There is no question about this being a very, very important issue. The Communists would be denuded if we really entered into and ratified these two treaties with Panama.

On the other hand, they would be extremely well strengthened, beyond even the 100,000 that the military asked for down there to protect it, if we turn them down. If we had gone about this in a helter-skelter way, I would have doubts. But this has gone through the work of several administrations. I am proud of President Ford. He has an uphill stream with his own party. But he has come out for this four-square. He knows where our interests lie. He knows, too, the difference between right and wrong.

I have tried to weigh my feelings about this and ask myself if I have missed anything. But I feel this is a very well worked out treaty. The military and people who live there and most everyone else far and away see this as being in the best interests of Panama, the United States, and world freedom.

EFFECT OF TREATIES ON COMMUNISTS

Senator SARBANES. You say that the Communists in Panama would be denuded and weakened by the new treaties and strengthened without them because it would leave them with an issue to direct against the United States.

Senator HOLLINGS. No question about it.

Senator SARBANES. What about Communists elsewhere in Latin America in that regard, or even elsewhere in the world? Will it have fallout and consequences there as well?

Senator HOLLINGS. Very definitely. That fallout for the Communists would give them ammunition, if we insist on colonial holdings. In this year of 1977, if we continue to insist on that kind of position in international affairs, we are going to lose out and they will exploit it at every particular turn. We stand with no friends whatsoever. We will stand alone with our own stupidity. It is just simply that.

I have tried to follow all of the statements, to read them and to listen closely, even this morning. But opponents bring out Romulo Bethancourt and a few other statements about Torrijos and say that we don't even mention them. Well, I don't see the Senator's statement mentioning President Carter. That is not a position. We are not naive or uneducated on this score.

It is a dictatorship down there. There are some things wanting down there in Panama. But if anything was created, that is "made in the U.S.A." in a sense, that is it. No one else was down there building.

Now the Senator from New Jersey says he does not like "mea culpa" too much. I think we have to accept our role in this. We have to look out and see what we did and what our record is. In the light of that we must very proudly stand with these two treaties. I think they have been well conceived and well worked out with all of the considerations of our military and our international posture taken into account. Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Hollings, we appreciate very much the testimony you have given this morning. It is 1 o'clock and we will have to take a break for lunch.

The committee will resume its hearings at 2 o'clock this afternoon in this same room. The witness at that time will be Senator Allen of Alabama.

[Whereupon, at 1 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen, we are very glad to see you here. You do not have a prepared statement do you?

Senator ALLEN. Yes; I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Allen, none of us knows to what extent we are going to be disturbed by rollcalls. Perhaps we ought to go ahead. You can present your statement as you see fit. You may read it, summarize it or have it printed in the record. You may proceed in any way you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES B. ALLEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

ALABAMA

Senator ALLEN. Thank you very much. I will read from my prepared text.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for affording me an opportunity to state to you and to the distinguished members of the Committee on Foreign Relations my reason for opposing giving advice and consent to the proposed Panama Canal treaty and the proposed so-called neutrality treaty. I do not object to the Senate giving its advice but not its consent. I would hope that our advice would be to reject the treaties.

FIVE MAJOR FLAWS IN TREATIES

Although the defects in both documents are legion, in my judgment there are five major flaws, each of which on its own ground would warrant complete rejection of the arrangements negotiated, inasmuch as each would independently damage the national interest of the United States to such extent as to render it improper for the Senate to give its assent.

The five major defects, at least as I see it, are (1), the failure of the canal treaty to provide for an adequate defense of the canal during the proposed 23-year term of the treaty; (2), the failure of the neutrality treaty to grant to the United States the unilateral right to intervene to assure the neutrality of the canal; (3) the astonishing provision of the canal treaty which forbids the United States even to negotiate with another nation for construction of a second sea level canal without the express consent of Panama; (4) the decision embodied in the canal treaty and related loan agreements to pay to Panama some $2.262 billion; and (5) the failure of the canal treaty to require congressional authorization for its proposed cession to Panama of the United States territory and property.

DEFENSE PROVISIONS OF PROPOSED TREATY

In order to understand the defense provisions of the proposed treaty, care must be taken to examine in detail the executive agreement in

implementation of article IV of the Panama Canal treaty. Moreover, further study must be given to the annexes to the executive agreement, to the annexes to the annexes, and to the various notes, minutes, and protocols-all of which form the fabric of the joint military defense we would undertake with Panama.

I am particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman, that the drafters of the canal treaty saw fit to set forth the major substantive defense provisions not in the canal treaty in its article IV, which is entitled "Protection and Defense", but instead in the executive agreement in implementation of article IV-an agreement which is several times as large as the entire canal treaty itself. Article IV of the canal treaty does not cover a complete printed page, yet the agreement in implementation of article IV is some 53 pages long, excluding annexes and excluding an additional 22 pages of agreed minutes themselves having their own annexes. So, Mr. Chairman, we have critical defense provisions not in the text of the treaty but rather in this executive agreement and in other extrinsic documents which could be modified from time to time by the executive branch with no requirement whatever to obtain the assent of the Senate.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, the defense provisions set forth in the executive agreement are themselves unworkable and portend a complete withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the Canal Zone well in advance of the projected date of A.D. 2000. The administration proposes in this first executive agreement to surrender 10 out of 14 bases. Thus, we are asked at the outset to permit the forces defending the canal to be hemmed in from day one in four relatively small enclaves. These bases would indeed be enclaves because our freedom of action outside of the four bases would be severly limited by the treaty requirement for approval of operations by a joint military board in which the United States and Panama will have equal authority. Apparently, the doctrine of unity of command is imperfectly understood at the Department of State, but the Panamanians no doubt recognize fully that this provision of the executive agreement would give a de facto veto of U.S. operations outside of the four retained bases.

So our forces would be restricted to four relatively small enclaves, and only the naive would doubt that we would very soon see pressure on our forces to withdraw from the four sites retained. That process of withdrawal would be facilitated by the fact that the executive department could close down any one or all of the remaining bases by amendment of the executive agreement with the stroke of a pen without the consent of the Senate or the consent of the Congress. Now, Mr. Chairman, the members of the distingiushed committee may not think that this process of accelerated withdrawal is contemplated, but I would call attention to the provision of the executive agreement implementing article IV which provides explicitly that the agreement will be renegotiated every 2 years or upon the request of either government and thus tacitly acknowledges what is coming.

This treaty is for a proposed term of 23 years. Yes, we are going to need tough minded negotiators if we plan to hang on to these four defense sites for a term of 23 years with the Panamanians hounding us daily for complete withdrawal and with our own Government already proposing to negotiate the matter on a biennial basis or upon request.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, these four defense sites would rest on a foundation of sand if, by Senate consent to the canal treaty, the Department of State were to be given the right to agree-and they seem pretty agreeable with this dictator down there in Panama-if the Department of State were to be given the right to agree with Panama more or less at any time that the time was propitious to shut down another base.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would ask the committee to consider carefully the feasibility of successful joint military operations with Panamanian forces. Over the long term we can expect problems. How can we expect full cooperation from an army whose recruits are taught to chant in unison at their recruit base at Fort Cimmaron. "Down with the Yankees, death to the Yankees, to the wall with the Yankees." No, Mr. Chairman, over the long term we would be naive in the extreme to expect full cooperation from Panama in any joint defense of the canal.

U.S. RIGHT TO DEFEND CANAL NEUTRALITY

Closely related to the issue of defense is the failure of the executive branch to negotiate for the United States a right to defend the neutrality of the canal after A.D. 2000. Much has been said in the media to the effect that the United States could unilaterally preserve canal neutrality after a full withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Isthmus of Panama, but Mr. Chairman, a careful reading of the neutrality treaty makes it evident that, in fact, the United States would have no such right whatsoever.

The neutrality treaty simply declares that the Canal Zone is neutral; it does not say anything, as I understand it, about defense. The proposed treaty only asserts neutrality. It declares that the Canal Zone is neutral and sets forth an agreement by the United States and Panama that both parties recognize the canal's neutrality. Nowhere is the United States granted the right to intervene to insure that the canal is not made available to an enemy nation while being denied to our Navy and merchant ships.

RIGHT OF EXPEDITIOUS TRANSIT

Additionally, Mr. Chairman, the so-called right of expeditious transit given to the U.S. warships is totally meaningless. The failure of our negotiators to insist on privileged passage for U.S. war vessels could permit Panama in an emergency to delay the movement of U.S. warships by simply requiring these vessels to transit the isthmus on the same "expeditious" basis as merchant ships of all nations.

As Dr. Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, Chief Negotiator for Panama, put the matter, "If the gringos with their warships say, 'I want to go through first,' then that is their problem with the other ships there." Regrettably, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Escobar's analysis of the practical meaning of our right to expeditious transit, although stated undiplomatically, is, nevertheless, precisely correct. His complete rejection of any claim that the United States is given the right to send troops to preserve canal neutrality also accords accurately with the language in the text. In fact, the truth is, Mr. Chairman, that Dr. Escobar's construction of the neutrality treaty, unlike the construction placed

on it by our own executive department, is a construction based on the language of the treaty itself rather than on wishful thinking or on the assertions of the mass media.

CONSTRUCTION OF NEW INTEROCEANIC CANAL

From the language in the canal treaty rather than from press reports, we also learn that the United States would agree not to negotiate without Panamanian consent with any country except Panama for the right to construct an interoceanic canal on any other route in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Chairman, knowing you as I do, I feel certain you share my astonishment that the negotiators for the United States saw fit to preclude any possibility of construction of a new interoceanic canal, perhaps at sea level, without our country first obtaining the express consent of a pro-Marxist and highly unstable military dictatorship. Why was this concession necessary? What did the United States gain from the concession?

I notice with some amusement, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of Panama purports to grant to the United States of America the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal. Inasmuch as the United States already has the right to add a third lane of locks to the existing canal, surely our negotiators did not think that a meaningless concession of that variety was sufficient consideration for giving the Panamanians a veto over any other project we may wish to undertake to connect the two oceans. Certainly, the negotiators for the United States could not have felt that the Panamanian agreement to commit Panama "to study jointly the feasibility of a sea level canal” warranted a countervailing commitment from the United States not to do anything whatsoever without Panamanian permission-but perhaps so. The bizarre behavior of our negotiators has produced other results equally as startling.

In any event, Mr. Chairman, one thing is sure and that is that the Panamanians know they got the best of this bargain. Discussing the sea level canal issue, Chief Panamanian Negotiator Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, on August 19, 1977, with pride explained to the Panamanian National Assembly the unilateral benefits of the so-called sealevel canal options. Dr. Escobar's remarks on the subject, like his remarks on neutrality, are illuminating and are worth studying in full. As Dr. Escobar explains, instead of the United States obtaining an option to build a sea level canal, the United States negotiators gave the Panamanians the option to veto construction of a sea level canal by the United States anywhere in the Western Hemisphere.

Now, Mr. Chairman, committing the United States to deal only with Panama about building another canal is a serious mistake. As the distinguished chairman knows, the best route for a second canal is in Nicaragua, that being the route that Senator John Tyler Morgan favored during consideration of isthmian routes in the early part of this century. Senator Morgan of Alabama, who was chairman of the Senate Committee on Interoceanic Canals, felt strongly that Nicaragua provided a more favorable political and geographical solution to the immense problems involved in constructing a canal between the two oceans. Retrospectively, he may well have been correct, yet our