Western Railway Company (ubi supra), but many other cases are cases in which the Court has found no difficulty in carrying into active execution the plain contract between the parties. It was suggested in the course of the argument, that railway companies in general stand on less favourable terms in the estimation of the Court than other people. I wholly disclaim the notion that a railway company is to be dealt with in this Court on any other principle than such as would apply and ought to be applied to an individual. Their contracts are to be considered just as any other contracts; their rights and obligations are in all respects the same as those of any other members of the community. They no doubt possess certain privileges, different from, and in some respects beyond, those of individuals, but while it is the duty of the Court to respect and secure the enjoyment of those privileges, it is no less the duty of the Court to take care that the powers with which the Legislature has entrusted them, and which are inherent in their constitution, are not so exercised by them as to protect them in doing wrong and escaping from the fulfilment of their lawful engagements. Now, nothing can be plainer than the engagement entered into by the railway company, which forms the object of the present suit. The company desired to make a certain railway through, among others, the land of the plaintiff. He resisted this, and he petitioned Parliament against the bill they presented. Whether he would or would not have succeeded in this opposition cannot now be ascertained. The company, however, were so moved by his opposition that they thought it prudent to come to terms with him, and they proposed or agreed that if he would permit them to acquire under the terms prescribed in their bill (the same as those provided in all such like cases) so much of his land as they required for their undertaking, that they would, in making their railway, make a siding out of that railway on to the land belonging to the plaintiff. The plaintiff having assented to these terms, and relying upon the performance of the obligation which the company thus assumed, the opposition was withdrawn, the bill passed through Par liament, and the company undertook, by an agreement, under the common seal, to perform their promises; they have taken such land of the plaintiff as they required. The plaintiff has performed his part of the contract. The company have made and opened their railway, and they now refuse to perform the other part of the contract, by force of which alone they have acquired possession of the plaintiff's land. A more direct, wilful, or determined violation of a plain contract cannot be imagined, and no excuse is offered, no suggestion that it is impracticable, or even that it is inconvenient for the company to perform their part of the contract, but what they say is that the plaintiff may, by an action at law, recover against them such amount of damages as a jury may think he has sustained by their wilful breach of their contract, and that therefore a Court of Equity will not entertain the complaint. I do not understand that the law of the Court countenances any such defence. If that were the law, the great majority of cases in which the Court has exercised its authority for the purpose of compelling specific performance of contracts would be readily disposed of, because, in a great majority of cases, a payment of money would satisfy the wrong which the breach of the contract involved, but it would be a total departure from all the principles by which the administration of this branch of the law has hitherto been guided to hold that it is at the option of a man who has persuaded another to part with his rights, on condition of his executing certain works, to say, I can but I will not perform the obligation I have entered into, and instead of keeping faith with you, and honestly fulfilling my promise, I will leave you to take the chance of an action for damages, and reserve to myself the power of endeavouring to defeat your claim, and instead of acknowledging your just rights compel you to receive, instead of them, such a sum as I may be able to persuade a jury will compensate you for the loss and disappointment which my wilful wrong doing may have occasioned. If this was said or done by an individual, the injustice would be too glaring to be endured. Can it be less so when it is done by a company? Is it because a joint stock company cannot be affected by any conscientious feeling, by any principle of honour, or any fear of forfeiting the good opinion of others that any dif ferent rule of law is to be applied to it than would be applicable to an individual? I am as unwilling as anyone can be to enforce against a company obligations to which private persons are not subject; but I should be acting in direct opposition to what I am satisfied is not less the plain law than it is the plain honesty of the case if I countenanced, on the part of the company, so gross a violation of their duty as they are endeavouring to practise in this case. The case of Storer v. The Great Western Railway Company (ubi supra) appears to me to establish the principles which are here applicable. It is said it may be distinguished in this, that the work which the company had then undertaken to make (which they endeavoured to evade) was to be performe 1 on their own land, while here the requisite work is to be performed on the plaintiff's land. But the plaintiff has undertaken and is willing and able to provide the requisite land. The work to be done is merely a collateral continuation of the railway, which the company have made upon land which was the plaintiff's, and has become theirs only on condition that they would so continue their railway. That there are cases in which the Court may be unable to do full justice in the way of specific performance is true. By imperfection of the contract itself, the Court may be unable to effect that which it would wish to perform. Such a case is presented by The South Wales Railway Company v. Wythes (ubi supra), where, from the uncertain and vague nature of several of the stipulations in the contract, the Court was unable to carry it into effect. But no such difficulty arises in the present case. The length of the siding is determined by the agreement. The land is private. The company has nothing to do but to continue their rails into the land which the plaintiff offers them. There is nothing vague or uncertain in the matter, and if they should be decreed to continue their rails by means of the siding they have undertaken to make, there can be no doubt that the Court has power to en Vendor and Purchaser-Specific Performance-Devise to Husband of Unmarried Woman-Doubtful Title-Demurrer. A devise of real estate to trustees for an unmarried woman for life for her separate use, and after her death to convey to her husband, with a gift over in the event of her dying "unmarried," vests the remainder in fee in the first person she may marry; and a title accruing under such a devise will be forced on an unwilling purchaser. Decision of WICKENS, V.C., reversed. Thomas Draper, being at the date of his will and down to the time of his death seised in fee of certain freehold hereditaments hereinafter called lots one, two, and three, by his will dated the 26th of January, 1831, devised all his real estate to trustees, upon trust to permit his daughters, Ann Draper and Lucy Draper, to receive the rents and profits therefrom during their respective lives in equal shares to their separate use. And from and after the respective deceases of his said daughters, the testator directed that his trustees should stand seised of his real estate, upon trust to convey and assure the same "unto and equally between the respective husbands of them, my said daughters, to hold to them re spectively and their respective heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, according to the several natures and qualities thereof respectively. Provided always that if either of my said daughters shall happen to depart this life unmarried, then and in such case the share of such daughter in and to my said real estate shall accrue and belong to the survivor of them my said daughters and be taken and enjoyed by her for her life in like manner as is before directed in respect of her original share; and on her decease the whole shall devolve to and shall be conveyed and assured to the husband of my said surviving daughter, as is hereinbefore directed with regard to her original share." The testator died on the 13th of March, 1832. Ann Draper had, on the 26th of March, 1831, married William Radford. She died on the 28th of February, 1868, leaving her husband surviving. Lucy Draper married Daniel Pearce on the 15th of September, 1832. Daniel Pearce, by his will dated the 27th of April, 1833, after reciting that under and by virtue of the will of the said testator, Thomas Draper, he (Daniel Pearce) was entitled, as the husband of Pearce, to one moiety absolutely of the said testator's real estate, devised unto the said Lucy Pearce all his estate, right, title, benefit, claim, and demand, to which he was entitled either in possession, reversion, remainder, or expectancy under or by virtue of the said will of the testator, to hold the same unto the said Lucy Pearce, her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns, for her and their own absolute use and benefit. Daniel Pearce died on the 16th of March, 1868, leaving his wife, Lucy Pearce, surviving. On the 10th of January, 1871, Lucy Pearce and the devisees of William Radford, who had also died in 1868, offered lots one, two, and three for sale by public auction, and they were purchased by the defendant, Thomas Willis. On the delivery of the abstract of title to the purchaser, he objected that, under the will of Thomas Draper, Daniel Pearce was not entitled to an absolute estate in fee simple in remainder expectant on the decease of Lucy Pearce in a moiety of lots one, two, and three, but that such moiety would vest solely in the person (if any) who, at the decease of the said Lucy Pearce, should be her husband, or would vest in such person jointly with the said Daniel Pearce. The purchaser therefore declined to complete his title. Under these circumstances the vendors filed their bill for specific performance against the purchaser; the purchaser demurred to the bill, and the demurrer was allowed by the Vice Chancellor Wickens, as reported 40 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 484. From this decision, the vendors appealed. Mr. Greene and Mr. H. J. M. Williams appeared for the appellants. Mr. Shebbeare (Mr. Dickenson with him) for the respondents. The arguments of the learned counsel were identical with those already reported at length at the hearing before the Vice Chancellor. The following additional cases were also referred to : On the rule of law favouring early vesting Stanley v. Stanley, 16 Ves. 491; Stert v. Platel, 8 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 249; s. c. 5 Bing. N.C. 434; Adams v. Bush, 9 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) C.P. 111; s. c. 6 Bing. N.C. 164 ; Parker v. Sowerby, 22 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 942; s. c. 1 Drew. 488. On the direction to convey not necessarily implying that the person to take must be in existence at the time when the conveyance is to be made— Re Mottram's Trusts, 10 Jur. N.S. 915. On the meaning of the word unmarried" Day v. Barnard, 30 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 220; s. c. 1 Dr. & S. 351. LORD JUSTICE JAMES could not concur with the decision of the Vice Chancellor. His Lordship had no hesitation in saying that, in the absence of any decided case to the contrary, a devise to an unmarried woman for life, with remainder to her husband in fee, would vest the fee in the first husband whom the woman might marry. The general rule of law which favoured the vesting of real estate in the first person who filled the character of devisee as described by the testator would apply to such a case. No doubt here the testator was one of those persons who thought that children were best provided for by putting all the property to which it was probable they would become entitled at their father's disposal; but if it were held that a second husband was to take the property, any family his daughter might have by a first husband would be entirely unprovided for. It would not be reasonable to suppose that the testator had any such intention. Then the question was, whether the will contained any such controlling context as to prevent the Court from carrying out the obvious wishes of the testator and applying the general rule of law which governed these and similar cases. His Lordship could find no such words. On the contrary, the context was in favour of the rule of law. It was only necessary to take the word “unmarried" in its ordinary and natural sense of "never having been married," and the conclusion was at once arrived at, that the first person who filled the position of husband would take the remainder. Then it was argued by the defendants that as the will contained a direction to convey, the necessary inference was that the person who was to take the conveyance was to be in existence at the time when the conveyance was to be executed. His Lordship could see no force in that argument. The fact was that the legal estate was in the trustees, and the direction to convey was merely a mode of clothing the beneficial interest with the legal estate in favour of the person who might at the time be entitled to the former. Then it was said that the gift to the daughter for her separate use must enure during the lifetime of any number of husbands that she might marry. That might well be so and yet not alter the plain words of the will which gave the remainder to the first husband. That being so, the only question which remained was whether, under all the circumstances of the case, this was a title too doubtful to force on a purchaser. But his Lordship was of opinion that the question to be decided in this case involved a question of general law applicable to all similar cases, and did not depend on any peculiar or specific words in the will itself. The Court would, therefore, follow its own decision in Alexander v. Mills (1), act on the will, and compel the purchaser to take the title. Having regard, however, to the fact that the question which was occasioned by the testator's will had been raised in the shortest and most inexpensive way by demurrer, the Court thought that the plaintiff ought not to ask for costs, and the simple order would be that the demurrer would be overruled. LORD JUSTICE MELLISH was of the same opinion, and for the same reasons. Solicitors Mr. W. H. Bishop, for plaintiff; Mr. William Wyatt, for defendant. Company-Winding-up-Settling List of Contributories-Affidavit of Documents by Liquidator. A person sought to be placed on the list of contributories has, after filing an affidavit stating his grounds for resistance, a right to require from the liquidator an affidavit as to documents relating to the matter. having been made by the official liquidator Adjourned summons.-An application of the corporation to have Mr. Gooch's name settled upon the list of contributories, Mr. Gooch, after filing an affidavit, stating his grounds for resisting it (but before closing his evidence), took out this summons requiring the liquidator to file an affidavit stating what documents he had in his possession or power relating to the matters in question between them, and to leave such documents for inspection with the Clerk of Records and Writs. This the liquidator refused to do, urging that 1) 40 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chane. 73: it was not the practice of the Court to compel a liquidator to make such an affidavit; that it would necessitate a search through an immense mass of documents exceeding a ton in weight, and cause a great expense to the estate. He offered Mr. Gooch the fullest liberty to inspect and examine all the documents. The Solicitor General (Mr. Jessel) and Mr. Bagshawe, for Mr. Gooch, only asked for an affidavit giving a list of the material documents, but insisted that they had a right to that. Sir R. Baggallay and Mr. Chitty maintained that they had no such right. THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS held that, as Mr. Gooch had put in an affidavit stating his case, he was entitled to have an affidavit of documents from the official liquidator. The liquidator had, in any case, to search his documents, in order to make out the list of contributories, and he should have them classified and labelled. NOTE. This case is under appeal. Solicitors Mr. H. W. Vallance, for Mr. Gooch; Messrs. Linklaters & Co., for official liquidator. WICKENS, V.C. Re WOODCOCK'S SETTLED An order was made for the payment of 1,2001. (proceeds of a sale under the Settled Estates Act) into Court, and for re-investment thereof in land, and for interim investment in Consols:-Held, that the Accountant General was not bound to invest the money in Consols without a written request of the solicitor who paid it in. This was a motion for leave to bring an action against the Accountant General of the Court of Chancery, or in the alternative, for damages to be paid by him, under the following circumstances :— On December 22nd, 1865, an order was made for payment into Court of a sum of 1,2007., being purchase money received on sale of lands under the Settled Estates Act, and the order went on to provide that the said sum "shall, until an investment in land can be found for it, be invested in Exchequer Bills or Consols." The money was paid in on June 20th, 1866. By the practice of the Accountant General's office, the solicitor is required to make a request that the money should be invested before the order is acted upon, which request was omitted in this case, and the money not having been required for re-investment until 1870, it was found, when application was made for it, that it had not been invested in Consols; and it was now contended that as this practice was not enacted by any statute, nor directed by any order of the Court, it ought not to prevail against an express enactment and the express words of the order for payment into Court. Mr. Hindle Palmer and Mr. Langley, for the motion. The practice contended for by the Accountant General is forbidden in the cases of the Legacy Duty Act (36 Geo. 3. c. 52. s. 32), and by the general order under the Trustee Relief Act, and in this Act the 25th section provides that interim investments shall be made in Consols or Exchequer Bonds, and the order for payment in was also peremptory as to interim investment. WICKENS, V.C., without calling on Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Methold (who appeared for the Accountant General) said that the practice of the Court did not compel an immediate interim investment by the Accountant General, but remained in suspense until the solicitor made a request. That practice was recognised by the fact that exceptions had been specially made in the cases of the Legacy Duty and Trustee Relief Act; and the first Consolidated Order (Rule 12) provided peremptorily for the interim investment of interest and dividends only, implying that interim investment of capital need not be made without a request. A contrary practice would often be inexpedient. For example, if an immediate re-investment in land had been contemplated in this |