avoid multiplicity of suits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of a private injury to each individual in the neigbourhood, than of a private wrong (u). So, if the king grant lands, forfeited to him upon a conviction of treason, to a third person, he cannot afterwards, by his grant, devest the property so granted in favour of the original owner; nor can he grant the same thing in possession to one which he or his progenitors have granted to another (x). NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI. (2 Inst. 273).—Lapse of time does not bar the right of the Crown. In pursuance of the principle already considered, of the sovereign's incapability of doing wrong, the law also determines, that in the Crown there can be no negligence or laches; and, therefore, it was formerly held, that no delay in resorting to his remedy would bar the king's right (y); for the time and attention of the sovereign must be supposed to be occupied by the cares of government, nor is there any reason that he should suffer by the negligence of his of ficers, or by their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party (z); and although, as we shall hereafter see, the maxim vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt is a rule for the subject, yet nullum tempus occurrit regi is, in general, the king's plea (a). From this doctrine it followed, not (u) 4 Bla. Com. 398; Vaugh. R. 333. (x) Argument, Rex v. Amery, 2 T. R. 565; Chit. Pre. Crown, 125. But the grant of a mere license or authority from the Crown, or a grant during the king's will, is determined by the demise of the Crown. (Id. 400). See n. (8), p. 26. (y) 1 Bla. Com. 247; 2 Steph. Com. 504. (z) Godb. 295; Hobart, 347; Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "Prerogative,” (E.6). (a) Hobart, 347. only that the civil claims of the Crown received no prejudice by the lapse of time, but that criminal prosecutions for felonies or misdemeanours (which are always brought in the sovereign's name) might be commenced at any distance of time from the commission of the offence; and all this is, in general, still law. But, by statute, it has been, in modern times, largely qualified (b); for, by stat. 9 Geo. 3, c. 16, the Crown is now barred from its civil right, in suits relating to landed property, by the lapse of sixty years, and possession for that period is, therefore, a bar even against the prerogative, in derogation of the above maxim (c). But the Statute of Limitations, 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3, does not bind the king (d). Again, by 32 Geo. 3, c. 58, the Crown is barred, in informations for usurping corporate offices or franchises, by the lapse of six years (e); and, by statute 7 Will. 3, c. 3, an indictment for treason (except for an attempt to assassinate the king) must be found within three years after the commission of the act of treason. Another important instance of the application of the above general doctrine occurs where church preferment lapses to the Crown. Lapse is a species of forfeiture, whereby the right of presentation to a church accrues to the ordinary, by neglect of the patron to present,-to the metropolitan, by neglect of the ordinary,—and to the Crown, by neglect of the metropolitan; the term in which the title to present by lapse accrues from one of the above parties to the other (b) 2 Steph. Com. 504. (c) 3 Bla. Com. 307; 2 Dwarr. Stats. 976. See Doe d. Watt v. Morris, 2 Scott, 276; Goodtitle v. Baldwin, 11 East, 488. (d) Judgment, Lambert v. Taylor, 4 B. & C. 151, 152; Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "Prerogative," (E. 5). (e) See Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "Prerogative," (E. 6), p. 467, and stat. 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 78, s. 23; R. v. Harris, 11 A. & E. 518. is six calendar months, after the expiration of which period the right becomes forfeited by the person neglecting to exercise it. But no right of lapse can accrue when the original presentation is in the Crown; and, in pursuance of the above maxim, if the right of presentation lapses to the Crown, prerogative intervenes, and, in this case, the patron shall never recover his right till the Crown has presented; and if, during the delay of the Crown, the patron himself presents, and his clerk is instituted, the Crown, by presenting another, may turn out the patron's clerk, or, after induction, may remove him by quare impedit (ƒ); though, if neither of these courses is adopted, and the patron's clerk dies incumbent, or is canonically deprived, the right of presentation is lost to the Crown (g). QUANDO JUS DOMINI REGIS ET SUBDITI CONCURRUNT, Jus REGIS PRÆFERRI DEBET. (9 Rep. 129). Where the title of the king and the title of a common person concur, the king's title shall be preferred (h). In the above case, detur digniori is the rule (¿), and, accordingly, the king's debt shall, in suing out execution, be preferred to that of every other creditor who had not obtained judgment before the king commenced his suit (k). The king's judgment also affects all land which the king's debtor had at or after the time of contracting his debt, or which any of his officers mentioned in the stat. 13 Eliz. c. 4, had at or after the time of his entering on the office; so that, if such officer of the Crown aliens for a valuable consideration, the land shall be liable to the king's debt, even in the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser, though the debt due to the king was contracted by the vendor many years after the alienation (1); whereas, between subject and subject, the general rule is, that a judgment has relation only to the day when signed (m). So, the rule of law is, that, where the sheriff seizes under a fi. fa., and, after such seizure, but before the sale (n) under such writ, a writ of extent is sued out and delivered to the sheriff, the Crown is entitled to the priority, and the sheriff must sell under the extent, and satisfy the Crown's debt, before he sells under the fi. fa. Nor does it make any difference whether the extent is in chief or in aid, i. e. whether it is directly against the king's debtor, or brought to recover a debt due from some third party to such debtor; it having been the practice in very ancient times, that, if the king's debtor was unable to satisfy the king's debt out of his own chattels, the king would betake himself to any third person who was indebted to the king's debtor (o), andwould recover of such third person what he owed to the king's debtor, in order to get payment of the debt due from the latter to the Crown (p). And the same principle was held to apply where goods in the hands of the sheriff, under a fi. fa., and before sale, were seized by the officers of the customs under a warrant to levy a penalty incurred by the defend (1) 3 Bla. Com. 420. (m) See 1 Chit. Arch. Pr., 7th ed., 341. (n) See R. v. Sloper, 6 Price, 114. (0) See R. v. Larking, 8 Price, 683. (p) Giles v. Grover, 9 Bing. 128, 191, recognising Rex v. Cotton, Parker, R., 112. See Att.-Gen. v. Trueman, 11 M. & W. 694; Att.Gen. v. Walmsley, 12 M. & W. 179; Reg. v. Austin, 10 M. & W. 693. ant for an offence against the revenue laws; the Court observing, that there was no sound distinction between a warrant issued to recover a debt to the Crown and an extent (q). ROY NEST LIE PER ASCUN STATUTE, si il ne soit EXPRESSMENT NOSME. (Jenk. Cent. 307).—The king is not bound by any statute, if he be not expressly named to be so bound (r). of rule. The king is not bound by any statute, if he be not ex- Qualification pressly named therein, unless there be equivalent words, or unless the prerogative be included by necessary implication (s), for it is inferred primâ facie that the law made by the Crown, with the assent of Lords and Commons, is made for subjects, and not for the Crown (t); but this rule seems to apply only where the property or peculiar privileges of the Crown are affected; and this distinction is laid down, that where the king has any prerogative, estate, right, title, or interest, he shall not be barred of them by the general words of an act, if he be not named therein (u). Yet, if a statute be intended to give a remedy against a wrong, the king, though not named, shall be bound by it (x); and the king is impliedly bound by statutes passed for the public good, the relief of the poor, the general advancement of learning, religion, and justice, or for the prevention of (q) Grove v. Aldridge, 9 Bing. 428. Rooke v. Dayrell (4 T. R. 402) is no longer law. 1. (r) Jenk, Cent. 307; Wing. Max. (s) 2 Dwarr. Stats. 670. (t) Per Alderson, B., Att.- Gen. v. Donaldson, 10 M. & W. 124, citing Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. 236. (u) The case of Magdalen College, 11 Rep. 66, cited Bac. Abr. " Prero- (x) Willion v. Berkley, Plowd. |