opment of the theory of international neutralization, of guarantee, and of intervention, this last being effected, on occasion, by the use of pacific blockade as well as of overt hostilities. While none of these lacked illustration in the earlier periods, the nineteenth century has witnessed their not always successful employment on a scale little dreamed of by their originators. The doctrine of condominium has also been a feature chiefly in northern Africa and the Pacific island groups.

Quite another aspect of the world-picture is seen in congresses or conferences which seek (1) to develop humane methods in the care of sick and wounded (Red Cross, founded in meetings at Geneva, 1864, 1868, 1906); (2) to modify the more barbarous aspects of warfare (Declaration of St. Petersburg, December 11, 1868, and Conference of Brussels, 1874); (3) to abolish the slave-trade (West African Conference at Berlin, 1884-1885, and also Brussels Conference, 1890); (4) to promote a systematization of international action touching either mere disputes or the actual conduct of war (The Hague conferences, 1899, 1907, and the Conference of London, 1908-1909).

The subjects discussed at this last conference are peculiarly in evidence to-day, since it is upon the sea that national conflicts must frequently produce grave differences of view touching belligerent relations. Hence the need of a sea code rendering the interpretation of maritime law uniform throughout the circle of governments acknowledging the authority of a law of nations. The London Conference was charged with the preparation of such a code, which, under the title of The Declaration of London, was signed by the representatives of the ten participating governments and still awaits formal ratification. This highly important document (printed here as Appendix H) attempts to define the principles governing blockade, contraband, unneutral service, destruction of neutral prizes, transfer from a belligerent to a neutral flag, the character of captured goods (whether friendly or hos

tile), convoy, and resistance to search. While the leading doctrines touching these subjects were developed long ago by the prize courts of Great Britain and the United States, as well as the administrative prize tribunals of the Continent, it was found necessary to reconcile wide divergencies of view if a uniform international system of jurisprudence adapted to the exigencies of naval warfare was to be produced. Portions of the ground to be covered had been treated in the Hague Convention of 1907; the war between the United States and Spain of 1898, and that between Russia and Japan of 1904, illustrated many a debatable feature, while the theories of contraband and continuous voyage (cf. infra p. 466) had been strongly developed in our own Civil War, 1861-1865. Although the practical conditions attending naval warfare would seem to be undergoing a marked change at the moment, it would be rash to assume that applicable principles are likely to change. Nor would it be wise to forecast as yet the influence destined to be exerted upon international law through these altered conditions.

Neu

trality can never hope to escape many a sharp strain when belligerents are endeavoring to compass mutual destruction. Whether problems arise through border warfare or insurrectionary struggles, as in the case of Mexico, or whether a belligerent claim to appropriate parts of the high seas as exclusively warlike territory, closing them to neutral traffic, the result must ever be one of harm to the neutral. The latter, however, will do well to confront any emergency with a clear apprehension of fundamental principles: his commerce is subject to stoppage by blockade, or seizure as contraband, and precisely what shall be deemed contraband will be declared by belligerents and enforced in their prize courts; the neutral, however, while strictly held to avoid unneutral service or direct aid to belligerents, commits no wrong in carrying contraband, nor yet in arming his merchant-ship for defence, nor yet in attempting to evade capture by flight. In any event,

international law will protect the lives of all non-combatants afloat or ashore, and whether the merchant-ship be neutral or hostile, whether it carry contraband or noncontraband goods, the belligerent has, indeed, a right to enforce search of neutrals and a right to capture belligerent merchant-ships, but none of these may be destroyed until human life aboard has been placed in safety. To consider these questions at greater length would unduly anticipate the text of the succeeding chapters. International law and civilization have no more serious task before them than to inculcate the sanctity of principles of international action and of international agreement or treaty, as well as the peril of a permitted avoidance of these through supposed claims of necessity.

The parties to international law are sovereign states whose organization and attitude towards other states justify their recognition as members of the circle of governments admitting the binding force of international and universal law. Should a state fail to conform to such standards, international recognition will be withheld, or, if a member of the family of civilized nations, it declines to be held by principles generally declared valid, or repudiates the sanctity of treaty obligations, it must be classed with barbarian or pirate governments, and should be denied the benefit of diplomatic intercourse..

Quite apart, indeed, from direct influence in advancing peace between nations or modifying the conduct of hostilities, international law increasingly becomes an indispensable element in the maintenance of human enlightenment. Its earliest beginnings, as a modern science, are seen in the reflections and convictions of writers moved by a lofty Christian and ethical spirit; if their aims are to be realized in the world to-day, an increasing study of the history and methods of international relations must be held to be no small part of that public duty owed by every friend of civilization alike to his country and to mankind.

CHAPTER II

STATES AND THEIR ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES: SOVEREIGN. TY, GOVERNMENT, TERRITORY

State: Nation. A state is a society of persons having a permanent political organization, and exercising within a certain territory the usual functions of government.'

The terms state and nation are by no means synonymous. The latter involves the idea of a community of race or language, the former is applied to a society of men organized under some form of government and occupying a fixed territory. A nation may furnish a contingent of population to several states. There is a Polish population in Austria, Russia, and Prussia; a German population in Prussia and Austria; on the other hand, the Austrian, Russian, and Ottoman empires include several distinct nationalities. As applied to societies of men, the term state represents an artificial, the term nation a natural, division. In recent times the tendency to reorganize states upon a national basis has been very marked. The movements within the present century which have resulted in quite a large measure of national unity in Germany and Italy are illustrations of this tendency."

Citizens: Subjects. The members of this society, or the individual units whose association forms the body politic known as the state, are called its citizens or subjects; the

Creasy, pp. 93-99, 112-118; Wheaton, §§ 17. 33; Vattel, liv. i. chap. i. § 1; Maine, Int. Law, pp. 33, 54.74; Hall, §§ 1, 2; Manning, p. 92; Pomeroy, $$ 47-56; Woolsey, §36; Klüber, § 20; Bluntschli, §§ 17-27; I De Martens, § 16; I Phil

limore, §§ 63-65; I Pradier-Fodéré, SS 45-68; Wildman, p. 39; Law. rence, § 43; Heffter, §§ 15-18.

2

'I Halleck, chap. iii. § 2; Wheaton, § 17; Pomeroy, § 47; Bowen, §9; I Pradier-Fodéré, §§ 45-68, 6981; I Phillimore, §§ 61-65.

former term being used in states having republican forms of government the latter in those in which monarchical institutions exist. The duties and privileges of citizenship are determined, as will presently be seen, in part by municipal, and in part by international law.'

Government. The government of a state is the outward, visible expression of its sovereignty; it is also the agency by means of which its sovereign powers are exercised, and through which it maintains intercourse with other states of the civilized world. It speaks and acts through agents, called public officers, whose powers are exercised, in behalf of the community at large, in accordance with the requirements of its constitution and laws. Through one of its departments or offices, that of State, or Foreign Affairs, its intercourse with other states is conducted.

Kinds of Government. A constitutional government is one in which the powers of sovereignty are defined and limited in accordance with the principles of a fundamental law called a constitution. None of the modern Christian states that acknowledge the sanctions of international law can be said to be absolutely without a constitution or fundamental law of some sort. There may be no substantial guarantees of individual right or of personal freedom; indeed, such rights may not exist, or may be restricted within very narrow limits. It may be a formal written instrument, as in the United States; it may be in great part unwritten, as is the case with the British constitution; or, as in many Continental states of Europe, it may be embodied in the municipal law, from which those principles which are of a fundamental character may be deduced and determined. In some form it must exist. Without such

' Vattel, liv. i. chap. xix. § 212; Pomeroy, § 171. For a discussion of the right of suffrage from the point of view of municipal or constitutional law see Cooley, Constitutional Law, pp. 259–268; see, also, the articles on political suffrage, by M. Henri Pascard, in vol.

xxiii. of the Revue de Droit International, pp. 441-474; vol. xxiv. pp. 69-99; vol. xxvi. pp. 51-75, 269-288.

Vattel, iv. i. chap. 1. §§ 2, 3: Klüber, $$ 30, 53: I De Martens, §§ 23-28, Hall, § 2; Heffter, § 16; Ï Lorimer, pp. 203-210.