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provide for effective United States Potsdam and continued unilaterand United Kingdom participa- ally to operate the ACC in Rution in the work of those bodies mania without effective partici(Potsdam protocol XI, revised pation by the United States and Allied Control Commission pro- United Kingdom. Examples of cedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and such actions may be cited as Hungary). follows:

(1) Issuance of directives to Rumanian authorities by Soviet element of ACC, throughout armistice period, without agreement of United States and United Kingdom representatives, sometimes in the face of United States and United Kingdom protests, often without even notification or discussion. Many of these directives were prejudicial to United States interests.

(2) Obstructive handling, throughout armistice period, of clearances to enter Rumania for official United States personnel and aircraft.

3. The three Governments 3. In contravention of this stated that they had no doubt agreement, the Soviet chairman that, in view of the changed con- of the Control Commission, by ditions resulting from the termi- the usurpation of authority, denation of the war in Europe, rep- layed and withheld entry perresentatives of the allied press mits to Rumania for accredited would enjoy full freedom to report United States correspondents, to the world upon developments in ejected several correspondents Rumania.

from that country on fabricated charges, and censored United States press dispatches. These obstructive tactics, which continued throughout the armistice period, were particularly in evidence prior to the Rumanian elections of November 1946.


1. Reestablishment of move- 1. The Soviet command in ment of persons, motor, rail trans- north Korea has since 1946 refused port and coastwise shipping be- to discuss or implement the agreetween the zones of north and ments reached on these matters, south Korea (agreement of Joint resisting efforts toward reestabUnited States and Union of Soviet lishing the natural economic unity Socialist Republics Conference, of the country. Concessions to January-February 1946). economic coordination have been


IV. KOREA-Continued



made only on a barter basis. No regularized movement of persons or transport has been established beyond that allowing the limited supply by the United States of its outposts that are accessible only by roads through Soviet-occupied territory.

2. Consultation by the Joint 2. The U. S. S. R. delegation on United States and Union of Soviet the Joint Commission consistently Socialist Republics Commission refused to allow such consultation with "Korean democratic parties except under unilateral interpreand social organizations" in the tations of the phrase, "democratic preparation of proposals for the parties and social organizations," formation of a provisional Korean which interpretation, in each case, government (Moscow agreement, would exclude all but pro-Soviet December 27, 1945, III, 2). political groups.

3. That the Joint United States 3. The U. S. S. R. delegation and Union of Soviet Socialist Re- refused to consult with groups publics Commission would con- adhering to communique No. 5 if sult with political groups "truly the representatives of the group democratic in their aims and had ever expressed opposition to methods", who would declare their the provision for placing Korea willingness to "uphold the aims of under the period of trusteeship enthe Moscow Decision," "abide by visaged in the Moscow agreement. the decisions of the Joint Commission in the formation of a provisional Korean government * * *"' (Joint Commission communiqué No. 5, April 18, 1946).

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4. That a signature of the com- 4. The U. S. S. R. delegation muniqué No. 5 (later included in refused to adhere to the agree decision No. 12) will be accepted ment when an attempt was made as a declaration of good faith with to schedule the party consultarespect to upholding fully the tions. The U. S. S. R. delegation Moscow agreement and will make unilaterally asserted that, despite the signatory party or organiza- the signature of communiqué No. tion eligible for consultation by 5, and despite assurances of coopthe Joint Commission; that such eration with the Commission, and signatories who, after signing the a pledge to refrain from fomenting communiqué, foment or instigate or instigating active opposition, active opposition to the Joint the members of a so-called antiCommission, the two powers, or trusteeship committee could not the Moscow agreement, can be de- be consulted by the Joint Comclared ineligible for consultation mission.

only by mutual agreement of the two delegations on the Joint Commission (exchange of letters between Secretary Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov, May 2 through May 12, 1947, citing the


IV. KOREA-Continued

November 26, 1946, December 24, 1946, exchange of letters between the Soviet and American commanders).



1. "The high contracting parties 1. "Industry agree to render each other every three



(in the also

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eastern provinces, possible economic assistance in the known as Manchuria) postwar period with a view to was directly damaged to the exfacilitating and accelerating recon- tent of $858,000,000 during Soviet struction in both countries and occupancy * the greatest to contributing to the cause of part of the damage to the Manworld prosperity" (Sino-Soviet churian industrial complex treaty and agreements of August was primarily due to 14, 1945, art. VI). Soviet removals of equipment."Department of State press release No. 907 of December 13, 1947, citing Pauley report.

2. "*


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In accordance 2. The Chinese Government has with the spirit of the aforemen- failed to receive from the U.S.S. R. tioned treaty, and in order to put since August 14, 1945, the prominto effect its aims and purposes, ised military supplies and other the Government of the U. S. S. R. material resources. But when agrees to render to China moral Russian troops withdrew from support and aid in military sup- Manchuria, "Chinese Communists plies and other material resources, in that area appeared with Japasuch support and aid to be en- nese arms in very substantial tirely given to the National Gov- quantities the natural ernment as the central government assumption is that they were of China. taken with the acquiescence, at "2. In the course of conversa- least, of the Russians."-Quotations * * * the Government tion is from testimony of W. W. of the U. S. S. R. regarded the Butterworth at hearing before the three eastern provinces (i. e. Committee on Appropriations, Manchuria) as part of China" United States Senate, December (note of V. M. Molotov, August 17, 1947. 14, 1945, relating to the treaty of friendship and alliance).

3. "The administration of Dairen shall belong to China" (agreement concerning Dairen of August 14, 1945).

3. Chinese Government troops attempting to enter Manchuria subsequent to the Japanese surrender were denied the right to land at Dairen by the Soviet authorities there and were forced to utilize less advantageous landing points.

Due in large part to Soviet obstructionism, China has up to the present time been unable to establish a Chinese Government administration at Dairen.


Note From Secretary Marshall to Ambassador Panyushkin, July 6, 1948

EXCELLENCY: The United States Government wishes to call to the attention of the Soviet Government the extremely serious international situation which has been brought about by the actions of the Soviet Government in imposing restrictive measures on transport which amount now to a blockade against the sectors in Berlin occupied by the United States, United Kingdom and France. The United States Government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers.

The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. The international agreements undertaken in connection therewith by the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union defined the zones in Germany and the sectors in Berlin which are occupied by these powers. They established the quadripartite control of Berlin on a basis of friendly cooperation which the Government of the United States earnestly desires to continue to pursue.

These agreements implied the right of free access to Berlin. This right has long been confirmed by usage. It was directly specified in a message sent by President Truman to Premier Stalin on June 14, 1945, which agreed to the withdrawal of United States forces to the zonal boundaries, provided satisfactory arrangements could be entered into between the military commanders, which would give access by rail, road and air to United States forces in Berlin. Premier Stalin replied on June 16 suggesting a change in date but no other alteration in the plan proposed by the President. Premier Stalin then gave assurances that all necessary measures would be taken in accordance with the plan. Correspondence in a similar sense took place between Premier Stalin and Mr. Churchill. In accordance with this understanding, the United States, whose armies had penetrated deep into Saxony and Thuringia, parts of the Soviet zone, withdrew its forces to its own area of occupation in Germany and took up its position in its own sector in Berlin. Thereupon the agreements in regard to the occupation of Germany and Berlin went into effect. The United States would not have so withdrawn its troops from a large area now occupied by the Soviet Union had there been any doubt whatsoever about the observance of its agreed right of free access to its sector of Berlin. The right of the United States to its position in Berlin thus stems from precisely the same source as the right of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to assert the latter and deny the former.

It clearly results from these undertakings that Berlin is not a part of the Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation. Commitments entered into in good faith by the zone commanders, and subsequently confirmed by the Allied Control Authority, as well as

1 Department of State Bulletin, July 18, 1948, pp. 85-86.

practices sanctioned by usage, guarantee the United States together with other powers, free access to Berlin for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibilities as an occupying power. The facts are plain. Their meaning is clear. Any other interpretation would offend all the rules. of comity and reason.

In order that there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever on this point, the United States Government categorically asserts that it is in occupation of its sector in Berlin with free access thereto as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies. It further declares that it will not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights. It is hoped that the Soviet Government entertains no doubts whatsoever on this point. This Government now shares with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom the responsibility initially undertaken at Soviet request on July 7, 1945, for the physical well-being of 2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin. Restrictions recently imposed by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have operated to prevent this Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France from fulfilling that responsibility in an adequate manner.

The responsibility which this Government bears for the physical well-being and the safety of the German population in its sector of Berlin is outstandingly humanitarian in character. This population includes hundreds of thousands of women and children, whose health and safety are dependent on the continued use of adequate facilities for moving food, medical supplies and other items indispensable to the maintenance of human life in the western sectors of Berlin. The most elemental of these human rights which both our Governments are solemnly pledged to protect are thus placed in jeopardy by these restrictions. It is intolerable that any one of the occupying authorities should attempt to impose a blockade upon the people of Berlin.

The United States Government is therefore obliged to insist that in accordance with existing agreements the arrangements for the movement of freight and passenger traffic between the western zones and Berlin be fully restored. There can be no question of delay in the restoration of these essential services, since the needs of the civilian population in the Berlin area are imperative.

Holding these urgent views regarding its rights and obligations in the United States sector of Berlin, yet eager always to resolve controversies in the spirit of fair consideration for the viewpoints of all concerned, the Government of the United States declares that duress should not be invoked as a method of attempting to dispose of any disagreements which may exist between the Soviet Government and the Government of the United States in respect of any aspect of the Berlin situation.

Such disagreements if any should be settled by negotiation or by any of the other peaceful methods provided for in Article 33 of the Charter in keeping with our mutual pledges as copartners in the United Nations. For these reasons the Government of the United States is ready as a first step to participate in negotiations in Berlin among the four Allied Occupying Authorities for the settlement of any question in dispute arising out of the administration of the city of

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