cordingly. That gives apportionment between a specific and a residuary legatee. Furthermore, it enacts that all such divisible revenue shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to have accrued by equal daily increment during and within the period for or in respect of which the payment of the same revenue shall be declared or expressed to be made. That in the present case is the year 1870, and as the testator lived till the 20th of October, we claim ths of the amount of the dividends.

Mr. Phear, for the testator's uncle.The Apportionment Acts do not apply to this case. Admitting that dividends on such shares as these would be apportionable between a testator's estate and a legatee of the shares in a proper case, the testator might, if he liked, give the apportioned part to the legatee, and the words of the will in this case clearly shew that it was his intention to do so

Clive v. Clive, Kay 600; s. c. 23 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 981. Mr. Fry in reply.-On the defendant's contention the word "dividends" is to mean the whole of such dividends as become payable, and then on a gift of dividends to one for life, there would be no apportionment between his executors and the remaindermen. But no such distinction has ever been drawn; indeed the common form of creating a tenancy for life in personalty is a trust to pay the dividends to one for life, and it has never been contended that the word "dividends" would exclude apportionment.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that he did not think that the Apportionment Acts applied to this case. The question was as to the meaning of the words of the will, and he considered that the whole of the dividends in question were specifically given to the testator's uncle. The costs should come out of the residuary estate.

Solicitors Mr. Worthington Evans, agent for Messrs. M. C. Jones, Paterson & Jones, Liverpool, for residuary legatees; Messrs. W. & J. Flower & Nussey, agents for Mr. R. N. Heane, Newport, Salop, for the testator's uncle.

Railway Company-Illegal PurchaseShares in another Company-TrusteeOrder and Disposition-Bankruptcy.

A railway company, not authorised by its statutes to invest in stock or shares of other companies, purchased stock of another railway company, and had it transferred to a trustee for them. The trustee was registered as owner of the stock. Notice of the trust was given to the company whose shares were purchased. The trustee became bankrupt:-Held, that his assignees in bankruptcy were entitled to the shares standing in his name discharged from the trust.

The bill was filed by the Great Eastern Railway Company against the defendant Turner, a bankrupt, who was adjudicated a bankrupt on the 4th of September, 1869, and the creditors' assignees under his bankruptcy, to determine whether the assignees or the plaintiff company were entitled to certain stock of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company, which was at the time of the bankruptcy standing in the books of that company in the name of the bankrupt, and which had been transferred to him as trustee for the plaintiff company, the plaintiff com-. pany being constituted by Act of Parliament, under which they had no power to purchase this stock. The certificates of the stock were held by the plaintiff company, having, on their application, been sent to them by the secretary of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company. There was some evidence entered into on both sides on the question whether sufficient formal notice of the trust was given to the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company or not.

The Master of the Rolls held that notice was given. The facts on which the decision was based are fully set out in his judgment, which was in writing.

Sir R. Baggallay and Mr. N. R. Smart, for the plaintiffs, contended that sufficient notice of the trust was given to the Lynn

and Hunstanton Railway Company, that the certificates of the stock were held by the plaintiff company, and that these facts prevented the stock from being in the order and disposition of the bankrupt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Acts; that the trustee having accepted. the trust could not raise the question of illegality against his cestuis que trust, and that his assignees in bankruptcy stood, in this respect, on the same footing.

Mr. Speed, for Turner, the bankrupt, took no part in the argument.

Mr. Fry and Mr. Bagshawe, for the assignees, contended that the trust was wholly void, as an illegal trust, and could not be recognised by the Court. That, in fact, the trustee might have dealt with the property as he liked, and that the plaintiffs could not have restrained him from so doing; that, at any rate, the assignees in bankruptcy were not prevented from setting up the illegality in answer to the plaintiff's claim, and that the case was governed by

Ex parte Burbridge, re Kidder, 1 Deac. 131; s. c. reported also nom. Ex parte Watkins re Kidder, 2 Mont. & Ayr. 348; s. c. 4 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. p. 84 in note; Ex parte Ord, 1 Deac. 166; s. c. 4 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 84. They argued further, that even if the trust had been such as the Court would have recognised, there was nothing to take the property out of the order and disposition of the bankrupt; that the holding of the certificate by the plaintiffs was not sufficient for this; that whether the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company had notice or not was immaterial, but that if it were material, no notice to that company was proved, but only knowledge by that company. They referred to sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Companies Clauses Act, and cited—

Ex parte Bolton, 1 De Gex & J. 163; s. c. 26 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 45;

Re Graham, 1 Law Rep. Ir. Eq. 84; Ex parte Stuart, 33 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Bankr. 4.

as to notice

Ex parte Bignold, 3 Deac. 151;

Re Barr's trusts, 4 Kay & J. 219;

s. c. 27 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 548;

Edwards v. Martin, Law Rep. 1 Eq.

121; s. c. 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)
Chanc. 186;

Ex parte Hennessy, 2 Dr. & W. 555;
Ex parte Castle, 3 Mont. D. & D.
117; s. c. 12 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)
Bankr. 30.

Sir R. Baggallay, in reply, cited on the point of notice

Re Agra Bank re Worcester, Law
Rep. 3 Chanc. 555;

Lloyd v. Banks, 37 Law J. Rep. (N.S.)
Chanc. 881; s. c. Law Rep. 3
Chanc. 488;

and contended that the cases of-
Ex parte Burbridge (ubi supra)

and

Ex parte Ord (ubi supra) did not apply, as there was no notice proved in those cases.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS (on 24th of May, 1872) delivered the following judgment—

The plaintiffs are a company incorporated by Act of Parliament. By the statute of incorporation, the company are not entitled or enabled to purchase or hold shares in any other company.

In June, 1863, Horatio Love was the chairman of the plaintiff company, and he, in that month, and by the direction of the plaintiff company, bought 102 shares in the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company, which were paid for by him out of the moneys of the plaintiff company.

In August, 1863, Mr. Love ceased to be chairman of the plaintiff company, and James Goodson was appointed chairman in his place, and thereupon 102 shares were duly transferred by Love to James Goodson; and in the month of February, 1864, these shares were converted into 1,0201. stock of Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company. In February, 1866, James Goodson ceased to be the chairman of the company, and the defendant, Charles Henry Turner, was appointed chairman; and in July, 1866, this stock was transferred by Goodson into the name of Charles Henry Turner. Due notice was given to the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company that the

transfer of the stock was made to Charles Henry Turner, as a trustee for the plaintiff company, and a certificate of his being the registered proprietor of this stock, being 1,0201. stock in the capital of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company, was forwarded by the secretary of the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company to the plaintiff company, as being beneficially entitled to the stock.

On the 4th of September, 1869, Charles Henry Turner was adjudicated a bank. rupt, and the defendants, Field and Foreman, were appointed assignees under the bankruptcy.

In May, 1870, the plaintiff company called on Turner to execute a transfer of the stock to a nominee of theirs. He declined to do this, on account of the claims of the defendants, Field and Foreman, who claim this stock, as having been in the order and disposition of Turner, as the reputed owner thereof, and this suit is instituted by the plaintiff company to try that question. I think that the assignees are right. I am of opinion that this stock, which the plaintiff company could not legally acquire or hold, cannot be said to be of that description of trust property which, upon bankruptcy, does not pass to his assignee.

All that Turner did was to enter into an agreement to deal with the shares as the plaintiff company should require, and this engagement his bankruptcy disqualifies him from executing. The notice to the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company could not have prevented Turner from transferring the shares or the stock as he directed. Nor would this have made the Lynn and Hunstanton Railway Company liable for having adopted such transfer.

And even assuming the plaintiff company were the "true owners," yet the shares would still be, with their consent, in the ostensible ownership, that is in the order and disposition of the bankrupt.

I am disposed to think that the stock vested in the assignees in bankruptcy, without the necessity of resorting to the order and disposition clause of the statute of 1869. I think also that the same question in principle arose in the case of In re Watkins (ubi supra), cited to me in argument, and that the question is con

Trustees-Investment-Power to Vary.

When specific property is bequeathed upon trust without any power being given to the trustees to alter the mode of investment, such trustees may, nevertheless, sell the property and invest the proceeds on any of the statutory investments and vary such investment from time to time, provided that they never buy any redeemable security at a premium.

A testator bequeathed a sum of consols and a sum of reduced annuities, which were standing in his name at his death, to trustees upon trust for certain persons for life, with remainders over, without giving them any power to alter the mode of investment. He also bequeathed the residue of his estate to trustees upon certain trusts, giving them an extensive power of investment and power to vary.

The question was raised on a special case-whether the trustees of the consols and reduced annuities had power to change these investments for any of the statutory investments, and whether they would have further power to vary investments from time to time.

The will was dated the 23rd of May, 1818. The testator died on the 23rd of October, 1820.

Mr. Dauney, for the plaintiffs, the trus tees.

Sir R. Baggallay, Mr. Southgate, Mr. F. C. J. Millar and Mr. Tyssen, for the various tenants for life and remaindermen, were willing to allow a variation in the mode of investment, so far as they were able, but the persons entitled were not all sui juris.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS said that what he held in all these cases was, that the only restriction to be placed on the trustees was that they might not invest in any redeemable security at a premium. They might take a declaration therefore that they might invest in India stock, if not at a premium, or in bank stock, or in any mortgage of freehold or copyhold estates, with power to vary such investments for others of a like nature.

Solicitors-Messrs. Walters, Young, Walters & Deverell, for plaintiffs; Mr. J. Murray, for other parties interested.

A testator bequeathed a sum of stock to the trustees of a charity to pay for painting and repairing a gravestone for a certain day yearly, and to pay the balance for the purpose of the charity :-Held, there was a valid bequest subject to a precatory trust.

John Hunter, the testator in this cause, bequeathed after the death of his niece, Elizabeth Hunter, 1,000l. stock free of legacy duty to the trustees of the Benevolent Institution for the Relief of Aged and Infirm Journeymen Tailors, at Haverstock Hill. He desired that his executors would have his own and his niece, Elizabeth Hunter's, inscription of death placed on the stone of the grave at "Kensal Green Cemetry provided they were buried there; if elsewhere, to have a stone inscribed placed on the grave.' He continued, "I further will and desire that my executors do pay to the trustees of The Tailors' Institution, Haverstock Hill, a further sum of 1,000l., 31. per cent., with duty free for the following use, that is to pay the required amount for painting and keeping in repair the grave stone or grave stones in Kensal Green or elsewhere for the 15th day of June yearly if required, and to divide the

balance that may remain into two equal parts," to be disposed of among pensioners in manner he described.

This was an administration suit, and one of the questions to be disposed of on further consideration was whether the gift to the institution of the second 1,000l. was void as being subject to a deduction which was void and uncertain. Mr. E. K. Karslake and Mr. Everitt appeared for the plaintiff.

Mr. D. C. Beale, for the trustees of the Tailors' Institution, contended that there was no uncertainty in the amount necessary to keep the graves in repair, and therefore the residue was ascertainable, and the gift to the institution good

Fisk v. Attorney General, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 521.

Nor if the former gift fails for uncertainty will the latter necessarily do so. In the case cited above the then ViceChancellor decided that

Chapman v. Brown, 6 Ves. 404, was overruled by

The Magistrates of Dundee v. Morris, 3 Macq. H. L. 134;

Mitford v. Reynolds, 1 Ph. 185. This was according to the rule laid down by Kindersley, V.C., in

Hoare v. Osborne, 35 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 345; s. c. Law Rep. 1 Eq. 585,

notwithstanding

Fowler v. Fowler, 33 Beav. 616; s. c. 33 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 674, was cited to him.

Mr. Amphlett and Mr. A. Bailey, for the residuary legatee, said the gift for repairing the graves was void as being a perpetuity, and that part being uncertain in amount the whole failed

Fowler v. Fowler (ubi supra); Chapman v. Brown (ubi supra); Mitford v. Reynolds (ubi supra). None of which had been really overruled. Mr. Bristowe and Mr. C. T. Mitchell, for other parties.

BACON, V.C., said, I think this case on the whole plain and free from doubt. [After describing the former part of the will, his Honour read the clause relating to the gift of the second 1,000l. to the institution, and proceeded:] This then

is a gift to the institution with an honorary trust attached to paint and keep in repair the grave stone for a certain day in every year "if required." I think none of the cases touch the present in any way, unless it be the case of Chapman v. Brown (ubi supra). But the wording there was, "if any surplus should remain," the same was to go over to the legatee, and it being impossible to ascertain how much it would have been proper to expend in building a chapel, had the object been a legal one, the consequence was that nothing passed to the legatee. It was considered impossible to ascertain how much would remain after that impossible payment had been made, and so the whole gift was held to be void. But no such thing occurs here; the gift is certain in amount, subject only to the fulfilment of this honorary trust.

I have no doubt whatever this second legacy to the Tailors' Institution is as good as the first.

County Court-Equitable JurisdictionPractice-Estate worth more than 5001.28 & 29 Vict. c. 99. s. 9.

A plaint was instituted in the County Court for the administration of the estate of a testator, alleging (as the plaintiffs then believed to be the fact) that the estate was worth less than 5001. Previous to the hearing, notice was given by the defendant to the plaintiffs that the estate was worth more than 5001., and at the hearing this was proved to be the case. The Judge made an order transferring the suit to the Court of Chancery:-Held, that he was right in so doing.

CASE on appeal from the County Court of Yorkshire holden at Doncaster.

John Harrison by his will devised and bequeathed all his real and personal estate to the defendant Emma Silverwood absolutely, whom he appointed his executrix. The testator died in September, 1870, and in November, 1870, his will was proved by the defendant, Emma Silverwood. The testator died much indebted, and was indebted amongst others to the plaintiffs. By a letter dated November 12, 1870, from the solicitors of the defendant, Emma Silverwood, the plaintiffs were informed that the assets were estimated not to exceed 3001.

On December 5, 1870, the plaintiffs filed their plaint in the County Court for the administration of the real and personal estate of the testator, alleging amongst other things (as they then believed to be the case) that the same real and personal estate did not exceed 5007. On December 24, 1870, the solicitors of the defendant, who had since their former letter discovered that the estate of the testator exceeded in value the sum of 5001., gave notice to the plaintiffs to that effect.

On the hearing of the plaint on January 5, 1871, the defendant produced evidence to shew that the estate did in truth exceed in value 500l., and applied to the Judge to order the plaint to be struck out with costs on the ground that the County Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the same in consequence of the amount and value of the estate. The judge, however, made an order in the following words: "It appearing that the subject matter of this suit exceeds in value the sum of 5007., it is ordered that this suit be transferred to the High Court of Chancery." The defendant appealed against this order, the grounds of appeal being stated as follows. 1. That the Court and the Judge thereof had no power, authority, or jurisdiction to make the said order intended to be appealed against.

2. That the said suit was not at any time in progress in the said Court within the meaning of section 9 of 28 & 29 Vict. c. 99, so as to make it the duty of the said Court to direct that the said suit should be transferred to the Court of Chancery.

3. That as the defendant always objected that the said Court had no juris