECTION 4. Upon the return of an officer on process or an affidavit duly filed, showing any person guilty of indirect contempt, a writ of attachment or other lawful process may issue, and such person be arrested and brought before the court or judge at chambers; and thereupon a written accusation, setting forth succinctly and clearly the facts alleged to constitute such contempt, shall be filed, and the accused required to answer the same by an order which shall fix the time therefor and also the time and place for hearing the matter, and the court or judge at chambers may, on proper showing, extend the time so as to give the accused a reasonable opportunity to purge himself of such contempt. After the answer of the accused, or if he refuse or fail to answer, the court or judge at chambers may proceed at the time so fixed to hear and determine such accusation upon such testimony as shall be produced. If the accused answer, the trial shall proceed upon testimony produced as in criminal cases, and the accused shall be entitled to be confronted with the witnesses against him: and if a trial by jury be not demanded, such trial shall be by the court without the intervention of a jury if the alleged contempt consists in the violation of an order or process of the court, or by a judge at chambers in case the alleged contempt consists in the violation of an order or lawful process granted by a judge at chambers; but upon application of the accused within the time allowed for an answer, a trial by jury shall be had, as in a criminal In case an application is made for a trial by jury, and the alleged offender is entitled thereto under the provisions of this act, a court or judge may impanel a jury for the trial of the que-tion from the jurors then in attendance, or send the case to a term of the court for trial at a future day; and if no jury is in attendance, the court or judge at chambers, as the case may be, may cause a sufficient number of jurors to be selected and examined as provided by law, to attend at the time and place fixed for the trial of such alleged contempt, from which panel of jurors a jury for the trial of the case shall be selected in the manner jurors are selected for the trial of misdemeanors, and in such proceeding the complainant shall be represented by the district attorney or any of his assistants for the district in which such contempt was committed. If the court or judge against which the contempt is alleged to have been committed has not power within its regular jurisdiction to examine and impanel jurors, the accusation and answer thereto shall be referred by the presiding judge to the superior court for the county within which the alleged contempt was committed, and said case shall take its place upon the docket of the criminal court for said county, and be tried in like manner as other cases upon said docket. In any case, however, in which a trial by jury shall be had as above provided, interrogatories shall be framed by the judge presiding at the trial, which shall embrace the questions of fact material to the inquiry, and be submitted to the jury to be by it answered in writing, and to which interrogatories the jury shall separately answer in writing; and in case the jury shall