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1865.

STANGER

V.

MILLER.

the day of the adjudication; so that, in effect, it is the same as if the rent accrued from day to day. By the 197th section the registration of a deed of this kind is assimilated to an adjudication in bankruptcy, and as the defendant might have proved for this rent in bankruptcy, he has now a right to set it off against the plaintiff's claim.

BRAMWELL, B.-I am of the same opinion. The proper way to consider this question is to see what is the law under an adjudication in bankruptcy. Assuming for the present that the execution of the deed is analogous to an adjudication in bankruptcy, I think this would have been a good plea of mutual credit under the 171st section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849. It is well known that whatever can be proved in bankruptcy may be made the subject of set-off in an action by the assignees against the creditor. Now, by the 150th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the defendant might have proved for a proportionate part of this rent up to the day of the adjudication of bankruptcy. Then, if the demise continued, rent might become due after the adjudication in bankruptcy, and although this rent might not be "a debt payable upon a contingency" within the meaning of the 177th section of the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act, 1849, it might be "a liability to pay money upon a contingency" within the 178th section of that Act. In either case there would be a mutual credit, and therefore the subject of set-off in bankruptcy, and, if so, it is clear to my mind that this rent may be set off; for, by the 197th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, the trustees are in the same position as if the debtor had been adjudged a bankrupt and they had been appointed assignees under his bankruptcy. Therefore, whether the date of the execution

of the deed, or of its registration, be taken as corresponding in point of time with an adjudication in bankruptcy, according to my view this plea of set-off is good.

Moreover, I am also of opinion that the plea is good, on the ground that the registration of the deed is the date with reference to which everything is to be considered; although there may be difficulties in the way, as in many other questions upon the construction of this Act. The 194th section applies to every deed made by a debtor, not being a bankrupt, for the benefit of his creditors, or his discharge from his debts and liabilities; and it requires the deed to be registered within twenty-eight days after its execution by the debtor; and by the 197th section upon the registration of the deed the provisions in bankruptcy come into operation. We must read the latter section as applicable as well to deeds binding creditors who have executed or assented to them as to those binding nonassenting creditors. But it is inconceivable that a deed executed on a given day, and which may be kept in the debtor's pocket, should, on its registration, have a retrospective operation, and relate back twenty-eight days, or such further time as the Court of Bankruptcy may, under section 194, have allowed for its registration. The deed becomes an official document, and determines the rights of parties under it, when an official sanction is given to it by registration. Therefore, I think that, as this debt was due to the defendant before the date of the registration of the deed, it was the subject of set-off as a mutual debt.

CHANNELL, B.-I am also of opinion that the plea is good, and that our judgment ought to be for the defendant. The plea is pleaded as a defence on equitable grounds, and the plaintiffs, who are trustees under the deed, are in the

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1865.

STANGER

v.

MILLER.

same position as assignees in bankruptcy, and therefore the defendant is entitled to succeed if he shew either a mutual debt or a mutual credit. At the time of the execution of the deed, a portion of the rent reserved by the demise was payable, but only payable by virtue of the 150th section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, which gives a right to prove for a proportionate part of rent up to the day of the adjudication in bankruptcy, and so in effect causes it to accrue de die in diem. This therefore was a proveable demand, and consequently a good set-off under this equitable plea. The plaintiffs being in the same position as assignees in bankruptcy, whether this is a plea of a mutual debt or a mutual credit, it is a good answer to the action. But, further, the whole of the rent now sought to be set off was not only due by contract, but payable before registration, which I conceive to be the dividing line, so that there was an actual debt which might be set off.

We have been referred to the 7th condition of the 192nd section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1861, as affording an argument that the date of the execution is the time to be regarded. But I do not so understand that condition. The statute makes a clear distinction between the execution of the deed and its registration. It is registration which gives effect to the deed, and places the proceedings thereafter taken upon the footing of proceedings in bankruptcy; but for some purposes the deed, when executed, may have an inchoate operation, so as to entitle the trustees to take possession of the property comprised in it. Neither does it appear to me that the concluding words of the 194th section, that in default of registration the deed "shall not be received in evidence," have the operation contended for. In a variety of cases the deed would have to be given in evidence in order to support the rights of the trustees, and

the statute only provides that it shall not be given in evidence as a valid deed until its registration. Upon these grounds, it seems to me tolerably clear that the defendant is entitled to judgment.

PIGOTT, B., concurred.

Judgment for the defendant.

1865.

STANGER

v.

MILLER.

BOULNOIS AND ANOTHER v. Mann.

DECLARATION for goods sold and delivered, &c. Plea.—That after the accruing of the causes of action, and after the 11th October, 1861, the defendant was indebted

to the plaintiff and to divers other persons, and thereupon a deed, bearing date, &c., was made and entered into, &c. -The plea set out the deed, which (so far as material) was as follows:

This indenture, made the 15th day of August, 1863, between James Mann, of, &c., of the first part, Thomas Fuller, of, &c., of the second part, John Cole, of, &c., of the third part, and the several persons who have assented hereto, or whose names or seals are hereunto subscribed and affixed, being respectively creditors either in their own right or in copartnership, or attornies or agents of creditors, of the said James Mann, of the fourth part, witnesseth as follows:-(The 1st clause declared that the expression "the trustee❞ shall mean the party of the third part.)

4. As soon as the trustee shall, in writing under his hand, certify that these presents have been executed or in writing assented to or approved of by a majority in number representing three-fourths in value of the now existing

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1865.

BOULNOIS

v.

MANN.

creditors of the debtor whose debts respectively amount to
107. and upwards, the debtor shall pay to each of his now
existing creditors such a sum of money or composition
dividend as shall be equal to the amount of 5s. in the
pound upon the whole debt now due to such creditors
respectively.

10. Unless and until these presents shall become void
under the proviso hereinafter contained, the creditors of
the debtor who shall have executed or otherwise acceded
to or be bound by these presents, shall not, nor shall any
of them, nor shall their respective heirs, executors or
administrators, or partners or assigns, at any time (except
so far as may be necessary in order to enforce any mort-
gage, lien or security, or any rights or remedies against
any persons other than the debtor), commence or prosecute
any action or suit at law, or in equity, or other proceeding,
or obtain, or endeavour to obtain any adjudication of bank-
ruptcy against the debtor, or his heirs, executors or admi-
nistrators, or make or sue out any attachment or seques-
tration of or upon him or them, or his or their property,
credits or effects for or on account of all or any part of
the debts now due from the debtor to the said creditors
who shall have executed or otherwise acceded to or be
bound by these presents, or any of them, or for or on
account of any claim of such creditors proveable under
these presents; and if any of them the said last mentioned
creditors, or their heirs, executors or administrators, part-
ners or assigns, shall in any respect fail to observe this
agreement, then and in every such case this present agree-
ment shall operate and enure, and may be pleaded in bar
as an effectual release of such debts or claims, and all
demands in respect thereof.

12. In case and as soon as the trustee shall, at any time

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