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tion." Are the Germans then considered as infants

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or superannuated dotards of the shortest memories, that they are spoken to on such matters in a tone like this? Are the writings of our time destroyed ? Are the chronicles and the facts extinguished ? On the contrary they are accessible to every man, and in a convenient form in a current work. Whoever will take the smallest trouble will find all the arguments on this subject in the 37th and 38th parts of Reuss’ Staatskanzlei.' The Peace of Westphalia was, as usual, renewed and confirmed on the Peace of Teschen, (May 13, 1779). Russia guaranteed the Peace of Teschen, before the Emperor and the empire of Germany acceded to it, and without being called upon on their part for the guarantee ; the Imperial decree on the accession contains (March 2, 1780) a protestation against disadvantageous consequences; in addition to this the ratifications of the guarantee do not appear to have been exchanged. On this was founded the pretension of the Russian cabinet to meddle with the affairs of the empire, a pretension which it thenceforward made good. Was it to be wondered at that the Germans did not welcome an interference of this

kind in their affairs from abroad? Johann Jacob Móser had warned them already on the occasion of the Peace of Teschen. “ The more foreign

guarantees, the more will foreign powers have " occasion for mixing in our internal affairs, with

grounds, or, at least, with apparent grounds, of “right.” How prudent, how mild was the language of Johannis Müller, after the Bavarian act of Exchange, with regard to Russia :

“ If the Russian Government, as a preponderating

Power, will liberate Asia from tyranny and bar" barism, and stand forth amongst Europeans as “ the Protectress of the weak, and guarantee of “ the good, Europe has a new and strong pillar “ of strength. But princes are men,

their maxims " are changeable; the cause of freedom is too

mighty, its dangers are too numerous to allow us " to be tranquillized by the hope that any Cabinet " whatever will at all times know its most glorious " and useful career."

It remains to be shewn how this conviction became more excited, more decisive, and by what circumstances. Russia had guaranteed the Polish constitution as well as the Peace of Westphalia. It was not


the enemies of Russia, but the Russian cabinet itself that drew the parallel in the Manifesto of May 18, 1792.

“C'est ainsi qu'ils ont eu la perfide adresse d'interprèter l'acte, par lequel la Russie garantit “ la constitution légitime de cette nation, comme “un joug onéreux et avilissant, tandis que les plus grand empires, et entre autres celui de l'Alle

magne, loin de rejetter ces sortes de garantie, les "ont envisagées, recherchées et reçues, comme le “ ciment le plus solide de leurs proprietés et de " leur indépendance.” (!)

This was considered ominous. Häberlin concluded his “Staatsrecht” (1797), after alluding to guarantees and their consequences, with the words. The first step to managing the German Diet, as

formerly the Polish Diet at Grodno, was hereby taken.” Complimentary writings and resolutions of the Diet (from Swabia and Franconia) of course ensued ; to say nothing of the notes of Oct. 1799, on which the author sets great value, but which, however, did not proceed from many, but only from some (six), and those the Ecclesiastical, Diets. Then followed the mediation and plans of indemnity which were discussed by France, Prussia and

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Russia (to the exclusion of the Emperor and the empire), and were then laid before the Imperial Deputations. The services done by Russia at that time are not forgotten by the Germans.

(To be continued.)

[Alarmed at the progress of the negotiations for the payment of the third series of the loan guaranteed to the King of Greece, by England, France, and Russia, we are induced at once to publish the following Despatch, although we are thereby compelled to break through the order which we had originally proposed to ourselves of developing from its origin, the complete system of delusion by which Russia has hitherto successfully cajoled every administration in England.

Our object in selecting this Despatch is not so much for the facts it contains, as for the developement of Russia's system of procedure. We here perceive two sets of Despatches, one secret and one ostensible ; consequently a set of arguments and appearances distinct from the real objects; a knowledge of the instructions of all the other ambassadors ; the committing of them with respect to their own courts, and the committing of their courts through them. Here also are most clearly revealed the grounds of the diplomatic success of Russia. She plays her double game with perfect confidence, from the consciousness of the absence of any duplicity, we may almost say, of any intention, in the minds of the British Cabinet.

This Despatch shows Russia's perfect acquaintance with the national character and feeling, with the position and interests of parties, with the feelings, qualities, and weaknesses of individuals. It shows her constant attention to every detail, her incessant communication of the minutest intelligence, and the bringing of all these to bear upon objects, invariable in their course through centuries; and, in addition to this, we must recollect that no favour, that no patro. nage overlies her diplomatic system, and that her first object is ability in the individuals charged with the execution of her policy.

The exposure bere made of the means by which she has invariably succeeded in making use of us, even while appearing to oppose us, will, we trust, be considered by the opposition, if not by the Government, with reference to the actual negotiations respecting the Greek Loan.]

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