10. (1st June, 1882.) "The receipt of the Funds of Friendly Societies and branches, and the investment of the same for their benefit." (Unlimited.) 11. (18th December, 1883.) "Enabling persons of the Jewish religion to provide for the due celebration of the Passover." 12. (24th March, 1888.) "The encouragement and promotion of the riding of Bicycles and similar machines." 13. (10th April, 1890.) For "the promotion of Education." The limitations in this case being the same as those of the special authorities of 3rd July, 1878, and 3rd October, 1879, "for the promotion of Literature, Science, and the Fine Arts," and "for the promotion of a knowledge of Music." 14. (4th March, 1891.) For "the promotion of the Science and Art of Cookery," the authority being subject to the same limitation as those of the authority of the 10th April, 1890, " for the promotion of Education." 15. (27th February, 1893.) "Providing the members with legal and other assistance when claiming compensation under the Employers' Liability Acts." It will be well for the legal adviser of the society in this case to see that it does not offend against the Law relating to Maintenance or Champerty. 16. (8th May, 1893.) For "the Mutual Protection and promotion of the interests of Friendly Societies." 17. (15th June, 1893.) "The promotion of the pursuit of Angling." E. TEMPERTON v. RUSSELL AND OTHERS. COMMON LAW ACTION. This was an action brought by Mr. Joseph Temperton, a builder carrying on business at Hull, against Mr. John Russell (President of the Hull Branch of the Operative Bricklayers' Society) and others to recover £1,000 damages for the alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, in procuring and inducing certain other persons to break their contracts with the plaintiff. The action arose out of a strike by the bricklayers, plasterers, and labourers employed by the plaintiff in consequence of his refusal to carry out one of the working rules adopted by the Hull Master Builders on the one part, and the Bricklayers, Plasterers, and Labourers on the other part. In consequence of this strike workmen at other establishments refused to use the goods supplied by the plaintiff, who thereby, as he alleged, lost several contracts and suffered considerable damage. He thereupon sued the defendants in the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, to recover damages. The case was tried before Mr. Justice Collins and a special jury at York on March 21st, 1893, when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with £250 damages and costs. The defendants then applied to the Court of Appeal to set aside the judgment, or for a new trial. The application was heard and argued before Lord Esher, Master of the Rolls, Lord Justice Lopes, and Lord Justice A. L. Smith on the 13th, 14th, and 17th April, 1893, when it was held that an action was maintainable by the plaintiff against the defendants for maliciously procuring breaches of contract, and for maliciously conspiring together to injure him by preventing persons from entering into contracts with him, and the appeal was dismissed. Lord Esher in giving judgment said: "It appears to me that the combination was wrongful both with respect to the interference with existing contracts, and with respect to the prevention of contracts being entered into in the future. I cannot doubt that there was evidence from which the jury might find that people were prevented from dealing with the plaintiff by the resolution of the joint committee, and the action taken by the defendants, and that the plaintiff was thereby injured.' Lord Justice Lopes said: "It has been contended that the damage to the plaintiff must be considered to have arisen from the spontaneous action of individual workmen ; but I cannot think that that view is maintainable. We know something of the action of Trade Unions and their officials. So far from the injury to the plaintiff arising from the men acting of their own accord, I think it is clear that if it had not been for the fear of the Trade Unions and of the consequences of breaking the compacts which they had entered into as members of the Unions, there would have been no question of the men withdrawing from their employ. I think it was shown that Russell acted in what he did as the delegate and under the instruction of the joint committee of the three Trade Unions of which the other defendants were members, and therefore I think that the other defendants occupy the same position as he does." Lord Justice A. L. Smith said that the learned Judge who tried the case had directed the jury that "it is perfectly clear law that to induce a person who has made a contract with another to break that contract in order to hurt the person with whom it has been made, to hamper him in his trade, or to put undue pressure upon him, or to procure some indirect advantage for the person himself, is, in point of law, to do it maliciously, and a cause of action would be established." Lord Justice Smith went on to say that this was correct in point of law, and he added: "It does appear to me that if a strike were used for the purpose, and with the intent above mentioned, an action would lie." It will be seen, from the decision of the Court of Appeal, and from the above extracts from the judgments delivered by the Court, that this case is one of the greatest importance to Trade Unionists. It is much to be regretted that the bankruptcy of the defendants, following as a result of the action and decision of the Court, prevented the case being heard upon its merits in the House of Lords. According to the above decision it would appear that any officer of a Trade Union taking an active part in calling out men from their employment in any case where there is a labour dispute, although protected from a criminal prosecution by § 2 of the Trade Union Act, 1871, is still liable to be proceeded against by civil action for damages. The question arises whether employers acting together in locking out their workmen might not be proceeded against in the same way. Moreover, did not the particular employer, who was plaintiff in the case, legally break a joint contract of employers and employed, thereby injuring, in some degree, the defendants ? In the case of 'chair-marking," or other devices for preventing men getting employment, will not the same law apply? 66 The decision in this case throws considerable doubt upon the right of combination for such trade purposes, as was supposed to have been secured by the Trade Union Acts. If the law operates in a one-sided way, instead of securing equality of conditions to workmen and employers alike, Trade Unionists will have seriously to consider whether some further amendment of the law is not absolutely necessary, in order to secure the full benefits intended by the Trade Union Acts. F. INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS. In a Divisional Court of Queen's Bench, on November 1st, 1894, there was a case of some importance to Trade Unionists with respect to alleged interference with contracts. The case was Wright & Co. v. Hennessey. Mr. Chitty on behalf of the plaintiffs sought to continue an interim injunction, granted by the Lord Chief Justice, restraining Mr. Hennessey and others Y from interfering with the works of the plaintiffs, at the Pavilion Theatre, Whitechapel, and elsewhere, by notifying that the men belonging to the National Association of Operative Plasterers would cease work if certain men continued to be employed. Mr. Wright was discharged in consequence of this interference. No actual decision was given in the case because the defendant, Mr. Hennessey, expressed his willingness to give an undertaking not to persist in the course of action complained of till the trial of the action then pending was disposed of. The Court sanctioned the proposed undertaking, but declined to grant the order asked for, as "there was no case in the present instance for interposing in a conflict.” The plaintiffs had to pay the costs of the application in the case. The legal points involved will, however, have to be decided when the trial of the action comes on in the Court of Appeal. INDEX. (Only provisions of Acts in force are quoted in the Index.) ACCIDENTS, Compensation for, 160. (See Employer's Liability.) and inquiries, 274. Returns to be rendered, 76, 87, 88, 100, 102, 139, 141, 142, 143, Actions, Entry of plaint, 17, 246, 247, 278. Consolidation of, 255, 256. Discontinuance of, 257, 258, 259. Joinder of causes, 245. in County Court, 176, 177, 185. in courts of summary jurisdiction, 17. by indictment, 43, 45, 50. Acts of Parliament—Arbitration, 18, 24-72, 187, 188, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238. Bankruptcy, 214, 215. Coal Mines Regulation, 204, 205, 217, 218. Companies, Limited, 217. Compensation for Injuries, 160. Conciliation in Labour Disputes, 232. Conspiracy and Protection of Property, 37, 47. County Courts, 2, 5, 21, 170, 176, 239, 289, 291. Employers and Workmen, 1, 21. Employer's Liability, 173. Factories and Workshops, 16, 27, 31. Falsification of Accounts, 155. Friendly Societies, 65, 66, 67, 95, 107, 108, 109, 279, 316. Hosiery, 194, 196, 199. Larceny and Embezzlement, 149. Merchant Shipping, 220-225. Metalliferous Mines, 218. Particulars of Work, 202. Prohibition of Payment of Wages in Public-Houses, 217, 218, Summary Jurisdiction, 2, 5, 23, 45, 51, 56, 58, 89, 92, 105. Tickets of Work, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201. Trade Union (1871-1893), 59, 95, 107, 145, 146, 147. |