anyone might advertise for sale. To draw the distinction more clearly, if a man, not being a vendor of any of the articles in question, were to publish a work for the purpose of informing the public what were the most convenient species of articles of house furniture, or the most graceful species of decoration for articles of house furniture, what they ought to cost, and where they might be bought, and were to illustrate his work with designs and with drawings of each article he described, such a work as this could not be pirated with impunity, and the attempt to do so would be stopped by the injunction of the Court of Chancery. Yet if it were done with no such object, but solely for the purpose of advertising particular articles for sale and promoting the private trade of the publisher by the sale of articles which any other person might sell as well as the first advertiser, and if in fact it contained little more than an illustrated inventory of the contents of a warehouse, I know of no law which, while it would not prevent the second advertiser from selling the same articles, would prevent him from using the same advertisement, provided he did not in such advertisement by any device suggest that he was selling the works and designs of the first advertiser. At the same time I am bound to say that I think that, where it is shewn that the second advertiser has been making use literally of the drawings of the first advertiser and copying them precisely, the Court, though it cannot stop him from taking that course, must feel that a use has been made of the works of the first advertiser, which would not be considered fair amongst gentlemen, nor (for the rules are the same as regards the usual intercourse of life) amongst traders, and would not give costs to the man who deliberately endeavoured to profit by the exertions of his fellow tradesman. But at the last it always comes round to this, that in fact there is no copyright in an advertisement. If you copy the advertisement of another, you do him no wrong, unless in so doing you lead the public to believe that you' sell the articles of the person whose advertisement you copy. A different rule applies to the letterpress which is said to be copied. Wherever this letter-press bears the trace of original composition, it is entitled to protection, but not where it simply describes the contents of a warehouse, the exertions of the proprietor, or the common mode of using familiar articles. Examining the work by this rule, I find the defendant has copied some lines from the plaintiff's synopsis. I think these were original remarks, and that the defendant was not entitled to use them without acknowledgment of the source from whence they came. They are the following [his Lordship here read the lines on bedding quoted above]. The other parts complained of cannot, I think, be treated as having any copyright in them. For instance, as to the statements set out in paragraphs 8 and 9 [his Lordship here read them]. Is this true? If yes, why may he not say so? The others are similar. I think the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction, if he thinks it worth taking, to restrain the republication of the eight lines I have read, but I shall give no costs on either side. Company-Contributory-Agreement to take Shares-Registration-Companies Act, 1862, s. 23. D. for good consideration entered into an arrangement with a company, part of which was that he and his partner should take 250 shares. He applied for fifty shares, and paid the deposit thereon. No allotment of shares in the company was ever made, and his name was never entered upon any register of members. The company afterwards being wound up :-Held, that D. was rightly placed upon the list of contributories. This was an appeal from a decision of Malins, V.C. The company was incorporated in March, 1867, the object being to acquire a concession which had been granted to a Mr. Waddington for constructing water works at Valparaiso. The company was not successful in raising the necessary capital, and was ordered to be wound up in May, 1869. The appellant was placed upon the list of contributories for fifty shares under the following circumstances. He was the member of a firm, carrying on business at Valparaiso, under the title of Templeman & Co. In April, 1867, some negotiations were entered into for appointing the firm of Templeman & Co. agents of the company at Valparaiso, and an agreement to that effect was, on the 29th of April, 1867, entered into between Davies on behalf of his firm and the company. These negotiations were conducted on the part of the company by Waddington. It was admitted by the appellant, when pressed in cross-examination, that it was part of the arrangement that his firm should take 250 shares. Davies in fact applied for fifty shares, and his partner, Templeman, applied for 200 shares, upon which they paid the deposit of 11. per share. No allotment of shares was ever made in England, and Mr. Davies' name was never inserted on any register of members, and the deposit was returned shortly after the winding up of the company. Afterwards the official liquidator placed him upon the list of members, and upon an application to the Court, Malins, V.C., held that he was rightly placed there. From this decision he now appealed. Mr. Cotton and Mr. Lindley, for the appellant.-Mr. Davies never was a member, his name has never been registered as a member, his application for shares was never accepted. How can he be made a contributory? The Companies Act, 1862, s. 23, defines a member as a person who has agreed to become a member, and whose name has been entered on the register of members. The latter part of the definition does not apply to Mr. Davies. Mr. Glasse and Mr. Higgins, for the official liquidator.-Mr. Davies entered into a binding agreement to take the shares, and that is sufficient. Neither allotment nor registration is necessary in such a case. The agreement is ad s. c. 34 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 523. LORD JUSTICE MELLISH.-This is an appeal from an order of the Vice-Chancellor, fixing Mr. Davies as a contributory in this company. It was a company for taking up a concession for water works at Valparaiso, and it appears that there was an agreement made between the company, through Mr. Waddington, jun., who was the concessionaire, that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should become the agents of the company at Valparaiso. They accordingly did become agents, and acted as agents for the company. Now the question to be determined is whether Mr. Davies became a shareholder or agreed to become a contributory in respect of fifty shares. The evidence against him entirely consists of his own statements, and his statements, according to their natural interpretation, appear to me to amount to this, that at the outset Mr. Waddington, jun., acting on behalf of the company, proposed to him that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should be the agents at Valparaiso, and it was part of his proposal to them, and part of what they accepted, that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should between them take 250 shares. It appears to me that Mr. Davies does state in his evidence that the company assented to that arrangement. It is true it was made through Mr. Waddington, jun., but he says, "I cannot remember whether our firm were appointed agents before or after our application for the shares. Our firm were appointed agents from the outset, and from the outset there was this arrangement about the 250 shares." It appears to me to amount to a very clear statement, that the verbal bargain made between them was this, that Messrs. Templeman & Co. were to be the agents, and that Messrs. Templeman & Co. between them were to take 250 shares. That part of the verbal arrangement which related to the agency was put into writing and signed by the directors, and then, as Mr. Davies appears to admit, in pursuance of the arrangement that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should take 250 shares, Mr. Templeman signs a written application for 200 shares, and Mr. Davies signs a written application for fifty shares. The deposit is paid and Messrs. Templeman & Co. go on acting as agents, and nothing more takes place. The only real question appears to me to be this-First, is there not sufficient evidence on this statement that there was an agreement that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should take the 250 shares between them? It appears to me that there is sufficient evidence, because he says so. Then there being that arrangement I think that the written application having been sent in by Mr. Templeman for 200 shares, and by Mr. Davies for fifty shares, and the company having made no objection to that, there is sufficient proof that the company assented to this division of the 250 shares, which were to be taken by Messrs. Templeman & Co. in the proportion of 200 shares by Mr. Templeman and fifty by Mr. Davies. If there had been no such previous arrangement I should certainly not have thought that the mere keeping the deposits would have been sufficient evidence. But assuming that there was, as there appears to me to have been, a valid binding arrangement previous to the written application being made, that Messrs. Templeman & Co. should take between them 250 shares, and there not being any objection on the part of the directors to taking the deposit there is sufficient evidence to shew that the directors assented to the 250 shares which Messrs. Templeman & Co. agreed to take being divided between Mr. Templeman and Mr. Davies in the proportion contained in their written applications. I am of opinion, therefore, that the order of the Vice-Chancellor is right, and that this appeal must be dismissed with costs. LORD JUSTICE JAMES.-I am of the same opinion. Solicitors-Messrs. Murray & Hutchins, for appellant; Mr. J. Tucker, for official liquidator. Heirs for their respective Lives in Tail Male Will-Construction-Gift to B. and his -Estate for Life or in Tail. Devise to trustees upon trust to permit A. to receive the rents for his life, and after his decease upon trust to permit the first son of A. and the heirs of his body "to receive the rents for their respective lives, severally and successively in tail male," and in default of such issue over:-Held, that the first son of A. took an estate in tail male, and not merely a life estate. Charles Foss Andrew by his will, dated the 21st of May, 1840, devised his manor of Nansough unto and to the use of H. P. Andrew and G. N. Simmons, and their heirs, upon trust in the first place to raise certain legacies, and subject thereto to permit his son, George Hugo Andrew, and his assigns, to receive the rents, issues and profits of the said manor during his life, and after his decease "upon trust to permit the first son of my said son, G. H. Andrew, lawfully begotten, and the heirs male of his body lawfully issuing, to receive the rents, issues and profits of the said manor, for and during their respective lives, severally and successively in tail male, and in default of issue male of such first son, upon trust, to permit the second, third, and all and every other the son and sons of my said son G. H. Andrew, severally and successively, according to their seniority and priority of birth, and the issue male of their respective bodies, severally and successively in tail mail, to receive the rents, issues, and profits of the said manor for and during their respective lives;" and in default of such issue upon trusts in precisely similar words in favour of several other sons of the testator and their children; and in default of issue male of such sons upon trust for the testator's own right heirs for ever. The testator died in June, 1840. His son, G. H Andrew, died in March, 1858, having had one son, Charles Foss Andrew, who attained twenty-one in May, 1859. On the 3rd of June, 1869, C. F. Andrew, the grandson, assuming to be tenant in tail in possession of the Nansough Estate, executed a dis-entailing assurance by which he vested the estate in himself in fee. The plaintiffs, who claimed to be entitled to the estate under the will of C. F. Andrew, the grandson, agreed to sell the estate to the defendant, and filed this bill for specific performance of the contract. They submitted that at the time of the execution of the disentailing deed, C. F. Andrew, the grandson, was tenant-in-tail in possession of the estate under his grandfather's will, that by the operation of that deed he became tenant in fee simple, and that they could therefore make a good title; but the defendant insisted that, upon the true construction of the will, C. F. Andrew, the grandson, did not become tenant in tail of the estate, and he therefore refused to complete his purchase, except under a decree of the Court. The question was raised by demurrer. Mr. Charles Hall, in support of the demurrer, submitted that the title was doubtful, and that the effect of a devise to A. and the heirs of his body for their respective lives severally and successively in tail male, might be held to give A. a life estate only, and not an estate tail. He referred to Doe d. Cotton v. Stenlake, 12 East, Seaward v. Willock, 5 East, 198; & G. 145; s. c. 22 Law J. Rep. Mr. Phear, for the bill, was not called upon. MALINS, V.C.-The question raised upon this will is whether the limitation in favour of the first son of the testator's son, G. H. Andrew, created an estate tail, in which case the title of the plaintiffs is a good title, or whether it created a life estate only, in which case the title of course is bad. What then is the effect of a devise to A. and his heirs during their lives? It was decided in the case of Doe v. Stenlake (ubi supra) by the Court of King's Bench, and that decision has been acquiesced in ever since, that such a devise to A. and his heirs created an estate in fee simple. Lord Ellenborough there says-" The words during their lives,' after the devise to the daughter and her heirs, is merely the expression of a man ignorant of the manner of describ ing how the parties whom he meant to benefit would enjoy the property; for whatever estate of inheritance the heirs of his daughter might take, they could in fact only enjoy the benefit of it for their lives." That is the case of a devise to a man and "his heirs," which creates an estate capable of being enjoyed for ever. This is a limitation to a man and "the heirs male of his body for their lives." I think, therefore, that the limitation to "the heirs male of his body," creates an estate tail, and the intention of the testator that there should be an estate tail is more distinctly shewn by the gift over in case the taker should die without issue male. Therefore this devise to the son and to the heirs male of his body during their lives gives an estate in tail male, and the words " during their lives" mean only that which is necessarily implied, that whoever takes under the limitation can only, in point of fact, have the enjoyment of it during his life; but it has not the effect of cutting down the estate of inheritance. The son, therefore, takes an estate in tail male. He has executed a disentailing deed, and the plaintiffs, who are parties claiming under him, take an estate in fee simple, and the title is good. The demurrer will, therefore, be overruled. I have been asked to preface the decree with the words-" this Court being of opinion that the first son of George Hugo Andrew took an estate in tail male, overrule the demurrer." This form of decree has been objected to by the Registrars, but I believe that there is no objection to it. I will, therefore, make the decree in that form. Solicitors-Messrs. Bell & Stewards, agents for Mr. E. Carlyon, St. Austell, for plaintiff; Mossrs. Gregory, Rowcliffes & Rawle, agents for Messrs. Smith & Paul, Truro, for defendant. Taxation of Costs-Perusing Affidavits -Three Counsel. During the progress of a suit the junior counsel for the defendant, who had prepared the pleadings, took silk. Prior to this a Queen's Counsel had been engaged upon an interlocutory application relative to the mode of taking evidence. The defendant at the hearing employed three counsel, viz., the leading counsel above referred to, the junior who had taken silk, and a new junior :Held, that under the above circumstances alone he was not entitled to charge in his bill of costs against the plaintiff (whose bill was dismissed with costs) the costs of the three counsel. Cousens v. Cousens, 41 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 166, observed upon. Fifteen bills were filed by the same plaintiff against persons who, as he alleged, had infringed his patent. The same solicitor acted for the defendant in all the suits, and the questions to be tried in all the suits were substantially the same. The plaintiff being required to put in an affidavit of documents in each suit, filed fifteen affidavits, which were precisely alike in all respects except the names, being in fact lithographed copies of the same draft. He gave notice to the defendants' solicitor that they were all alike, and offered him a lithographed copy. The defendants' solicitor examined the affidavits at the office, and took an office copy in one suit. All the bills were dismissed with costs:-Held, that the defendants' solicitor was not entitled to charge in the bills of cost for perusing the affidavit in each suit. The decision of BACON, V.C., was reversed on both points. This was an appeal from an order of Bacon, V.C., directing the taxing master to revise his taxation. The suit was one of fifteen suits, all filed by the same plaintiff, a patentee, against persons who, as he alleged, had infringed his patent. The questions to be tried in the suits were precisely similar in all the cases, and the same solicitor acted as solicitor for all the defendants. Mr. Eddis was the junior counsel for the defendants, who prepared the answers in all the suits. During the progress of the suits he became a Queen's Counsel. Prior to this an application was made to the Court that the hearing of the causes might be delayed until the cross-examicluded, and an order was then arranged nation of the plaintiff should be conas to the mode of hearing the causes, and as to taking evidence once for all. Upon this application Mr. Kay was employed as leader to Mr. Eddis. At the hearing briefs were delivered in all the suits to Mr. Kay, Mr. Eddis and Mr. Langley; all the bills were dismissed with costs. The taxing master disallowed the costs of the third counsel. The defendants required the plaintiff to The other question was as followsput in an affidavit of documents in each suit. The plaintiff accordingly did so, all the affidavits being, except as to formal parts, strictly identical, being in fact lithographed copies of the same draft. The plaintiff's solicitor gave notice of the fact to the defendant's solicitor, and offered him a lithographed copy. The question was whether the defendant in each suit was entitled to charge in his bill of costs for perusing the affidavit. An office copy of the affidavit in one suit only (Betts v. Willmott) being taken, evidence was furnished that a clerk of the solicitor attended at the Record Office, and read the affidavits. The taxing master disallowed the costs of perusing the affidavit in this and the thirteen suits other than Betts v. Willmott. The ViceChancellor having overruled the taxing master on both points, the plaintiff appealed. Mr. Swanston and Mr. Everitt, for the appellant. This is a case of great oppression; but we do not rely upon that. As to the first point, the taxing master held that this case was not governed by Cousens v. Cousens (ubi supra), because the employment of a leader upon an interlocutory application was not a retainer, and besides, there was no necessity in this suit for retaining a leading counsel at that stage. The Vice-Chancellor thought that the employment was equivalent to a re |