Cases similar to the above, it may, in conclusion, be observed, depend on the general principle recognised by the law, viz., that, where the right of an individual to land is once established, such right must be exclusive, and the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his land, that term being used in the comprehensive sense above assigned to it. QUICQUID PLANTATUR SOLO SOLO CEDIT. (Wentw. Off. Ex., 14th ed., 145).—Whatever is affixed to the soil belongs thereto. It may be stated, as a general rule, that whatever is fixed to the freehold becomes a part of it, and is subjected to the same rights of property as the freehold itself (k). Having already seen that the right of property in land extends also indefinitely to that which is above and likewise underneath the surface, we shall consider how, and with what qualifications, the above maxim applies: 1st, with reference to trees; 2ndly, emblements; 3rdly, awaygoing crops; and, 4thly, fixtures;-treating these important subjects with brevity, and merely endeavouring to give a concise outline of the law respecting each. trees, &c. 1. The general property in trees, being timber, is in Property in the owner of the inheritance of the land upon which they grow; that in bushes and underwood is in the tenant, though, if the latter exceeds his right, as, by grubbing up or destroying fences, he may be liable to an action on the case for waste (1). According to the above rule, therefore, if trees, being When blown (k) Woodf. L. and T., 5th ed., 447. (1) Per Tindal, C. J., Berriman v. Peacock, 9 Bing. 386, 387; Com. down. N When wrongfully severed. Severance of trees not fit for timber. Repairs. timber, are blown down by the wind, the lessor shall have them, for they are part of his inheritance, and not the tenant for life or years; but, if they be dotards, without any timber in them, the tenant for life or years shall have them (m). So, where timber is severed by a trespasser, and by wrong, it belongs to him who has the first vested estate of inheritance, whether in fee or in tail, and he may bring trover for it (n). And, if there are intermediate contingent estates of inheritance, and the timber is cut down by combination between the tenant for life and the person who has the next vested estate of inheritance, or, if the tenant for life himself has such an estate, and fells timber; in these cases the Court of Chancery will order it to be preserved for him who has the first contingent estate of inheritance under the settlement (0). On the other hand, where trees not fit for timber are cut down by the lessor, the property in such trees vests in the tenant; for the lessor would have no right to them, if severed by the act of God, and, therefore, can have no right to them, where they have been severed by his own wrongful act; and the same rule holds where they are severed by a stranger (p). A tenant, who is answerable for waste only, may cut down trees for the purposes of reparation, without committing waste, either where the damage has accrued during the time of his being in possession in the ordinary course of decay, or where the premises were ruinous at the time he (m) Herlakenden's case, 4 Rep. (n) Woodf. L. and T., 5th ed., (0) Bewick v. Wms. 268. Wintfield, 3 P. (p) Channon v. Patch, 5 B. & C. 897, 902; Ward v. Andrews, 2 Chit. R. 636. entered; if, however, the decay happened by his default, in this case to cut down trees, in order to do the repair, would be waste (q); and, at all events, the tenant can only justify felling such trees as are fit for the purposes of repair (r). It is, moreover, a general rule, that waste can only be committed of the thing demised; and, therefore, if trees are excepted out of the demise, no waste can be committed of them, and, consequently, ejectment does not lie on the ground of a forfeiture. Trespass in such a case would be the proper remedy (s). A tenant "without impeachment of waste" is entitled to cut down timber, which he could not otherwise do; but this clause does not extend to allow destructive or malicious waste, such as cutting down timber which serves for the shelter or ornament of the estate (t). A tenant for life, without impeachment of waste, has as full power to cut down trees for his own use as if he had an estate of inheritance, and is equally entitled to the timber if severed by others, so that an action of trover for such timber will not lie against him at suit of a tenant in tail expectant on the termination of a life estate (u). But, if the tenant for life cut timber so as not to leave enough for repairs, or, if he cut down trees planted for ornament or shelter to the mansion-house, or saplings not fit to be felled for timber, a court of equity will restrain him by injunction (x). tail, Lastly, it is an inseparable incident to an estate tail, that Tenant in the tenant shall not be punished for committing waste by felling timber; but this power must be exercised, if at all, (q) Woodf. L. and T., 5th ed., 440. (r) Simmons v. Norton, 7 Bing. 640. (s) Goodright v. Vivian, 8 East, 190; Rolls v. Rock, cited 2 Selw. N. P., 10th ed., 1314. (t) Packington's case, 3 Atk. 215. during the life of the tenant in tail; for, at the instant of his death, it ceases. If, therefore, tenant in tail sell trees growing on the land, the vendee must cut them down during the life of the tenant in tail; for, otherwise, they will descend to the heir as part of the inheritance (y). In like manner, the grantee of tenant in tail is said to be dispunishable for waste (z); nor is tenant in tail, after a possibility of issue extinct, liable for waste (a), though equity would, in this case, interfere to restrain extravagant and malicious devastation (b). Emblements. 2. The next exception to the general rule, that whatever is planted or annexed to the soil or freehold passes with it, occurs in the case of emblements, which term comprises not only corn sown, but roots planted, and other annual artificial profits of the land (c), and these, in certain cases, are distinct from the realty, and subject to many of the incidents attending personal property (d). General rule. The rule upon this subject has been already stated, and is, that those only are entitled to emblements who have an uncertain estate or interest in land, which is determined by the act of God, or of the law, between the period of sowing and the severance of the crop (e). Where, however, the tenancy is determined by the tenant's own act, as by forfeiture for waste committed, or by the marriage of a feme copyholder or a tenant durante viduitate, and other similar cases, the tenant is not entitled to emblements; for the principle on which the law gives emblements is, that the tenant may be encouraged to cultivate by being sure of receiving the fruit of his labour, notwithstanding the deter (y) Woodf. L. and T., 5th ed., 440, 879. (z) Id. 879. (a) Williams v. Williams, 15 Ves. jun. 427; 2 Bla. Com. 125. (b) 2 Bla. Com., 16th ed., 283, n. (10). (c) Com. Dig." Biens,” (G. 1). (d) 2 Bla. Com. 404. (e) Co. Litt. 55. a.; ante, p. 113. mination of his estate by some unforeseen and unavoidable event (f). By this rule, however, the tenant is not entitled to all the fruits of his labour, or such right might be extended to things of a more permanent nature, such as trees (g), or to more crops than one, since the cultivator very often looks for a compensation for his capital and labour in the produce of successive years; but the principle is limited to this extent, that he is entitled to one crop of that species only which ordinarily repays the labour by which it is produced within the year in which that labour is bestowed, though the crop may, in extraordinary seasons, be delayed beyond that period (h). life. If, then, a tenant for life or pur autre vie sows the Tenant for land, and dies before harvest, his personal representatives shall have the emblements or profits of the crop; and, if the tenant for life sows the land, and afterwards grants over his estate, and the grantee dies before the corn is severed, it shall go to the tenant for life, and not to the grantee's executor; and, if a man sows land, and lets it for life, and the lessee for life dies before the corn is severed, the reversioner, and not the lessee's executor, shall have the emblements, although, if the lessee had sown the land himself, it would have been otherwise (i). Further, the under-tenants or lessees of tenant for life shall be entitled to emblements in those cases where tenant for life shall not have them, viz., where the life estate determines by the act of the last-mentioned party; as, in the (ƒ) Com. Dig. "Biens," (G. 2); 1 Steph. Com. 242, 243. (g) See 2 Bla. Com. 123. (h) Judgment, Graves v. Weld, 5 B. & Ad. 117, 118; citing Kingsbury v. Collins, 4 Bing. 202. In Latham v. Atwood, Cro. Car. 515, hops growing from ancient roots were held |