of the district of Gex. He said the pretext put forward at the time for this interpolation, was a desire expressed by Talleyrand that France should possess the residence of Voltaire at Ferney, a desire with which I imagine the French Statesmen of the Restoration had little sympathy; the real motive having been to give France access to the Great Simplon road, so important at that time.

There is no doubt that the possession of this district would be of great value to Switzerland in a strategic point of view, besides setting at rest the apparently interminable question of the Vallée des Dappes.

The President added that a considerable party existed in the neutral territory of Savoy favourable to joining the Swiss Confederation, but that he doubted whether such a step would be advantageous to Switzerland, since it would introduce a powerful adjunct to the Roman Catholic Ultramontane element, with which his Government already found a difficulty in dealing, and that it would be more prudent to adopt the more circumscribed frontier as marked in the map.

I told the President that I had no authority to deal with these prospective questions, but that in any matter relating to the security and independence of Switzerland, he might feel assured that Her Majesty's Government would act openly, and with the strongest regard for her interests.

I have seen the President since I communicated to him the substance of your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant, with which he expressed himself greatly satisfied.

I have reason to believe that the remarks which he made to me were the expression of the ideas and opinions, not of himself and his colleagues alone, but of a large portion of the influential and thinking part of the people here. They do not merely indicate a fear arising from the rumoured cession of Savoy, but the desire to obtain a more efficient military frontier. They feel that however well disposed the Great Powers may be towards Switzerland at present, late events have greatly altered the proportional weight of those Powers upon her frontier which formerly neutralized each other-Prussia, since the Neuchâtel affair, being indifferent, Austria crippled, and France much more powerful.

During my conversation with the President, I thought it right to suggest that his Government should be cautious how they took the initiative in this matter, not to appear as a Power eager for annexation or extension of territory, but as acting from motives of prudence and self-preservation. I also expressed a doubt whether Piedmont would cede the part of Haute-Savoie within the frontier line on the map, without an equivalent.

I inquired whether M. Kern, the Swiss Chargé d'Affaires in Paris, had full instructions on this subject.

The President replied that he had.

M. Kern enjoys some intimacy with the Emperor from former acquaintance in Switzerland.

No. 16.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.-(Received January 26.)

My Lord, Paris, January 25, 1860. SINCE I addressed your Lordship yesterday on the subject of the annexation of Savoy to France, Dr. Kern has again called upon me, and informed me that from all the information which reaches him, he cannot doubt that active measures are going on to ensure the realization of this project. His Government has become much alarmed in consequence, and he has orders to state to the French Government and to his colleagues, that Switzerland will protest against any alteration of the existing state of things on her western frontier, brought about without her concurrence.

The Swiss Government, Dr. Kern said, had received satisfactory assurances from the Great Powers of their intention to uphold the interests of Switzerland. He was desired, he added, to express to me the hope that Her Majesty's Government will see fit to remonstrate against the supposed intentions of the Emperor of the French before it would be too late.

I told Dr. Kern that I would communicate to your Lordship the observations which he had made to me,

He requested me to forward to your Lordship the inclosed copies of a pamphlet which placed the question of Savoy, as far as it regarded Switzerland, in a very clear light. The pamphlet is not published by the Swiss Government, but they approve of the sense in which it is written.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

COWLEY.

(Extract.)

Inclosure in No. 16.

Pamphlet entitled "La Suisse dans la Question de Savoie."

No. 17.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.-(Received January 26.)

Paris, January 25, 1860.

IT is more than probable that your Lordship has been made acquainted with a rumour prevalent to a certain extent in Paris, that there exists a secret Treaty between France and Sardinia entered into before the late war, by which the latter binds herself, in case her territory should be considerably increased in Italy by the events of the war, to cede Savoy to France.

I have no reason to believe in the existence of this Treaty, and for many reasons am inclined to doubt it; still I cannot take upon myself to affirm that some sort of engagement or understanding respecting Savoy has not been entered into between the two Governments.

But let this be as it may, it is my duty to call your Lordship's attention to the fact that the question of the annexation of Savoy to France is beginning to occupy the public mind very seriously, and I cannot doubt is more or less in the contemplation of the French Government, should the Duchies, and more particularly the Romagna, be annexed to Sardinia.

I inclose an article from the "Patrie."

Inclosure in No. 17.

Extract from the "Patrie."

LES VEUX DE LA SAVOIE.-Au commencement de l'année dernière, nous mîmes plus d'empressement à poser la question d'Italie que nous n'en avons mis cette année à aborder la question de Savoie. C'est qu'alors il s'agissait de porter secours à une nationalité opprimée qui ne pouvait être sauvée que par nous, et dans ce cas la France ne devait pas se faire attendre. Aujourd'hui, il s'agit d'un intérêt qu'on peut croire personnel, et nous avons voulu, avant de nous prononcer, que le doute fût presque impossible, et que l'évidence eût parlé.

Les journaux, les correspondances, les voyageurs sont d'accord pour affirmer que le vœu de la Savoie est d'être Française. Elle l'est par la langue, elle l'est par les mœurs; pourquoi ne le serait-elle pas de nom et de fait ? Elle le fut, et comment cessa-t-elle de l'être? Par la force, uniquement par la force. Mais les Traités de 1815 n'ont pu changer la nature des choses, et il ne leur a pas plus été possible de faire la Savoie Italienne que de supprimer les Alpes. Un jour devait venir où l'œuvre de la diplomatie disparaîtrait fatalement devant la puissance de la logique et les sentiments de tout un peuple. Il a été facile de comprendre que ce jour était prochain, quand on a vu la politique Française par l'influence de ses conseils, par le sang de ses soldats, par des sacrifices de toutes sortes, s'efforcer de substituer aux combinaisons arbitraires du Congrès de Vienne le généreux et fécond principe des nationalités.

Certes, on serait mal venu à accuser la France de n'être pas restée fidèle à son programme de désintéressement. Une idée de justice et l'intérêt de l'équilibre de l'Europe lui avaient mis les armes à la main: elle les a déposées après la victoire, sans demander aucun dédommagement et sans autre satisfaction que

D

l'honneur d'une grande tâche accomplie. Aucune ambition de conquête ne l'a tentée. Elle a donc tenu parole, elle a rempli héroïquement son devoir. Est-ce une raison pour repousser les vœux de populations qui veulent se donner à elle précisément en vertu du principe pour lequel nous venons de combattre? Ce ne serait plus du désintéressement, et ce serait une rare inconséquence.

Sur quoi d'ailleurs serait fondé ce refus? Il est vrai que le Piémont est notre allié, et que son Roi chevaleresque a droit à notre admiration et à toutes nos sympathies. Ses soldats sont les frères d'armes des nôtres, et, malgré la disproportion des territoires, nous attachons un prix véritable à son alliance. Mais il faut voir au vrai l'état des choses. Le Piémont s'agrandit, grâce à Magenta et à Solferino, du côté où le portait depuis si longtemps son ambition légitime. Il devient la Puissance Italienne par excellence, le conseil et l'épée de l'Italie. Dans cette nouvelle et glorieuse évolution, il est vraisemblable qu'il entraînerait encore moins la Savoie qu'il ne l'a entraînée jusqu'à présent. Les populations Savoisiennes deviendraient de plus en plus pour le Piémont un élément étranger. Avec cette intelligence politique dont Victor Emanuel et ses principaux hommes d'Etat ont récemment donné tant de preuves, on comprendra certainement à Turin que ce sont les mêmes causes, dans des circonstances différentes, qui poussent le Piémont vers l'Italie et la Savoie vers la France.

Dira-t-on que c'est la richesse de la Savoie qui nous attire? C'est un des pays les plus pauvres de l'Europe.

Dira-t-on que c'est pour donner à la France la frontière des Alpes? Ici nous acceptons l'allégation, et nous ne craignons pas de répondre que les Alpes sont notre frontière naturelle, et que cette clé est plus que jamais nécessaire dans nos mains, quand il va se former à nos portes un véritable Royaume d'Italie, qu'on a eu raison de comparer à la Prusse pour l'étendue, la force, et l'esprit militaire.

Les Alpes sont si bien la frontière naturelle de la France, "la Savoie," dit M. Anselme Petetin, "est si visiblement une découpure de notre carte militaire et politique, qu'en 1814, lorsque nous étions écrasés, que nous n'avions plus, je ne dis pas à dicter, mais presque à implorer des conditions, on nous donnait la Savoie par le Traité de Paris."

Notre droit fut donc reconuu par l'Europe en 1814. Supprimé en 1815, on sait pourquoi et comment, il reparaît aujourd'hui avec l'assentiment de la Savoie tout entière, et l'avénement du principe des nationalités en Europe.

Dans la Savoie, comme dans le Comté de Nice, dont nous parlerons un autre jour, le mouvement national est maintenant assez prononcé pour qu'on puisse dire: Le jugement est déjà rendu; Vox populi. Cependant, comme nous sommes de ceux qui aiment les situations nettes et qui veulent le triomphe des principes au grand soleil, nous ne désirerions pas que l'annexion de la Savoie à la France s'accomplît sans que le vœu populaire fût solennellement constaté. Le suffrage universel sera encore ici la meilleure solution.

Francaise, la Savoie retournera à la France. L'histoire, la politique, la langue, les mœurs auront raison, et nous aurons nos frontières naturelles-les Alpes, qui, selon une expression heureuse, sont un décret de Dieu.-PAULIN LIMAYRAC.

(Translation.)

THE WISHES OF SAVOY.-AT the beginning of last year, we showed more anxiety to bring forward the question of Italy, than we have this year to approach the question of Savoy. The reason is that then it was a question of giving succour to an oppressed nationality, which could only be saved by us, and in that case France could not allow herself to hesitate. At present we are dealing with an interest which may be considered as a personal one, and we have desired, before declaring ourselves, that doubt should be almost impossible, and that the evidence should have been pronounced.

Newspapers, correspondents, travellers, all agree in affirming that it is the wish of Savoy to be French. She is so by language; she is so by customs. Why should she not be so in name and in fact? She was so. And how did

she cease to be so? By force; purely by force. But the Treaties of 1815 have not been able to change the nature of things, and it has been no more possible for them to make Savoy Italian than to suppress the Alps. A day

must come when the work of diplomacy must to a certainty disappear before the power of logic, and the sentiments of a whole nation. It was easy to understand that that day was near, when it was seen that the policy of France, by the influence of her counsels, by the blood of her soldiers, and by every kind of sacrifice, was striving to substitute for the arbitrary combinations of the Treaty of Vienna the generous and fertile principle of nationalities.

It would certainly be unfair to accuse France of not remaining faithful to her programme of disinterestedness. An idea of justice, and the interest of the balance of power of Europe, placed arms in her hands. She laid them down after victory without asking for any recompense, and without other satisfaction than the honour of having accomplished a great work. No ambition of conquest tempted her. She has, then, kept her word; she has heroically fulfilled her duty. Is this a reason for repelling the wishes of populations who wish to give themselves to her, precisely in virtue of the principle for which we have just fought? This would no longer be disinterestedness; it would be an extraordinary contradiction.

Upon what ground, moreover, could this refusal be founded. It is true that Piedmont is our ally, and that her chivalrous King has a right to our admiration and our sympathy. Her soldiers are brothers in arms of ours, and, notwithstanding the disproportion of our territories, we attach a high price to her alliance. But it is necessary to look at affairs in their true state. Piedmont is aggrandizing herself, thanks to Magenta and Solferino, on the side to which her legitimate ambition has so long inclined her. She is becoming the Italian Power par excellence—the counsel and sword of Italy. In this new and glorious change it is likely that she would have less attraction for Savoy than she has hitherto had the populations of Savoy would become more and more, as regards Piedmont, a foreign element. With that political intelligence of which Victor Emanuel and his principal statesmen have lately given so many proofs, it will certainly be understood at Turin that they are the same causes which, under different circumstances, impel Piedmont towards Italy and Savoy towards France.

Can it be said that it is the richness of Savoy that attracts us? It is one of the poorest countries of Europe.

Can it be said that it is to give to France the frontier of the Alps? Here we accept the allegation, and we fear not to answer that the Alps are our natural frontier, and that that key is more than ever necessary in our hands, when there is to be formed at our very doors a genuine Italian kingdom, which has been with reason compared to Prussia in extent, strength, and military spirit.

The Alps are so clearly the natural frontier of France, "Savoy," says M. Anselme Petetin, "is so evidently a piece cut out from our military and political map, that in 1814, when we were crushed, when we were unable, I do not say to dictate, but hardly to pray for conditions, they gave us Savoy by the Treaty of Paris."

Our right, then, was recognized by Europe in 1814. Suppressed in 1815 -it is known why and how-it now re-appears with the unanimous approval of Savoy, and the inauguration of the principle of nationalities in Europe.

ઉંદ

In Savoy, as in the County of Nice, of which we shall speak another day, the national movement is now sufficiently pronounced to enable us to say, Judgment has already been given: Vox populi." Nevertheless, as we are of those who prefer situations free from ambiguity, and who wish the triumph of principles in the broad light of day, we should not desire that the annexation of Savoy to France should be effected without the wish of the people being solemnly asserted.

French, Savoy will return to France. History, politics, language, and customs will have their due, and we shall have our natural frontier, the Alps, which, according to a happy expression, are a Decree of God.-PAULIN LIMAYRAC.

(Extract.)

No. 18.

Earl Cowley to Lord J. Russell.—(Received January 28.)

Paris, January 27, 1860.

I SHOULD be glad to receive your Lordship's instructions as to the language which I should hold with regard to the annexation of Savoy and of the County of Nice to France.

I inclose for your Lordship's information a further article which has appeared in the "Patrie" on this subject.

I mentioned the matter this afternoon to M. Thouvenel. I said that I had no authority from your Lordship to speak to him, but that as Count Walewski had, some months ago, given me a solemn assurance that the idea of annexation, if once entertained, had been abandoned, I could not avoid asking, in the midst of all the rumours that were in circulation, whether his Excellency had any information to give me.

M. Thouvenel replied that he could assure me that the Emperor had not alluded to Savoy with him, but he proceeded to discuss the subject in a way which proves to me that he is ready to do argumentative battle in defence of it if necessary.

Inclosure in No. 18.

Extract from the "Patrie."

LE COMTÉ DE NICE. CE n'est pas un expédient ou un arrangement provisoire que la France poursuit en ce moment en Italie. La dernière campagne lui a donnée le droit et lui a presque imposé le devoir de fonder dans la Péninsule une œuvre sérieuse, et qui ait toutes les conditions de la durée. L'Italie était une cause perpétuelle de désordre; c'était une maladie Européenne. Il faut guérir radicalement cette maladie. Ce n'était plus une nationalité, c'était un volcan. Il faut éteindre ce volcan. Or, pour obtenir ce résultat désirable, comment pouvait-on s'y prendre? On ne pouvait faire que ce qu'on a fait, c'est-à-dire, réunir tout ce qui s'attire et demander à la géographie, à la langue, à l'histoire, leur dernier mot, résumé dans le vœu populaire.

Pour les esprits superficiels, le vœu populaire, même plusieurs fois renouvelé, n'est qu'une fantaisie. Pour les esprits clairvoyans, pour les historiens dignes de ce nom, pour M. Augustin Thierry, par exemple, l'instinct populaire, résistant à toutes les circonstances et traversant les phases les plus diverses sans se dénaturer, c'est l'histoire elle-même. De cette vérité, la situation actuelle de l'Italie nous offre un frappant exemple. Livrées à elles-mêmes, les populations s'efforcent de réaliser les conceptions de la diplomatie depuis deux siècles, conceptions qui n'ont été interrompues violemment qu'en 1815, lorsque l'esprit de haine et l'esprit de représailles prirent la placede l'habileté et de la prudence.

Dans une remarquable étude, publiée dans la "Revue des Deux-Mondes," du 15 Juillet dernier, M. Saint-Marc Girardin a rappelé qu'à la fin du dixseptième siècle, et avant les entraînements de la guerre d'Espagne, l'Angleterre et la Hollande ne se souciaient pas plus que la France delivrer l'Italie à l'Autriche. "On sait," disait-il, "qu'avant le testament de Charles II, qui donna toute la monarchie Espagnole au petit-fils de Louis XIV, des Traités de partage de cette succession toujours près de s'ouvrir, avaient été faits entre la France, l'Angleterre, et la Hollande.”

Nous n'avons pas à nous occuper, aujourd'hui, de ce que contenait le premier de ces Traités de partage; mais voici ce qui était contenu dans le second, à la date du 17 Mars, 1700. L'Archiduc Charles d'Autriche, plus tard l'Empereur Charles VI, était appelé à recueillir l'héritage de la monarchie Espagnole, sauf l'Italie méridionale, qui était donnée au Dauphin. Quant au Duché du Milanais, on ne voulait le donner ni au Dauphin ni à l'Archiduc; il était attribué, soit au Duc de Lorraine, qui devait alors céder la Lorraine à la France, soit au Duc de Savoie, qui devait alors céder à la France la Savoie et le Comté de Nice.

La même attraction qui pousse à travers l'histoire le Milanais dans les bras