are parties to the treaty, and hold office for terms of six years. The scheme of selection is such as to insure a due measure of representation on the court to all of the signatory states in succession. Cases are brought by the states who are parties to the undertaking, but an action may be maintained by the subject or citizen of a signatory power with the consent of his government. Where treaties exist between the belligerent captor and the power which is a party to the controversy, or whose citizen or subject is a party thereto, the court is required to conform to the stipulations of such conventions. In the absence of such stipulations, the court is required to apply the rules of international law. If such generally recognized rules do not exist, the case will be decided in accordance with general principles of justice and equity.1 DISTRIBUTION Prize-Money. It has been seen that the title to captured property is vested, by the decree of condemnation, in the government whose flag the ship carries, and by whose forces such capture is made; its subsequent disposition is regulated by the municipal law of the captor's state. The proceeds of the sale of ships and cargoes which have been regularly captured and condemned is called prize-money, which, by the law of most states, is distributed among officers and crews of the vessels or fleets by whom the capture was made. Such was the law of the United States, in respect to the distribution of the proceeds of maritime prizes, from the establishment of the government under the Constitution until the close of the war of 1898 with Spain, when, by a formal enactment of Congress, all laws authorizing the distribution of the proceeds of the sale of prizes, as well as those authorizing the payment of bounty or head-money, were finally repealed." 1 For text of the convention, see Appendix F, Convention No. 12. § 13 Act of March 3, 1899 (30 Stats. at Large, p. 1007); §§ 46304635 and 4643 of the Rev. Stats. were repealed by this enactment. Privateers. In case of privateers, prize-money is distributed among the owners, officers, and crew in accordance with any agreement which may have been made by them for that purpose; in the absence of such an agreement, however, one-half of the prize-money is awarded to the owners and one-half to the officers and crew, which is distributed in accordance with the same rules as are applied to public armed vessels. Rules for Determining the Nationality of Ships and Goods. It has been seen that, in the determination of a question of prize, the decision will depend upon whether the property seized has, or has not, the enemy character. To determine questions thus arising, as to the nationality of ships and goods, certain rules are recognized by the prizecourts of all nations. The more important of them are: (a.) The nationality of ships and goods is, in general, determined by the domicile of their owner. Those owned by one domiciled in a hostile country are enemy goods; those owned by one having a domicile in a neutral state are neutral goods.1 (b.) The products of hostile soil, and articles manufactured in enemy's territory, are hostile, by whomsoever owned. (c.) The share of a neutral partner, in a firm having a hostile domicile, is hostile. (d.) If an owner of, or partner in, a business situated in a neutral state has himself a hostile domicile, his share in the neutral house is regarded as enemy property. (e.) A neutral sailing under the enemy flag, or carrying his register or license to trade, is regarded as an enemy. (f.) The nationality of goods is determined by their ownership at the instant of capture; a change made in ownership after that date is not recognized. (g.) In addition to the immunity accorded to ships engaged in religious or philanthropic missions by the Con This is the Anglo-American view. Cf. the case of the Pedro, 175 U. S. 354. vention of The Hague of October 18, 1907,1 "vessels of discovery, or of expeditions of exploration and survey, sent for the examination of unknown seas, islands, and coasts, are by general consent exempt from the contingencies of war, and are therefore not liable to capture. Prize cases were at first determined in the United States by the Federal Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture to which appeals were brought, under the Confederation from state admiralty courts. Upon the adoption of the new Constitution in 1789, the United States District Courts took cognizance of prize cases as an inherent element in their jurisdiction, and the states recognized, although not without misgivings, that they had ceased to have any control in admiralty or prize cases (U. S. vs. Peters, the case of the famous sloop Active, 5 Cranch, 114–141). In Great Britain a jurisdiction in prize is instituted upon the outbreak of war (cf. The Naval Prize Acts, 1864, 1894, 1914). Upon the Continent of Europe, save in Holland, Prize Courts are administrative and not judicial tribunals. The French Prize Court of to-day sits at the Palais Royal in an apartment usually devoted to sessions of the Section du Contentieux of the Conseil d'État. CHAPTER XII NEUTRALITY: THE NEUTRAL RELATION : RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF NEUTRALS: UNNEUTRAL SERVICES Neutrality. It has been seen that the outbreak of war between two or more states, and, in certain cases, the occurrence of a purely internal war, operate to place all other states of the civilized world in a peculiar status of non-interference in respect to the operations of war; to the relation thus created between the states which become parties to the war and those which refrain from participation in its operations- either as belligerents or allies- the term neutrality is applied, and a neutral state may be defined as one which wholly abstains from taking part in an existing war and renders no aid or service to either belligerent in his military operations.' Character of the Neutral Relation. In strictness, the relations existing between two states, at any time, must be either those of peace or war. International law recognizes no in'termediate condition. When a state occupies the position of a neutral it simply undertakes to maintain, without interruption, its peaceful relations with both belligerents. The maintenance of such relations is, of course, more difficult in war than in time of profound peace; and to this end a neutral state finds itself obliged to take such precautions, within its territorial limits, as will guarantee the continuance of such 'Vattel, liv. iii. chap. vii. § 104; Grotius, liv. iii. chap. xvii.; II Halleck, p. 173; Boyd's Wheaton, §§ 435, 436; Hall, pp. 81, 82; Creasy, $$ 531, 532; Woolsey, § 163; Risley, pp. 171, 172; III Phillimore, p.225; II Ferguson, § 226; I Kent. pp. 116, 117; Upton, p. 259; Bluntschli, §§ 742, 743; Klüber, §§ 279, 280; IV Calvo, §§ 2491-2493; Heffter, § 144 friendly relations. For the same purpose it has recourse to such positive measures as will secure immunity from acts of belligerency within its territory, and compel respect for its sovereignty and independence.' History of Neutrality. The rules of neutral obligation are of relatively recent growth, and, in their present form, are largely the result of a compromise between the conflicting rights and interests of belligerents and neutrals. In ancient times the very conception of neutrality was impossible. So long as one powerful state aspired to or claimed universal dominion, it was impossible for other and less powerful states to maintain that separate, independent existence which is essential to the recognition of state rights, and so to the development of a true theory of neutrality. War, among the ancients, was the normal state of mankind, in which all nations participated, either as principals or allies. Had any ancient state attempted to occupy a position remotely resembling that of neutrality, according to the modern acceptation of the term, and had it attempted to compel respect to its neutral rights, the belligerent against whom the attempt was made would have regarded it as an act of war, and would have governed itself accordingly. This state of affairs continued until the modern idea of state sovereignty and territorial independence began to be generally recognized, towards the close of the Middle Ages.' 144 Neutrals in their own country may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents may choose to buy. The principal exceptions to this rule are that neutrals must not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to the other, and must not furnish soldiers or sailors to either; nor prepare, or suffer to be prepared, within their territory, armed ships or military or naval expeditions against either. So, too, except goods contraband of war, or conveyed with intent to violate a blockade, neutrals may transport to belligerents whatever belliger- 2 Lawrence, Int. Law, § 244; Hosack, pp. 164, 165; IV Calvo, §§ 2495 -2500; Heffter, § 152. |