decide to close the Canal to our ships of war, to our navy, and where would we be then? The proposed treaty as already stated specifically permits the ships of a nation in a state of war with the United States to transit the Canal.

C. Will the new treaty protect from or expose canal to sabotage?

One of the forcefully repeated arguments made by The President and the State Department is that if we do not surrender the Canal through this treaty, Panamanians will sabotage the Canal, whereas the new treaty will eliminate this hazard. Well, this type of reasoning should expose itself to real question. Sabotage by whom? There are far left radical students in Panama today who object to the proposed treaty and there was a crazed Panamanian in Stockholm who immolated himself simply because the treaty gives to the United States the right to manage it and underwrite the costs until 1999 and provides for a limited U.S. presence there. It is very difficult now to sabotage the Canal. It will not be difficult after the pending treaty is ratified and the Zone ceases to exist. It is almost impossible now. It will be easy if the treaty is ratified. Certainly after the treaty is approved, they would have a far better opportunity to sabotage the Canal than now when we give up substantially all of our police power in the Zone because there will be no Zone-it will all be Panama.

If Panamanians with or without the tacit approval of its Marxist-dominated government were to sabotage the Canal, it would cut off about 25% of Panama's gross national product. The indirect benefits flowing to Panama now are at this level. The Panamanians know that their livelihood depends upon the continued operation of the Canal as it stands now. Attempts at sabotage in the past have been thwarted by our own police and security forces which under this treaty we will no longer be able to maintain. So, in fact, for those radical students who consider the United States an imperialist power, as does Dr. Escobar, this treaty increases the opportunity for sabotage and surrenders a vital, strategic and tactical defense instrumentality of the United States which we cannot afford to surrender.

The Panamanians themselves have enjoyed nearly the highest standard of living on the average of any other nation in Latin or Central America due to the beneficence of the United States, and they know it. Most Panamanians who are fearful to speak out-they are afraid of their dictatorship-know that their government could not effectively operate the Canal anyway, but their lips are sealed by their fear.

D. Who is Omar Torrijos and how did he come to power?

Omar Torrijos did not seize power from the old oligarchy nine years ago. That coup was led by Majors Boris Martinez, a subordinate of Torrijos, who was kept innocent of the coup because of his excessive drinking problem. Major Martinez was an active, determined Communist.

When the Communist party of Panama, however, headed by Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, Juan Materno Vasquez and Marcellino Jaén decided on March 6, 1969 to purge Martinez, Jaén, who is married to Torrijos' sister Toya, persuaded Bethancourt and Vasquez to make Torrijos the head of the national guard, and later in 1972 the chief of government. Martinez was purged because he wanted to move too fast, faster than Bethancourt, the brains of the Communist party in Panama, thought they should move. He felt they could obtain much more by moving more slowly and not risk a countercoup.

Torrijos has been frequently described as the son of rural schoolteachers. This is correct. Both his mother, Joaquina, and his father, José, have been identified as founders of a Communist cell in Veragua Province. It is now the most powerful and influential cell in Panama.

Omar Torrijos was a member of the Marxist organization of "Young Veraguas" when he attended the normal school of the Province of Veraguas. Drew Pearson on November 19, 1968 later identified him as a member of the Communist party of Panama. During July 1977, a Soviet economic mission to Panama confirmed a treaty establishing a free zone for the Soviet Union in Panama. A discussion took place at that meeting in which the Soviets stated they would consider financing and constructing a new sea-level canal for Panama across the Isthmus. E. What about a sea-level canal? Is one needed for defense?

Immediately after World War II, the idea of a sea-level canal was thought to have great urgency from a defense standpoint during the immediate reaction to the atomic bomb. Many studies since then have established that both a lock canal and a sea-level canal are obviously equally vulnerable to atomic attack and that

both require extensive protection with air cover and sea forces, antisubmarine, surface and submarine. For all of this, we need the air fields in the Zone and we need the bases there over which we are surrending control.

A sea-level canal across the Isthmus would be a foolhardy undertaking because of the geology of the Isthmus, let alone the nature of the Panama government. The uniquely intractable geologic formations were primarily the cause of the French collapse. It was only because of the superior capabilities and resources of the United States that we were able successfully to excavate the main channel known as the Culebra (Gaillard) cut. Not only that, it would be foolhardy to undertake it after this treaty goes into effect, if it does go into effect, given the characteristics of the Panamanian Marxist dictatorship with its axes with Moscow and Havana.

F. We should not agree to refrain from negotiating for and creating a new canal in Nicaragua

What is even more foolhardy about the treaty if it is ratified is that we commit ourselves not to construct another canal between the oceans anywhere else during the life of the treaty. We also agree not to negotiate with any third state for a new route in the western hemisphere (Article XII).

If the United States were to undertake to establish a canal which would accommodate vessels of deeper draft and broader beam, it should be created in Nicaragua, not Panama. The geology is different and though the distance from shore to shore is longer, the land bridge is no longer than the narrow neck of the Panamanian Isthmus. In Nicaragua, either a sea-level or a lock canal could be built.

Because of the Pacific sea snake and other marine life indigenous to the Pacific Ocean, a sea-level canal might well imperil the important food fisheries of the Atlantic. There is no mixing of the seas now.

G. Would this usher in a new era of cordial and friendly relations with all of the nations of Latin America?

The President, Secretary Vance, negotiators Bunker and Linowitz and other spokesmen endlessly repeat the theme that the proposed treaties would establish and era of good feeling, of friendly, cordial and constructive relations with all of the nations of the western hemisphere. There is no doubt that this is in fact NOT so.

These assertions have been made because of the presence in Washington for the signing ceremonies of most of the heads of government or chiefs of state of Latin America at President Carter's invitation extended through the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to attend the signing ceremony? Their presence is not evidence which supports these extravagant claims.

Only four Latin American states have supported Panama's demand for this treaty. Torrijos knows it too. He has so stated.

In May of 1977, very likely around May 15, twenty Mexican women journalists visited Panama and were received by Torrijos. Among these journalists was one, Marlise Simons, a Dutch journalist now living in Mexico City. Ms. Marlise Simons was once on the staff of the Washington Post.

On May 19, 1977, the Washington Post printed a byline article by Marlise Simons with regard to the mentioned interview with Torrijos. In it she quoted Torrijos as having stated to the twenty Mexican women journalists that he was supported by only four Latin American nations in his quest for the Panama Canal. He named them as Venezuela, Colombia, Costa Rica and Mexico.

The news stories of these twenty journalists were widely reported in the Latin American press.

It is well know that the chiefs of state and heads of government of our Latin American neighbors do not feel themselves in a position to have declined the President's invitation regardless of their feelings regarding the proposed treaty. To my knowledge. to my certain personal knowledge, there are several Latin American states, the governments of which are against these treaties. They can hardly bring themselves to believe that the United States government could bring itself to do this. They consider that it will foster an increase and not a decrease in terrorist and subversive activities in their own states. They consider that Panama and Cuba form an axis with Moscow. They consider that their own security will be diminished by these actions. I wish I could quote which nations, but it should be evident that I am not in a position to do so. I should add that they consider that these treaties will be followed by an insistent demand on the

part of Fidel Castro that the United States abandon its naval base in Guantanamo. When one has in mind the Soviet view of the Caribbean Sea, the Panama Canal, the entire Isthmus, we would do well to avoid any action which would -increase the pressure on the United States to abandon Guantanamo.

They cite an article in the Washington Evening Star of twenty years ago in May of 1957 which carried a story that the Soviet Union had launched a propa, ganda offensive against the United States and Central America to incite Panama into demanding control of the Panama Canal. It worked.

They wonder why Linowitz was appointed as a negotiator in view of his general reputation as favoring unilateral disarmament by the United States. When Bunker and Linowitz returned from Panama in triumph to be received by President Carter on a Sunday, it was later learned that the treaties had not yet been drafted, and that there were great complexities and difficulties with language translation that would take many days before the general agreements which had been initiated could be put into treaty language. Yet within a few days after their return, it was announced that The President had read every word of the treaties and stated that he was well satisfied. How could The President have read every word of nonexistent treaties?

According to the World Bank, Panama's external debt is in excess of $1,600 million. The rank and file of Panamanians have not benefited. Where has the money gone? Who are the principal lenders? And who did benefit?

In any event, Panama is close to bankruptcy. The proposal is that we yield to unjustified demands wholly devoid of any moral basis by a nearly bankrupt, Marxist-oriented, Communist-affiliated, Yankee-hating nation.

H. To whom is it proposed we surrender?

Is the Senate of the United States familiar with the recent statement of Marcellino Jaén, a Marxist and a member of the ruling Marxist triumvirate who installed Omar Torrijos? He is, as it will be recalled from the foregoing, a brotherin-law of Omar Torrijos. On July 19, 1977 when Panama signed an economic pact with the Soviet Union, he stated publicly and I quote:

"With the signing of this document that constitutes the final draft of an agree ment in which the governments of the U.S.S.R. and Panama have participated, is an event of deep historic significance, not only for our country but for the American continent as well, who are always facing strong forces that represent a philosophy that is contrary to the destiny of Latin America."

Let us remember, it is not really Omar Torrijos, a man with a heavy drinking problem with whom we are dealing-it is Romulo Bethancourt Escobar, Marcellino Jaén and the Lenninist-Marxist party of Panama supported by Cuban agents of Fidel Castro with whom we are dealing. It should also be noted that it was reported that during the negotiations with U.S.S.R. completed on July 19, 1977 as stated above, that there was an extended discussion on July 16, 1977 not only for the financing and construction for Panama of a new sea-level canal by the U.S.S.R. but also for the establishment of a Soviet naval base in Panama. In Article XII of the proposed treaty, it will be recalled, the United States may not negotiate with any other state to create a new canal. Panama undertakes NO reciprocal obligations.

We are frequently admonished that we must appease the Panamanian demands or face violence. In 1974, the then Ambassador of Panama to the United States said that if Panama is unsuccessful in its demand for the Canal and the Zone, "there will be no canal for anybody, not for us, not for the United States, not for the world."

Is it not clear that we propose to surrender in order to appease? In so doing, we do not enhance our security and defense-we critically impair both. And we would create conditions wherein sabotage would be easy, whereas it is difficult-next to impossible now except by a transiting vessel.

I. What about Colombia?

There are those who say that if any nation has a reason to be critical of the United States it is Colombia by reason of the events of 1903. What should be realized is that in 1922 the United States and Colombia amicably settled their differences in a treaty negotiated during the Wilson Administration. Under it, Colombia obtained certain transit rights through the Canal and it referred to the Canal Zone "title to which is now vested entirely and absolutely in the United States." Under that treaty, the United States paid Colombia $25 million in five annual installments as an indemnity for the loss of Panama in return for Colom99-592-78

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bia's agreement to recognize the independence of Panama. The $25 million was paid and accepted. Any legal question about our acquisition in 1903 was put permanently at rest. So also was any moral question.

J. Do we pay rent to Panama? Absolutely not

Members of the State Department and other government officials seeking to push the American people into a misunderstanding, hopefully to obtain ratifica tion, cite as "proof" of the fact that the Canal Zone does not belong to the United States that the United States has always paid rent to Panama. The fact is the United States is not and never has been obligated to pay rent. The $250,000 per year required by the original treaty of 1903 was in lieu of the $250,000 per year annuity which had been agreed to be paid to Colombia in the Hay-Herran treaty, in consideration of the grant by Colombia to the United States of the right forever to operate the Panama Railroad. Inasmuch as the Panamanian conspirators who seceded from Colombia were aware of this, they expected and received not only the $10 million payment which Colombia would have received but also the $250,000 railroad operating annuity which Colombia would have received. The annuity over the years has been increased but it is not and never has been at any time rent. It is now $2.3 million.

K. What about the watershed which is essential to the operation of the lock system of the canal!

The canal lock system cannot operate without a constant and abundant supply of huge quantities of fresh water. These water sources are Madden, Miraflores and Gatun Lakes and the Chagres River. Protection of the watershed unquestionable and certain is indispensable to the future operations of the Canal. Without such assured protection, the requisite availability of vast amounts of flowing fresh water would vanish. Approximately two-thirds of this vital watershed lies in the Canal Zone itself. As you know, upon the coming into force of this pending treaty, the Canal Zone would wholly cease to exist and would become Panamanian property under its sovereignty and jurisdiction with small parts by permission of Panama set aside for use and occupancy by the United States in carrying out its "management contract" to operate the Canal until the year 2000 at the sole cost and expense of the United States.

The contiguous land area portion of this watershed lies outside the Zone in Panama. This important one-third portion of the watershed which lies outside of the Zone boundary has been virtually destroyed by a relentless assault on the flora. By whom? By Panamanian peasants and farmers living in these areas. The Government of Panama knows about this and does nothing about it. When the Canal Zone ceases to exist as it will, these assaults may well continue and be carried forward into the remaining two-thirds of the watershed. In that case, and there is nothing in the treaty to prohibit this, the jungle will disappear as it has in the other thirds and the Zonian two-thirds of this irreplaceable watershed will progressively become desertized as the contiguous one-third is becoming.

While Article VI entitled "Protection of the Environment" provides for a joint commission on the environment to be established with equal representation from both sides, the Commission only concerns itself with the implementation of certain provisions of the treaty and does not concern itself with that which would then be going on within Panama (in what was formerly the Canal Zone) as the implementation of the treaty by the parties relates only to those areas temporarily reserved for the use and occupancy of the United States for housing, for military bases, some training and for canal operations. This Article has no application specifically to the protection of the watershed, all of which will lie in Panama and none of which would come under the active care of either party once the treaty goes into force. These lakes and the river now in the Zone-those portions now in the Zone-would survive by themselves if left alone, but will not survive at all if they are treated in the same way as the portions of the watershed which have always been in Panama have been treated during the years since the Canal commenced operation. So the treaty has no protective environmental provisions in this regard-certainly no enforceable ones and Article VI by its plain language clearly does not have this subject in mind. L. What about the allegation of the vulnerability of the Panama Canal to sabotage or the threats of sabotage if the proposed treaty is not ratified? On September 12, 1977, General Omar Torrijos said that the Canal "is as indefensible as a newborn baby." Is this true? The answer is "No, it is not true." Since 1942, the Canal has been provided with protective and with emergency

devices capable of putting ships through the Canal even if every gate and In every lock were to be destroyed. A bomb, a conventional bomb, that is, could not disrupt Canal traffic for an extended period of time. Neither could a ship which exploded within the locks stop traffic for extended periods. The dams also have special protection from outside attack. So long as the Canal Zone continues to exist, sabotage of the lock system is next to impossible in such a manner as to put the Canal out of commission for an extended period. When the Canal Zone #2 ceases to exist, which it will upon the coming into force of this treaty, these protective devices will themselves become vulnerable. Present jurisdiction plus the included police power and the protective shield of the ten-mile wide zone are essential.

The treaty makes no provision for the continuation of the Zone in order to * assure or more particularly to avoid the creation of a vulnerable situation which will arise when both the Zone and U.S. police power become extinct. The treaty, if approved, will extinguish both. This is a fatal flaw. Contrary to the contentions of the proponents, the continued existence of the Canal Zone and our jurisdiction assure the security of the Canal. The treaty will strip away that security e and render the Canal vulnerable to the attack of saboteurs and terrorists. M. The Protocol of 1914 to the 1903 treaty.

If the proposed treaty is confirmed by the Senate, the United States will no longer have a treaty right to deny passage to belligerent ships. To the contrary, the United States will be obligated to allow such vessels to transit the Canal if they can reach its approaches. The United States now possesses that right and - always until now considered it to be a valuable right. Soviet naval power is multiplying and over the last 25 years ours has been steadily diminishing both relatively and absolutely. Why would we then agree to forego this valuable treaty right?

On October 10, 1914, an agreement between Panama and the United States was signed whereby belligerent ships could be denied the use of Panamanian waters and Canal Zone waters. Ships using Panamanian waters would be denied the use of the Canal Zone ninety days. This would make it more attractive to such belligerent vessels to sail around the Horn.

This agreement indirectly had the effect of modifying the neutrality provisions of the 1903 treaty and I am told with the tacit consent to Britain with whom in 1901 the second Hay-Pauncefort Treaty superseded the first treaty upon assurance to Britain who surrendered her rights to construct a canal in return for a promise that ours would be neutral and open. I might add, by the way, that the words of neutrality in the 1901 Hay-Pauncefort Treaty with Britain are not dissimilar from those incorporated in the neutrality treaty which the Administration contends gives the U.S. the right to intervene in defense of the Canal after the year 2000. I have never heard anyone contend that the HayPauncefort neutrality treaty with Britain in 1901 gave Britain the right to intervene in the Canal Zone which is U.S. territory. In an agreed minute to the principal pending treaty which minute has reference to paragraph 1(c) of Article I (covering abrogation of prior treaties and the establishment of a new relationship) this 1914 agreement would cease to exist. It would be expressly abrogated and the United States would lose its existing treaty rights whereby belligerent vessels can be denied the use both of Panamanian and Canal Zone waters. This is a very important treaty right which should be preserved and carried forward perpetually.

N. The transfers of property and the payments to Panama

The proposed treaties would cede and surrender and transfer to Panama without consideration vast properties outright, including the Panama Railroad. This would be done immediately upon the coming into force of the principal treaty, if it is confirmed by the Senate. The Railroad is vital to Canal operations, maintenance and Canal emergencies. Also included in the immediate transfer to Panama and its sovereign jurisdiction to the exclusion of the United States would be all of the land areas of the Zone. These land areas which were ceded to the United States are U.S. territory subject to the exclusive right of the United States to exercise sovereignty over them. Not only that-lands within the Zone which was ceded by the 1903 treaty in perpetuity were later purchased by the United States from the individual Panamanian owners who owned land within the ten-mile wide Zone.

Between the coming into force of the treaty and the year 2000 and perpetually thereafter, all of these lands will belong to Panama from the beginning. The