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Opinion of the Court.
railroad company, its vendor through the foreclosure proceedings of the lands the Government desired, and yet the latter company was designated in the act as the company to select the lands in compensation for those desired and taken by the Government for the Mount Ranier National Park. It may be, as said by the District Court, a matter of speculation why the railroad company rather than the railway company was named as grantee, but it is certain it was done in recognition of rights and not in mere jugglery to obtain lands for the National Park and convey nothing to either company in return-nothing to the railroad company because, according to the contention, it had gone out of existence; nothing to the railway company because, according to the contention, it had not succeeded to the rights of the railroad company. On the contrary, we must assume that the act was passed and the railroad company selected to consummate the exchange either by itself or by its successor, the railway company, or by both. And this was done and the two companies and the trustees of the railway company's mortgage joined in a deed of reconveyance to the United States. And this purpose of the act and what was done under it was recognized by the Land Department. Davenport v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 32 L. D. 28; Ferguson v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 33 L. D. 634; Idaho v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 37 L. D. 135, 138. See also Delany v. Same, 45 L. D. 6. It is pertinently said by counsel for the railway company: "The government itself is satisfied with its title; and certainly it cannot, while retaining that title, deny to those from whom it was obtained the lands offered in exchange."
(2) As we have seen, the right was to select "an equal quantity of nonmineral public lands, so classified as nonmineral at the time of actual Government survey." The lands are in fact non-mineral, but the contention is that they were not so classified at the time of actual survey.
Opinion of the Court.
The deputy surveyor who made the survey reported that the lands, if cleared, would be suitable for grazing, but at the time of the report were more valuable for their timber. This, it is contended, is not a classification of the lands as non-mineral, that it was not a classification but an omission to classify-negative, not affirmative; inferential, not positive and therefore not a compliance with the statute. We cannot concur. The report was accepted by the department as a description of the lands as non-mineral. They could be made suitable for grazing, was the report; pending that time they were more valuable for their timber. There was positive description of their character; words excluding some other character were not necessary. Classification is characterization through the selection of some quality or feature, and therefore lands may be classified as pasture (grazing), timber, arable or mineral. It is determined by surface indications. Minerals may be hidden under any surface, but a surveyor is not expected to explore for them that he may include or exclude reference to them in his reports. Such character is exceptional, besides, and considered by the land office as absent if not noted.1
244 U. S.
The contention that the lands were classified as mineral under the Act of February 26, 1895, is answered by the admission made at the trial that the records do not show it.
(3) The act of Congress authorized the selection of an unsurveyed tract, but required it to be described "in such manner as to designate the same with a reasonable degree of certainty," and it was provided that when surveyed a new list was to be filed describing the tract "according to such survey."
The lands, we have seen, were designated by sectional
1 Davenport v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 32 L. D. 28; Bedal v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 29 L. D. 254; Idaho v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 37 L. D. 135; St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 34 L. D. 211; Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 40 L. D. 64.
244 U. S.
Opinion of the Court.
number, township and range, and it is contended that such designation-"terms of future survey," as counsel term it was not a description "with a reasonable degree of certainty."
This seems to have been the only contention submitted to the Court of Appeals and upon careful consideration the court decided against the contention upon the Act of 1899 and, in analogy, upon other acts of Congress in relation to the public lands and also upon the rules and decisions of the Land Department. It is not necessary to repeat the reasoning of the court. What was a description having "a reasonable degree of certainty" was to be determined by the circumstances. It was in the nature of a question of fact and had tests for decision, as the Court of Appeals pointed out. It had the aid of an adjoining survey and the lands could be readily located from such survey. It was pointed out that the act of Congress did not require exactness; it contemplated a subsequent readjustment. "The filing of the first list is in a sense preliminary to obtaining the patent. It initiates the right, and not as much particularity and exactness is ordinarily required as to where final stages are to be observed in clearing up and completing the transaction. In fact, by contemplation of the statute, the new selection is required to conform with the established survey and thus to correct the description in the primary selection. By reasonable intendment, therefore, we are impressed that the description contained in the Railway Company's list No. 61, under the conditions prevailing of the survey of Township 45 to the north and the proximity of the land in question thereto, designated the land with a reasonable degree of certainty, and must be held sufficient as a matter of law." For the premises from which this excerpt is the conclusion we refer to the opinion.
The Court of Appeals said that the question of the sufficiency of the description was "the single question
urged" for its decision and counsel for defendants contend that no other question is open to our review, and cite Montana Railway Co. v. Warren, 137 U. S. 348, 351. Plaintiff replies that the principle of that case applies only to questions of procedure and not to questions of jurisdiction or the foundation of the right, adducing Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29; Old Jordan Mining & Milling Co. v. Société Anonyme Des Mines, 164 U. S. 261; Gila Valley, Globe & Northern Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94. See also Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 113.
The distinction between questions seems to be artificial. The essential circumstance would seem to be that a review is sought of that which was not decided, not submitted at all or withdrawn from submission and which, if it had been submitted, might have been decided in favor of the appealing party.
However, in deference to the earnestness of counsel, we have considered the questions.
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS POWDER COMPANY ET AL. v. MASLAND ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.
No. 210. Argued May 4, 1917.-Decided May 21, 1917.
In a suit to enjoin defendant froin using or disclosing secret processes of plaintiff's business, defendant, while in effect conceding that he learned them through his former confidential employment by plaintiff, denied that they were secret and insisted on his right to use them as processes well known to the trade and to reveal them to expert witnesses in making his defense. Held, that, during the taking of proofs, defendant might properly be enjoined from disclosing the
processes to experts or other witnesses, the restraint not extending to his own counsel, and that the trial judge in his discretion might reveal them to such persons, at such times, and under such precautions as he might deem necessary in the progress of the case. In such a case the right of the defendant to make a full defense is limited by his duty to abstain from any fraudulent abuse of the trust which was reposed in him by the plaintiff.
The word "property," as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets, is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith.
224 Fed. Rep. 689, reversed.
THE case is stated in the opinion.
Mr. Edwin J. Prindle, with whom Mr. Warren H. Small, Mr. John P. Laffey and Mr. Kenneth S. Neal were on the brief, for petitioners.
Mr. George Wharton Pepper, with whom Mr. John G. Johnson and Mr. Frank Smith were on the brief, for respondents.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a bill to prevent the defendant Walter E. Masland from using or disclosing secret processes the knowledge of which was acquired by the defendant while in the plaintiffs' employ. The defendant admits that he intends to manufacture artificial leather, to which some of the plaintiffs' alleged secret processes relate, but denies that he intends to use any inventions, trade secrets, or secret processes of the plaintiffs that he may have learned in any confidential relation, prefacing his denial, however, with the averment that many of the things claimed by the plaintiffs are well known to the trade. A preliminary injunction was refused at first. 216 Fed. Rep. 271. But before the final hearing the defendant proposed to employ