the character of the cargo are of the highest importance. As the trade of neutrals with each other undergoes no restriction in time of war, a neutral merchant vessel found on the high seas with a bona fide neutral destination is exempt from seizure or detention; it is only when the ship's papers indicate an immediate or ultimate hostile destination that she becomes liable to capture and condemnation.' The port from which the ship sails is called her port of origin; that to which she is finally destined at the completion of her voyage is called her port of ultimate destination; ports at which she touches between these terminal points are called ports of call or of immediate destination. The destination of a vessel is determined from its papers. If the ultimate destination and all intermediate ports of call are neutral, the ship is said to have a neutral destination. If the port of final destination or any intermediate port of call be hostile, then her destination is hostile. If the purpose of the master to visit an intermediate hostile port be contingent only, and if he has abandoned his purpose in the course of the voyage, the burden of proof is with him to establish such abandonment of the hostile destination. In this case he will have to overthrow the presumption, as to destination, which is created by the ship's papers.' 1 "No trade honestly carried on between neutral ports, whether of the same or of different nations, can be lawfully interrupted by belligerents, but good faith must preside over such commerce; enemy commerce under neutral disguises has no claim to neutral immunity." The Bermuda, 3 Wallace, 514. "Goods of every description may be conveyed to neutral ports from neutral ports, if intended for actual discharge at a neutral port, and to be brought into the common stock of merchandise of such port; but voyages from neutral ports intended for belligerent ports are not protected in respect to seizure, either of ship or cargo, by an intention, real or pretended, to touch at intermediate neutral ports." — Ibid. The Imanuel, 2 Rob. 198. "Neutrals may convey to belligerent ports not under blockade whatever belligerents may desire to take, except contraband of war, which is always subject to seizure when being conveyed to a belligerent destination, whether the voyage be direct or indirect; such seizure, however, is restricted to actual contraband, and does not extend to the ship or other cargo, except in cases of fraud or bad faith on the part of the owners, or of the master with their sanction. Vessels conveying contraband cargo to belligerent ports not under block The destination of the goods is usually, but not invariably, determined from that of the ship. If the destination of the ship be neutral, that of the goods is neutral; if it be hostile, that of the goods is hostile. Until the American Civil War the presumption by which the destination of the goods was deduced from that of the ship was generally regarded as conclusive. During the course of that war, however, the Supreme Court of the United States rendered several decisions, the effect of which was to extend considerably the rights of belligerents at the expense of those of neutrals. As the new rule is likely to receive considerable support in future wars, it is important to understand its relation to the old rule of international law upon the same subject. The rule laid down by the court was that the destination of the goods, rather than that of the ship, was to be inquired into by the court, in determining the liability to capture. If the result of such inquiry showed that the goods were destined to the military use of a belligerent, they were held liable to condemnation, ade, under circumstances of fraud or bad faith, are liable to seizure and condemnation from the commencement to the end of the voyage."-The Bermuda, 3 Wallace, 514. "The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles not contraband is absolutely free unless interrupted by blockade. The conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is always unlawful, and such articles may always be seized during transit by sea." The Peterhoff, 5 Wallace, 28. "Vessels conveying contraband cargo to belligerent ports not under blockade, under circumstances of fraud or bad faith, or cargo of any description to belligerent ports under blockade, are liable to seizure and condemnation from the commencement to the end of the voyage."-The Bermuda, 3 Wallace, 514. "A voyage from a neutral port to a belligerent port is one and the same voyage, whether the destination be ulterior or direct, and whether with or without the interposition of one or more intermediate ports, and whether it be performed by one vessel or several employed in the same transaction and in the accomplishment of the same purpose. Ibid. See also the Jonge Pieter, 4 Robinson, Adm. Rep. p. 79; the Freundschaft, Ibid. p. 96; the Jungfrau Charlotta, 1 Acton, Adm. Rep. p. 171; the Maria, 5 Robinson, 365; the Polly, 2 Ibid. 361; the Imanuel, Ibid. 197. The cases of the Springbok and the Peterhoff, which arose during the American Civil War, in which the doctrine of continuous voyages was recognized and applied, have proved to be less important in their effects upon the relations between beligerents and neutrals than was expected when they were decided. even though they were ostensibly destined to a neutral port. The application of the rule is illustrated by the cases of the Springbok and Peterhoff. Case of the "Springbok." The Springbok was a neutral ship of English ownership, which sailed from London in December, 1862, having on board a cargo made up in great part of contraband of war. The destination of the vessel, as indicated by her custom-house certificate, certificate of clearance, and manifest of cargo, was Nassau, N. P., a British, and therefore neutral, port. On February 3, 1863, she was captured by a public armed vessel of the United States, on the high seas, about one hundred and fifty miles east of her port of destination. She was conveyed to New York as a prize, and ship and cargo were there condemned by the United States District Court, a tribunal having original jurisdiction in the case. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, where the decree was reversed as to the ship, but affirmed as to the cargo. The decision of the court with regard to the ship was that, when "the papers of a vessel sailing under a charter party are all genuine and regular, and show a voyage between ports neutral within the meaning of international law, and when the aspects of the case generally are, as respects the vessel, otherwise fair, the vessel will not be condemned because the neutral port to which it is sailing has been constantly and notoriously used as a port of call and transshipment by persons engaged in the systematic violation of blockade, and in the conveyance of contraband of war, and was meant by the owners of the cargo carried on this ship to be so used in regard to it." The Springbok was held to come within the rule. "Her papers were regular, and they all showed that the voyage in which she was captured was from London to Nassau, both neutral ports within the definition of neutrality furnished by international law. The papers, too, were all genuine, and there was no concealment of any of them, and no spoliation. Her owners were neutral, and do not appear to have had any interest in the cargo; and there is no sufficient proof that they had any knowledge of its alleged unlawful destination." The case of the cargo was quite different. The cargo of the ship consisted of over two thousand packages. Of these the bills of lading disclosed the contents of less than one-third, and concealed the contents of over two-thirds, of the entire cargo. The manifest and bills of lading named no consignee, but described the cargo as deliverable to order. The real owners of the cargo were found to be certain firms in London, all of whom had been the owners of similar packages of merchandise which had been captured on a previous occasion, and condemned as contraband.' The court inferred from these facts the intention of concealing from the scrutiny of American cruisers the contraband character of a considerable part of the cargo. The motive of such concealment being "the apprehension of the claimants that the disclosure of their names, as owners, would lead to the seizure of the ship in order to the condemnation of the cargo." The concealments above mentioned were not of themselves regarded by the court as sufficient to warrant the condemna. tion of the cargo. "If the real intention of the owners of the cargo was that the cargo should be unloaded at Nassau, and incorporated by real sale into the common stock of that island," the cargo should have been "restored, notwithstanding the misconduct of concealment. What, then, was the real intention?" This was inferred by the court in part from the ship's papers and in part from the character of the cargo. The manifest and bills of lading showed that the consignment was to order. This was regarded by the court as a negation that any sale was made, or intended to be made, at Nassau. The final destination of the cargo, therefore, was not Nassau, but some ulterior port, and must be inferred from the character of the cargo. A small part of this cargo consisted of arti 'The Springbok. 5 Wallace, 1. Prize Cases (U. S. Dist. Court), 374; the Stephen Hart, Ibid. 387. cles which were contraband by the narrowest definition of the term. A considerable part consisted of articles useful and necessary in war-such as army cloth, blankets, boots and shoes-and therefore contraband within the construction of English and American prize-courts. These being contraband, the residue of the cargo, belonging to the same owners, was included in the decree of condemnation.' Case of the "Peterhoff." The case of the Peterhoff resembles, in some respects, that of the Springbok. The Peterhoff was a steamer which sailed from London with proper documents and ship's papers, indicating her destination to be Matamoras, Mexico. The Rio Grande, for a portion of its course, separates the territory of the United States from that of Mexico. The city of Matamoras is situated on the lower waters of the river, about forty miles from its mouth, and directly opposite the city of Brownsville, in the United States. The Peterhoff never reached her destination, but was captured, near the island of St. Thomas, by the United States steamer Vanderbilt, on suspicion that her destination was the blockaded coast of the states in rebellion, and that her cargo consisted in part of contraband of war. She was taken to New York, where ship and cargo were condemned as prize. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court by claimants interested in the vessel and a portion of the cargo. The court, in reaching a decision, found it necessary to pass upon the question of the right of a belligerent to blockade a boundary river, in order to determine whether the ship was liable for breach of blockade or for carrying contraband of war. 2 Upon this point the ruling was that, when a navigable river separates two sovereign states, neither belligerent, in the exercise of his right of blockade, can interrupt commerce with the other state, if neutral, by preventing access to any ports of such neutral state as are situated upon the boundary river at The Springbok, 5 Wallace, 1; V Calvo, §§ 2762-2766; vol. vii. Revue de Droit International, pp. 241-258; vol. xiv. Ibid. pp. 328-331; Hall, pp. 673, 674, note; III Dig. Int. Law, § 375. |