VALENTINI

ON THE

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF CONSTANTINOPLE.

THE study of the past is only truly useful in so far as we know how to derive instruction for the present and the future. Although the war that we have just described ought not to serve as a model, it teaches us at least the nature of the country and the means of penetrating into it, as well as the character of the people, and the best means of combating them; and we may thence draw conclusions as to the conduct that ought to be pursued by those whom Providence may select to emancipate these fair regions from the yoke of the barbarians.

Such a study ought not to be classed amongst the useless speculations, even if the execution of our plan should be reserved for future generations.

The road which leads to the centre, and which goes straight to the capital, must doubtless be preferred; however great the advantages that any less

direct route appears to offer for the safety of the enterprise. Nevertheless, there is one idea which naturally presents itself—it is that of effecting a disembarkation in Asia Minor before coming to the attack of Constantinople. Such a measure would produce the happiest effects in a military point of view, besides hindering the Grand Seignior from quitting the seraglio and fleeing into Asia with his treasures, which must serve to indemnify the expenses of the war.

At the same time, then, that the army by land advances by Adrianople, the fleet must follow its movement along the coast of the Black Sea, and must convey directly to the entrance of the Bosphorus the troops that will disembark in Asia, vessels of war, and

under the protection of the whose first care will be to entrench themselves properly. Although the defence of the coasts is reputed to be ill organised amongst the Turks, one might fear that the points in the neighbourhood of the Euxine would be better defended than the rest; but the most recent descriptions speak only of the two castles constructed in 1773 by Baron de Tott, one on the coast of Europe and the other on that of Asia. These castles, which could not much

annoy the ships of war, would be easily reduced to silence by the superior fire of the latter, and the batteries beside them would soon be turned by the troops after having landed in sufficient numbers.

With regard to the old castles, known under the names of Roumili and Anatoli Hissar, built by Mahomet II. before the siege of Constantinople, they are situated two leagues from the entrance to the canal, at the narrowest spot, and consequently they could offer no obstacle to the disembarkation. Besides, they would not long resist a well-directed attack from the land side; and as soon as they should be taken possession of, the Turkish vessels which would oppose the disembarkation would find the passage absolutely prohibited; these vessels would also have to contend against the current which comes from the Black Sea, and against the winds of the North, which habitually prevail; circumstances which would favour, on the contrary, the manœuvres of the Russians.

As soon as a footing should be gained on shore, one would push forward the Cossacks and Chasseurs on foot to some elevated spot, whence they might discover the march of the Asiatic troops, who would arrive to succour the capital.

It

It will then be of the highest importance to get possession of Scutari, a kind of suburb of Constantinople, built like an amphitheatre, on the coast of Asia, opposite the Seraglio. This town, protected by a bad enclosure of great extent, would be an easy conquest, in spite of the seventy thousand inhabitants, most of them true believers. is commanded from the neighbouring heights, and presents on the side of the hills a narrow point unprovided with walls, which the besiegers would surround with advantage. Masters of Scutari, the Bosphorus may be considered as a large wide river that one must pass to attack the capital.

Nevertheless, the latter must be straitened as much as possible on the side of Europe. It is important to establish oneself very near the walls, and to cut the aqueducts which conduct the waters from sources at the distance of two leagues. We have already seen above, that the most easy mode of vanquishing the Turks is by thirst. Thus a strict blockade will suffice to force the city to surrender, without the necessity of a formal attack, and without the effusion of blood.

It will be well to entrench strongly the posts

selected for investing the place, above all, the neighbouring villages, and other advantageous points on the roads which lead to the city, and to support these posts by troops encamped behind. By this means one may easily check the furious sallies of the Mussulmans, and they will be reduced to despair, without fatiguing the main body of the army which, encamped still further back, will enjoy perfect tranquillity.

The plan of Constantinople shows that the localities lend themselves to these plans. One finds there numerous suburbs extending as far as the wall, farms, villages situated at a short distance from the city, hills separated by marshy valleys; all the circumstances which contribute to form defiles, and give the means of opposing sorties. Beyond the Port, the walled quarter of Galata is hemmed in by the long suburb of Pera, which is at present entirely open, and which, even if the Turks were to fortify it, could not offer much resistance.

The besieged might also, on their side, take advantage of these localities for their own defence. The suburb of Eyoob, which extends for a considerable distance along the Port, leaning on