OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES Order XVI. rule 1 formerly stood in these terms: "All persons may be joined as plaintiffs in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative,

." and there it stopped as far as is material. The existing rule is in very widely different terms: "All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom " -not" the right to any relief," but "any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, where, if such persons brought separate actions, any common question of law or fact would arise..." That rule has been commented upon and explained by the Court of Appeal in the case of Stroud v. Lawson.4

Lord Justice Chitty, whose judgment I refer to as stating shortly the effect of the rule, says this with reference to the rule: "That rule in its present form was framed with reference to the difficulty which arose in the cases of Smurthwaite v. Hannay

2 and Carter v. Rigby & Co. [1896].8 It is obvious on the face of the rule that it was not thereby intended to allow any number of different plaintiffs to join in one action any number of separate and different causes of action, but that it was intended merely to effect a modification of the old rule by which a limited liberty of joining plaintiffs with separate causes of action should be conferred."-Therefore there is to be a limited number of joint plaintiffs with separate causes of action"The nature of the limitation is plain upon the face of the rule." The Lord Justice read the rule and continued: "It is necessary that both these conditions should be fulfilled, that is to say, that the right to relief alleged to exist in each plaintiff should be in respect of or arise out of the same transaction, and also that there should be a common question of fact or law, in order that the case may be within the rule." It was held by the Court of Appeal that the rule did apply to the case under consideration.

But a

"It

little later on the Lord Justice says:
is not necessary for the present purpose to
say to what cases the rule would apply.

(8) 65 L. J. Q.B. 537; [1896] 2 Q.B. 113.

Now, according to the interpretation put on the rule by the Court of Appealand, indeed, it seems to me plain on the face of the rule itself-there are two conditions to be satisfied: First, that the right of relief alleged to exist in each plaintiff should be in respect of or arise out of the same transaction; and secondly, that there should be a common question of fact or law. Are these conditions satisfied in the present case? First, do they arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions? The action arises out of the publication by the defendants of a series of books bearing the title "The Oxford and Cambridge Publications," or "The Oxford and Cambridge Edition," and otherwise bearing the name "Oxford and Cambridge." It seems to me clear that the action arises out of one transaction, or at any rate a series of transactions if each separate publication is to be treated, as a separate transaction. Then comes, the question, Does the statement of claim shew that any common question of law or fact will arise in this action ? In the first place, the statement of claim alleges the fact of these publications. No defence has been put in yet, and I do not know, as a matter appearing on the pleadings, how far these separate publications will be admitted; but I have had this action before me, no doubt, as counsel for the defendants said, on a question of injunction, and it has been suggested that the publication there was not denied. believe that is so, and it is very probable that the publication would be admitted.

I

Then it is said there is no common question to arise. But is the pleader, in framing his action, to take upon himself to judge as to what the defendant is going to do in the way of admission in the prosecution of his action? Can that be the meaning of the rule? That would make the rule very difficult to work. What

together, may at any time apply to the Court or a Judge for an order confining the action to such of the causes of action as may be conveniently disposed of together." It was said that the causes of action, which are said to be three-namely, the case of injury to the plaintiffs jointly, and injury to the plaintiffs separatelycannot conveniently be tried together. It seems to me that the nature of the case is such as to shew that it is manifestly most convenient that these different causes of action should be disposed of together; and I think that that application fails just as much as does the other.

OXFORD AND CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITIES v. GILL & SONS. the rule says is, "Where, if such persons brought separate actions, any common question of law or fact would arise." The publication of these things is one common fact which would have to be proved by the plaintiffs in order to establish their case. But I am not driven, as it seems to me, to rely upon that. What is the case made by the plaintiffs' pleader in paragraph 9? It is an allegation that the titles used by the defendants induce the belief that the books or publications of the defendants are publications of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and so emanated from the presses of both, or are authorised by the Universities as text-books-that is, by both. Therefore, what the plaintiffs take upon themselves, according to their statement of claim, to prove, is that the belief which is induced in the publication is not that it is published by Oxford separately or Cambridge separately, but by Oxford and Cambridge together. That is no doubt one of the paragraphs on which I anticipate the defendants will join issue. The evidence which goes to prove the effect upon the publication of that statement is common to both cases, and it seems to me that it raises manifestly in this case a common question of fact which will have to be

decided.

In my judgment, this case is brought within the terms of the rule; and I do think I must say, after all the argument I have heard, that it would have been lamentable if, the rule being amended, this case was not brought within it;

and if this case is one which does not fall within the rule, I think that the rule ought speedily to be amended. In my judgment, it has been amended in the way pointed out by Lord Justice Bowen as the means of bringing about the effect which was sought to be obtained in Hannay v. Smurthwaite, and I think that the draftsman has attained what I doubt not was his object.

Then another question is raised. It is said that, if this be so, I ought to exercise the power given to me by Order XVIII. rule 8, which is as follows: "Any defendant alleging that the plaintiff has united in the same action several causes of action which cannot be conveniently disposed of

In the course of the argument it was suggested that paragraph 10 of the statement of claim was embarrassing. I agree with the contention on behalf of the defendants that that is not a proper form of allegation in a statement of claim. It is said on behalf of the plaintiffs that there is no application at the present moment before the Court which is directed to that specific paragraph. I think, upon the construction of the notice of motion, that objection might prevail; but as the junior counsel on behalf of the defendants has given notice that if it cannot be disposed of now he will hereafter make a separate application, which I think he will be justified in making--and, not having heard the case, I merely express my prima facie opinion that he will be justified in making it-I suggest that while I dismiss, as I intend to do, this present summons, I should give the plaintiffs liberty to amend in order that the pleader may consider whether he will strike out that paragraph, or amend it in such a way as to make it less obnoxious.

Solicitors Freshfields & Williams, for plaintiffs; T. Lamartine Yates, for defendants.

[Reported by W. A. G. Woods, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Settled Land Trust for Sale-Personal Settlement-Power to Purchase LandTrust for Re-sale and Re-investment"Money liable to be laid out in the purchase of land"-Capital Money-Settled Land Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 38), 88. 32 and 33.

Money in the hands of trustees of a personal settlement, whereby the proceeds of sale of land are settled, with power to lay out the trust funds in the purchase of land to be made subject to the settlement, may be applied as capital money under section 33 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, such money being "liable to be laid out in the purchase of land" within the meaning of that section, which is not confined to money that must necessarily be so laid out.

By an antenuptial settlement dated April 7, 1860, the proceeds of sale of lands and funds conveyed to the trustees on trust for sale by indentures of even date were settled on trust for the husband and

wife successively for life, with subsequent

trusts for their issue. There was the usual trust for investment in Government

sidered as personal estate, and the rents. and profits thereof should be applied for the benefit of the persons who would be entitled to the income of the said trust moneys in case no such purchase had been made.

On April 4, 1898, the husband, the present tenant for life, being desirous of effecting certain improvements on the settled estates remaining unsold, took out a summons asking, inter alia, for leave to submit a scheme, and for a declaration that the trustees had power to sell investments held by them upon the trusts of the settlement and to apply the proceeds in or towards the proposed improvements.

The trustees held considerable investments which had not arisen from the sale of land.

A. Adams, for the applicant.-This being a settlement by way of trust for sale falls under section 63 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and the leave of the Court is necessary under the Settled Land Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 18), s. 7, before the tenant for life can exercise his power of submitting an improvement scheme under the Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 26. The submission of such a scheme is a necessary preliminary to effecting the improvements, and leave is therefore

and other securities, with power to change required.

the same.
It was also declared that it
should be lawful for the trustees, with the
consent of the husband and wife or the
survivor of them, to call in or sell any of
the trust moneys and securities and invest
the proceeds in the purchase of freehold
hereditaments in England and Wales,
such hereditaments to be conveyed to the
trustees upon trust with the consent of
the husband and wife or the survivor of
them, and after the decease of such sur-
vivor at the discretion of the trustees to sell
the said hereditaments and to invest the
moneys to arise from such sale in one of
the modes of investment mentioned in the
power to change securities, and to stand
possessed thereof upon the trusts declared
concerning the
with which the
moneys
said hereditaments so sold should have
been purchased, and it was declared that
until the sale of such hereditaments the
same (although real estate) should be con-

NORTH, J.-You may take this leave, which I see no reason for refusing.

A. Adams. The money in the hands of the trustees is money that "is liable to be laid out in the purchase of land to be made subject to the settlement within section 33 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and may therefore be applied as (1) The Settled Land Act, 1882, provides as follows:

Section 32: " Where, under an Act incorporating or applying, wholly or in part, the Lands Clauses Consolidation Acts, 1845, 1860, and 1869, or under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, or under any other Act, public, local, personal, or private, money is at the commencement of this Act in Court, or is afterwards paid into Court, and is liable to be laid out in the purchase of land to be made subject to a settlement, then, in addition to any mode of dealing therewith authorised by the Act under which the money is in Court, that money may be invested or applied as capital money arising under this Act

[IN THE COURT OF APPEAL.]

LINDLEY, M.R.

CHITTY, L.J.
COLLINS, L.J.
1898.
July 29.
Aug. 1, 11.

STOCKPORT RAGGED, IN-
DUSTRIAL, AND REFORM-
ATORY SCHOOLS, In re.

Charity Sanction to Mortgage of Charity Lands-Consent of Charity Commissioners-"Endowment". - Funds Derived from "Voluntary contributions"— "Cathedral, collegiate, chapter, or other schools"-General Words-Rule" Ejusdem generis"-Charitable Trusts Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 137) 88. 17, 62, and 66.

The proviso at the end of section 62 of the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853 (which exempts certain charities therein enumerated from the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioners)," that the said exemption shall not extend to any cathedral, collegiate, chapter, or other schools," does not exclude all schools from the exemptions in the section, but only cathedral, collegiate, chapter, and other schools of a similar kind.

Decision of STIRLING, J. (67 L. J. Ch. 372; [1898] 1 Ch. 610), affirmed on this point.

An industrial school whose income is derived partly from voluntary contributions and legacies, and partly from government grants, contributions from school boards, and other public authorities, and which is possessed of land in the occupation of the school, is, as regards leasehold land with buildings erected thereon partly by means of savings of income, within the jurisdiction of the Commissioners, and their consent is necessary to an application to the Court for leave to mortgage such land.

Decision of STIRLING, J, reversed on this point.

Appeal by the Charity Commissioners from the decision of Stirling, J. (67 L. J. Ch. 372; [1898] 1 Ch. 610), upon a petition by the trustees of the Stockport Ragged, Industrial, and Reformatory Reformatory Schools, presented under the Charities Procedure Act, 1812 (52 Geo. 3. c. 101), asking the sanction of the Court to a proposed mortgage of part of the property vested in the trustees. The Charity

Commissioners having been served with the petition at the request of the AttorneyGeneral, contended that their sanction to the petition and the mortgage was necessary under the Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, s. 17, and as such sanction had not been obtained opposed the application.

The circumstances were as follows: Prior to 1865 a school for poor children existed in Stockport, managed by a committee, and was at first entirely supported by voluntary subscriptions, but subsequently received a Government grant.

The committee in 1865 purchased a freehold house in Stockport, which they had previously rented, in consideration of No trusts were declared by the deed of a perpetual rentcharge of 20l. per annum. conveyance, which vested the property in three nominees of the committee.

ting and adding to the school buildings The money for the purpose of renovawas obtained at this time by donations from the Marquis of Westminster and others, and the school buildings were known as Town End House.

In 1866 the school was certified under the Industrial Schools Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 118), and the Town End House was conveyed to trustees upon trust to permit the land and buildings to be used as a ragged, industrial, and reforapply the proceeds in acquiring other matory school, and with power to sell and larger and more convenient premises.

The income of the school was derived from school boards, boards of guardians from a Government grant, contributions and other public authorities, subscriptions from residents in the neighbourhood, and the earnings of the school children in their industrial occupations. From the evidence it appeared that all donations or bequests made to the school were applicable by the committee of management in aid of the voluntary contributions, and that every donation or legacy had been so applied.

In 1887 the trustees obtained a lease for a term of 999 years of a piece of land at a rent of 201. per annum, and the committee of management erected thereon a girls' school out of subscriptions and a balance in their hands derived from legacies and voluntary contributions and