trains terminate at Jersey City, the short-haul traffic carried by them moves in large volume to and from New York by way of the Hudson & Manhattan on either flat standard or commutation fares. Defendants show a daily operation of 40 such local trains to and from the Jersey City terminal, and they deprecate the diversion of any of those trains to the Pennsylvania Station, New York, which they predict would be demanded if the supplemental fare assailed were eliminated. They base this upon the grounds that (1) the supplemental fare acts to divert a substantial portion of the short-haul traffic from the Pennsylvania Station to the uptown stations of the Hudson & Manhattan, and especially to the latter's Thirty-third Street station because of its proximity to the Pennsylvania Station, and (2) the unoccupied seats available for short-haul passengers in coaches now operated to and from the Pennsylvania Station are inadequate to accommodate short-haul traffic which now moves over the Hudson & Manhattan.

While the number of short-haul or commutation passengers who would change to the Pennsylvania Station is unpredictable, defendants selected March 8, 1937, as representative and show, as an extreme possibility, that between 7:05 and 9:34 a. m., March 8, 1937, 2,010 Pennsylvania passengers rode on joint Pennsylvania-Hudson & Manhattan trains from Manhattan Transfer to the Hudson & Manhattan uptown stations in New York, and, if, at the same time and place, an equal number of passengers had taken available Pennsylvania trains bound for the Pennsylvania Station, there would have been seats for only 875, leaving 1,135 without seats. This excess, in the aggregate, approximates the seating capacity of 14 modern coaches, but 16 coaches would have been required, due to the unequal distribution of movement with reference to Pennsylvania train schedules. These facts may be interpreted in the light of their potential significance, the purpose for which they were presented, or they may be considered as a gage of the extent and facility with which the short-haul traffic now uses the Hudson & Manhattan to its uptown stations in New York, bearing in mind that its use by the short-haul traffic tends to reduce interference with through Pennsylvania trains carrying long-haul traffic to and from the Pennsylvania Station.

The foregoing depicts the conditions only during the period of intensive movement designated. However, the following analyses of the same joint short-haul traffic for the entire day of March 8, 1937, as representative, affords a conception of the total volume of that traffic now moving daily to and from Hudson & Manhattan stations, and what it portends if any material portion were deflected to the Pennsylvania Station. During the entire day there were 16,407 passengers transported in 139 joint Pennsylvania-Hudson & Manhattan

trains from points on the Pennsylvania to the Hudson Terminal, and 5,336 passengers to uptown stations, inclusive of Thirty-third Street, on the Hudson & Manhattan. In the opposite direction, on the same day there were 24,290 passengers carried in these joint trains from points on the Hudson & Manhattan east of Journal Square, Jersey City, inclusive of its Thirty-third Street Station, New York, to points on the Pennsylvania. In addition, 3,657 passengers, principally from the Hudson Terminal, transferred from the Hudson & Manhattan to Pennsylvania trains at Exchange Place station, in New Jersey. Included in the total of 27,947 passengers there were 3,059 from the Thirty-third Street station of the Hudson & Manhattan and 2,841 from the latter's other uptown stations, comprising a total of 5,900 from all of its uptown stations. Considering only the 3,059 passengers segregated in the study as originating at the Thirty-third Street station, and the ease with which they could change to the Pennsylvania Station, one city block distant, if the supplemental fares were eliminated, it would require approximately 37 modern coaches seating 84 passengers each, to transport them and provide each passenger with a seat. And while the Pennsylvania passengers moving daily in the opposite direction to the Thirty-third Street station were not segregated in the study, it may be conservatively estimated that they are sufficient in number to warrant practically the same consideration in this analysis as is given to the passengers departing from that station.

Data taken from defendants' exhibits show that the average passenger train consists of a locomotive and seven car units, including coaches, and baggage, express, mail, sleeping, and miscellaneous cars. Translated into units of operation on that basis, it would require potentially 10 Pennsylvania trains, made up entirely of seven modern coaches each, to transport to and from the Pennsylvania Station the number of Pennsylvania passengers who now use the Thirty-third Street station of the Hudson & Manhattan as a point of arrival and departure in New York. This demonstrates in a general way the significance of that volume of traffic, when reduced to the measures of railroad operation used in the equation. As applied in the instant case, it affords some measure of the probable effect of abolishing the supplemental fares, for such a course would attract the shorthaul traffic to the Pennsylvania Station, and the largest part of the short-haul traffic from which the increase to and from the Pennsylvania Station would be drawn consists of commuters to and from New York during the periods from 7:30 to 9 a. m. and 4: 30 to 6 p. m., when the most intensive movement of trains in and out of that station now takes place.

In this connection, defendants assert that during those periods the train facilities of the station are operated to their capacity. The train movement from and to the Jersey side, exclusive of switching operations, averaging a train every 4 minutes 54 seconds between 7:30 and 9 a. m. and one every 3 minutes 20 seconds between 4:30 and 6 p. m. daily, results in congestion in the tunnels under the North River and blocking of the ladder tracks by which the 21 station tracks are converged into the throat tracks connecting them with those tunnels. This involves the operation of the trains as affected by the construction of those facilities, for instance, by the lateral contour of the tunnels, their single one-way track capacity. the intricate tower control system of switches and cross-overs of the double two-way ladder tracks, which form two prongs of a wye with the throat tracks as a stem and the prongs interlacing the station and yard tracks, and the capacity and occupancy of the station tracks.

The North River tunnels are 2.54 miles long. Trains enter them in either direction on a descending grade, followed immediately by an ascending grade conforming to the dip of the tunnels under the river. On the Jersey side the grade extends 1.55 miles plus and varies from 1.3 to 1.19 percent. This meets the grade on the New York side, which extends for 0.99 mile plus and varies from 0.5 to 1.93 percent. Within 1,200 feet inside of the east portal of each tunnel are four alternating right-hand and left-hand slight simple curves of 2° each, separated by 75 and 100 foot tangents, and farther in the interior of each tunnel are three right-hand and left-hand curves of less than 1o. The two single tracks, as they emerge from the east portals of the tunnels, connect each with two parallel tracks forming three eastbound and three westbound tracks between the tunnels and the ladder tracks. These six tracks are interconnected and each is connected by the ladder tracks with 21 tracks serving 11 passenger platforms within the station. Fourteen of the platform tracks are assigned to the Pennsylvania, Lehigh Valley, and New Haven operations, and seven to the Long Island. To the west, and on the opposite side of the ladder tracks from the station-platform tracks, are the stationyard tracks, which are used in direct connection with the operations at the station. These yard tracks are not to be confused with the extensive Sunnyside yards at Long Island City.

Although no freight moves through this station except company freight destined to the Sunnyside yards, unless an emergency requires it, and a large terminal was constructed at Sunnyside yards for the handling of express, there is a large volume of United States mail handled at the station, and defendants show that the track room required for the mail cars and platform space necessary for that service

and the handling of the mail cars, which must be expedited under all circumstances, consume a substantial portion of the station's train facilities which could otherwise be used for the handling of passenger equipment.

The study of August 21, 1936, shows that ordinarily it requires from eight to nine minutes for a train to pass through the North River tunnels and, between 7 and 10 a. m., trains entered the eastbound tunnel as often as two and three minutes apart, which resulted in as many as three trains being in that tunnel at the same time. These same conditions prevailed between 4 and 6 p. m. in the westbound tunnel on the same day. This represents the conditions on a normal day and pertains to the handling of long-haul traffic, exclusive of the Pennsylvania's daily commutation traffic, which now enters and leaves New York over the lines of the Hudson & Manhattan. Manifestly these operations in connection with the normal long-haul traffic must be intensified during periods when that traffic to, from, and through New York materially increases above normal. This is shown to occur during Christmas and other holidays, at the time of the opening and closing of schools and colleges, and during other events which induce such periodical increases in this traffic.

Defendants also stress the difficulties met with in clearing trains through the interlocking system of ladder tracks between the stationplatform tracks and the throat tracks to and from the tunnels as previously described. This operation includes the movement of light engines and empty equipment or so-called "drills" as well as scheduled trains. The study indicates that it requires from two to five minutes for this operation to and from 11 station tracks numbered 5 to 15, inclusive, which are used regularly by the Pennsylvania and Lehigh; and during that time two or more, and commonly from five to all, of those platform tracks are blocked so that no movements can pass to or from them. Complementary to the foregoing is the present almost continuous occupancy of the station platform tracks by trains, light engines, and drills, and this prevails more especially during the rush hours from 7 to 9 a. m. and from 4 to 6 p. m. or during the periods when any material diversion of commuters from the Hudson & Manhattan auxiliary stations to the Pennsylvania Station would be bound to occur if all restrictions were removed from their use of the latter station.

The testimony submitted by defendants with respect to the operation of the Pennsylvania Station and its train facilities, which is not contradicted, is addressed to the reasonableness of charging supplemental fares in their category as a regulation. Ever since the Pennsylvania Station has been in operation there has been a similar charge of this character applied to both the short-haul standard and

commutation traffic as defined herein. Their elimination or modification would be in the nature of an experiment. With the uncontradicted assertion of the defendants in mind that this terminal is now being operated at its capacity during the morning and evening rush hours under the restrictive effect of the supplemental fares, it is a reasonable assumption, based upon the expressed desires of the complainants, that, if those fares were canceled, the number of commuters who would change from the Hudson & Manhattan stations to the Pennsylvania Station would be sufficient to require additional trains, which would seriously impede the present operation of through trains carrying long-haul traffic.

The conditions surrounding the location and operation of the Pennsylvania Station require that the utmost consideration be given to the interest and needs of the public in a broad sense, due to New York City being a center of nation-wide business and social activities, as contrasted with the desires of the complainant commuters who have submitted no evidence that the requirements of commuters generally cannot be met by service to and from the Hudson & Manhattan stations without extra charge. Defendants assert that the design, location, and costly construction of Pennsylvania Station would not have been justified by either the needs of, or the revenue derived from, the entire short-haul traffic defined herein as being subject to the supplemental fares. As between the two classes of traffic, the present need of long-haul passengers for the facilities of the Pennsylvania Station is definitely greater than that of commuters, and this is considered a factor of eminent importance in determining the issues in this proceeding. Obviously, under circumstances where, as shown, the commutation traffic transported at relatively low fares is sufficient in volume to potentially obstruct or interfere with the regular and ostensibly safe operation of through scheduled trains carrying a greater volume of long-haul passengers paying standard fares, the interests of the latter should be protected, as they now are, by diverting commutation traffic from this terminal. The commuters have the alternative use of eight other adequate terminals at the lower flat commutation fares which are more conveniently located than the Pennsylvania Station with relation to the business districts in New York. Preference of the long-haul traffic is neither undue nor discriminatory within the contemplation of sections 2 or 3 of the act. The act does not prohibit carriers from extending to the passenger who has paid the regular fare different privileges and advantages from those accorded a passenger who has paid less than the regular fare. Eschner v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 18 I. C. C. 60, 64. The charging of a supplemental fare as a regulatory practice, under the circumstances and for the purposes described,