other claim? When the independence of Texas was acknowledged by the United States and by other nations, she had declared her boundary; and if this had been considered an element as absolutely inconsistent with her claims to sovereignty, if it had been viewed as a gross infringement upon the rights of Mexico according to the laws of nations, it should have been noticed by these nations as a bar to their acknowledgment.*

the United States," &c. This work was noticed by the National Intelligencer, October 21, 1829, under the following head: "Prospect of the annexation of Texas to the United States."

In an article published in the New York Courier and Inquirer, November 8, 1834, on the boundary of Texas, in case of annexation, the writer says, "What that boundary will ultimately be, it is impossible to say; but it is so obviously the interest, both of Mexico and the United States, to make the Rio Grande the dividing line, that we do not doubt, sooner or later, that river will be fixed upon by the two governments."

We give these extracts mainly for the purpose of showing the popular sentiment in regard to the boundary of Texas long before it became a party question.

* This principle was recognized by the British government, in regard to a different boundary, when called upon to acknowledge the independence of Texas. "While the Texan commissioner at the court of St. James was negotiating the acknowledgment of the independence of his country by England, Lord Palmerston called the attention of General Henderson, the Texan minister, to the extraordinary claim set up by the president of Texas, and objected to go on with the negotiation, lest the acknowledgment of the country might be construed to sanction its asserted claim to Northern Mexico and California. The commissioner replied, that he had no authority to commit his government on the question of boundary. Nevertheless, the independence of Texas was then acknowledged by the British government, and with full knowledge and admission by them of President Lamar's claim. General Lamar, in his first message as president of the Republic of Texas, claimed all the country lying west of Texas to the Pacific.". Gilliam's Mexico, p. 388. If Lord Palmerston had foreseen the event of annexation, the independence of Texas, most likely, would not have been acknowledged by England at that time. See Appendix T.

The formal recognition of a new government is an important act, and involves important principles. These principles are entirely national in their character, and relate to the well-being of nations as such. Ephemeral governments would be national evils; and governments of outrage would be national wrongs. Although one nation cannot determine for another nation its form of government, nor direct its foreign or internal policy, still, it has a right to require conformity to certain great principles of justice which make up the common law of nations. It may not be the right of a nation to demand such conformity of another, except when called upon to grant an act of recognition. This recognition should always be on the side of justice and humanity — not according to the views of one nation, but of all nations that come within the sphere of civilization.

The United States had agreed to take the title of Texas to sovereignty, and if this does not embrace rights as to its own boundary, it is inconsistent with itself.

But with the spirit of equity let us examine

which gives the Rio Grande as the true boundary between the two nations.

This is said to be no treaty, because it was not ratified by the government of Mexico. In this respect it would be defective as a treaty between two nations, if made under ordinary circumstances. The circumstances in this case, however, were peculiar and extraordinary.

1. Mexico was governed at that time by a military dictator, and he was, ex officio, commander-in-chief of the Mexican

army.

2. Under his command the army invaded Texas; was defeated and captured.

3. Santa Anna, as commander-in-chief of the Mexican army, was a prisoner of war; but as dictator of Mexico, he

* See Appendix G.

fully represented the treaty-making power of his own government, - he was, in fact, the government.*

4. He proposed and urged a treaty, agreeing to all the stipulations required by Texas, and it was executed by himself as president of Mexico and by the chief officers of his army,the second in command, Filisola, at the head of five or six thousand men, being at liberty to act his pleasure, to confirm the act of his commander or to reject it. He confirmed it, and the army and its officers were liberated.

5. The president solemnly pledged himself to use his influence with his government to ratify the treaty; but he violated his promises, and by his government it was denounced and proclaimed as void, because, as was falsely alleged, it was extorted from their president while prisoner of war.†

On the part of Texas, all the stipulations of the treaty were honorably fulfilled. The lives of the prisoners were saved, and * Vattel says, "The same power who has the right of making war, of determining on it, of declaring it, and of directing its operations, has naturally that likewise of making and concluding a treaty of peace."

+ In his despatch to the government ad interim, dated June 10, 1836, General Filisola, who was never a prisoner, says,

"His excellency, (Santa Anna,) in my humble opinion, in the treaties agreed upon, and that I had the honor to send to your excellency, acted with entire liberty, and nothing more in view than the interest of his country."

Santa Anna, in his letter of July 4, 1836, says,

"When I offered to treat with this government, (Texas,) I was convinced that it was useless for Mexico to continue the war. I have acquired exact information respecting the country, which I did not possess four months ago. I have too much zeal for the interests of my country to wish for any thing which is not compatible with them. Being always ready to sacrifice myself for its glory and advantage, I never would have hesitated to subject myself to torments of death, rather than consent to any compromise, if Mexico could thereby obtain the slightest benefit. I am firmly convinced that it is proper to terminate this question by political negotiation."

See the very able speech of Senator Johnson, (H. V.,) delivered in the U. S. Senate, January, 1848.

their persons liberated. All property taken was returned, and the Mexican army, unmolested, marched with its effects beyond the Rio Grande.

The end of law is justice between men, and between nations. The rights of nations are defined by law or by treaty. Both law and treaty are sustained by power. The law of the strongest is executed. Our views as to what constitutes the strength of a nation the reader will find in other chapters of this work. The object of treaties is to supersede the frequent exercise of power in the adjustment of undefined rights, by embracing conditions applicable to the positive and probable wants and interests of the high contracting parties.

As the peace of nations is preserved or disturbed according to the good or bad faith in which treaties are observed, they cannot be too solemnly regarded. Attempted fraud in a treaty should be met with universal reprobation. Its condemnation and consequent penalties should be commensurate with the great evils which it is calculated to produce, if successful. It would be a dangerous incitement to lessen the serious importance of national compacts. Such compacts should be held as sacred as the flag of truce, not to be counterfeited or violated with impunity.

In this case, a counterfeit treaty was attempted by the presi dent of Mexico and imposed upon Texas. It was honorable on the part of Texas, false on the part of Mexico.

If Mexico deemed it just to renounce the treaty, her power should have reached the treason that sanctioned it. Its authors should have been tried as traitors, or returned to the confinement from which its conditions had freed them. The army of Mexico should have been marched back to Texas, to be resurrendered to those who had been made the subjects of the treachery. It is a safer precedent to sanction such a treaty, under the circumstances, than to sanction its violation in the principal officers of the nation. It would indeed be a precedent of the most dangerous tendency.

If Mexico rejected the acts of her president, which involved

the safety of her army, there is no good reason why it should be done at the expense of Texas.

It was eminently a treaty on the side of humanity. Mexico had murdered, by the orders of her government, the soldiers of Texas who had surrendered as prisoners of war; and what would have been the measure of retaliation in this case, it is difficult to say. It unquestionably prevented much bloodshed and suffering. It may have saved the Mexican army and the chief magistrate of the Mexican nation from slaughter; and shall it now be tolerated, either in theory or practice, that Mexico may gather her strength to massacre the Texans, at whose hands they were permitted to live? Shall Texas surrender the only considerations which Mexico gave, and which would have been ratified by the Mexican government, if Santa Anna and his troops had been held as securities? or if Santa Anna and his officers had demanded it as necessary to their honor and integrity? Never. To admit such a principle is against the best good of civilized nations; to sanction it, an outrage upon humanity.

If Mexico was false to the treaty, Texas could be true to herself. The same power that compelled terms was able to defend them.* The same power that humbled Santa Anna was able to punish his perfidy. Texas had her boundary lines marked by the best blood of her citizens, and her energy was equal to her wants in the defence of her rights against Mexico.

Let us examine how this subject was viewed by the government of the United States. It is with the sentiment of proud

* Mr. Pillsbury, member of U. S. Congress, 1847, and long a resident of Texas, in a speech before the house, says,

"That all attempts at maintaining Mexican posts east of the Rio Grande had been frustrated by the Texans, and the Mexicans driven west of the Rio Grande. No Mexican forces could maintain themselves, as was frequently attempted; all Texas would have rushed to arms to drive them back."

See the excellent speech of the Hon. Mr. Norris, delivered before the house in February, 1847.