ECCLESIASTICAL.] THE BISHOP OF NATAL v. THE REV. J. GREEN. vious to this it was held by, and taken from, the rebel Boers by the British troops. It was at first a district of the Cape colony, and the Legislative Council at the Cape was vested with the power of legislation as regards Natal. It was subsequently formed into a distinct and separate colony. In 1847 the Queen, by letters patent, created a Legislature for Natal, giving it power to make and ordain all such laws as might be necessary for the peace, order, and good government of the colony, and by royal instructions which accompanied those letters patent appointed three persons, namely, the Colonial Secretary, Crown Prosecutor, and the Surveyor-General, to be the members of that Legislature, and over which the Lieutenant-Governor was to preside. That council existed until 1856, when, by charter, the present Legislative Council, consisting of four officers of the Crown, and twelve unofficial members, to be elected as is therein provided, was established. This narrative has become necessary because it is argued that the Privy Council have held that after the establishment of an independent Legislature the Crown, by virtue of its prerogative, had no power to grant to the plaintiff his letters patent of Nov. 1853, creating him Bishop of Natal. It may be doubted whether the Privy Council have decided in strict terms either in the case of Mr. Long or in that of the plaintiff, that the Crown had no power to grant the letters patent it did to the plaintiff in Nov. 1853, on the ground that in 1853 the colony of Natal was possessed of an independent Legislature. The language of the Privy Council is this: "Three principal questions arise and have been argued before us; first, were the letters patent of the 8th Dec. 1853-by which Dr. Gray was appointed metropolitan, and a metropolitan see or province was expressed to be created-valid and good in law?" The answer is: "With respect to the first question, we apprehend it to be clear, upon principle, that after the establishment of an independent Legislature in the settlements of the Cape of Good Hope and Natal, there was no power in the Crown, by virtue of its prerogative, to establish a metropolitan see or province, or to create an ecclesiastical corporation." The question stated by the Privy Council refers to Dr. Gray's patent only, and their answer, in my opinion, to only one (an) independent Legislature-namely, that of the Cape of Good Hope, and to one (a) metropolitan seenamely, that of the Cape of Good Hope also; for it is clear that Natal never was created a metropolitan see. It is true that, further on in the judgment, the Privy Council, assuming that the colony of Natal was possessed of an independent Legislature similar to the colony lay down this: "There is, therefore, no power in the Crown to create any new or additional ecclesiastical tribunal or jurisdiction; and the clauses which purport to do so, contained in the letters patent to the appellant and respondent, are simply void in law. No metropolitan or bishop in any colony having legislative institutions can, by virtue of the Crown's letters patent, unless granted under an Act of Parliament alone, or confirmed by colonial statute, exercise any coercive jurisdiction, or hold any court or tribunal for that purpose." I notice that in the answer to the question I have alluded to, the terms "independent Legislature" are used, whilst in the subsequent quotation the terms used are "legislative institutions." In my opinion, the Privy Council, proceeding on the erroneous assumption, either that Natal formed a part of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope-whereas, in truth, it is a separate and distinct colony, 1000 miles away from the Cape of Good Hope-or else that an "independent Legislature, or "legislative institution," existed in Natal in 1853, similar to those which then existed at the Cape of Good Hope; whereas, in truth, the Cape [ECCLESIASTICAL. of Good Hope in 1853 had an independent Parliament, consisting of an elective House of Assembly and an elective Legislative Council, whilst in 1853 the colony of Natal had no such "independent Legislature," or any such "Legislative institutions;" and, in fact, possessed a Legislature wholly dependent upon the Crown, consisting of the LieutenantGovernor and three officers of the Crown, selected and appointed by the Crown, to which the terms "independent Legislature" or "legislative institution" were wholly, in my opinion, inapplicable in the year 1853, when the plaintiff received his letters patent. Indeed, I doubt very much whether either of these terms would be applicable to the council of 1856 and now existing, constituted, as it is, of official nominees of the Crown, and a certain number of non-official members elected by the people; it is half dependent and half independent, and neither altogether the one nor the other, and resembles the council at the Cape of Good Hope, established in 1833, except that the non-official element in the latter were the nominees of the Crown and not elected, as in Natal since 1856. In Mr. Long's case the Privy Council lay down: "The bishopric of Capetown was founded in the year 1847. At this time the legislative authority in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope was vested in the Crown.” True, but it then had a legislative council, composed of certain officers and nominees of the Crown. Besides, the legislative authority at the Cape was not, in 1847, wholly vested in the Crown; the Crown reserved a kind of concurrent jurisdiction to legislate. Well, then, if the Cape Council of 1847, being that established in 1833, was not an "independent Legislature," or a "legislative institution," how can the Natal Council of 1853, composed of the Lieutenant-Governor and three paid officers of the Crown, be termed or held to be an "independent Legislature" or a "legislative institution?" The Privy Council, in their judgment in the Colenso case, say, "We therefore arrive at the conclusion that although in a Crown colony properly so called, &c., a bishopric may be constituted, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction conferred, by the sole authority of the Crown, yet that the letters patent of the Crown will not have any such effect or operation in a colony or settlement which is possessed of an independent Legislature." I have already shown that in 1853 the colony of Natal did not possess anything even resembling an independent Legislature; it would be a caricature to apply these terms to the council which then existed. If I were called upon to define the meaning of the term "a Crown colony properly so called," I should say it was this, namely, a colony or settlement acquired by the British Crown, by conquest or treaty, in which the power of legislation vested with the Sovereign by virtue of the Queen's prerogative, or in which legislation vested with the official nominees of the Crown, appointed by the Crown in that behalf, in which the revenue and expenditure were in the absolute control and disposal of the Crown, in which the lands of the colony were vested in and disposable of, only by the Crown, in which the accounts of the revenue and expenditure were examined by and allowed, or disallowed, by Her Majesty's Commissioners of Audit in London, and in which the inhabitants of the colony had no voice or power whatever, either as to legislation or anything else connected with Government. I think a colony or settlement in the position just described would be essentially a Crown colony properly so called; at any rate it would not be possessed of an independent Legislature. If this definition is correct, then it represents exactly the condition in which the colony of Natal was in the year 1853, and prior and subsequently, as I have already shown, the Cape Colony was at that time possessed of an ECCLESIASTICAL.] THE BISHOP of Natal v. THE REV. J. P. GREENB. [ECCLESIASTICAL. independent Legislature, consisting of an elective assembly and Legislative Council. It may be said that I am bound by the decision of the Privy Council. No man is more willing or anxious to respect and uphold the judgments of their Lordships than I am. I entertain the deepest respect in a quarter where I know so much profound wisdom and learning exist. Iin no manner call in question the wisdom of their decision in this instance; but I trust I need no apology for stating that, in my humble opinion, resting on the facts I have stated, their Lordships, as regarded the colony of Natal, proceeded in respect of the plaintiff's letters patent on imperfect information as to the facts in reference to the political condition of the colony in the year 1853. In questioning this part of the subject it only remains for me to state distinctly that, in my opinion, the colony of Natal in 1853 was a Crown colony properly so called. I come now to another part of this controversy, namely, had the plaintiff the power to take the proceedings and pronounce the sentence he did in regard to the defendaut? To my mind the answer is easy. If, in 1853, Natal was a Crown colony properly so called, then, in my opinion, the proceedings were good and valid, as held by the Privy Council; if, on the other hand, Natal was not a Crown colony properly so called, then they are void in law, because the plaintiff could not under his patent "exercise any coercive jurisdiction, or hold any court or tribunal for that purpose," as also held by the Privy Council. The Privy Council have decided that in the colonies the Anglican Church is to be regarded as a merely voluntary association, and I view the plaintiff and defendant before the court in this sense. In the Ordinance No. 7, 1843, regulating the Dutch Reformed Church, sect. 8 lays down, "No rule or regulation of the said Church, whether contained in the schedule to this ordinance or to be afterwards framed, shall have or possess any direct or inherent power whatever to affect in any way the persons or properties of any person whomsoever. But all such rules and regulations shall be regarded in law in like manner as the rules and regulations of a merely voluntary association, and shall be capable of affecting the persons or properties of such persons only as shall be proved in the course of any action or suit before any competent court to have subscribed, agreed to, adopted, or recognised, the said rules and regulations, or some of them, in such manner as to be bound thereby, in virtue of the ordinary legal principles applicable to cases of express or implied contract." The law contains the proper legal principles by which the rights and privileges of the plaintiff and defendant are to be tested; and this is also what the Privy Council, in Mr. Long's case lay down as the legal position of the Anglican Church in the colonies. The court, then, has to decide on a simple question of evidence, as it would be left to a jury, and I am bound to say that there is abundant direct evidence in the case to show that the plaintiff and defendant were guided and bound by the rules of the Church of England, in so far as they could be made applicable to the Church here. That the defendant formally acknowledged himself as bound to the plaintiff, subject, of course, to those rules, and that so long as the plaintiff took no step which a bishop in England (viewing the parties as the creatures of English law) could not take, his acts must be viewed as within these rules. The defendant was raised to his present position of Dean of Maritzburg by the plaintiff himself, and he before this held his licence. Now, the defendant says, I will no longer acknowledge the plaintiff's capacity, still less authority, because he says the Church has excommunicated the plaintiff, a step which is based upon the proceedings of the Bishop of Capetown, which, as well MAG. CAB.-VOL. V. as the sentence which followed it, the Queen in Her Q. B.] MAYOR, &C., OF REIGATE v. Hart. Mr. Justice PHILLIPS Concurred with the Chief Justice, but if he could have any objection, it could only arise from the smallness of the amount in dispute. Mr. Justice COPE also held that the letters patent were valid, but thought that the court ought to give effect to the decisions of the Bishops' Court. Judgment for the plaintiff, and to carry costs. COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH. Wednesday, Feb. 12, 1868. MAYOR, &c., OF REIGATE v. HART. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 31-Meaning of word "borough" -Penalties, to whom payable, treasurer of borough or of county. 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 31, provides that where the statute under which an information shall have been framed contains no directions for the payment of penalties inflicted thereunder to any person, the justices' clerk of the division shall ". pay the same to the treasurer of the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place, for which such justice or justices shall have acted and the said clerk shall send or deliver every return so made by him as aforesaid to the clerk of the peace for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place within which such division shall be situate, at such times as the court of quarter sessions for the same shall order in that behalf." The borough of Reigate has no separate commission of the peace, or separate court of quarter sessions, and before its charter constituting it a municipal borough with a corporation, formed part of the petty sessional division of the county of Surrey. Its mayor and exmayor act as justices of the peace in and for the borough, but the justices of the county act concurrently with them as borough justices in dealing with offences which are not of a purely borough character: Held, that the mayor and ex-mayor, exercising their jurisdiction within the borough, acted as justices in and for the county within the meaning of the above section: That the word "borough" in that section means borough having a separate quarter sessions; And therefore that the penalties paid on conviction for offences not of a purely local character committed within the borough must be paid by the clerk to the treasurer of the county, and not to the treasurer of the borough. This was an action brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant for the recovery of 481. 12s. 6d., being the amount of penalties and other sums of money adjudged by the justices of the peace acting in and for the borough of Reigate, to be paid under and in pursuance of statutes containing no directions for the payment of such penalties and moneys to any particular person or persons, and received by the defendant as clerk to the said justices; and by the consent of the parties, and the order of Lush, J. according to the C. L. P. A. 1852, the following case was stated for the opinion of the court without any pleadings: CASE. By royal charter, dated the 11th Sept. 1863, the parliamentary borough of Reigate, in the county of Surrey, was constituted a municipal borough with a corporation under the title of "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Burgesses of the Borough of Reigate,' having all the powers and privileges held and enjoyed by the several boroughs named in the schedules to the statute 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, as fully and effectually as if the said borough of Reigate had been | [Q. B. one of the boroughs named in the 1st section of schedule B. to the said Act annexed, and Her Majesty did thereby extend to all the inhabitants of the said borough of Reigate all the powers and provisions of the said statute, and of any other Acts amending or altering the said Act, or in anywise relating thereto. The said borough of Reigate before the said 11th Sept. 1863 formed part of the petty sessional division of the county of Surrey. There is no separate commission of the peace for the said borough under sect. 98 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, and there has been no grant of a separate court of quarter sessions of the peace to the said borough. The justices of the peace for the said county have since the said date by virtue of the 111th section of the said statute exercised the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in and for the said borough, and acted concurrently with the mayor for the time being, who by sect. 57 of the said statute is ex officio a justice of the peace of and for the said borough, and so continues during the year next succeeding his year of office. The defendant, previous to the said 11th Sept. 1863 had been and still is clerk to the county justices acting out of quarter sessions in and for the said petty sessional division of Reigate, and since the incorporation of the said borough he has acted as clerk to such justices, both when acting as justices for the said county out of sessions, and when acting as justices in and for the said borough. By 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 31, it is enacted, That in every warrant of distress to be issued thereunder, the constable or other person to whom the same shall be directed, shall be thereby ordered to pay the amount of the sum to be levied thereunder unto the clerk of the division in which the justice or justices issuing such warrant shall usually act, and if any person convicted in any penalty, or ordered by a justice or justices of the peace to pay any sum of money shall pay the same to any constable or other person, such constable or other person shall forthwith pay the same to such clerk; and if any person committed to prison upon any conviction or order as aforesaid, for nonpayment of any penalty or of any sum thereby ordered to be paid, shall desire to pay the same and costs before the expiration of the time for which he shall be so ordered to be imprisoned by the warrant for his commitment, he shall pay the same to the gaoler or keeper gaoler or keeper shall forthwith pay the same to the said clerk, of the prison in which he shall be so imprisoned, and such and all sums so received by the said clerk shall forthwith be paid by him to the party or parties to whom the same respectively are to be paid according to the directions of the statute on which the information or complaint in that behalf shall have been framed; and if such statute shall contain no such directions for the payment thereof to any person or persons, then such clerk shall pay the same to the treasurer of the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for which such justice or justices shall have acted, and for which such treasurer shall give him a receipt without stamp, and every such gaoler or keeper of a prison shall keep a true and exact account of all such moneys received by him, of whom and when received, and to whom and when paid in the form (T) in the schedule to this Aet annexed, or to the like effect, and shall once in every month render at the petty sessions for the division in which such justice or justices aforesaid shall usually act, to be holden on or next after the first day of every month under the penalty of 40s., to be recovered by distress in manner aforesaid, and the said clerk shall send or deliver every return so made by him as aforesaid to the clerk of the peace for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place within which such division shall be situate, at such times as the Court of Quarter Sessions for the same shall order in that behalf. From the time of the incorporation of the said borough hitherto there has always been a treasurer of and for the said borough. The defendant has since the incorporation of the said borough received divers sums of money, amounting to the sum of 487. 12s. 6d., ordered to be paid by the justices of the peace acting in and for the said borough, for fines and penalties and otherwise for offences committed against certain statutes, which statutes contain no directions for the payment of such money to any particular person or persons, and such moneys have from time to time been paid over by the defendant to the treasurer of the County of Surrey, to whom the defendant contends that they are payable. Plaintiffs' points for argument.-1. That the penalties and sums of money received by the defendant as clerk to the justices, acting in and for the borough of Reigate, should in all cases where the statute, on which the information or complaint in that behalf shall have been framed, contains no directions for the payment thereof to any person or persons, have been paid over by him to the treasurer of the said borough: (See 4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 76, sects. 57 & 111; and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 31.) 2. That the effect of sect. 126 of 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, is only to regulate the payment of certain penalties recovered in boroughs having courts of quarter sessions, which, but for such enactment would be payable to other persons than the treasurer of the borough. 3. That the last-mentioned section is consistent with its being the duty of the clerk of any justices receiving fines, penalties, or fees within a borough, and in matters wherein the justices are acting in and for such borough to pay them over to the treasurer of the borough, even though it may have no separate court of quarter sessions. [Q. B. The question for the opinion of the court is | borough; and if so they come within the 31st secwhether the said sums of money received by the tion of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43. [LUSH, J.-Before defendant as aforesaid should have been paid by him the charter to the borough, the county justices to the treasurer of the said borough or to the trea- had jurisdiction over the borough as part of the surer of the said county? If they should have been county.] The mayor for the preceding and current paid to the treasurer of the borough judgment is to years, at any rate, are justices for the borough be entered for the plaintiff (with costs) for 481 12s. 6d. only; and the other justices acted at the time with If the said sums should have been paid to the reference to offences committed within the borough, treasurer of the said county judgment is to be On these grounds it is submitted that the penalties entered for the defendant with costs. should be paid over in the first instance to the treasurer of the borough, not to the treasurer of the county. [LUSH, J.-Supposing they are ultimately to go to the treasurer of the county, there is nothing in the Act to say that they are to go in the first instance to the treasurer of the borough; there is no provision as to how they are to be got out of him, if they once go to him. BLACKBURN, J.-I think the concluding part of sect. 31 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, shows that the Legislature intended in that section to refer only to places where quarter sessions were held. The concluding words are "And the said clerk shall send or deliver every return so made by him as aforesaid to the clerk of the peace for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place within which such division shall be situate at such times as the quarter sessions for the same shall order in that behalf." LUSH, J.-Some light seems to be thrown on the matter by the form of schedule T. to that Act, setting forth a monthly return of fines, &c., received by the clerk to the justices; for in the form, whilst there is no mention of borough rate, the heading of one column is "Amount of fine received for county rate."] I rely on the fact that, of the justices acting here, the jurisdiction of two did not extend beyond the limits of the borough. [BLACKBURN, J.-Would not a justice acting for a liberty be acting in and for the county in which that liberty was, although his authority was confined to only part of the county? The question comes to this-whether a justice, acting for part of a county, cannot be said to be acting in and for the county, within the meaning of sect. 31 of 11 & 12 Vict. c.43?] Defendant's points.-1. That the borough of Reigate having no separate court of quarter sessions the defendant was not bound to pay over the moneys in question to the treasurer of the said borough. 2. That upon the true construction of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, s. 31, and of the 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 126, which is in pari materiá, such penalties as those in question are only payable to the treasurer of the borough when the borough has a separate court of quarter sessions, and at such times as the eourt of quarter sessions shall order in that behalf. Macnamara for the plaintiffs.-This case comes within the express language of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43, 8. 31, which provides that where a statute contains no directions for the payment of these penalties, the clerk shall pay the same "to the treasurer of the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place for which such justices shall have acted." The case finds that the justices here were acting for the borough, and one of them, the mayor, could act nowhere else, his jurisdiction being confined to the borough; and the county justices also were in the present case acting within the borough for offences committed within the borough. [LUSH, J.-Is there a borough gaol ?] I believe there is no borough gaol. [LUSH, J.-I suppose we are not to consider that the penalties were inflicted for offences of a peculiarly borough kind, or local character, as the violation of a corporation bye-law.] I believe the offences were not of that nature. [BLACKBURN, J.-It would be advisable to have some further information as to the character of the offences.] By sect. 111 of the Municipal Corporation Act (5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76), "the justices assigned, or hereafter to be assigned to keep the peace in and for the county in which any borough is situated, to which His Majesty shall not have granted that a separate court of quarter sessions of the peace shall be holden in and for the same, shall exercise the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in and for such borough as fully as by law they and each of them can or ought to do in and for the said county." I apprehend it was under this section that the county justices in the present case were exercising jurisdiction within the Archibald for the defendant.-Rex v. Amos, 2 B. & Ald. 533, is precisely in point. In delivering the judgment of the court Bayley, J. says: (p. 542) "The justices of the borough of Liverpool have no exclusive jurisdiction within the borough, and they have no jurisdiction in general beyond the borough. As the borough magistrates have no exclusive jurisdiction, the offences within the borough, generally speaking, are county offences. The offenders may be committed ad libitum, either to the borough house of correction, whilst there was one, or to the county house of correction; and they may be tried ad libitum, either at the borough sessions or at the county sessions. They are county offenders, and if not tried at the borough sessions, must, at probably a heavy expense to the county, be tried at the county sessions. The borough justices, therefore, and the borough sessions, as far as they act upon what are at the same time borough and county offences, and borough and county offenders, act in ease and aid of the county magistrates. To a certain extent, therefore, they are for that part of the county to which their power extends, county magistrates." [BLACKBURN, J.-The distinction between that case and the present being that Liverpool had a quarter sessions, and that the case was decided before the Municipal Corporation Act.] As regards the point in dispute the cases are similar. The borough magistrates are, so far as their authority goes, county magistrates; and the jurisdiction which the county magistrates had over the district before the charter is not taken away by it. Reg v. Dale, 22 L. J. 44, M. C., is also in point. It decided that on a conviction under the Alehouse Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 61) by justices of a borough which has a 20 Q. B.] MAYOR, &c., of Reigate v. HART. separate commission of the peace, but no quarter [Q. B. | two passages are, I think, ample authority to confirm what was floating in my mind as probably the solution of the whole matter, namely, that the mayor of such a place as Reigate, where there is no quarter sessions and no non-intromittant clause, acting within the borough, is in the nature of, and to a great extent, a justice of the county, with his powers as justice of the county limited to a certain locality. He is acting as a county justice in and for the county, although his power to act is confined to such matters as occur within a limited portion of the "If any person convicted of any county. Then what says the 31st section of Jervis's Act? penalty, or ordered by justices to pay any sum of money, shall pay the same to any constable or other and all person, such constable or other person shall forthwith pay the same to such clerk; sums so received by the said clerk shall forthwith be paid by him to the party or parties to whom the same respectively are to be paid, according to the directions of the statute on which the information or complaint in that behalf shall have been framed ; and if such statute shall contain no such directions for the payment thereof to any person or persons, then such clerk shall pay the same to the treasurer of the county, riding, division, liberty, Now, stopping there, city, borough or place for which such justice or justices shall have acted." does a borough magistrate, when he acts with reference to an offence which any justice of the county might try, act for the borough or the county? I think he may properly be said to be acting for the county, and not for the borough. "And the said clerk Then the section says: shall send or deliver every return so made by him as aforesaid to the clerk of the peace for the county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough or place within which such division shall shall be situate, at such times as the court of quarter sessions for the same shall order in that behalf," meaning plainly a quarter sessions to which an appeal would lie from the conviction, and that would be in the present case, the quarter Macnamara in reply, Reg v. Dale was decided sessions for the county. There must be such a entirely with reference to the wording of the Ale-quarter sessions; and the words being taken to be house Act, as appears from the judgment. The word "borough" does not occur in that Act as it does in the present. R. v. Amos is distinguishable as having been decided before the Municipal Corporation Act. BLACKBURN, J.-I think now the case is pretty clear. R. v. Amos was a case in which the point was raised whether the justices of the borough of Liverpool, which had no non-intromittant clause, though it had a borough sessions, were bound to be at the expense of building a gaol, and in the judgment of the court we find it laid down that "the borough justices and the borough sessions, as far as they act upon what are at the same time borough and county offences, and borough and county offenders, act in ease and aid of the county justices and county sessions, and discharge that duty which must otherwise be discharged by the county magistrates. To a certain extent, therefore, they are for that part of the county to which their power extends county magistrates." And further on, in allusion to the distinction laid down by Lord Ellenborough between a county offence triable ad libitum either at the borough or the county sessions, and a borough offence cognisable by borough justices only, "Upon what principle could that be but upon this, that to this extent, and with reference to county offenders within their limits, they were in the nature of, and had the powers of county justices; and if this were their character they must be considered as county justices for all purposes connected with the subject, and not for the purpose of commitment only." These 66 county, riding, division, liberty, city, borough, or place," as the county and riding have always quarter sessions, and the liberty generally, I think that "borough" must be taken ejusdem generis with the rest, as referring only to such a borough as has a quarter sessions. And where the appeal is to the justices of the county, and the expenses of prosecutions are borne by the county, one would think that the benefit of the penalties should go to the fund which bore the expenses of the prosecution. Accordingly, it is said in Reg. v. Dale, "It would be strange that the same word should give to one fund, the borough fund, all the penalties for good convictions, and charge upon another fund, the county rate, all the costs for convictions which could not be sustained." The same reasoning applies here and we avoid the strangeness by holding the justices here to be acting in and for the county, and the general words "borough or place" to be limited to such as are ejusdem generis with the preceding. LUSH, J.-I am of the same opinion. For the purposes of this decision I import into the case what has not been stated in it, but is agreed to by both parties, that the offences for which the penalties have been inflicted are not offences against any local Act or bye-law, and, that being so, I think the case of Reg. v. Dale decides that the magistrates acting with reference to such offences act as justices in and for the county. Then the 31st section seems free from doubt and ambiguity: "If such statute shall contain no such directions for the payment thereof to any person or persons, then such clerk |