take on themselves no responsibility, they have not exceeded their authority or confirmed in the slightest degree any scheme which is laid before them; on the contrary, on the face of their scheme (which is not their affair but the affair of the defendants, the Metropolitan Board of Works) they state broadly the grounds by which anybody who might read the paper might see that their objections might be taken. They furnish information, and then ask if anybody has any objection to make to it. That is all that passed, that is the state of things as far as the Inclosure Commissioners are concerned. I do not find fault with the Inclosure Commissioners. They have performed a kind of ministerial office in the manner which might be expected from them. They seem, moreover, if I may take the liberty of saying, and I only make the remark because they are absent persons, to have properly exercised their discretion in the matter. They have not decided in favour of either the one or the other, but have left the whole matter entirely open. I cannot consider that this case is within the scope of those authorities which have been referred to, all of which decisions, be it observed, were pronounced by the Court with evident reluctance and dislike, only yielding to what is the law and authority of this Court, but their own sense of right ran directly opposite to it. I can find no certain necessity for going to Parliament. Nothing in the injunction which is here asked, either in terms or effect, seeks to control the power which the Metropolitan Board of Works or anybody else in this country has to go to Parliament for the purpose of obtaining an Act if they can, to authorise them to do the thing which they wish. I am obliged, admitting the entire and full authority of all those cases, to disregard them as inapplicable in this case. There is only one other topic which I need mention, and that is this; it is suggested that Mr. Telford, the plaintiff, has been willing himself to become the purchaser of this land. I have read the correspondence and the statement of the case. What does it all amount to? Mr. Telford does not attempt to disavow his desire to become the owner of this piece of land coloured blue,-but he has at the same time insisted upon all occasions upon his right to prevent the common being applied to any other purpose than that for which he agreed to sell it. He says, "I will sell you this right of preemption. If you like I will release you from it, and if we can come to terms, I am willing to enter into a bargain with you upon that subject." That, like all other bargains, is to be taken or to be left. The Metropolitan Board of Works are under no obligation to enter into any contract with him. They cannot, on the other hand, say, "Because you have agreed to certain terms, one of which was to preserve your right and interest in your building land coloured pink" (I do not mean to say such words were used), but therefore they have a right to say, "if you will come to terms with us we will buy all your rights, including the right of preemption, and deal with you upon those terms." Why not? There was nothing to prevent them doing that, and nobody will find any fault with them for doing it. That is not the question in this case. The question is whether they can by a strong hand, by the construction which they put upon this Act of Parliament, which I think is a wrong one, and one which is unusual, place this plaintiff in this position, that he must then go before the Commissioners, fight his battle as best he can, and then in the event of a bill being carried into Parliament present his petition against it there, and there encounter difficulty, trouble and expense which no success would adequately recompense him for, and that for no reason but because the Metropolitan Board of Works have taken it into their heads that they can make a profit out of this piece of land purchased, and make a profit in a manner different to that which was contemplated by them when they entered into the contract, and totally opposed to that power which the Act of Parliament enables them to derive from the purchase which they have made. Mr. Charles Hall argued that, being the local authority, it was in their power to present a memorial to the Commissioners whenever they thought fit. I cannot restrain any lawful power which they may possess. But in granting the injunction, as I do in the terms in which it is prayed by the bill, I simply preserve a plain, honest, distinct contract between a vendor and purchaser, and refuse to permit the purchaser to take more under the contract than he fairly bargained for or intended to pay for. Solicitors Mr. C. W. Stevens, for plaintiff; Mr. W. W. Smith, for the Board of Works; Messrs Bristows & Carpmael, for other parties interested. LIPPARD V. RICKETTS. BACON, V.C. Where a mortgagee's costs are ordered to be added to his security, and to be a charge on the mortgaged estate, the amount so charged carries interest. It makes no difference that the mortgage is by grant of a redeemable annuity. Interest in such a case was allowed at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum. By an order dated the 29th of July, 1862, made in a previous suit of Scaping v. Cheetham, which was instituted for the administration of the real and personal estate of Matthew Dyer, deceased, it was ordered that the costs of Thomas Maitland, who was a mortgagee of certain shares in the residuary estate of Matthew Dyer, should be added to his security and stand as a charge upon the mortgaged interest. The mortgage was by indenture dated. in 1846, whereby, in consideration of 4001. advanced, an annuity of 401., during the lives of Thomas Maitland and his three sons, was charged upon the said shares of residue, with a proviso for redemption on payment of 4201. and all arrears of the annuity. The question arose on the further consideration of this suit, which was for the partition or sale of the real and leasehold estates of Matthew Dyer, whether Thomas Maitland was entitled to interest on the costs charged as above mentioned. Mr. Kay and Mr. Stevens, for the personal representative of Thomas Maitland, who was dead.-Wherever a debt is charged it carries interest Wainman v. Bowker, 8 Beav. 363; In re Kerr's policy, 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 539; s. c. Law Rep. 8 Eq. 331. The Court will give interest on costs. See 1 Seton on Decrees, 96, and the cases there cited. We do not ask for an annuity proportionate to the amount of the costs, but only for interest. Mr. Eddis and Mr. F. G. Bagshawe, for persons interested in the equity of redemption.-Wainman v. Bowker (ubi supra) was a case of indemnity, and full indemnity could only be given by giving interest on costs. In In re Kerr's policy (ubi supra) there was an agreement for a charge. The provision in sect. 27 of 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, only applies between solicitors and their clients. [This was admitted.] This is not a security bearing interest, but an annuity repurchasable on payment of a principal sum, to which these costs are now added. Mr. Langley, in the same interest. Mr. W. H. Bagshawe, Mr. Jolliffe, Mr. Haddan, Mr. W. A. Clark and Mr. A. J. Lewis appeared for other parties. BACON, V.C., said that the only question was as to the interest on the costs ordered to be charged. There had come a time when costs should be dealt with, and it was ordered that when ascertained they should be added to the security and stand as a charge on the mortgaged interest. The Court had power to charge costs on the security, i.e. to increase the amount charged, and on the amount so charged interest was of course payable. In the case which had been cited of In re Kerr's policy (ubi supra), it was held that there was an agreement to charge the debt. But that was only one step towards the decision, which was that there was a charge bearing interest. When once it was decided that there was a charge, the charge bore interest. That the security here was by way of Bankrupt-Jurisdiction. The plaintiff was an uncertificated bankrupt. His creditors had been paid their principal in full, but without interest. He filed a bill against his former solicitor, his two partners and the assignee of the estate in bankruptcy to set aside a sale which had been made of the plaintiff's share of his business to his partners as having been made at an under value, fraudulently and by means of a conspiracy between all the defendants. The sale had been made under the direction of the Court of Chancery in a partnership suit:-Held, that the plaintiff had no locus standi in this Court. This was a suit to set aside a sale of the plaintiff's share in a distillery business, which had been made to his two partners, Messrs. John Hay & Briggs. The plaintiff was a bankrupt; all his creditors had been paid 208. in the pound, but no interest had been paid. The bill alleged a conspiracy between Mr. Moojen, the first defendant on the record, who had formerly acted as his solicitor, the plaintiff's two late partners, Messrs. John Hay & Briggs, and Mr. Staunton, his assignee in bankruptcy, all of whom were made defendants to the suit. The business in question had formerly belonged to Mr. William Hay, brother of the defendant, John Hay. William Hay had sold his business to one Burdett, who had assigned his contract to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then went into partnership with the defendants, Hay & Briggs. Disputes shortly arose between the parties, and cross suits were filed for dissolution of the partnership: in these Chancery proceedings, an order was made that the business should be sold by auction, John Hay was given the conduct of the sale, he and Briggs not being allowed to bid. This order was obtained by the plaintiff. It was opposed by his partners, and they, with the help of the defendant, Moojen, succeeded in preventing its being carried out. In the meantime Mr. William Hay, not having been paid his purchase money, filed a bill against Burdett, the plaintiff, John Hay and Briggs. An order was obtained in the last-mentioned suit for payment of 6,000l., and a writ of sci. fa. was sued out against Burdett, the plaintiff, and Briggs. The plaintiff alleged that Mr. Moojen persuaded him to keep out of the way for eight months, then procured his arrest on the writ, that he was kept in prison four months and was only liberated upon his being made bankrupt. That he was made bankrupt on the petition of Burdett on a debt which had been bought up by Mr. Moojen. That Mr. Moojen had attempted to procure a creature of his own to be appointed assignee, in which attempt he ultimately succeeded, and after having kept the plaintiff a bankrupt for several years, had procured a sale to be sanctioned in the Court of Chancery of the plaintiff's share of his business, on a valuation that had been tampered with, at an under value, which value was just sufficient to satisfy the claims of the creditors without payment of interest. None of the defendants demurred to the bill, but two of them, by their answers, took the objection that the plaintiff could not sue as being a bankrupt. Mr. Kay and Mr. Chitty, for the plaintiff, contended that this was a case within the exceptions to the rule, that an uncer tificated bankrupt could not sue in this Court Troup v. Ricardo, 34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 91; Wearing v. Ellis, 6 De Gex, M. & G. 596; s. c. 26 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 15. The creditors had been paid everything but interest, and it was quite clear that the plaintiff had a substantial interest in what could be got from the defendants. Moreover it was in this Court that the sale had taken place, a fraud had been committed on this Court, and this was the proper place to undo the effect of that fraud. Moojen having been the main actor in the conspiracy was a proper party to the suit, and liable to pay costs Bowles v. Stewart, 1 Sch. & Lef. 227; Daniel's Chancery Practice, 282. As to setting aside an order of the Court of Chancery, they cited Mitford on Pleading, 92; Barnsley v. Powell, 1 Ves. sen. 120. Mr. A. E. Miller and Mr. W. W. Cooper, for Mr. Moojen. Mr. Bristowe and Mr. Owen, for Mr. John Hay. Mr. Amphlett and Mr. Marten, for Mr. Briggs, and Mr. De Gex, for Mr. Staunton, contended that the plaintiff could not sue in this Court, the Court of Bankruptcy having ample jurisdiction, at any rate he could not sue without obtaining the sanction of that Court Smith v. Moffatt, 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 219; s. c. Law Rep. Benfield v. Solomons, 9 Ves. 77; 578; Martin v. Powning, 38 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 212; s. c. Law Rep. 4 Chanc. 356; Stone v. Thomas, 39 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 168; s. c. Law Rep. 5 Chanc. 219; Phillips v. Furber, Law Rep. 5 Chanc. 746; Hammond v. Attwood, 3 Madd. 158; Rochfort v. Battersby, 2 H.L. 388; Tudway v. Jones, 1 Kay & J. 691; s. c. 24 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 507; Ex parte Sullivan, 36 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 1; Ex parte Banfield, 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 12; s. c. Law Rep. 1 Chanc. 154; Ex parte Sampson, Law Rep. 1 Chanc. 476; Ex parte Savin, 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Davis v. Snell, 28 Beav. 321; s. c. 2 Heath v. Chadwick, 2 Philli. 649; There was no offer on the part of the bankrupt to pay what should be found due from him in case anything should be so found. Mr. Kay replied. BACON, V.C., said, If I had to consider only what Mr. Kay called the moral justice of the case, I should find less difficulty than I do at present. The important question in the case, important not only as concerns all these parties in the litigation, but as it concerns the administration of the law, is the point of the plaintiff's capability of sustaining this suit. The bankrupt whose bankruptcy is not closed, in my opinion, is by a very plain rule incapacitated from maintaining such a suit. To permit him to do so, would in point of reason be to transfer it from the Court which has full jurisdiction over the subject to this Court, which would have no less extensive jurisdiction, but which this Court has never assumed. No instance has been adverted to in which the Court has ever assumed a right of interfering with the administration of bankruptcy, where bankruptcy exists. The only two cases which were mentioned as exceptions to that rule are Troup v. Ricardo (ubi supra), and the other case of Wearing v. Ellis (ubi supra). In those cases, which are treated as purely exceptions, the reason apparent. There it was not possible that any other step could be taken either in the bankruptcy or in the insolvency. In Troup v. Ricardo (ubi supra), was the Lord Chancellor's judgment points out the reason of the difficulties that there existed. He founds his judgment upon the fact that there was no other means by which relief could be given to the plaintiff, that there was nothing which the Insolvent Debtors' Court could do for him or against him, and he most expressly guards himself against its being supposed that by the decision in that case, he infringed upon the principles of Rochfort v. Battersby (ubi supra) and Wearing v. Ellis (ubi supra). Now Rochfort v. Battersby (ubi supra), is as strong a case as can be conceived upon the principle I am adverting to. The case had gone on in the Court in Ireland, it was brought by appeal to the House of Lords, and without going into the merits of the case, with some degree of violence, it might be said by persons unacquainted with the law, the House of Lords itself took the objection that a man who unqestionably was improperly a party to the suit below, being appellant there, could not be heard. Any objection to his being a party entitled to be heard, must have been waived in the Court below. Nevertheless the House of Lords, upon principles which I believe have never been challenged, held there, that it was impossible that a suit could be sustained by a man whose insolvency in that case (bankruptcy it is in this) wholly disqualified him from suing in any other Court than the Court of Bankruptcy. Well, Heath v. Chadwick (ubi supra), the case referred to by Lord Cottenham, contains in it very strong expressions, but not stronger than the exigencies of the case require. He puts the case of a combination and conspiracy to rob and so on, and says, notwithstanding, that the demurrer was allowed. What can it signify what the allegations are in the bill if a demurrer will be a demurrer upon principle? It is true the facts stated in the bill are admitted, but granting that all that is said upon these various subjects were true, nevertheless the law does not enable the plaintiff to sustain this suit. It does not say to the plaintiff, these wrongs of which you complain shall go unredressed or unpunished. It says you cannot do it here, and for what reason? The plainest in the world. By means of the bankruptcy, all the rights and interests which a bankrupt had at the time of his bankruptcy, have become vested in other persons, the creditors or the persons who have all the rights the bankrupt once had. Until they are satisfied, of course he has no interest, and they can only be satisfied by carrying the proceedings in the bankruptcy to a legitimate and proper conclusion. In this case, if a demurrer had been filed in the first instance, the matter might have been as readily disposed of as any other case upon demurrer. But according to the view of the law which I take, every one of these defendants might as I am satisfied they ought to have demurred to the bill as it stood, notwithstanding the charge of the wrongs committed by the defendants. They have not thought fit to pursue that course. Two of them in their answers, and all of them at the bar, have argued the point of demurrer. They all insist, that according to the well established law, this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction over the matter, that it will not because it is already in a tribunal perfectly competent to deal with every question that is here raised. I am of opinion, therefore, that the demurrers must prevail, and that the plaintiff's bill must needs be dismissed. Unless I were to make a decision totally at variance with the real terms and the real principle of the decisions which have been pronounced now many years ago, I could not entertain the suit by this bill. But then that does not dispose of the whole case before me. The plaintiff has stated what he has to complain of, and the defendants have put in answers, evidence has been gone into, and many hours have been expended in discussing and arguing upon the facts of the case. Now, first of all, they were wholly irrelevant to the subject, if a demurrer would hold, as I have expressed my opinion that it does in this case. But since the defendants have chosen to go into that case, then upon the subject of costs a totally different consideration presents itself, and I must needs consider the case made by the |