effect any alteration either of conduct or opinion, such measures must be adopted as are suitable to the peculiar situation, disposition, and feelings of the party; and consequently that this moral and physical influence must be applied in such diversity of form, and with such variations of lenity and severity, as may from time to time suit the circumstances of the case. When we speak of punishing crimes, we are in danger of being misled by a figure of speech. In fact, we do not punish the crime, but the individual who commits the crime; and whatever end the punishment is intended to answer, it must bear a relation to the nature, disposition, and circumstances of such individual. To hang up indiscriminately a certain number of persons, because they have committed a certain act, without any regard to the peculiar circumstances under which such act was committed, or by which every different case is distinguished, or even without any clear idea of the result to be produced, would be the height of folly, if it were not the height of injustice; and with regard to inferior punishments, it must be apparent on the slightest reflection, that the same punishment applied to different persons may produce not only a different, but a contrary effect, and that which may be necessary to reform one, may only serve to harden another. To apply the same punishment to all, is there

fore, a kind of empiricism in legislation, which pretends by a certain specific to cure a certain crime, without any reference to the state of the party on whom the nostrum is to be tried. The consequences of this have been most fatal to the interests of society, and under the pretext of an impartial administration of justice, the greatest possible diversity has always subsisted, not only in the degree of suffering sustained, but in the consequences produced. That which to one is agony, another disregards; and transportation, which by some may be considered as the utmost extreme of misery, may to others resemble an excursion of pleasure.* But this inequality is the least portion of the evil. The only rational object which punishment should have in view, is frustrated by this blind and indiscriminating process; and it is in consequence of this, that criminals, after having gone

* «The same nominal punishments are not in fact the same punishments for different individuals. If the offence be a corporal injury, the same pecuniary penalty which a rich offender would despise, would effectually ruin a poor one. That ignominy, which to a man of high rank would be intolerable, would be disregarded by one in a lower class. An imprisonment, which might ruin a man of business, occasion the death of a person old and infirm, and be the lasting dishonour of a woman, might be almost a matter of indifference to a person under other circumstances."-Bentham, Theorie des Peines, p. 29.

through some prescriptive mode of discipline, are again turned loose on society, more har dened in their crimes, and more instructed." On this subject then, one of the most important that can engage the attention of the human faculties, it is highly requisite that a thorough investigation should take place; in the result of which, it may perhaps appear, that the talisman to which we have trusted is no longer to be relied on; that there is no short and expeditious way of extirpating moral evil; but that, if we wish to. succeed, we must enter upon the task with a full conviction of its importance, and a sincere resolution to bend ourselves down to our labour. We must enquire into the character, temper, and moral constitution, of the individual, and acquaint ourselves with his natural or acquired talents, his habits, and his views, in order that we may be enabled to adopt such measures for his improvement, as may be best adapted to the case. If he be ignorant, we must instruct him; if he be obstinate, and arrogant, we must humiliate him; if he be indolent, we must rouse him; if he be desponding, we must encourage him; and this, it is evident, cannot be accomplished without resorting to different modes of treatment, and the full exercise of those moral and sympathetic endowments, which subsist in a greater or less degree between all human beings as incident to our common nature.

In the mean time, this supposed practicability of the adaptation of punishments to crimes, is unfavourable to the progress of real iniprove ment; as one of its expected consequences is, that punishments should be invariably inflicted, without any relaxation whatever. That this is the opinion of Mr. Bentham is apparent, from several passages in his works, and particularly from the following, where, under the head of remissibility, he thus explains the term. "This

is where, although the offender has been punished, yet on account of some good behaviour of his, displayed at a time subsequent to that of the commencement of the punishment, it may seem expedient to remit a part of it. But this can scarcely be, if the proportion of the punishment iş in other respects what it ought to be. The purpose of example is the more important object in comparison with that of reformation. Whatever then is required for the purpose of example, must abide at all events. It is not any reformation on the part of the offender, that can war. rant the remitting any part of it. If it could, a man would have nothing to do but to reform immediately, and so free himself from the greatest part of the punishment which was deemed necessary.

To this reasoning, which, if admitted, would.

舍

Bentham, Traités de Legislation à Dumont.

destroy the very principle of the penitentiary system, and establish an inflexible, uniform, and indiscriminating mode of punishment, it may, for the present, be sufficient to reply, that until a regular and efficient scale of crimes and punishments has been formed, it would be premature to avail ourselves of our boasted infallibility; and upon an idea that the judgment given, was perfectly just and applicable to the offence, to punish a criminal to the full extent of his sentence. Even Mr. Bentham has himself admitted, that "under the continuance of the present imperfect system, the property of remissibility may be deemed a useful one; but this," he adds, "would not be the case in any new constructed system, in which the rules of proportion before laid down, should be observed." That in the opinion of Mr. Bentham himself, such pe riod has not yet arrived, is apparent from his constant and successful efforts, for the advancement of every plan that may tend to reform the unhappy offender, and shorten the period of his captivity; and till it does arrive, let us continue to avail ourselves of the most likely measures in our power, to call the guilty to repentance, and to soften the calamities of human nature.

On this subject, it cannot be uninteresting to attend to the very judicious, cautious, and