Beattie, adm'r, v. Abercrombie et als.

versed for the want of allegations in the bill to suit the evidence. And Maury's Adm'r v. Mason's Adm'r, decided by this court, 8 Porter's R. 211, is to the same effect.

The counsel of the defendants contend that the bill is insufficient to impeach the release of the intestate's distributees; that it is not competent for an administrator, as such, to impeach the transactions settled by the distributees, more especially by a suit to which they are no parties, (and most of them are not parties to this suit--none as distributees.) But that question need not be touched in this case; because Holt's release, which is not impeached by the bill, is a sufficient bar. The counsel for the defendants also contend that the complainant, as the intestate's administrator in Alabama, cannot impeach the acts of Mr. Holt as the intestate's administrator in Georgia—that this can be done only by the distributees; that between such administrators there is no privity, their relation not being changed by our statutes, or the decisions thereon relative to administrators and administrators de bonis non appointed here. But even if we could decide that the whole of this argument is wrong, the complainant would not be aided; because if he can, as the administrator in Alabama, impeach the acts of the administrator in Georgia, the answer is that he has not done so.

We have only to notice one other question-the question whether Mr. Holt, on the 25th Dec. 1838, had authority to make settlement of the claims in favor of his intestate against the surviving members of the company, and to assign and release them, as he did by his deed of that date. If he had such authority bis deed is a good bar, it not being properly impeached in this suit. Mr. Holt was the only administrator of the intestate at that time. The complainant was not appointed in Alabama until some time afterwards. Before he was appointed the claims upon which his suit is founded were fairly settled and released by his intestate's administrator in Georgia, for the settlement and release not being effectually impeached in this suit, we must regard them as having been made in good faith. Does the complainant suppose that he alone, as the administrator in Alabama, had authority to release these demands? Or does he suppose that he has the exclusive right to release some of the defendants, conceding to the administrator in Georgia the right to release others? It appears by the case that some mem

Beattie, adın'r, v. Abercrombie et als.

bers of the company reside in Alabama and others in Georgia. The intestate's demands were not against some of the defendants, but against all. The intestate in his life-time could not have closed this business with the other members of his company finally and effectually, but by a settlement with or a suit against all. It appears by the evidence that Watson & Iverson, two of the members of the company, in taking Mr. Holt's assignment and release of the 25th day of December 1838, acted in fact as a committee of the company, and it is the same as if it had been a release directly to all the surviving members of the company. As the demands of the intestate were joint against all the members of the company, some of whom were domiciled in Georgia, and as Mr. Holt could not effectually close the transactions without the concurrence of all, we cannot doubt but that he had full authority under his administration in Georgia to settle with and discharge all the parties. It appears by the evidence that the settlement was in Georgia-and further, that the company held its meetings for business purposes in that State, and that its books and papers were there, and we may presume that its funds were there. But it does not necessarily follow that the authority of Mr. Holt was exclusive. If there had been then an administrator in Alabama and he had closed the transactions and released the demands, that might have barred Mr. Holt. We think there may be cases, and that the present is one of them, in which the authority of an administrator in one State and an administrator in another, of the same intestate, is concurrent; as if the intestate held a promissory note made by A. of the one, and by B. of the other of those States—one of these administrators has as much right to receive the money owing by this note as the other; and further, either of the makers of the note may pay the whole sum to the administrator of the State within which that maker lives, and this will discharge the whole debt. These demands of the intestate against the surviving members of his company cannot be said to have had a positive and individual locality. As debts owing to the intestate, they were owing by persons domiciled in Georgia, as well as by persons domiciled in Alabania; they were joint and practically inseparable; all the debtors were as one, for the concurrence of all was necessary, in any suit or settlement which could be final or effectual as to all. There is a

Frice et als. v. Talley's Adm'rs.

case stated by Judge Story, which is not of the nature of the question we are considering, yet it suggests reasoning, we think, which tends to our conclusion.--Story's Confl. of Laws, § 521; Orcutt v. Orms, 3 Paige's R. 459: And see Whyte, Adm'r, v. Rose, 3 Adolp. & Ellis, N. S. 493. We can see no error in the decree dismissing the bill. Let it be affirmed.

DARGAN, C. J. not sitting, on account of relationship to one of the parties.

PRICE ET ALS. vs. TALLEY'S ADM'RS.

1. To maintain the action of detinue the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to the entire property, either general or special, in the thing sued for. If others, not joined, are interested with him, he cannot

recover.

2. A sale by the tenant for life of the absolute property in a chattel * converts the interest of the remainder-man into a chose in action,-the transfer of which, with a knowledge of the fact that the chattel is in the adverse possession of the purchaser, under a bona fide claim of the entire title, is void, and passes nothing to him to whom such transfer is made.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of Jackson. Tried before the Hon. Geo. Goldthwaite.

THIS was an action of detinue to recover a slave named William, and was instituted by William J. Price, Elisha Price, Oliver Hughes, John B. Hughes, William J. Hughes and John E. Hughes, heirs at law of Polly Woods, deceased, against Jacob Talley. The defendant having died, pending the suit, it was revived against his administrators. On the trial, as appears by the bill of exceptions, the plaintiffs read in evidence a deed in the following words: "Know all men by these presents, that I, Richard Price, of Warren county, and State of Tennessee, for and in consideration of the natural love and affection I have

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Price et als. v. Talley's Adm`rs.

for my daughter, Polly Woods, I have bargained, sold and delivered to her a negro girl named Mary and her child named Patty, with their increase; to have and to hold the said negro slaves during the natural life of my said daughter and her present husband, Drury Woods, or the survivor of them; and at the death of the said Polly and Drury Woods, the said negro slaves, with their increase, are to be returned and delivered to the right and legal heirs of said Polly Woods; it being the intention of this instrument to convey a life estate in said slaves to my said daughter and son-in-law. And I do hereby warrant and defend said negro slaves to the said Polly and Drury Woods, from the claims of all persons whatsoever. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this 4th day of April 1810.-RICH'D PRICE, [SEAL."] They then proved the death of Polly and Drury Woods, that they were the heirs at law of said Polly, and that the slave sued for is the son of the woman Mary named in the deed. The defendants proved that their intestate recovered a judgment against the said Drury Woods in his life-time in a justice's court, and that the slave sued for, then five or six years of age, was sold by a constable under an execution issued on said judgment and purchased by the said intestate, who up to his death always claimed him as his property. They further proved that two of the plaintiffs had died since the institution of the suit, and as to them that it had not been revived, and that Emory W. Hughes, Richard P. Hughes, James N. Hughes and Elisha T. Hughes, children of Christiana Hughes, deceased, were also heirs at law of Polly Woods, and were in life. To rebut this, the plaintiffs introduced a deed executed by the said Emory W., Richard P., James N., and Elisha T. Hughes, after the purchase by the defendants' intestate, and whilst he had possession of and claimed the slave as his own property, by which they conveyed to William J. Hughes all their right and title to said slave. There was evidence in the case from which the jury might infer that the plaintiffs and the grantors in the last named deed knew, at the time of its execution, that the intestate of the defendants had the possession of the slave, and claimed him as his own property. There was much other testimony introduced on the trial, none of which, however, is material to the questions decided by this court. The charge of the Circuit Court upon

Price et als. v. Talley's Adm`rs.

the above evidence, which was excepted to by the plaintiffs, and is now assigned as error, will be found in the opinion.

ROBINSON, for the plaintiffs in error:

1. No sale or other disposition made by the tenant for life can defeat the remainder.-Fearne on Remainders, 415, (marg.) Lyde et als. v. Taylor et als. 17 Ala. 270. On many deeds similar to this our own court has put a construction, which shows that this remainder to the heirs of Polly Woods is good, and not contingent. Catterlin v. Hardy, 10 Ala. 514; Inge v. Murphy, 10 ib. 885; Adams v. Broughton, 13 ib. 731; Price et al. v. Talley's Adm'r, 10 ib. 946-see also, Bank's Adm'r v. Marsberry, 3 Littell, 279. Defendant proved that certain persons by the name of Hughes were heirs of Polly Woods: That these persons, in Oct. 1838, sold their interest in the property sued for to one of the plaintiffs, and that this sale took place before the death of Drury Woods; and at the time of this sale Talley was in possession under an alleged purchase and claimed title in himself. Upon this proof the court charged that the possession of Talley was adverse, and being adverse, that the plaintiff acquired no right under said sale, and that the plaintiffs could not recover. This charge was clearly erroneous: For, if it be true that Woods held but a life estate, and that the remainder to the plaintiffs could not be destroyed by any act of the tenant for life, it thence follows that Talley bought Woods' life estate, and no greater interest, and that he held that interest in precisely the same character that Woods held it. By his purchase from Woods he sustained the same relation to those in remainder that Woods did. Woods being tenant for life, was a trustee for those in remainder: And being trustee, his purchaser could acquire no greater powers than he had.-Fearne on Remainders, 414; Lyde et als. v. Taylor et als. 17 Ala. 270. No adverse possession could commence in any one till after the death of Woods and wife, because the possession of Woods was in perfect harmony with the rights of the remainder-men. King v. Mims, 7 Dana, 267.

2. Again, the charge is erroneous in this-it assumes that because Talley's possession was adverse at the time of this purchase, that none of the plaintiff's could recover. If this conclusion be true, then property never could be recovered against an adverse possession, no matter how perfect the right to it.