CORN HUSKER - See MASTER AND SERVANT (3).

CORPORATIONS.

1. The receiver of a mutual fraternal organization engaged in loaning and investing funds is entitled to maintain a suit in equity for accounting as against officers and directors of the association who were charged by the pleading with having neglected their duties, permitting the secretary of the organization to handle funds in an improper and unauthorized manner, as set forth in the bill, and failing to audit his accounts in a reasonably careful manner, so that he was enabled to convert funds of the association to his own use and to make loans to his wife and otherwise divert the property of the association. Snover v. Boynton, 539.

2. The several officers and directors of the association who were jointly and severally charged by averments of the bill with neglect, were properly made joint defendants; a demurrer was properly overruled although no conspiracy was averred. Id. 540.

See FRAUD (5, 6); STREET RAILWAYS (7); VARIANCE (1). COUNTS-See PLEADING (1).

The recorder's court of the city of Detroit has the same power on motion for change of venue as any of the circuit courts of the State have. Act No. 67, Pub. Acts 1909; Detroit Charter (1904), § 290. Glinnan v. Judge of the Recorder's Court of Detroit, 674.

CREDITOR'S SUIT.

Upon a motion to compel a discovery by a trustee in bankruptcy as complainant in a judgment creditor's bill, Chancery Rule 30 (b), vests in the trial court a judicial discretion to compel a further or more specific answer, and its action denying such motion will only be reversed on mandamus if there is an abuse of discretion. Crawford v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 109.

CRIMINAL LAW.

1. Under the amendment of the indeterminate sentence law enacted in 1905 (Act No. 184), directing the court imposing sentence to state the maximum penalty, no discretion to name a shorter period than the statute fixes vests in the circuit judge, whose duty is purely ministerial, so that a respondent convicted of burglary, for which the statutory maximum is 15 years, was not entitled to be released at the end of five years, the maximum erroneously stated by the order of the court which also named three years as a reason. able time. In re Evans, 25.

2. Without some excuse for delay the prosecuting attorney was not entitled to and should not have been permitted to indorse a new witness' name on the information at a second

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trial of the case. 3 Comp. Laws, § 11934. People v. Karamol, 354.

8 On the trial of a prosecution for violating the local option law, the respondent was entitled to have a request given that he was presumed innocent until proved guilty, and could only be convicted if he was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; nor was the point covered by a charge that he could not be presumed to be guilty, that he must be found guilty by the evidence, and was not required to introduce evidence in his own behalf unless the people had proved him guilty by testimony so convincing as to convince the jury of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

4. Desertion or abandonment of wife and family within the meaning of Act No. 144, Pub. Acts 1907, includes both the idea of a wilful and perpetual separation by the husband and failure to support. People v. Dunston, 368.

5. After respondent's wife had procured a divorce from him, awarding to her the custody of their minor children, and requiring him to furnish a stated sum each week for the support of the two children, his failure to comply with the order as to payments did not constitute abandonment under Act No. 144, Pub. Acts 1907. Id.

6. Where the prosecuting attorney called to the stand the attorney for respondent in a civil suit, wherein it was claimed respondent had testified falsely, and asked him questions as to communications made to him by his former client, who was thereby compelled to claim that such communications were privileged and to object to the questions, the conduct of the prosecutor was prejudicial and required the reversal of the case. People v. Dahrooge, 375.

7. In a prosecution for threatening injury to person or property with intent to extort money, as defined by 3 Comp. Laws, § 11488, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) § 14541, it was sufficient to charge in the information that respondent "did threaten to dynamite the dwelling house" of a person named, with the intent specified by the statute, setting out in full the written communication containing the alleged threat. 3 Comp Laws, § 11908. People v. Campbell, 381.

8. Evidence of former convictions and sentences imposed on the accused to the State prison for one year or more, was admissible under an information setting up such_former_convictions, in pursuance of the provisions of 3 Comp. Laws, §§ 11785, 11786, 5 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) §§ 14977, 14978, authorizing an increased penalty in such cases: and it was essential to a sentence as for a third conviction under such statute, that the information should so allege, and proof thereof be made, so that although respondent did not take the witness stand he could not complain of alleged prejudicial effect by reason of the introduction of such proof. Id.

9. The prosecuting attorney did not commit reversible error in arguing the case to the jury by referring to and stating the

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effect of such evidence, which was not objected to or disputed by the accused. Id.

10. Nor did the court err in its charge, submitting the other issues to the jury, in advising them that as to the prior convictions it was their duty to find against respondent. Id. 11. The sentence, showing all necessary allegations, including the accusation, evidence, and determination of prior sentences, etc., was valid and regular. Id.

12. After respondent had pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and had been placed on probation by the court, under Act No. 124, Pub. Acts 1909, he was taken into custody and put in jail by the probation officer, for a violation of the conditions of his parole. The court deferred sentence, on the advice of the officer, who was of the opinion that if respondent was permitted to remain in jail a few days, he would keep the conditions of the probation thereafter. Having been released, he again broke the conditions and was rearrested and sentenced to imprisonment. Held, that the sentence was valid, and that the court had not exhausted its authority by reason of the action of the officer, taking the respondent into custody and releasing him on the former oocasion. Act No. 91, Pub. Acts 1903. People v. Dudley, 389.

13. The officer had no power to revoke the probation. Id. 14. No constitutional right to the aid or advice of counsel is infringed by the statute which contains no provision granting respondent such right. Id.

15. On being taken into custody for violation of his parole, respondent was not entitled to a jury trial to establish the question whether he had violated its conditions, or to be confronted with witnesses as in criminal trials, and the acts are valid although they make no provision for hearing and trial. Id. 16. The violation of the terms of probation is not necessarily a crime and is not treated by the law as a crime, but rather as a breach of contract; when the person convicted is granted rights thereunder he agrees to the terms and understands that for certain misconduct his probation will be terminated, nor is the proceeding for carrying out this feature of the law in any sense a criminal prosecution. Id. 390.

17. Respondent was not deprived of liberty without due process of law by being summarily rearrested and sentenced. Id. 18. Testimony that respondent had a quantity of intoxicating liquors on hand during the period charged in the information, which stated the offense to be that of keeping a place where intoxicating liquors were sold, between May 1 and May 19, 1911, in violation of the local-option law (2 Comp. Laws, § 5412 et seq, 2 How. Stat. [2d Ed.] § 5017), was competent; and the prosecution was further entitled to show that respondent was engaged as a druggist in selling intoxicating liquors prior to May 1st. People v. Bullock, 397.

19. It was, however, erroneous to receive evidence of the manner

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in which respondent had conducted the business before pro hibition was adopted in the county and to receive proof of alleged offenses committed by him during the preceding sixteen months: and the court improperly charged the jury that such evidence might be considered to determine the character of the place that respondent ran during the subsequent period of time. Id. 398.

20. On the trial of a respondent charged with taking indecent liberties with a child, the prosecutor is not justified in asking a character witness, on cross-examination, as to opinions formed after learning about the accusation, or as to its effect on his opinion. People v. Snyder, 616.

21. It is error for the court to indicate to the jury his opinion as to the guilt of the respondent in a criminal case; so that the court improperly stated to the jury in the course of his instructions, "The question is asked, why not bring all the people in the theater up here to prove that, words to that effect. Of course, the offense was not committed on the stage; it was not part of the performance that afternoon; and it is possible and very likely that he tried to commit it so nobody else would see him," etc. Id.

22. It was improper, upon the separate trial of one of two joint respondents charged with larceny, to permit the prosecuting attorney to cross-examine a witness who was produced to testify to the good character of respondent, relative to acts of the other respondent subsequent to the alleged crime, on an occasion when she was engaged in identifying property stolen at other times and from other persons than those mentioned in the information. People v. Huff, 620.

23. Opinions of a witness as to respondent's character, formed subsequent to the date of the alleged offense and after some of the facts had been made public, are not admissible to prove or disprove good character. Id.

24. Witnesses called to attack or defend character can be asked on direct examination only as to the general character of the person in question, and will only be allowed to testify as to particular facts or instances upon cross-examination with a view to test the value of the testimony given: but cross-examination must be confined to acts occurring before the offense charged. Id.

25. It was also error for the prosecuting attorney to attack one of respondent's witnesses, accusing her, without proof, of having knowingly received stolen goods. Id.

26. And it was equally improper for the prosecuting attorney to praise one of the people's witnesses and to extol his skill and ability to detect wrongdoers. Id.

27. Upon counsel for respondent calling the attention of the court to such alleged misconduct, although the court merely granted him an exception, respondent was entitled to treat the matter as an adverse ruling. Id. 621.

28. On the trial of a criminal prosecution for keeping a house of

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ill-fame, it was not so erroneous as to constitute reversible error to permit the jury to take to the jury room an exhibit offered in evidence and examined by the jurors and consisting of a list of telephone numbers and names of subscribers whom the inmates of the house were accustomed to call up and invite in: although the practice is not commendable, the court will not reverse the conviction unless the respondent was prejudiced. People v. Tibbetts, 628.

See APPEAL AND ERROR (8); CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (10-14); EVIDENCE (12); HOMICIDE; INJUNCTION; PERJURY; TRIAL (4); VENUE.

CROSS-EXAMINATION-See CRIMINAL LAW (20, 22, 24); EviDENCE (5, 8); LIBEL AND SLANDER (3); Parent and CHILD (2). CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-See DIVORCE (2).

CUSTOMS AND USAGES.

1. Evidence that it was customary in driving oil wells to include an extra charge for "rimming out" or enlarging the bore in order to admit the casing, was incompetent in an action for labor and materials furnished in driving a well under a written contract, containing complete terms and providing for a charge of five cents a foot for removing the casing under certain contingencies. Hanna v. Smith, 483.

2. A written contract cannot be varied or contradicted by proof of usage, although evidence is admissible, in the absence of express stipulations, where the meaning of the contract is equivocal, to explain the terms used. Id.

3. Provisions that the methods employed in casing the well should be such as are usually employed in similar drilling and casing of oil and gas wells in oil territory, had no reference to the price, but referred merely to the methods of work; and no dispute having arisen relative to the manner of driving and casing the well, the clause did not warrant admission of evidence as to custom. Id.

4. Under undisputed evidence that an elevator, used in boring the well, was part of the necessary apparatus which plaintiff, the contractor, agreed by the written contract to supply, defendant was entitled to a direction in his favor that plaintiff could not recover extra compensation for furnishing the equipment. Id. 484.

5. And the defendant was entitled to recoup for the cost of procuring hydraulic jacks to raise the casing, which the contract provided should be withdrawn when necessary, plaintiff to receive five cents a foot for the work. Id.

CYCLONE INSURANCE-See INSURANCE (2).

DAMAGES.

General allegations of damage are sufficient to warrant a recovery for physical and mental suffering resulting from breach of promise of marriage. Houser v. Carmody, 121.