Here, he claims to hold property given to him for an immoral or illegal purpose, he must say so in plain terms, he must clearly put forth his scoundrelism if he intends to avail himself of it. however, all that he says is, that the plaintiff, fearing an adverse decision in a suit of Haigh v. Haigh, conveyed the property to him. That in my opinion. is not sufficient. The next objection that was raised was founded upon the statute of frauds. The defendant admits that he took the estate upon a promise to return it; but he sets up in another part of his answer the statute of frands, and claims the estate as his own. Now, no doubt, the statute of frauds that says any one claiming an estate under any declaration of trust or confidence, must prove such trust or confidence by a declaration in writing, but the statute says that no resulting trust and no trust arising by operation of law, is within that enactment. I apprehend that it is quite plain that the statute was not intended to prevent a Court of Equity from giving relief in a case of clear deliberate fraud. The words of Lord Justice Turner in Lincoln v. Wright (1), where he says, "The principle of this Court is that the statute of frauds was not made to cover fraud," express a principle upon which this Court has acted in numerous instances where the Court has refused to allow a man to take advantage of the statute so as to keep another man's property which he has obtained by fraud. This case is, I think, hard to be distinguished from Childers v. Childers (supra). It is consistent with Davies v. Otty (supra), which does not seem to me to carry the matter at all further than the decision of Lord Justice Turner in Lincoln v. Wright (1), when it was attempted to use the statute of frauds by a man who claimed to have an absolute conveyance instead of a mortgage. Now, having disposed of these two grounds of defence, the supposed illegality and the statute of frauds, we have this fact, that the defendant comes into possession as a trustee of the plaintiff, but he (1) 4 De Gex & J. 16; s. c. 28 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 705. NEW SERIES, 41.-CHANC. Voluntary Settlement-Stat. 13 Eliz. c. 5-Fraudulent Intention. A debtor made a voluntary settlement, but at the same time he made provision for raising enough money to enable him to pay all his existing debts. He raised the money, paid some, but not all, of his debts, and afterwards became bankrupt. On bill by a creditor, whose debt existed when the settlement was made-Held, that the settlement was not void under the 13 Eliz. c. 5, as it was not made with a fraudulent intent, and it was not the natural result of it to defeat creditors. This was a bill to set aside a voluntary settlement, executed by the defendant, W. F. Riley. The plaintiff was his assignee in bankruptcy, and a creditor in respect of a debt, which existed at the time the settlement was made. It appeared that in February, 1868, W. F. Riley wrote to his solicitor, Mr. Leach, mentioning that he then owed 3951. in very pressing matters, and 3667. in matters of less urgency, and asked him to raise money on a house belonging to him in Albemarle Street, which was already subject to several mortgages. Mr. Leach, who was an old friend of his wife's family, 4 D replied that he would not help him to raise any more money unless he would settle the residue of his property on his wife and children; and at an interview which took place shortly afterwards Mr. Riley assented to this proposition. Mr. Leach accordingly procured at once an advance of 5501., on the security of a further mortgage of the house in question, from his brother, who was the holder of one of the existing mortgages on it. And by two deeds of even date with the further mortgage, the date being the 16th of March, 1868, W. F. Riley conveyed the ultimate equity of redemption in the house to trustees upon trust to sell the house, satisfy the mortgages, pay 4001. to W. F. Riley himself, and invest the residue on certain trusts for his wife and children. The trustees sold the house accordingly, paid the mortgages and the 4007., and invested the residue, which amounted to upwards of 700l., in their names, to be held upon the trusts of the settlement. W. F. Riley, out of the money he received in this transaction, paid some, but not all, of his then existing debts, spent the rest of the money, incurred new debts and became bankrupt. The plaintiff now claimed the investments, representing the 7001. The date of the bankruptcy was the 18th of March, 1869, and the bill was filed on the 5th of June, 1871. Mr. Hinde Palmer and Mr. Boyle, for the plaintiff.-The law is settled that if the debt of a creditor, by whom a voluntary settlement is impeached, existed at the date of the settlement, and the remedy of the creditor is defeated by the settlement, such a settlement is fraudulent and void under the 13 Eliz. c. 5; and that the fact of the settlor retaining money enough to pay the debts he then owed, but which are not actually paid, will not take the settlement ont of the statute. This is laid down in many cases and in all the text books, but it will be sufficient to refer to Spirett v. Willows, 34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 365; s. c. 3 De Gex, J. & S. 293. Sir R. Baggallay and Mr. Grenside, for the defendants.-A settlement is not vitiated by the mere fact that a debt which existed at the date of it remains unsatisfied; but the settlement must have been executed with the intent to defeat creditors. Of course if the natural result of the execution of the settlement is to defeat creditors, the rule applies that every man is presumed to intend the natural result of his own actions. In the present case, however, it is evident that there was no fraudulent intent, and it cannot be said that the natural result of the settlement was to defeat creditors, since it was part of a transaction, the very object of which was to pay the creditors in full. Our view of the law is borne out by— Freeman v. Pope, 39 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 689; s. c. Law Rep. 5 Chanc. 538; Moreover in the present case the settlement was not purely voluntary, but the procurement of the loan by Mr. Leach was a consideration for it Holmes v. Penny, 3 Kay & J. 90; Mr. Hinde Palmer, in reply.-The last cited case was under the statute 27 Eliz. c. 4. The settlement here was certainly voluntary, and could have been upset by the present plaintiff immediately after its execution; that being the case it is void against him now Skarff v. Soulby, 1 Mac. & G. 364; The rule was correctly laid down by Freeman v. Pope (ubi supra), and his judgment was affirmed on appeal (ubi supra). THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS.-This is a suit to set aside a deed on the ground that it was executed for the purpose of defeating creditors; at least the best interpretation I can give to plaintiff's case is that he bases his right to relief upon that ground. I think that the result of the cases is what is expressly laid down by the Lord Chancellor and Lord Justice Giffard in Freeman v. Pope (ubi supra), that the real question in every case of this sort is whether the deed was executed for the purpose of defeating the creditors or not. It is justly observed that it is impossible to penetrate iato a man's mind and discover all his purposes. The facts, however, must be looked at to see what inferences can be drawn from them. Now in the present case it is evident from the facts that in this transaction the object of the settlor was not to defeat or delay his creditors, but to pay them in full, and to make a settlement of what property he had, which should remain for the benefit of his wife and children. He first writes to his family solicitor to raise money on the security of his house in Albemarle Street. The solicitor in return says he is extremely sorry to find he is so much in debt; he thinks the time has come for him to settle the residue of his property on his wife and children; and unless he does them that justice he cannot help him to raise the money. I think it important to refer to this correspondence, because it shews for what purpose Mr. Riley was raising money. It was in order to pay his creditors. With his letter he sent a schedule of the amount of his debts, which is now in evidence. He asks the solicitor to raise money for this purpose, and the solicitor says, "I will only do it on condition you settle the residue of your property on your wife and children." Now that means the residue after payment of the existing debts; it is not a fixed sum mentioned, but whatever the value of the property might be. Then see what is done. The debts are divided into two lots, 3951. of most pressing demands, and 3661. less pressing. Mr. Leach then goes to his brother, who knows the property, and gets from him an advance of money for payment of the most urgent claims at once, and the amount so advanced is applied accordingly. Then the house is conveyed on trust for sale, with a provi sion that 4007. is to be paid out of the proceeds to the settlor, so as to enable him to pay the 3661. I have no doubt that these creditors could themselves have brought actions against him and secured this money. The balance of the purchase money amounts to 700l., and that he settles upon his wife and children; if it had been more, more would have been settled. Now the creditors knew they had debts owing, and if they had taken proceedings they could have got paid. I think, then, that the deed was executed in good faith, and I cannot say that it was done for the purpose of defeating creditors. The settlor, however, behaved ill in not paying the creditors out of the money raised under it. I shall, therefore, dismiss the bill, but do so without costs. Will-Payment of Legacies out of Realty and Personalty pro rata-Mixed Fund. It is not necessary that there should be an absolute direction for conversion of real estate in order that the real and personal estate may constitute a mixed fund for payment of legacies. A testator gave his real and personat estate to trustees, and empowered them to sell the real estate, and he directed that an annuity should be paid out of the annual income of the estate; and he also directed certain legacies to be paid out of his trust estates, moneys and premises. He was intestate as to the residuary estate by reason of the death, in his lifetime, of the residuary devisee and legatee:-Held, that the legacies were payable out of the real and personal estate rateably. This was an appeal from a decision of Vice-Chancellor Bacon. The testator in the cause, John Gott, by his will, dated the 26th of June, 1852, directed his debts, funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid out of his personal estate. He next gave divers specific and pecuniary legacies, the legacy duty on which was to be paid out of his personal estate, and he specifically devised two freehold estates (one of which was to be chargeable in aid, as thereinafter mentioned, to secure an annuity thereinafter bequeathed to his wife) to his brother, W. Gott. He then gave the residue of his real estate and his personal estate, not thereinbefore disposed of, to W. Gott, W. Allan, and W. W. Maitlan, upon the trusts therein declared. H› empowered his said trustees or trustee for the time being, from time to time, in case and as often as they or he should think fit, to sell and convert all and every his said real and personal estate, but he provided that his share of the capital in his business should not be required from his surviving partner earlier than in seven annual instalments, the first of which was to be paid twelve months after his decease. He then directed that his trustees or trustee for the time being, their or his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns should stand possessed of the residue of his said real and personal estate, and of the moneys arising from the sale thereof, or of any part thereof, if and when sold upon trust, after payment of his debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and the pecuniary legacies thereinbefore given, to invest the same moneys, and upon further trust out of the income to pay an annuity of 1,2001. to his wife during her life, with a provision, in case of deficiency, that the annuity should be charged upon the estate given to W. Gott. He then recited a settlement under which a sum of 6,000l. was settled upon himself and his wife for their lives, and after the death of the survivor, for such persons as the survivor should appoint; and he declared that he had given the annuity of 1,2001. to his wife in satisfaction of her interest in the fund which he directed should be released by her and paid to his said trustees, and form part of the fund to arise from his real and personal estate. He then directed that his trustees should, out of the trust estates, moneys and premises, raise the sum of 10,000l. for each of his six sisters, to be held upon the trusts thereby declared, and he gave all the residue of his real and personal estate not thereinbefore disposed of to his brother, W. Gott. The testator died in April, 1867. His brother, W. Gott, predeceased him. The question was raised in the present suit, which was an administration suit, whether the annuity of 1,2001. and the six legacies of 10,0007. should be provided for primarily out of the personal estate, or rateably out of the real and personal estate. The Vice-Chancellor decided that the estate of the testator was by his will constituted a mixed fund, and that the payments should be made rateably out of the real and personal estate. From this decision the heir-at-law appealed. Mr. Hinde Palmer and Mr. Whitehorne, for the appellant.-In order that payments such as these should be payable out of the whole estate as a blended fund there must be a conversion of the real estate. This will, no doubt, charges the real estate, but only in aid of the personal estate, and there must be pro tanto exoneration of the personal estate in order to support the contention that the two bear the burden rateably. The only direction here is, that if the trustees think fit they may sell the realty. That is not enough. The cases are the following Roberts v. Walker, 1 Russ. & M. 752; reversing 1 Coll. 26; Bootle v. Blundell, 1 Mer. 193, 233; 411; s. c. 25 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) s. c. 16 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 251; Greenway v. Greenway, 2 De Gex, F. & J. 128; s. c. 29 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 601. Mr. Amphlett, Mr. Kay, Mr. Swanston, Mr. Eddis, Mr. Fry, Mr. Lindley, Mr. Bagshawe, Mr. Brodrick, Mr. Marten, Mr. North and Mr. Davey, for the several respondents, were not called upon. LORD JUSTICE JAMES.-We do not think it necessary to hear the counsel in support of the decree of the Vice-Chancellor in this case, because we are satisfied that the decree is perfectly right. As a great number of cases have been cited, it may perhaps be convenient and of some utility to recur a little to the principles of which those cases are illustrations and applications. Now, it is quite clear that by the law of the land the debts of a deceased person are a charge upon his personal assets, wholly irrespective and paramount to any directions which he may express with regard to them. The execu tor is bound to pay the creditor, and the creditor is entitled to be paid out of those personal assets immediately, or as soon as it can be done in the course of administration, and the personal estate is the primary fund for the payment of debts. To a great extent the same thing is applicable to legacies, that is to say, legacies given simpliciter are to be paid by the legal personal representatives out of the personal assets, and therefore the ordinary rule and presumption is that the personal estate is also the primary fund for the payment of legacies. That being so, it was long ago settled that where a testator was minded, in addition to his personal estate, to make his real estate assets for the payment of debts and legacies or either of them, the presumption was that the real estate was made secondarily liable as a fund auxiliary to the personal estate which still retained its primary liability. That being so, it was held that it was absolutely necessary, not only to have an expression of oneration of the real estate, but a sufficient expression of exoneration of the personal estate, either wholly or partially, before there could be any interference with the ordinary rule for the application of assets. At first it seems to have been thought that this was to be evidenced by actual expression of oneration and exoneration, but in a series of cases of which the case of Bootle v. Blundell (ubi supra) is a sufficient instance, it was held that you might, in that case, as in any other case, for this purpose as well as for other purposes, look at the whole contents of the will; and if, upon an interpretation of the will according to the ordinary principles of legal construction, the Court arrived at a judicial conviction that there was an intention on the part of the testator, not merely that the real estate should be onerated, but that the oneration should be in partial or total exoneration of the personal estate, then the Court was bound to give effect to that intention. But with regard to legacies, it is important to observe the legacies do not stand entirely on the same footing as debts. A gift of a legacy or a sum of money may well be made so as not to charge the personal estate at all. It is of every day occurrence that a man may give his farm of Whiteacre to one person charged with an annuity or sum of money in favour of a second person. In that case the annuity or sum of money would never be a legacy in respect of which the personal estate was ever charged at all, and you would not be obliged to find any intention to exonerate that which was never onerated. A testator may also do this, he may give to a specific devisee or to a specific legatee a portion both of his real and personal estate; for instance, he may give his freehold house, together with his leasehold coachhouse and stable, together with the furniture and effects in the house, coachhouse and stable, all to one person charged with the payment of an annuity or a sum of money to some other person. In that case there would be no question of priority as between the freehold and personal parts of that which constituted one subject of gift to one person, but so far as it might be necessary to ascertain the effect of the charge in that case there would be a charge equally upon all and every part of the subject of the gift. In that state of things came the case of Roberts v. Walker (ubi supra), in which |