plaintiff died (February 1858), and the reversioners applied to be,
and were, admitted as her heirs, to conduct the appeal.

The grand-daughter remained in possession from the date of
transfer until 1866 when she died.

In April 1867 the present suit was brought by the surviving
reversioner, who claimed to be entitled to recover possession of
the property by right of inheritance from the alienor's father. He
was one of the reversioners who had been admitted to conduct the
appeal in the former suit upon the death of the alienor.

Held (on special appeal and review) there had been no adverse
possession; the instrument enured as a transfer of the donor's
life-interest only; the judgment in the former suit brought to set
it aside, did not bind or affect the reversioners, who, in that suit,
merely represented the interest of their predecessor the life-tenant.

In the first Court an issue was raised whether or no the hearing
of this suit was barred by the Law of Limitation. One of the
grounds of appeal to the Judge was that the Principal Sudder
Ameen ought to have held the suit barred as regards the diaras
under the special limitation of three years from the date of the
Collector's settlement. The Judge did not notice this ground in
his judgment. The same ground of appeal was repeated in the
special appeal to the High Court, but that Court refused to enter-
tain it for the reason that it did not appear to have been raised in
argument before the Judge, or in the first Court. On application
for review, it was urged that the Court ought to have listened to
this ground, but the Court adhered to its former decision.

Counsel should not be heard to re-argue a case on review upon
the same points as were argued in special appeal.

MUSSAMAT RAJ KUNWAR alias SHEOMURAT Kunwar v. MUSSA-
MAT INDERJIT KUNWAR

...

...

LIMITATION-Mesne Profits-Cause of Action.] The cause of
action, in respect to mesne profits, accrues on the date on which,
but for the fact of dispossession, the plaintiff would have been
entitled to receive them.

LAKHI KANT DAS CHOWDHRY v. RAM DYAL DAS

Page

585

...

App. 61

App.

See SPECIAL APPEAL.
MAGISTRATE—Arrest— Warrant― Complaint— Remand—Commit-
ment-Bail-Criminal Procedure Code (Acts XXV of 1861 and
VIII of 1869), ss. 68, 77.] Section 68 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Code applies only to cases in which the private individual
injured or aggrieved does not come forward to make a formal com-
plaint. That section is intended for the purpose of enabling
a Magistrate to take care that justice may be vindicated, notwith-
standing that the persons individually aggrieved are unwilling
or unable to prosecute; and even in such cases the jurisdic-
tion to arrest requires, for its foundation, knowledge of the
fact of an offence having been committed, and that knowledge must
be either personal or derived from testimony legally given. The
report of the Police, or any statement which falls short of an actual
formal complaint, or of a statement made on oath, is not sufficient
in law to give a Magistrate jurisdiction to issue his warrant.

Under section 77 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a Magistrate
ought not to issue a warrant to an unofficial person, except when
he is without the assistance of competent Police officers, and unless
the urgency is imminent.

The force of a warrant of arrest is at an end when the prisoner
is brought before the Magistrate, and the prisoner cannot lawfully
be committed to prison, or remanded without sufficient grounds;
and in the absence of evidence, there can be no grounds.

In this case, although the Magistrate had acted illegally before
evidence was recorded, and had shown a want of discretion in some
of the stages, the High Court refused to quash the Magistrate's
order, directing the prisoners to be put upon their defence, on the
ground that the order had been made by a competent officer after
hearing evidence, which was judicially received and recorded.

...

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF SURENDRA NATH ROY.
THE QUEEN v. SURENDRA NATH ROY
MAGISTRATE, CONVICTION BY, FOR PRACTISING AS
MOOKTEAR WITHOUT CERTIFICATE.

See ACT XX OF

Page

274

Dower-Prompt Dower-Deferred Dower-
A Mussulman, on

Limitation-Act XIV of 1859, s. 1, cl. 9.]
his marriage, entered into a written agreement (unregistered) with
his wife to pay her a lakh of rupees, one-fourth as prompt (mooûj-
jul) dower, the remainder as deferred (moowujjul) dower. A
separation occurred between the husband and wife, but there was
no divorce. During the separation, on 3rd May 1861, the wife
petitioned for leave to sue as a pauper to recover the balance of
her prompt dower. The husband, on the 1st July 1861, filed a
petition denying her claim against him. The wife's application to
sue as a pauper was rejected on 27th January 1862. The husband
died on 30th August 1867. On the 13th May 1869, the widow
brought her suit to recover the balance of prompt dower and the
whole of the deferred dower. Held, that she could only recover
the latter. The cause of action in respect of deferred dower could
not arise until the husband's death. But the cause of action, in
respect of prompt dower, arises upon demand by the wife, and
refusal by the husband. In this case there was a demand by the
wife, and a refusal by the husband, viz., in their petitions of 3rd
May and 1st July 1861, respectively, more than three years before
suit, therefore the claim to prompt dower was barred by clause 9,
section 1 of Act XIV of 1859.

MUSSAMAT RANI KHIJARANNISSA v. RANI RISANNISSA BEGUM
Usury-Interest, Rate of Act XXVIII of
1855-Small Cause Court Acts IX of 1850 and XXVI of 1864-
Procedure.] The custom of taking interest as between Maho-
medans is recognized by the Courts.

The Small Cause Court Acts, IX of 1850 and XXVI of 1864,
form one procedure, and the High Court can therefore exercise, in

84

Page

cases referred under section 55 of Act IX of 1850, the extend-
ed powers given to it by section 8 of Act XXVI of 1864.

Semble.-Per PHEAR, J. (dissenting from Ramlal Mookerjee v..
Haranchunder Dhur)-Act XXVIII of 1855 repealed the
Mahomedan laws relating to usury. By "laws relating to usury,"
the Legislature meant laws affecting the rate of interest.
MIA KHAN AND MANU KHAN v. BIBI BIBIJAN AND BIBI
AMNUJAN

...

...

MAJORITY, AGE OF, OF HINDUS-Act XL of 1858.] A Hindu,
domiciled with his family at Serampore, in the Zilla of Hooghly,
died, leaving a will, in which was the following direction :-

"In order to look after the affairs, to conduct suits and manage
"the debts and dues relative to my real and personal estates, my
"eldest son, H. C. G., who has attained the age of majority, remains
"executor, for my younger son, G. C. G., is an infant; but as my
"eldest sister, S. H. D., is prudent and sensible, all the affairs of
"the estates shall be under her superintendence; and my eldest
"son shall do all the acts according to her advice and direction.
"But when my younger son, G. C. G., will then come of age, both
"the brothers shall be competent personally to manage the affairs;
"at that time the advice and superintendence of my said sister
"shall not remain.”

G. C. G., after attaining the age of 16, but before he had reached
the age of 18, applied for grant of probate of his father's will to
himself, jointly with his brother H. C. G., in respect of property in
Calcutta. Held, that he had not attained the age contemplated
in his father's will at which he was to be joined in the executorship
with his brother

IN THE GOODS OF GANGA PRASAD GOSAIN
MANAGER OF JOINT HINDU FAMILY
See ACT I of 1845, s. 21.

...

500

80

546

347

MERITS OF THE CASE, IRREGULARITY NOT AFFECTING 371

Sale of Ancestral Property-Cause of Action.]
According to the Mitakshara, a son has a right during the life-time
of his father to sue to set aside alienations of ancestral property
made without his consent. His cause of action arises from the
date when possession is taken by the purchaser.

442

AGHORI RAMASARG SING, alias DAU JHI, v. J. COCHRANE, App. 14

MOKURRARI ISTEMRARI POTTA-Perpetual Lease--Regula-
tion XIV of 1812.] A zemindar in the District of Cuttack granted
the following lease:-

66

66

"In the chawd-nak 1236 Amli, 17th day of the month of Brisa,
"Sri Hari Chuckerbutty grants to Nared Manti this istemrari
'(permanent) potta. For that I execute istemrari potta of my
Khardigi Ayma in Mauza Bhimpur, Jote land measuring four
"bigas, being previously to this in our occupation, you will culti-
"vate and cause to be cultivated hereafter. Mokurrari (fixed)
"rent at rupees 8-12 sicca you will pay from year to year. In case
"of flood or drought, you will be allowed a reduction of rent
"according as such reduction will be allowed to others. To this
"Hari Chuckerbutty assents." A subsequent purchaser of the
zemindari right obtained a fresh settlement of the zemindari under
Government. The son and grandson of the grantee held succes-
sively under the lease.

In a suit by the zemindar against the holder for enhancement of
rent, held, that the potta was a hereditary lease fixing the rent
in perpetuity, and that it was binding on the representatives of the
grantor.

KARUNAKAR MAHATI V. NILDAHRO CHOWDHRY

...

MONEY PAID OUT OF COURT, SUIT TO RECOVER
See ACT VIII or 1859, s. 206.

652

223

MOOKTAR PRACTISING IN REVENUE COURT WITH-
OUT CERTIFICATE, CONVICTION BY MAGISTRATE

389

See REGULATION XVII of 1806, s. 7.

-Agreement not to alienate.] By an agreement reciting
that A. had executed a bond in favor of B., for a certain sum of
money, A., "in order to repay the bond-money in the terms in the
bond contained," declared that, "until the repayment of the
money covered by the bond, he should not, from the date of the
agreement, convey the property mentioned therein to any one, by
deed of sale, or deed of conditional sale, or mokurrari potta, or deed
of mortgage, or zuripeshgi ticca potta. Should he make all these
transactions in respect of the said lands, the instrument relating
thereto shall be deemed invalid, and as executed in favor of nominal
parties for evading payment of the money covered by the said land."
Held (MARKBY, J., doubting), that the instrument operated as a
mortgage to A. of the lands comprised therein.

No precise form is required to create a mortgage.

RAJKUMAR RAMGOPAL NARAYAN SING V. RAM DUTT CHOWDHRY 264

MORTGAGE-Equity of Redemption, Purchase of-Tacking-Mofus-
sil.] In 1840, A. mortgaged certain lands to B., which he
had granted in patni at a rent of rupees 145. Subsequently in
September 1844, A. granted a fresh patni at a reduced rent of
rupees 90; and on the 9th October 1844, A. mortgaged the same
lands to C. In 1856, C. obtained a decree for the redemption of
the mortgage to B., and he paid off the debt to B.: but it did not
appear that he took an assignment of the mortgage for the purpose
of keeping it on foot as a security against incumbrances created by
A. subsequently to the date of that mortgage, and prior to that of
the mortgage to himself; and in 1862, he obtained a final decree
for foreclosure against A. In a suit by C. to set aside the lease of
September 1844, held that it was valid and binding upon him.

Semble.-The English principle of tacking does not apply to
mortgages of land in the mofussil.

Page

GAUR NARAYAN MAZUMDAR V. BRAJA NATH KUNDU CHOWDHRY 463

-Act X of 1859, ss. 86, 99-Act VI of
1862 (B. C.), s. 17-Act VIII of 1859, ss. 236, 265-Execution of
Decree for Rent-Collector, Sale by.] A. obtained a decree
against B., for arrears of rent. C. was an under-tenant of B.,
under an ijara lease. In executing A.'s decree against B., the Col-
lector sold the "rights and profits of the debts due for rent" from
C. to B., for the years 1273-4-5.

A. became the purchaser, in a suit brought by D., as assignee of
A., of rents alleged to be due for the years 1273-4-5.

Held that, for the purposes of Act X of 1859, rent is moveable
property; and that the Collector, therefore, was competent to effect
the sale to A.

MAHES CHANDRA CHATTAPADHYA v. GURUPERSAD ROY
MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONERS, SUIT AGAINST
See ACT III OF 1864 (B. C.), s. 87.

MUTATION OF NAMES, PETITION TO
FOR

...

See GIFT.

155

...

App.

50

COLLECTOR

123

MUTUAL DEALINGS--Act XIV of 1859, s. 8.-Limitation—
Year-Account, Balance of.] The defendant in 1865 and 1866
indented on the plaintiffs for large quantities of merchandize, which
was shipped to Calcutta from time to time by the plaintiffs' agents in
London, who drew bills on the defendant for each shipment, for-
warding such bills and the shipping documents to the plaintiffs, in
Calcutta. The bills were presented to the defendant by the plain-
tiffs, and accepted by them. In the course of the transactions,