Q. B.] BIRCH V. THE VESTRY OF ST. MARYLEBONE. sons having the control of the pavements of any streets or public places in any parochial or other district within the jurisdiction of this Act, or with any person or persons authorised by them, for the sale and conveyance of their respective estates and interests therein, or cannot be found or known, or shall not produce and evince a clear title to the premises they are in possession of, or to the interest they claim therein, to the satisfaction of the said commissioners or trustees or other persons as aforesaid, or of the person or persons so authorised by them, then and in every such case it shall be lawful for the said commissioners or trustees or other persons as aforesaid, and they are hereby required to issue a warrant or warrants, precept or precepts, directed to the sheriff or sheriffs or bailiff or other proper officer of the city, borough, or county wherein the premises shall respectively lie or be, who is hereby authorised, directed, and required accordingly to impannel, summon, and return a competent number of substantial and disinterested persons qualified to serve on juries, not less than forty-eight, nor more than seventy-two; and, out of such persons so to be impannelled, summoned, and returned, a jury of twelve men shall be drawn by some indiffe rent person to be by the said commissioners or trustees or other persons as aforesaid appointed, in such manner as juries for the trial of issues joined in His Majesty's court at Westminster are . which persons so to be impannelled, summoned, and returned as aforesaid, are hereby required to come and appear before the justices of the peace for the city, borough, or county, wherein the premises shall lie and be, at some court of general or quarter sessions of the peace, to be holden in and for the same city, borough, or county, or at some adjournment thereof, as in such warrant or warrants, precept or precepts, shall be directed and appointed, and to attend such court of gene al or quarter sessions from day to day until discharged by the said court; and all parties concerned shall and may have their lawful challenges against any of the said jurymen, but shall not be at liberty to challenge the array; and the said justices are hereby authorised and empowered by precept or precepts from time to time, as occasion shall require, to call before them all and every person and persons whomsoever, who shall be thought proper and necessary to be examined as a witness or witnesses on his, her, or their oath or oaths, touching or concerning the premises; and the said justices, if they think fit, shall and may, on the application of either party, likewise authorise the said jury to view the said place or places, or premises in question, in such manner as they shall direct; and the said justices shall have power to adjourn such court from day to day as occasion shall require, and to command such jury, witnesses, and parties, to attend until all such affairs for which they were summoned shall be concluded; and the said jury, upon their oaths (which oaths, as also the oaths of such person or persons as shall be called upon to give evidence, the said justices are hereby empowered and required to administer) shall inquire of the value of such houses, buildings, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, and of the proportionable value of the respective estates and interests of all and every person and persons seised or possessed thereof, or interested therein, or of or in any part or parts thereof, and shall assess and award the sum or sums of money to be paid to such person or persons, party or parties respectively for the purchase of such houses, buildings, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, and of such respective estates and interests therein, and also for goodwill, improvements, or any injury or damage whatsoever that may affect any such person or persons, party or parties, either as leaseholders or tenants at will, provided that such goodwill shall be estimated by what, in the opinion of such jury, the same would have been worth in case the improvements intended by this Act had not been in contemplation; and the said justices shall and may give judgment for such sum or sums of money so to be assessed, &c. [Q. B. Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 (8 & 9 Vict c. 18), but by sect 152 it is provided That the provisions of the said Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, "with respect to the purchase and taking of lands otherwise than by agreement," shall not be incorporated with this Act, save for enabling the Metropolitan Board of Works to take land, or any right or easement in or over land, for the purpose of making any sewers or works for preventing the sewage or any part of the sewage within the metropolis from passing into the Thames, in or near the metropolis, or otherwise, for the purpose of the sewerage or drainage of the metropolis. J. Horne Payne (with whom was H. Lloyd, Q. C.), in support of the demurrer to the pleas and of the declaration demurred to. The defendants, being substituted by sect. 90 of 18 & 19 Vict., c. 120, for the former commissioners or trustees, have a duty imposed on them to issue their warrant or precept, by the words contained in sect. 82 of 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix., "and they are hereby required to issue a warrant or warrants, precept or precepts," &c., they having given the plaintiff notice to treat for the purchase of her premises, and not having agreed with her for the compensation to be paid in respect of them. In R. v. The Commissioners for Improving Market-street, Manchester, in a note to R. v. The Hungerford Market Company, 4 B. & Ad. 333, the enactment in the local Act of Parliament was similar, and the commissioners resisted the application made for a mandamus to issue their warrant, on the ground that their funds were limited, that a very small portion of the premises was in fact requisite for the purposes of their Act, and that they gave the notices merely with a view of being enabled to take any favourable opportunity which might occur for purchasing (there being no power given them by their Act to remove any party without such notice), but not with any final determination to purchase at all events; yet the court made absolute the rule for a peremptory mandamus. The defendants are bound by the notice which they have given to the plaintiff. In R. v. The Hungerford Market Company, p. 332, Parke, B. says: "The company are not bound to purchase the property mentioned in the schedule, but the question is, at what period they shall be said to have exercised their option. Now, I think that is done when they have given notice, and that, according to reason and good sense, such notice ought to be as binding on them as on the owner or occupier. And this construction, which I should be disposed to put independently of express words in the statute, is supported by the language of sect. 6, &c.; and, speaking of the case of R. v. The Commissioners for Improving Market-street, Manchester, he says: "The language of the statute there was different, and I believe there were no compulsory words; but the court thought, from the general provisions of the Act, that the commissioners were to be considered as having exercised their option when they gave notice of taking the premises, and that they could not withdraw from it." In some cases it has been held that a notice to treat under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act constitutes the relation of vendor and purchaser between the parties. In Fotherby v. The Metropolitan Railway Company, L. Rep. 2 C. P. 188, it was held that the neglect by a company to issue their warrant to assess the value of land which they had given notice that they would require for the purposes of their Act, within a reasonable time after such notice, is an actionable wrong, and that the issue of such warrant might be enforced by action for a mandamus under the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. This doctrine was upheld by the Court of Exchequer Chamber (affirming the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas) in the case of Morgan v. The Metropolitan Railway Company, L. Rep. 4 C. P. 97. Then, as to the objections raised by the This Act incorporates certain provisions of the defendants' fourth and fifth pleas, viz., that the By sect. 90 of the Metropolis Local Management Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), the powers of the commissioners or trustees as aforesaid are transferred to the vestries. It provides that All the duties, powers, and authorities for or in relation to the paving, lighting, watering, cleansing, or improving of any parish mentioned in schedule A to this Act [the parish of St. Marylebone being one], or any part of such parish, now vested in any commissioners or in any body other than the vestry of such parish, or in any officer of any commissioners or other body, and all other duties, powers, and authorities in any wise relating to the regulation, government, or concerns of any such parish or part, or of the inhabitants thereof (except such duties, powers, and authorities as relate to the affairs of the church, or the management or relief of the poor, or the administration of any money or other property applicable to the relief of the poor, so far as such duties, powers, and authorities relate thereto), now vested under any local Act of Parliament, in any commissioners, or in any body other than the vestry of such parish, or in any such officer, shall cease to be so vested, and shall, save as herein otherwise provided, become vested in, and be possessed and exercised by, the vestry of such parish under this Act. Q. B.] BIRCH V. THE VESTRY OF ST. MARYLEBONE. plaintiff did not deliver to the defendants parti- | culars of her estate and interest, within twentyone days from the service of the notice on her, or within a reasonable time after that service, there is no duty to do so cast on the plaintiff by the Act of 59 Geo. 3, c. xxix., and so the pleas are bad. Keane, Q. C. in support of the pleas and of the demurrer to the declaration.-Two things are by sect. 80 of 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix., necessary to give the vestry jurisdiction to take the plaintiff's premises, first, that the premises should be adjudged by the defendants to project into, obstruct, or prevent them from altering, turning, widening, &c., the streets or public places within the parish; and secondly, that the possession, occupation, and purchase of the premises will be necessary for the purpose of altering, turning, widening, &c., the said streets or public places. The declaration is bad for not averring the existence of these conditions precedent to the exercise of the defendant's jurisdiction to take the premises. [COCKBURN, C. J.-Must it not be taken against you that having given a notice to treat for the purchase, that state of things existed which entitled you to give the notice?] If after the vestry have given the proper notice to treat for the purchase of the plaintiff's premises the necessity for taking them no longer exists, the vestry are not bound by their notice. The vestry are a public body, and obliged to perform their duties strictly according to law, and they cannot purchase where a necessity to take the premises no longer exists. There is nothing about giving notiee in writing or otherwise in the statute, and the notice does not constitute a binding contract. [BLACKBURN, J.-I think the declaration makes an unnecessary allegation when it alleges that the defendants gave the plaintiffs a notice in writing. The material allegation is that they gave her such a notice as tied up the land.] It is submitted that as the statute contains nothing about notice, the notice of itself cannot be binding on the defendants. [LUSH, J.-When are they bound, if not by their notice? There are no words in the statute to bind them even after verdict. COCKBURN, C. J.-The notiee takes away from the owner his option, and by virtue of the statute amounts to an agreement on his part to sell. Then there must be reciprocity, and those who gave the notice must be bound by it.] Surely if the vestry find that the notice was given on a mistaken view as to the necessity of taking the premises they ought not to be held bound to take them simply because the notice was given. [BLACKBURN, J.-I by no means say that by a proper plea you might not allege the fact that the notice was given with reference to something which was not necessary for the purposes of the vestry but I find nothing of that sort on the record as it stands.] In Reg. v. The Commissioners of Woods, Forests, &c., 15 Q. B. 761, it was held that the commissioners in giving notices under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 38, s. 15, that they intended to take lands for the purpose of forming Battersea Park, were acting in a public capacity, and that the notices given by them did not constitute a quasi contract enforceable by mandamus. Patteson, J. says, in delivering the judgment of the court, "If this was the case of a railway or other private company, no doubt the return would be insufficient, because, notice having been given that the lands were required, and a claim sent in accordingly, a contract is entered into, and the parties stand in the relation of vendor and purchaser. If the company had not the means of paying for the lands, they should have abstained from giving notice to the owner. But a private company to whom an Act is granted for their profit, differs materially from commissioners appointed under a public Act, to do on behalf of the executive Government certain things for the [Q. B. benefit of the public; and the principle that imposes liabilities upon a private company, as arising in consideration of the statute granted to them, has no application in the case of such public commissioners. In the case of commissioners for the public, having a limited power of taking land, provided the required quantity can be obtained for a given sum, a notice to treat for the purchase should be construed to be that which it is; the commissioners cannot ascertain whether the land can be obtained for a price unless they treat for the purchase. There is a duty under the statute to open the treaty; but it would defeat the intention of the Legislature if the opening of a treaty was held to be the completion of the contract. . . It has been contended that the prosecutor suffers a hardship by reason of the notice, inasmuch as his property is rendered unsaleable and unimproveable thereby; but these results arise in truth from the passing of the statute, and not from the giving of the notice. The statute places the land at the option of the commissioners; the title is at once affected thereby, and the motive for improvement is taken away; no material addition to these inconveniences arises from the commissioners opening a treaty for the purchase of the lands so placed at their option, by giving the notice." The reasons on which this judgment proceeded apply to the present case, the vestry being a public body, not acting for their own benefit, as a railway or other private company does. [COCKBURN, C. J. referred to the case of Coe v. Wise, 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 666, and on appeal 7 B. & S. 831, as to the liability of public bodies.] No argument was addressed to the court in support of the 4th and 5th pleas. COCKBURN, C. J.-Our judgment must be for the plaintiff. With regard to the pleas demurred to, viz., the 4th and 5th, I have no hesitation in saying that they are bad, and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to give the notice to the defendants, which they complain has not been given. Then we come to the declaration, which is objected to, first, on the ground that it must show the existence of that preliminary state of facts on which the jurisdiction of the vestry to take the premises arises; and secondly, that the notice to treat given by the defendants to the plaintiff is not binding on them, so as to constitute an engagement on their part to take the land entitling the plaintiff to insist on their issuing their warrant. As to the first ground of objection, it seems to me quite allowable for the plaintiff to allege that she received a notice from the defendants, which they were entitled to give only in case of the existence of a certain state of facts. It has been contended that the existence of that state of facts must also be alleged in the declaration. It appears to me to be quite sufficient that the vestry are alleged to have done an act which presupposes the existence of that state of circumstances. If the defendants allege by a plea the fact that they had made a mistake as to the existence of the state of circumstances on which their statutory jurisdiction arises, I do not at present say whether that would be a sufficient answer to the claim of persons against whom they have taken steps in exercise of their statutory power, and who are entitled to assume that the vestry have taken care to see that the antecedent facts on which their jurisdiction arises, have been called into existence. Next comes the question whether the notice which they have given the vestry is binding on the vestry. I think it is. The case of Reg. v. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests, 17 L. J. 341, is an authority directly in point. There the statute under which the commis Q. B.] CIRCULAR DELIVERY COMPANY (LIMITED) (apps.) v. WILLIAM CLARE (resp.) sioners were acting contained provisions similar to those in the present Act, and the commissioners having given notice of their intention to take certain lands, it was held that a mandamus would lie to compel the commissioners to issue their warrant to the sheriff to summon a jury to assess compensation. The subsequent case, reported in 15 Q. B. 761, has been quoted on behalf of the defendants to show that even if a mandamus would lie against such a body as the Commissioners of Woods and Forests, yet since they are a public body, they cannot be held bound by the notice which they have given, and consequently it is contended that an action like the present will not lie. I think the answer to that contention is furnished by the case of Coe v. Wise (ubi sup.), and by the fact that the present defendants are not in the position of servants of the Crown. [Q. B. convenient to do so. Mr. Keane then urged that the defendants were a public body, and as such, on the authority of Reg. v. The Commissioners of Woods and Forests (ubi sup.), were not bound by their notice, and that no mandamus would lie against them. But it is obvious that the case of the Marylebone vestry is quite different from that of the Commissioners of Woods and Forests. The vestry does not represent Her Majesty in any point of view. It is rather analogous to the Middle Level Drainage Commissioners, in the case of Coe v. Wise. As to the last question, viz., whether the pleas demurred to are good, I can see nothing in the statute which makes it the duty of the plaintiff to give particulars of her estate and interest to the defendants, and therefore I am of opinion that the pleas are bad. MELLOR and LUSH, JJ. concurred. Judgment for the plaintiff. Attorneys for plaintiff, Birch and Gorton. Attorney for defendant, Randall. BLACKBURN, J.-I am quite of the same opinion. I quite agree with Mr. Keane that where a person seeks to obtain either a prerogative writ of mandamus from this court to compel the performance of a certain duty, or a mandamus under the Common Law Procedure Act, it is necessary for him to show the existence of such a state of facts as give rise to the obligation, either statutory or common law, which he seeks to enforce; and the question upon THE the declaration here is, whether the existence of such a state of things is sufficiently shown. We have been in the habit for many years of holding that where notice to treat for the purchase of lands is given under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, there follows a legal obligation on the party giving the notice to issue their warrant. It has been so long the practice to treat that as law that I thought at first that the question as to granting a mandamus in the present case might turn on the construction of some provision in that Act. But it is not so; the Act under which the notice was given, and under which this action is brought, is the 57 Geo. 3, c. xxix., and Mr. Payne has satisfied me that the principle on which we have granted mandamuses is not the peculiar enactments of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, but this, that wherever by Act of Parliament a body is entitled to take lands compulsorily, there, as soon as they have made up their minds to do so, and give the other side notice of their intention, thereby hampering the land, and leaving it no longer free in the hands of the owner, they are bound to go on. The parties are in a position analogous to that of a vendor and purchaser, where everything is settled but the exact price to be paid. In Reg. v. The Hungerford Market Company (ubi. sup.), Parke, B. notices the fact that in the Act of Parliament with which they were there dealing there was a provision that if within twentyone days after notice, terms of sale should not be agreed upon, the company should cause the same to be assessed by a jury; but he notices this for the purpose of stating that his judgment does not proceed on that consideration, but on the principle that the notice ought to be as binding on the company as on the owner or occupier. When once it is shown clearly as a fact that the owner has got notice to treat binding him, there arises, I take it, by operation of law, a duty on the party giving notice to go on and determine the amount to be paid by way of compensation. In the case of Reg. 7. The Commissioners for Improving Market-street, Manchester, the argument was urged which Mr. Keane has used to-day, that if the commissioners, after giving the notice, were of opinion that it was not convenient to proceed further, they ought not to be held bound by the notice; but it was held that they could not put the other party in such a position of disadvantage; that, having once given it, they could not go back because they found it Wednesday, June 2, 1869. CIRCULAR DELIVERY COMPANY (LIMITED) By the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 33, the Postmaster- Held, that this was a violation of the Act, and was not within the exemption. This was a case stated by Sir Thomas Henry, chief magistrate of the metropolitan police courts, under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, upon a conviction of the appellants, as follows: The appellants, the Circular Delivery Company (Limited), were summoned upon the information and complaint of the respondent, Willes Clare, an officer of the post-office, which charged that the appellants on the 8th May 1868, in the parish of St. George, Hanover-square, in the county of Middlesex, and within the said district, did convey, otherwise than by post, a certain letter not exempt from the exclusive privilege of Her Majesty's Postmaster-General, to wit, a letter directed and addressed as follows, that is to say, "Messrs. Nevell and Son, 5, Eccleston-street, N.W.," trary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. The statutes under which the proceedings were taken are 1 Vict. c. 33 and 1 Vict. c. 36. By the 2nd section of stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 33 intituled "An Act for the Management of the Post-office," it is enacted con That Her Majesty's present Postmaster-General and the person or persons to be from time to time hereafter appointed by the Queen's Majesty by letters patent under the great seal of Great Britain shall be master of the post office by the style of Her Majesty's Postmaster-General, and wheresoever within the United Kingdom and other Her Majesty's dominions post or post communications are Q. B.j CIRCULAR DELIVERY COMPANY (LIMITED) (apps.) v. WILLIAM CLARE (resp.) now or may be hereafter established by the PostmasterGeneral, by himself or by his deputies, and their respective servants and agents, shall have the exclusive privilege of conveying from one place to another all letters except in the following cases, and shall also have the exclusive privilege of performing all the incidental services of receiving, collecting, sending, dispatching, and delivering all letters except in the following cases (that is to say), letters sent by a private friend in his way, journey, or travel, so as such letters be delivered by such friend to the party to whom they shall be directed; letters sent by a messenger on purpose, concerning the private affairs of the sender or receiver thereof; commissions or returns thereof, and affidavits and writs, process or proceedings or returns thereof issuing out of a court of justice; letters sent out of the United Kingbom by a private vessel (not being a packet-boat); letters of merchants, owners of vessels of merchandise or the cargo or loading therein sent by such vessels of merchandise, or by any person employed by such owners for the carriage of such letters, according to their respective directions, and delivered to the respective persons to whom they shall be directed without paying or receiving hire or reward, advantage, or profit for the same in any wise; letters concerning goods or merchandise sent by common And known carriers to be delivered with the goods which [Q. B. with some other letter or thing. And in any prosecution by action or otherwise for the recovery of any such penalty the onus shall lie upon the person prosecuted to prove that the act in respect of which the penalty is alleged to have been incurred was done in conformity to the Postoffice laws. By sect. 47 of this Act it is enacted that "town letters shall include packet," and that "person shall inculde bodies politic or corporate." following facts were found: The appellants are incorporated under the Companies Act 1862, c. 89, and under the provisions of the said Act were duly registered on the 22nd Feb. 1868 as the Circular Delivery Company (Limited). The memorandum and articles of association of the said company are attached to and form part of this case. By the 3rd clause of the said memorandum of association it is declared that "the objects for which the company is established are to deliver for and on behalf of its shareholders and members circulars, newspapers, periodicals, catalogues, reports, pamphlets, printed and other matter in London and elsewhere, and to fold, address, and contract for printing or lithographing such matters, and to carry on the business of printers, and to contract for advertisements of every kind, also the carriage of small parcels of every kind, and doing all such other things as are incidental or conducive to the attainment of the above objects, or any or either of them." The appellants have an office at 317, High Holborn, from which circulars are despatched. M. Jules Clavelle carries on the business of a wine grower and merchant at 63A, Great Towerstreet, London, and at Bordeaux, France, and is a shareholder of the Circular Delivery Company, holding a 17. share. In April 1868 he sent a number of documents relating to his said business inclosed By the 2nd section of statute 1 Vict. c. 36, in-velopes had been previously directed by M. Jules in envelopes to the office of the appellants. The entituled "An Act for consolidating the laws relative to offences against the Post-office of the United Kingdom, and for regulating the judicial administration of the Post-office laws, and for explaining certain terms and expressions employed in those Laws, the preventing any breach of the privilege conferred by the Post-office Acts on the Post master-General for the benefit of the public revenue," it is enacted: That every person who shall convey otherwise than by the post a letter not exempted from the exclusive privilege of the Postmaster-General shall for every letter forfeit 5l., and every person who shall be in the practice of so conveying letters not so exempted shall for every such week during which the practice shall be continued forfeit 100., and every person who shall perform otherwise than by post any services incidental to conveying letters from place to place, whether by receiving, or by taking up, or by collecting, or by ordering, or by despatching, or by carrying or by delivering any letter not exempted from the exclusive privilege of the Postmaster-General shall forfeit for every letter 51., and every person who shall be in the practice of so performing any such incidental services shall for every such week during which the practice shall be continued, forfeit 1001., and every person who shall send a letter not exempted from the exclusive privilege of the Postmaster-General otherwise than by the post, or shall cause a letter not so exempted to be sent or conveyed otherwise than by post, or shall either tender or deliver a letter not so exempt in order to be sent otherwise than by post, shall forfeit for every letter 51.; and every person who shall be in the practice of committing any of the acts last mentioned shall for every week during which the practice shall be continued forfeit 1001.; and every person who shall make a collection of exempted letters for the purpose of conveying or sending them other wise than by post, or by the post, shall forfeit for every letter 51.; and every person who shall be in the practice of making a collection of exempted letters for either of these purposes shall forfeit for every week during which the practice shall be continued 100%. And it is declared that the term post shall herein include all post communications by land or by water (except by outward bound vessels not being employed by or under the Post-office or the Admiralty to carry post letters), and the above penalties shall be incurred whether the letter be sent singly or with anything else, or such incidental service shall be performed in respect to a letter either sent or to be sent singly or together Clavelle to various persons residing in different The circular proceeded to set out a variety of matters connected wiith the growth and price of wine. The case proceeded as follows: The appellants charged M. Jules Clavelle a farthing a-piece for the delivery of the documents. The documents, viz., the envelope and its enclosure did not bear any postage stamp, and had not at any time passed through the post. It was contended by the appellants that the documents, viz., the envelope and its enclosure before-mentioned, did not constitute a letter within the meaning of such Acts; that as Mr. Jules Claments were within the exceptions contained in velle was a shareholder of the company, such docu1 Vict. c. 33, s. 2. I convicted the appellants in the penalty of 5l., being of opinion that the documents, namely, the envelope and its enclosures delivered by the appellants to Messrs. Nevell and Sons, as above stated, constituted and were a letter within the meaning of 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 2, and being also of opinion that as Newnham was not the servant of M. Jules Clavelle but of the company, such letter was not within the exceptions contained in 1 Vict. c. 33, s. 2. I was further of opinion that the fact that M. Jules Clavelle was a shareholder of the company did not bring the case within any of the exceptions. The only questions for the opinion of the court are, whether I was justified in finding that the documents were a letter within the meaning of the Postoffice Acts (1 Vict. c. 33, and 1 Vict. c. 36); whether such letter was within the exceptions of 1 Vict. c. 33, s. 2, by reason of M. Jules Clavelle being a shareholder in the company; whether, in point of law, Newnham can be considered as the servant of M. Jules Clavelle for the purpose of delivering such letter so as to bring the case within the said exceptions. If the court shall be of opinion that my convic- | tion is right in point of law, then judgment is to be entered for the respondent with costs. If the contrary, then judgment is to be entered for the appellants, with costs. The original envelope and document will be produced for the inspection of the court, if deemed necessary. THOMAS HENRY, Chief Magistrate, Bow-street Police Court. Anderson appeared for the appellants. - The question is whether this circular was a document which, under the circumstances, comes within the exception of the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 33, as being a letter "sent by a messenger on purpose concerning the private affairs of the sender or receiver thereof," and I contend, first, that it is a letter concerning the private affairs of the sender. [COCKBURN, C. J.-It was the company who sent the letter, and it was not upon their private affairs.] No, it was "Jules Clavelle," who sent it. He was the sender to "Nevell and Son." He directed it, took it to the company, and they delivered it for him. Then does the document relate to Clavelle's private affairs? [COCKBRUN, C. J.--Yes, if he is the sender within the meaning of the exemption.] Instead of sending a special messenger with the letter, he sent it to the company for them to deliver. [COCKBURN, C. J.--He has a right to send a letter by a messenger, but that is not the case here.] It is the same, except that instead of giving it to a single person, he gives it to the company to deliver. [COCKBURN, C. J.-He employs a company to send by a messenger-a company who employ messengers are not themselves messengers.] Suppose one of a firm is at a distance, and he sends a letter to his partners to be delivered by a messenger, that is really the present case. [COCKBURN, C. J.-Not so. Clavelle has no connection with the company, except for the purpose of their delivering his letters. As long as a tradesman sends a letter by his own messenger he is doing right; but forming a company to deliver letters is a very different thing. They are not sending letters upon the private affairs of the company; the circulars do not relate to their private affairs.] That is supposing that the senders of the letters are the company, but my contention is that the sender is Jules Clavelle, and that the company are merely his agents. [LUSH, J.-I was certainly surprised to find such a company registered. I considered they were formed for an unlawful purpose. COCKBURN, C. J.-They are sending letters for profit. They are not messengers themselves, they are the employers of messengers.] Secondly, if this is not to be considered as a letter concerning the [C. P. private affairs of the sender-may it not be considered to be within the exemption as being "concerning the private affairs of the receiver thereof?" [LUSH, J. What is there which concerns the business of the receiver? The company send letters indiscriminately to all persons to whom they are required to send.] By the COURT.-The case is really too clear for argument. Conviction affirmed. Attorney for the appellant, Merriman and Co. Attorneys for the respondent, The Solicitor to the Post-office. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. Reported by W. GRAHAM and M. W. MCKELLAR, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. Tuesday, Dec. 1, 1868. CRANE (app.) v. POWELL, (resp.) Masters and Servants Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 141), s. 9-Contract in writing-Form of information. An information under the Master and Servants' Act 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 14), s. 9, which claims that the contract shall be fulfilled, and is not framed in the alternative requiring the defendant to pay damages or fulfil the contract, is not for that reason bad. The respondent being in want of labourers, applied to a society called the Free Labour Registration Society, and at the request of the secretary, filled up and signed a form headed "Form to be filled up by employers requiring hands from the Free Labour Registration Society," stating the terms and probable duration of the employment. This was read over to the appellant, who signed a document stating that he had accepted employment at S. (the respondent's address), and that he would not quit the employment without just and reasonable cause: Held, that this document sufficiently referred to the document signed by the respondent, and that the two constituted a contract in writing. This was a case stated by justices under the 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43:— And The appellant, a journeyman stonemason, appeared by his attorney on the 30th May 1868, before the magistrates of the borough of Sheffield, in answer to a summons issued on the information and complaint of the respondent, a master builder at Sheffield. The summons charged the appellant with the following offence: "That he, Owen Crane, being the servant of James Powell, of Brook Hill, in the said borough, builder, in his trade or business of a stonemason, under a certain contract of service for a period now unexpired, did unlawfully neglect and refuse to enter into and commence his said service, according to the same contract." the respondent declared by his information that he claimed that the contract should be fulfilled by the appellant. On the hearing before the justices, it appeared in evidence that the respondent, in the month of April last, was the contractor for building a house at Endcliffe, in Sheffield, and that in the early part of that month there was a strike amongst the masons in his employ on such building, and he put himself in communication with Col. Maude, the secretary to the Free Labour Registration Society in London, to obtain more following letters and application passed between the respondent and Col. Maude: men. The April 16th, 1868. Brook Hill, Sheffield. Colonel Maude,-Dear Sir,-Have you any masons that you can recommend to me that are in want of employment? I could provide work for ten or twelve good masons that |