On a reference from the Sessions Judge, on the ground that the proceedings were irregular under section 66, Act XXV of 1861, and that, therefore, the order of the Deputy Magistrate was with- out jurisdiction, held, that the petition was sufficient, and that the Magistrate was justified in making over the petition to a Deputy Magistrate, who had the full powers of a Magistrate, for enquiry and trial.
THE QUEEN V. UMESH CHANDRA CHOWDHRY
ACT-1861-XXV, ss. 68, 77
See MAGISTrate.
ss. 407, 426. See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE,
-XXI, ss. 27, 39.-Appeal―Jurisdiction--Value of Suit- Value of Decree.] The Recorder of Moulmein, in trying an administration suit, valued at rupees 13,000, found as to rupees 6,000 in value of the property claimed that it did not exist. The value of the amount decreed by him amounted to rupees 7,000.
Held that, under Act XXI of 1863, sections 27 and 39, the appeal lay in the first instance to the High Court, and not to the Privy Council.
HAWABI V. IBRAHIM SALI BHAY DAPTI --1864–III (B. C.), s. 87— Act VIII of 1859, s. 2-Res judicata-Limitation-Suit against Municipal Commissioners for Possession of Land.] Previous to the institution of the present suit, one of the shareholders of a piece of land brought a suit against the Chairman of the Municipality for recovery of possession of his share. The other shareholders were made pro formâ defend- ants in the suit. This suit was dismissed as barred by the Law of Limitation. After the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff brought the present suit for recovery of his share of the land, on the allega- tion that his tenant had relinquished the land within three months in consequence of his having been dispossessed by the Municipal Commissioners.
Held, that the suit was not barred by section 2, Act VIII of 1859; and that section 87, Act III of 1864 (B. C.), did not apply.
Semble.--Act III of 1864, s. 87 (B. C.), relates only to actions brought in respect of acts done by the Commissioner under that Act for the purpose of the Act.
H. PRICE v. KHILAT CHANDRA GHOSE
-XVI, s. 51--Act XX of 1866, s. 53-Act VIII of 1859, s. 194-Registration-Bond-Power of Court to alter Terms of a Specially Registered Bond.] By a bond specially registered under Act XVI of 1864, the obligor stipulated to pay the entire amount secured thereby, with interest at the rate therein mentioned, on a day therein mentioned. There was a further stipulation that, on
default of payment, the bond was to be enforced as a decree. On failure of payment, the obligee applied for execution under sec- tion 53, Act XX of 1866, but the Subordinate Judge ordered the payment to be made by instalments. On an application to the High Court under section 15 of the Charter Act, held, that the Subordinate Judge had no jurisdiction to pass a decree on the bond altering or varying its terms. Section 194, Act VIII of 1859, did not apply.
KHETTRA MOHAN BABOO v. RASHBEHARI BABOO
-1865-VIII (B. C.), s. 16—Act X of 1859, s. 6-Sale of a tenure for Arrears-Right of Purchaser-Ejectment-Incumbrance by former Tenant.] A purchaser of a tenure sold under Act VIII of 1865 (B. C.), for arrears of rent, cannot, under section 16, eject a ryot who has acquired a right of occupancy, under section 6, Act X of 1859, under the former tenant.
NILMADHAB KARMOKAR v. SHIBU PAL
App. 18 Shareholder-Purchaser of Rights of Holder of Fractional Share.] Section 16 of Act VIII of 1865 (B. C.) does not apply to the purchaser of the rights and inter- ests of the holder of a fractional share in an under-tenure. HARASUNDARI DASI v. KISTU MANI CHOWDHRAIN
-XI, s. 19-Immoveable Property-Moveable Property -Growing Crops.] Growing crops are "immoveable property," and execution of a decree of a Small Cause Court cannot be had against them under section 19 of Act XI of 1865. GOPAL CHANDRA BISWAS v. RAMJAN SIRDAR
s. 21-Small Cause Court Act (Mofussil).] A defendant, desiring a new trial of a case decreed against him in a Small Cause Court, must deposit in Court the amount of the decree passed against him and costs, at the time of giving notice of his intention to apply for the new trial. A subsequent deposit, though made within seven days from the date of decision, will not entitle the party to ask for a new trial.
Semble.-"The next sitting of the Court," mentioned in section 21, Act XI of 1865, refers to the next sitting after the decision complained of; and the words "within the period of seven days from the date of the decision," apply to cases in which the sittings of the Small Cause Court are not held consecutively by reason of the same Judge being the Judge of more than one Court. KAILAS CHANDRA SANNEL v. DAWLAT SHEIKH
XX, s. 34-Conviction by a Magistrate for practising as a Mookhtar in the Revenue Court without a Certificate-Jurisdic-
ACTS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BINDING GOVERN- MENT-Act IX of 1859.] Where, by a decree of the Special Commissioner's Court, established under Act IX of 1859, a decree was made directing property to be made over to a claimant, the pro- ceedings of officials making over that property were, when followed by a suit against Government to obtain possession of a portion of that property, in which suit the Government raised no question as to the propriety of the decree, or of the making over of the bulk of the property under it, held, to bind the Government as to the right of the decree-holder to the property.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL v. MUSSAMAT KHANZADI
ADMINISTRATION, CERTIFICATE OF
IN THE GOODS OF SHAM LAL DAS ADMISSION IN ANOTHER SUIT WHEN EVIDENCE See SANAD, RENT-FREE.
OF PARTNER WITH WIFE OF CO-PARTNER 109 See PARTNERSHIP.
AGENT OF COMPANY, AUTHORITY OF-Corporation-Seal- Contruct-Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, 8 and 9 Vict., c. 16, s. 97-The Scinde Railway Act, 1857, 20 and 21 Vict., c. 160.] The Scinde Railway Company was incorporated by 18 and 19 Vict., c. 115, for the purpose of making and main- taining Railways in India, and for other purposes. This was repealed by 20 and 21 Vict., c. 160, which authorized the Company to extend their operations, and extend their capital, &c. This Act, by section 3, declared the Companies' Clauses Consoli- dation Act, 1845, to be incorporated with it. By section 18, the Company have "a seal for use in India in lieu of the common seal "of the Company, and from time to time may vary and renew it, "and make regulations for its use; and except, as by this Act "otherwise expressly provided, every document sealed with such "seal, in conformity with such regulations, or in pursuance of any "order of the directors, or of any authority given by the Company "under their common seal, shall be as valid and effectual as if the common seal were affixed thereto." By section 54, “the Com- pany, from time to time, may appoint and remove such commit- "tees, persons, or person, as the Company think fit to act on behalf "of the Company in India or elsewhere, with respect to the mak- ing, maintaining, managing, working, and using of the railways "and other works of the Company, and the control and conduct "of any of the affairs in India or elsewhere of the Company; and "may delegate to any such committee, persons, and person "respectively all or any of the powers of the Company and of the "directors and officers thereof which the Company thinks it expe- "dient that such committee, persons, and person respectively "should possess for the purposes of his or their respective appoint- "ment." In January 1867, E. was the Agent of the Company in India, and he entered, it was alleged, on their behalf, into a con- tract with the plaintiffs, for 60 sets of iron-work for low-sided waggons. The plaintiffs' firm did not deal in iron-work, and they had to get the goods manufactured for them in England. The Board of Directors were at the time supplying iron-work for the Company. There was nothing to show that E. had been appointed under the provisions of section 54 of the Act, 20 & 21 Vict., c. 160, nor was there any evidence of the extent of his power or authority. A specification of the contract differed from it, in that it stated the waggons to be covered waggons, and not low-sided waggons. The contract was not made under seal of the Company, nor was the iron-work, the subject of the contract, ever accepted by the Company. The defendants admitted that at the date of the alleged contract, E. was the Agent of the Company in India, but denied that his power extended to the making of such contract; they further stated that the contract, if entered into, had been afterwards cancelled.
Held, by PHEAR, J., that there was no evidence to show that E. had authority to make the contract. The contract was one which E. would have had power to make in writing only, under section 97 of the Companies' Clauses Consolidation Act, had he been appointed under section 54, 20 and 21 Vict., c. 160, but there was no proof of such appointment.
Held, on appeal, that, assuming that E. had been appointed under section 54 with power as large as in the ordinary course could be conferred upon him under that section, the contract was not one by which, acting as such agent, he had power to bind the Company. STEWART V. THE SCINDE, PUNJAB, AND DELHI RAILWAY COMPANY
See Co-RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN APPEAL. PERMANENT.] Principle on which the Court will grant
permanent alimony.
ORD V. ORD
ANCESTRAL PROPERTY, SALE OF
APPEAL. See Co-RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO RE HEARD IN APpeal.
--Act VIII of 1859, ss. 324, 325-Award.] Two out of three arbitrators appointed in the case, submitted their award before the Moonsiff. The defendant, against whom the award had been made, applied to the Moonsiff to set aside the award, on the grounds of corruption and misconduct, and that the award was a nullity, inas- much as only two out of three arbitrators had made the award. The Moonsiff overruled the objections, and passed a decree in terms of the award. On appeal to the Judge, the order of the Moonsiff was set aside, on the ground that the award was illegal, as two only of the three arbitrators originally appointed had made the award, and that the evidence did not prove the plaintiff's case.
On an application to the High Court to set aside the order of the Judge, held, that, under section 325, Act VIII of 1859, the Judge had no jurisdiction to set aside the award when the Court of first instance had passed judgment according to the award.
In the Matter OF THE PETITION OF SHEIKH ILAHI BUX. App. AND REVIEW, ARGUMENTS ON
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