The sine qua non, as to the boundary of Indian territory, was suddenly abandoned; and, in its stead, a provisional article tendered, providing reciprocally an Indian pacification. This article was harmless, and simple in its terms and tendency; and, having been actually anticipated, by treaties between the United States and the Indians, was accepted by the American commissioners.

While the negociations were pending, accounts of the capture and possession, by the British forces, of the territory and towns between the Penobscot river and the bay of Passamaquoddy, were received in London. Immediately afterwards, the British commissioners substituted a new demand; which savoured more of plausibility, than the pretensions they had previously advanced, in relation to the boundary line, between the United States and the British provinces. They proposed the basis of uti possidetis, under an impression, that the retention of the forts at Michilimackinac, and Niagara, and the territory and towns east of the Penobscot, which, at different periods of the war, had fallen into the possession of the British forces, would compensate for the abandonment of the terms, which they had proposed, in relation to the western lakes, and the north-west boundary of the United States. In submitting the basis of uti possidetis, they declared, that they had no further demands to make; and no other stipulations, on which they were instructed to insist.

This proposition was received, as it deserved to be, by the American commissioners; who stated that they had no authority to cede any part of the territory of the United States, and would subscribe no stipulation to that effect.

The proposed basis of uti possidetis was very inconsistent with the professions of Great Britain, when the American government was invited to a negociation for peace, and at war with the spirit, which the British, in their first interview with the American commissioners, declared had actuated the prince regent. Lord Castlereagh, in his better of the 4th of November, 1813, to the American secretary of state, pledged the faith of the British government, that it was willing to enter into discussions with the government of the United States,

for a conciliatory termination of all controversies subsisting between the two states, with an earnest desire on its part to bring them to a favourable issue, upon principles of perfect reciprocity," not inconsistent with the established maxims of public law, and the maritime rights of the British empire." In addition to this pledge of the British minister, the commissioners, at Ghent, declared, "that no events, which had occurred since the proposal for the negociation, had altered the pacific disposition of their government, or varied its views, as to the terms upon which it was willing to conclude a peace;" and disclaimed any intention, on the part of their government, to acquire an increase of territory.

As the departure from these professions was produced by the partial successes of the British arms, in the vicinity of Passamaquoddy; so the events on the Niagara, in July, August, and September, the capture of the British squadron on Lake Champlain, and the repulse of sir George Prevost from Plattsburg, results on which the British government had not calculated, changed the whole aspect of affairs; and induced the government of Great Britain, to adopt a tone more consonant with the principles of respect for the United States.

From this stage of the negociation, the deportment of the British commissioners promised a favourable issue. On the other hand, the American commissioners avoided every impediment to a successful result. From the new dispositions on the one side, and continued candour and justice on the other, the correspondence speedily terminated in a treaty, which was signed on the 24th of December, 1814, by the respective commissioners, and ratified by the prince regent, on the 28th, and by the president, with the advice and consent of the senate of the United States, on the 18th day of February, 1815. See Appendix No. VIII.

The termination of the war was a subject of sincere congratulation with all parties in this country. The spirit with which it had been conducted by the enemy, through the campaign of 1814, and the pretensions of the British government, as disclosed by its commissioners at Ghent, had tanght the peo

ple the necessity of exerting all their energies, to assert the rights of their country, and to protect its soil against invasion, conflagration, plunder, and outrage. In the animated determination to "assume an armour and attitude,” demanded by the crisis, several of the state legislatures surpassed the national legislature, in preparations for the campaign of 1815. Early in the last session of the 13th congress, a productive system of internal taxation was enacted, to support the credit of the government, and provide the ways and means of equipping a force, adequate to repel every effort of the enemy, upon the frontiers of the United States, and carry a decisive and victorious war into his territories. Happily the treaty arrived in time to save much blood and treasure. The revenues, created to meet a continued war-expenditure, were diverted to an extinguishment of the debt already incurred.

In the result, the equitable demands, with which the United States embarked in the war, were not explicitly attained: but the enemy gained no admission of his extravagant pretensions, which he called his maritime rights. A renunciation of the right of impressment, by Great Britain, a definition of blockade, and the rights of neutrals, were not spread on paper, and ratified in form: but, it is believed, that the energy, valour, and skill of the American seamen, whether engaged in the public or private armed vessels of the United States, and of our army and militia, have made such impressions on the British and other nations, as will, hereafter, command respect for our rights, and prevent the repetition of the wrongs to which we were subjected. The termination of the European wars, actually suspended the practice of impressment; and removed, for the time being, the obnoxious orders and blockades, which had been the subjects of complaint, in the United States, against the British government. In this state of things, the American government and people may rely on the experience of the war, for security against their revival. It may be reasonably assumed, that Great Britain, for the future, will find it more her interest to respect the flag, and regard the rights of the United States, than to hazard a second contest with a people, who, in a war of two years and a half, injured her com

merce* more seriously, and depressed her naval renown more signally, than the powers combined against her, since the commencement of the French revolution. Great Britain has every motive to maintain peace with the United States, on liberal and just terms; and the United States will never preserve a peace with her upon any other terms.

The services of those citizens, who embarked in privateering adventures, during the war, and there were not a few, contributed greatly to annoy the enemy, and make him feel the consequences of a war with the United States. Not less than fifteen hundred prizes, many richly laden, were captured from the enemy, by American privateers. In most instances, their officers and crews exhibited those qualities which characterized the services of their brethren employed in the navy of the United States. An interesting volume might be formed of the various enterprises of the American seamen in private cruisers. Frequently they assailed fleets of merchantmen under strong convoy, and, in spite of their vigilance, carried off valuable prizes. They engaged British armed vessels, with the most desperate resolution. They spread over every sea; and even ran into the English and Irish channels. It is notorious that the British commerce, in those narrow seas, was so harassed, that the premium of insurance was higher than it had been, for many years during the war with France.

APPENDIX No. I.

Extract from the Instructions to Thomas Foster, their representative, by the Freeholders and inhabitants of the town of Plymouth, in opposition to the Stamp Act, in October, 1765.

“YOU, sir, represent a people, who not only descended from the first settlers of this country, but inhabit the very spot they first possessed. Here was laid the foundation of the British empire, in this part of America, which, from a very small beginning, has increased and spread, in a manner very surprising, and almost incredible; especially when we consider, that all this has been effected, without the aid or assistance of any power on earth; and that we have defended, protected, and secured ourselves against the invasions and cruelty of savages, and the subtlety and inhumanity of our inveterate natural enemies, the French: and all this without the appropriation of any tax by stamps, or stamp acts, laid upon our fellow subjects, in any part of the king's dominions, for defraying the expense thereof.

"This place, sir, was, at first, the asylum of liberty; and, we hope, will ever be preserved sacred to it, though it was then no more than a barren wilderness, inhabited only by savage men and beasts.

"To this place, our fathers, whose memories be revered, possessed of the principles of liberty in their purity, disdaining slavery, fled, to enjoy those privileges, to which they had an undoubted right, but of which they were deprived, by the hands of violonce and oppression, in their native country."

We, sir, their posterity, the freeholders, and other inhabitants of this town, possessed of the same sentiments, and retaining the same ardour for liberty, think it our indispensable duty, on this occasion, to express, to you, these our sentiments of the stamp act, and its final consequences to this country; and to enjoin upon you, as you regard not only the welfare, but the very being of this people, that you exert all your power and influence, in opposition to the stamp act."