Hargroves v. Cloud. to the defendant of the grounds relied upon. If the notice is special, as the law requires, where is the necessity of disclosing the facts in the plea, which tend to establish the fraud? The record does not set out the notice, or even alledge that it was given, and it could not with propriety be sent up, unless it was incorporated by bill of exceptions; but it must be presumed that it conformed to the law. COLLIER, C. J.-A discharge and certificate duly granted to a bankrupt, under the act of Congress of 1841, for the establishment of a uniform system of bankruptcy, shall, in all courts of justice, be deemed a full and complete discharge of all debts, contracts and other engagements of such bankrupt, which are proveable under the act, and shall be and may be pleaded as a full and complete bar to all suits brought in any court of judicature whatever, and the same shall be conclusive evidence of itself in favor of such bankrupt, unless the same shall be impeached for some fraud or wilful concealment, by him, of his property, or rights of property, contrary to the provisions of this act, on reasonable notice specifying in writing such fraud or concealment." (See § 4.) The fraud and concealment of property by a bankrupt, it is held, must be deliberate and intentional to affect him; but it is said, where property is discovered belonging to the bankrupt's estate, subsequent to the issuing of the decree, which had not been accounted for; the intention of the bankrupt being apparent, his discharge and certificate will be disallowed. [Owen on Bank. 222-3.] What facts will establish fraud or wilful concealment, so as to annul a certificate already allowed must depend more or less upon the circumstances of every particular case. The possession of property by a bankrupt at the time of his discharge, or immediately after, which by industry he might reasonably have aequired, would not warrant the presumption that he did not make a full surrender of his estate. But where the value of it is so great as to make it improbable that it was earned by him since the filing of his petition, it devolves upon him to show how he became the proprietor of such property: whether by inheritance, bequest or purchase. This much the bankrupt owes to his creditors as well as himself; and the onus of relieving himself from the imputation of fraud, is, in such case, Hargroves v. Cloud. cast upon him, who is best acquainted with the origin and nature of his title, and if fair may easily sustain it. In the present case, the property in the possession of the bankrupt, was slaves. These, we know, are of too great value to be acquired in a very short time as the earnings of industry, and if they were purchased on credit, obtained by gift, &c., the fact should be proved. It is not shown by the bill of exceptions how long the case of the bankrupt was pending; if for a long time, the presumption of fraud would be weakened. But as all intendments are favorable to the decision of a primary Court, it would be presumed, if necessary, that the suit progressed regularly to a hearing, without a continuance; especially as the party excepting has not shown by the record, that the reverse is true. Without stopping to inquire whether the act, in requiring a notice in writing, to the bankrupt, specifying the fraud or concealment, has any influence upon the form of the pleadings, we are satisfied that the replication in this case is good. It is explicitly stated in the record, that both the defendant and plaintiff pleaded and replied "in short by consent." This being the case, we have repeatedly held, that it must be intended that the plea and replication contain every material allegation which the law requires, to make them complete; and that an objection which supposes the reverse, cannot be entertained. If the pleadings could, under no circumstances, be supported, of course a demurrer would be sustained, if so interposed as to reach the defect. But the objection which is made to the replication, applies with all force to the plea, and that being prior in order, would be adjudged bad, if the demurrer could be entertained. This view disposes of the case; the judgment is affirmed. Watson and Wife v. May. WATSON AND WIFE v. MAY. 1. The statute which gives a writ of error or appeal from all judgments, or final orders of the Orphans' Court, does not take in cases in which neither writ of error or appeal could be taken, by the course of practice in the Courts of the civil or common law. 2. It is not necessary to the validity of proceedings by administrators before the Orphans' Court, that parties should there be made except in cases provided by the statute. Even where the estate is ready for distribution, a general citation to parties having an adverse interest was necessary, prior to the last act. 3. Persons having an adverse interest, are not concluded by an erroneous decree, but they cannot, without further proceedings, forthwith sue out a writ of error. 4. The personal representative is entitled to examine and litigate the title of any one who claims an interest in the final distribution of the estate. 5. When the proceedings by an executor or administrator have been in conformity to the rules prescribed for his action, there can be no review of the facts upon which the judgment of the Court is founded, although persons having an adverse interest were not apprised of the final settlement intended by the administrator. On the other hand, the administrator cannot prevent a re-examination, when the proceedings are erroneous, because those actually interested have not appeared. 6. When any one claims to have the right to examine the correctness of a final decree, the proper practice is for him to propound his interest to the Court in which the decree is rendered. Upon this, after citation to the administrator, and his appearance or default, the person is made a party or his petition is dismissed. 7. When a writ of error is sued out by persons who are not parties to the proceedings below, the writ of error will be dismissed. Writ of Error to the County Court of Sumter. THE writ of error in this case is sued out by Watson and his wife, who is the Emily Easley hereafter named, and a motion is submitted to amend the writ of error in the parties plaintiff, so as to conform to the transcript sent to this Court. The motion is resisted, and a cross one made to dismiss. Watson and Wife v. May. The record discloses these facts: At a special term of the County Court of Sumter, held on the 3d June, 1839, probate of the will of Wareham Easly was granted, and letters testamentary issued to David Blackshear and Thomas Ballzell, who are named by it as executors. By this will, specific bequests are made to Creed T. Easley and Martha Ann Foreman, two of the testator's children. Another bequest of a right of action is made to Martha Ann Foreman, before mentioned, and Samuel W. and Christopher Easley, two children of his sons, and the remainder of his estate, real and personal, is given to his wife, Emily Easley, and to her children, until his daughters, Catharine Maria, Elizabeth Jane and Virginia Noble, should become of age, when the whole estate was to be equally divided between them, his said children. His executors are also invested with power to sell certain lands described in the will. Both the executors resigned the trust on the 17th June, 1839, and on the 8th July, Patrick May, the defendant in error, was appointed administrator de bonis non cum testamento, &c. In August of that year, the administrator filed a petition praying an order for the sale of certain lands therein described, and other than those named in the will. In this petition he sets out, that Emily Easly, the widow, Catharine M., Elizabeth J. and Maria N., the children of the testator, are the only persons interested, they being the devisees, &c. A guardian ad litem was appointed, who denied the allegation, and a decree was made the same day that the petition was filed for the sale of the lands. Commissioners were appointed to conduct the sale, and their report of sale was confirmed at the October term of the same year. After a return of inventory, account sales and several accounts showing the hiring of slaves, the administrator, on the 27th October, 1842, applied for leave to make a final settlement, and thereupon the 3d of January, 1843, was set for that purpose. On that day, as appears from the recitals of the record, the administrator appeared and presented his accounts for settlement; a settlement was made, in which he appeared as having expended more than he had received, $1,650. This sum, by the decree, was to be retained by him out of uncollected assets; or out of assets which should afterwards come to his hands; or for which an execution might issue, at his option, to be levied of the goods and chattels of the estate, as soon as administered by some other person, It Watson and Wife v. May. does not appear that any one appeared at the settlement of the estate to contest the proceedings, and the administrator immediately afterwards resigned his trust. R. W. SMITH, for the motion. GOLDTHWAITE, J.-1. In testamentary matters, the Or phans', or, more properly to speak, the County Court, is invested with jurisdiction of a peculiar nature, entirely different in many essential particulars from that of a court of common law; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction from its inception, upon the application of any one for the grant of administration, to its close, by rendering judgment upon the final settlement of the accounts of the executor or administrator, questions may arise which require the intervention of parties who would not be parties under other circumstances. Thus when a will is presented for probate the heirs at law are proper parties to contest the will, and yet, after its probate, it might be that they could have no interest whatever in the subsequent proceedings, or in the final settlement. So also where two wills exist, the legatees or devisees under one of them, have the right to contest the other, as well as the heirs at law to contest both. Again, the real estate being charged by statute, generally, with the payment of debts on the deficiency of personal assets, and the personal representative having the capacity to ask for an order of sale of lands, the heirs generally, or the particular devisee, may be entitled to contest the facts, upon the existence of which this power may be called forth. In all these cases, and our statutes present many similar, it is evident, unless the parties interested can re-examine proceedings alledged to be crroneous, their rights may be greatly prejudiced. It was with reference to such matters as these, our statute was enacted, which provides, that from any judgment, or order final, whether in vacation or term time, an appeal or writ of error will lie to the Circuit or Supreme Court, in the same manner as upon judgments in the Circuit Courts. [Clay's Dig. 297, § 4.] When, however, an appeal or writ of error is spoken of, the statute must be understood as using these terms in their known and received signification, and ought not to be extended to take in cases in |