that in 1914. So that, while complete unification of control can undoubtedly do still more to improve operation, there is not likely to be as great an opportunity for improvement in pure operation as in the direction of the traffic. The number of ton-miles accomplished by the railroads in 1916 would probably suffice for even our war needs if all traffic were directed so that none of the tonnage was wasted.

Government operation will also take care of any difficulty that might otherwise have arisen in borrowing money to buy new equipment and to pay off former loans that are maturing. The Government may even see that the roads get the equipment, as well as see that they have money to pay for it. The railroads have ordered new cars and engines, but the military needs abroad have prevented their getting many of them. The Director General will have the power to get such cars and engines as the conduct of the war demands for our roads.

As for the railroad revenues themselves, under the Government any deficit that might arise in operation would be met by taxes.

Besides directing traffic, unifying operation, and financing the roads, Mr. McAdoo must face another problem-in many ways an even harder one. He has got to find some way of maintaining the personnel of the railroad organizations. The engineering companies, the draft, and munition factories have all drawn on the railroad labor supply. Mr. McAdoo will have to meet these inroads and also meet the demands of the railroad brotherhoods for more and more wages. Two years ago the brotherhoods showed their strength to the Government, and their experience then would not deter them from trying the experiment again. Perhaps the patriotism of the railroad workers will remain uppermost in their minds during the whole course of the war. If not, Mr. McAdoo has a real test ahead of him. If such strikes as have spread over most of other war industries, despite the promises of labor leaders, come into the railroad field, it will make railroad conditions as bad as those which Mr. McAdoo was called on to improve.

Altogether the new Director General of Railroads is faced with many difficulties, and with an equal number of opportunitiesopportunities full of possibilities of service to the Nation in winning the war.

I delight in the fact that when we entered this war we were not, as our adversary, ready for it, anxious for it, prepared for it, and inviting it.

Certainly all Americans will agree with Mr. Baker in being delighted that we were not anxious for this war. But our delight at being unready and unprepared is being tempered, if, indeed, most people had it. For a Secretary of War to have had this feeling about a war which had been directly threatening us for nearly two years causes some wonder as to what Mr. Baker considered the purposes of the War Department to be. When Mr. Baker, with the present situation abroad staring him in the face, told the Senate Committee that the war was 3,000 miles away and that there was no hurry, the suspicion of his unfitness was confirmed.

Mr. Lowry, the author of the Collier's article, gave the following description of Mr. Baker last September:

He has not disclosed a powerful, penetrating intellect of "flashing impulses," but he has a sound, good mind. He contends daily in the War Department with an almost impossible, impractical organization. The power and responsibility in that archaic scheme of things are not intelligently placed. But Mr. Baker runs his job; it does not run him. Too infrequently can that be said of Cabinet officers.

It is not possible to erect Mr. Baker into a great heroic figure forging thunderbolts of war and launching them with majestic mien against a cowering and hated enemy. That is not his style. Neither is he the negligible quantity and colorless apparition some persons suppose.

The "almost impossible impractical organization," that "archaic scheme of things which makes up the War Department, came into Mr. Baker's hands two years ago. As Mr. Lowry points out, the Secretary seemed to dominate the Department until war, which is the test of a War Department, struck it. But then, as the Senate investigation has shown, the task got somewhat away from him. The humiliating testimony given by General Crozier and General Sharpe indicated that there was not a vigorous controlling force in the Department. General Sharpe, for example, testified that he had not been officially informed of how many men he was to clothe,

but that he heard there were to be a half million more and went and asked about it.

Not only did the testimony seem to indicate a lack of a big enough man at the top, but the results were bad. It is announced now that we are to have 400,000 men in France by March. That is thirteen months after we broke relations and eleven months after The British recruited and trained and delivered to the war area many more than that number from a population half the size of ours in the same length of time. And the army that Great Britain sent could not count on artillery, machine guns, or other munitions from its Allies as we are doing.

Mr. Baker has now shuffled the archaic scheme of things around and has gotten in some new blood. In peace times we should let it go at that, for Mr. Baker's personality is pleasant and his intentions are good. But we are now at war and delay means death, mistakes kill people. Big mistakes and long delays kill thousands. The President and Mr. Baker must know that the lack of foresight and the lack of efficiency in the War Department cause grave concern to the people in the United States and damage our reputation abroad and will lead to unnecessary deaths in our army. If the President and Mr. Baker are sure that no one else can be had to do the job better than Mr. Baker is doing it and will do it, it is the part of courage and patriotism to keep him at his post.

Optimism About the Shipping Situation

O

FFICIAL statements, from both the United States and England, give grounds for optimism concerning the general shipping situation. Mr. Bainbridge Colby, a member of the United States Shipping Board, goes so far as to say that the shipping problem is solved. "America's stupendous ship-building programme is the answer to the submarine." The recent parliamentary statement of Sir Eric Geddes, the new First Lord of the British Admiralty, gives more definite reasons for thinking that the German submarine has done its worst. The net losses in British shipping, in three and a half years of warfare, have amounted to 2 million tons. That is, England has that much less tonnage afloat now than in August, 1914. But the explanation for this falling off, Sir Eric says, is not primarily the German submarine. For

the first two years of the war, the English shipyards almost stopped building mercantile ships, devoting all their energies to constructing war vessels. The annual output of warships in England has exceeded the product of peace years by 300 or 400 per cent. The general impression that England's navy is at least twice as large as when war began is apparently substantiated by this official declaration. British yards can now turn their attention to recouping the losses in England's mercantile fleet. Sir Eric supplies another new fact: had England in these three years of war maintained her construction of mercantile ships on the pre-war level, English shipping, despite the depredations of the submarines, would be 2 or 3 million tons to the good. Now that the British yards have begun building merchant ships on a much greater scale than prevailed before 1914, the chances of making good the losses seem favorable.

We

Since February, 1917, when Germany's unrestricted campaign began, England has lost 3 million tons-at the rate of about 300,000 tons a month. How much shipping has been constructed in that same period? From January 1st to June, according to Chairman Hurley, American yards launched 500,000 tons; that is, even before the United States adopted its present large programme, we were building at the rate of one million tons a year. Shipping statistics are so entangled that it is impossible to tell how many tons England has turned out in this same period. can get some idea of British capacity, even before the augmentations required by war, from the fact that, in 1913, British yards turned out 3 million tons. Probably the statement is therefore entirely justified that English and American yards have replaced at least 2 million of the 3 million tons which England has lost since February, 1917. But there have been other sinkings than those of English ships. The best figures estimate that Germany has been destroying about 500,000 tons a month of the world's shipping since she decided to play her last card. This is at the rate of 6 million tons a year. If English shipyards produce 3 million tons and Americans 5 million tons, it is quite apparent that Germany has failed, even though the English and American navies find no more effective method of handling the submarine. Though Mr. H. L. Ferguson, president of the Newport News Shipbuilding Company, insists

Washington knew about the shortage of rifles and the changes in ordnance, the complaints of visiting manufacturers, their offers to supply the Government with munitions, and the lack of equipment. It was even predicted by men within the army exactly what the suffering would be, both on the transports and in the camps. Not a word of this, however, was it possible to print because of the strict rules barring any discussion of military plans. No one in the Government would permit any information to be released which tended in any way to reflect unfavorably on officials. Efforts were made frequently by the Committee on Public Information headed by George Creel to bring about relations of frankness with the press, but these failed. Similarly War Department officials, when confronted with the stories of inefficiency which were current here in many cases, actually entered denials and forbade their subordinates to throw any light whatsoever on these subjects. The usual reply was that the information would be useful to the enemy, but no person in authority either in the Committee on Public Information or any other branch of the Government weighed the advantage to America in a revelation of inefficiency as compared with the alleged disadvantages of having Germany learn details of American equipment.

The return of Congress has been the first healthful influence brought to bear on a situation the gravity of which had long been known inside the national capital. The attitude of smug complacency which some officials adopted toward their work was not disturbed, because criticism has been for many months virtually impossible. Rumors galore were prevalent, but newspaper inquirers, anxious to obtain the facts on which to base a judgment, were repeatedly thwarted and told that military matters were none of the public's affairs.

The creation of a Department of Munitions is again being urged as a way out of the ordnance troubles and the difficulties of handling questions involving contracts and supplies on a large scale. This suggestion has been repeatedly made in the sessions of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense, and a separate munitions organization responsible for ordnance would have been formed many months ago, could a public opinion have been aroused as to the need of such a step.

There are several deductions from Mr. Lawrence's narration of facts, which is in no way an exaggeration.

The fact, of course, is that there was and is something rotten in the state of the War Department.

The second is that the press failed in its duty. Censorship or no censorship, a paper with the information and the courage could have forced the issue.

The third deduction is that even if the censorship did stop the press from telling the whole truth, there is nothing to stop Congress from finding out whether the executive branches of the Government are doing their duty. It is the fundamental safeguard of all liberal government that the legislature elected by the people shall control the expenditure of the people's money and that the executives, whether elected or appointed, are in the last analysis responsible to that body, which, with us, is Congress.

But the difficulty with our system is that Congress does not attend to that function of supervision except periodically. Most of the executive departments go their way between appropriations with little responsibility to any one but the press. The press has assumed the task of watching the operations of the executive departments and reporting on them to the people. But it is a voluntary responsibility. The Washington correspondents who really perform this service to the Nation are not elected by the people to do this. It is inreality the duty of Congress, and the fact that the press generally does it does not excuse Congress from its obligations.

If the Committees of Congress had representatives of the departments empowered to answer questions about the department activities before them every week, Congress would keep posted and the departments would have to keep up with their work all the time. As it is, the Congressional investigations only occur after there is good reason for the public to believe that there has been a failure or a scandal.

The opportunity for Congress to assume its responsibilities and serve the country lies before it. In practically all other countries with democratic governments the executives resign when their conduct is unsatisfactory to a majority of the legislature. Our cabinet members are not responsible to the legislature to the degree that an adverse vote would mean resignation, and to make them so would require a constitutional amendment, but they are, nevertheless, responsible in that few adminis

trations would continue men in office who could not justify their work before Congress. And Congress by keeping in close touch with the administrative departments would be able to encourage ability, prevent mistakes, and legislate more effectively and with greater knowledge. Congress has a great opportunity within its grasp to grow in importance and responsibility and to render a great service to the United States and to civilization.

Concrete Ships Making Progress

T

O WHAT extent might concrete ships help to solve our shipping problem? Concrete vessels may be built quickly and cheaply; material is readily available; concrete is fireproof, rat-proof, and rot-proof, and withstands hard usage. The practicability of concrete barges and the smaller types of self-propelling freighters has been proven by practice though the value of concrete for large ships is yet to be shown.

It is interesting that the first example of what is now called reënforced concrete was a small boat, built by a Frenchman in 1849. Prior to 1900 several barges of less than 100 tons were in use in Italy and Holland. In 1900 a 200-ton barge for river traffic was built in Germany, and to-day concrete barges varying in capacity up to 700 tons are used in the Panama Canal, the Welland Ship Canal, and the Manchester Ship Canal in England, and in the harbors of San Francisco, Baltimore, and Sydney, New South Wales.

But the last year has demonstrated the true possibilities of concrete boats. A company in California will soon launch a 5,000-ton self-propelling vessel for ocean service. But Scandinavia is taking the lead in this new industry. In that country several companies advertise that they will build concrete ships for ocean travel as large as 5,000 tons, and early this year they will launch several ships, of three and four thousand tons, equipped with Diesel engines. One 400-ton Scandinavian ship has already received a Lloyd's rating. The English and French governments, it is rumored, are planning to construct a fleet of concrete barges and coastwise selfpropelling ships. And it has even been suggested in England that mammoth concrete barges of 15,000 or 20,000 tons' displacement be built for train ferries between England and Gothenburg.

Save for the Next Liberty Loan

T

HE determination of the American people to see the war through to the right ending will be tested by the third Liberty Loan-the first loan of 1918. We are now past the first burst of enthusiasm; we have settled down to the grim business of war. We have reached the point where the real sentiment of the people will be reflected in their actions, and there must be no occasion for doubt in Germany as to what that sentiment is. The time has come for each one to do his or her part. Less than ten million people subscribed for the first two loans. It is not just a question of furnishing money. It is a question of backing the Government with the clear declaration that we will give everything needed to rid the world forever of this German menace. The next loan affords the best opportunity to show that determination unmistakably to the world, to cheer our hardpressed Allies, and to hasten our participation in the war on the scale necessary for final victory.

If

Now is the time to begin thinking about this third Liberty Loan and to start saving for it. It will come within the next two months. Saving that is done for it now is better than saving done for it afterward. we have the money ready to pay for the bonds in full when they are offered, then we do not tie up bank funds to finance our purchases. And saving done now rather than later means that the material and labor, which would have been bought by that money were it not saved, is released that much sooner to increase the supply of labor and material available for war purposes. Those are the things

which the Government needs, and to do one's part, those are the things which the individual must really save. The man who sells other securities to buy Liberty Bonds does not do half as much as the man who saves and buys Liberty Bonds. The man who buys the other securities from him may be doing more than he, provided he saves the money to buy them with. For by saving the money he saves labor and material for the Governmentsaves the things with which the war must be fought.

The man or woman who buys a $1,000 Liberty Bond provides the Government with sufficient funds to equip twenty-five soldiers with two rifles apiece, or a full company with