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were active members of the Communist youth movement. Perhaps that is why he has gathered men around him of the same stripe: Mercurial, Marxist, anti-American.

Several of the Panamanian negotiators themselves have been in and out of the Communist Party. Torrijos and his advisers continue to express admiration for the Cuban revolution and for Libya's Qadhafi. They have formally alined Panama with the so-called Third World group. So, even if the Torrijos regime is not overwhelmed by Communists, is this Mr. Chairman, the kind of government that is going to be cooperative and friendly to our interests and our interpretation of the treaties?


Question No. 7 concerns the U.S. employees of the Canal Zone. Even those who believe that the canal should be given to Panama will admit that the canal's outstanding record is attributable to the dedication, loyalty, pride, and morale which the employees of the canal have shown in their work.

Mr. Chairman, I have been there. I have talked with them. I have seen this. This loyalty, pride, and dedication is particularly true of the U.S. citizen employees there.

Even if Panamanians are to be phased into their jobs, we still cannot operate the canal and train Panamanians without the assistance of U.S. citizen employees. Yet, a recent poll indicated that 62.8 percent of these U.S. citizen employees say that they will not remain under Panamanian jurisdiction.

These are the Americans who know the Torrijos government best. A substantial percentage of them are intermarried with Panamanian families and understand all too well what will be in store for them.

Some of our diplomats charge that the Zonians are a privileged caste, reluctant to give up a privileged way of life. I guess, in a sense, they are privileged-in that same sense that all Americans are privileged who live under the U.S. Bill of Rights, with competent policemen, fair courts, and equal taxation.

But, by forcing them to give up these rights if they wish to continue their jobs, are we not breaching the terms of their employment contracts? The treaty does not protect their rights if they choose to leave. They get transfer rights only if their jobs are eliminated.

Would it not be sensible to offer a reservation to extend diplomatic immunity to every U.S. citizen employee? The treaty provides for 20 top officials to get immunity; if it is necessary for those 20, why not, Mr. Chairman, for all? Including dependents, it would affect 9,400 U.S. citizens in a country of 1.6 million people. This compares with a total of 18,879 people with diplomatic immunity in the Washington, D.C., area, with a population of 3 million.

If this treaty is ratified, the United States will become a coconspirator to deny these employees the civil rights they deserve as Americans. Do our diplomats think that they are the only ones who need privileges and immunities while living in a repressive society, Mr. Chairman?


Question No. 8 concerns our position in the world.

It is often said that all of Latin America is demanding that we give back-and that word "back" is contradictory because Panama never had the canal in the first place-but we hear that all of Latin American is demanding that we give back the canal to Panama. But the available evidence is rather scanty, to say the least.

Panama's immediate neighbors and those Latin American countries. given to Marxism, socialism, and the expropriation of American investments have found the issue just one more excuse to denounce the gringos.

But I have been in several Latin American countries in recent years, in some of the largest and most important ones in South America. I have talked to presidents, foreign ministers, and joint chiefs of staff. Without exception, Mr. Chairman, without exception, all have told me that they were deeply disturbed by the thought of the canal going to Panama, not only for their economic interests, but because of Torrijos' Marxist leanings.

This is not hearsay, Mr. Chairman. I was told this directly and personally.

They are all disturbed by the lack of leadership and our apparent surrender of important international interests to a weak country.

If we are so concerned about Latin America, why have we not consulted the Inter-American Defense Board with regard to this treaty? The IADB is the only independent multilateral organization concerned with the defense of the Western Hemisphere. It was organized in 1942, as the chairman knows.

Would it not be wise to consult with Latin American defense experts before changing the status of a strategic defense installation?


My last question, No. 9, concerns the bypassing of the role of Congress.

This question relates to the State Department's handling of the treaty negotiations. Here we have a situation where the overwhelming majority of the American people are opposed to giving away our Panama Canal. It has also been clear that substantial portions of both Houses of Congress are opposed, and have been opposed. Yet, instead of dealing honestly with the problem, the State Department has taken the position that Congress can be bypassed. Would it not have been better, given the political problem, for the State Department to have worked through Congress, rather than bypass Congress?

For example, on the article IV, section 3, issue, why did not the State Department go the last mile and seek congressional authority to dispose of the Canal Zone, instead of denying that such authority was needed?

For example, why wasn't the Kissinger-Tack Agreement submitted to Congress as a joint resolution? It would have required only a majority vote, and the negotiators would then have had a clear mandate.

Why is the administration now stating that the House of Representatives need not play a role? Parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, I might say that there is come confusion within the administration on that point. I realize that spokesmen are saying that the participation

of the House of Representatives is not necessary. But on the second Thursday of August of this year, President Carter called me in North Carolina and told me flatly that he recognized the constitutional principle involved and he would not attempt to circumvent it. The following day I wrote to the President confirming the substance of our conversation and thanking him for being so explicit and forthright. I have not had any response from the President negating the substance of that letter.

Now I can understand why there has been no denial because the President knows what he said and I know what he said.

Why is the administration or spokesman therefor now stating that the House of Representatives need not play a role?

Why is Panama being paid benefits out of tolls, bypassing the appropriations process?

Why are major military and economic benefits being funneled through military credits and loan guarantees, bypassing the authorization process?

These techniques, Mr. Chairman, are not calculated to reassure the American people. I suspect that the American people will continue to ask questions, and hopefully they will demand answers.

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege of appearing before your committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Helms. We appreciate your statement. It shows that you have put a great deal of thought and study into it. That is what this committee is trying to do.

Hopefully, we may come to some resolution on this, though I have no idea when. As I have stated before, we are going to go into this thoroughly.

Senator Case, do you have any questions?

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, but no. I just want to thank our colleague for his careful and thoughtful statement and for the moderation with which he has expressed views that we do not always agree with entirely, but agree with a great deal of the time. It is true, I think, that it is expected that the House will participate in a number of the aspects of this arrangement

Senator HELMS. But after the fact.

Senator CASE [continuing]. And the administration witnesses so stated, although they do take the position that it is a matter of law that the property to be transferred to the Panamanians can be transferred to a treaty that is ratified.

The CHAIRMAN. May I add that the House may be necessary for the implementing legislation. The House will join with the Senate on that.

Senator CASE. Yes. It is anticipated, I think, that legislation on three different important parts of this arrangement will be necessary, and I believe the Secretary of State and his assistants have so told us.


You are not at liberty, I suppose, to tell us—and I don't press you unless you want to tell us which countries and which leaders of countries confided to you that they were concerned about our giving up the canal under the present treaty arrangements, are you?


Senator HELMS. I would be glad to tell the Senator privately. Under the circumstances they were private conversations; I don't want to breach any confidences. But I would be glad to say this privately.

Senator CASE. This is not by way of questioning, but if you could, it might give a little bit clearer picture.

Senator JAVITS. Would the Senator yield at that point?

Senator CASE. Yes.

Senator JAVITS. That is the same thing that occurred to me, Senator Helms. I would like to join with Senator Case in thanking you for an obviously very thoroughly prepared testimony.

Would you mind, sir, if you do discuss this matter privately, discussing it with our chairman and ranking member, and deciding with them whether or not to impart this information to the other members of the committee? We would like to be briefed, too? There would be a real timesaving if you do it the way the agencies do when they have secret information for the committee.

Senator HELMS. I would be delighted to give that information, including the dates.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator Helms, I know you contend that the administration would have been advised to submit the question of disposing of territories for the approval of the House, as well. It was not clear whether you contend that legally that is the only way it can be done and that it cannot be done by treaty; or whether as a matter of policy that that is what they should have done.

Senator HELMS. Of course, the answer is both. I think the parameters of the proposed disposition of territorial property have to be established by the House of Representatives. The Constitution is very explicit on that point.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

I have no other questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Does anyone have any further questions?

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Helms, thank you very much for your appearance here today.

Senator HELMS. I thank you and the committee for your courtesy. The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Hon. John M. Murphy, of New York.

We are glad to have you with us, Congressman.

Senator JAVITS. I especially welcome my colleague. I appreciate very much his committee appearance.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a copy of your prepared statement. That whole statement will be printed in the record. You may handle it as you see fit.


Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to be here. I do have some legal documents that are very relevant to the statement, particularly in the constitutional areas. I would like to ask that they be included in the record also.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, that will be done following the text of your prepared statement.

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I have studied and followed this issue for the eight terms that I have been in Congress formally, and my first committee assignment was to the Panama Canal Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. I chaired that subcommittee and I now chair the full committee. I went through the era of the 1967 treaty and its relevance at the time and have closely discussed and followed with each of the ambassadors, who have the responsibility to negotiate a resolution of the Panama Canal, Panama-United States relationship.

There generally was with all ambassadors, until the Tack-Kissinger agreement was signed, two areas that were considered nonnegotiable. One of those areas, of course, was the operational control of the canal. The other area, of course, was the defense of the canal.


We see in the treaty that was finally presented to us immediately upon ratification both of those areas, operational control coming under a board of four Panamanians and four Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Four and five?

Mr. MURPHY. No; I am not talking about the commission. The commission itself is five Americans and four Panamanians. Under that commission, a board for operational control of that canal, that will be a four-and-four board. There is a similar device for defense of the canal and that is another board comprised of four Americans and four Panamanians.

So, at the outset of ratificatiton we lose a majority in those critical areas and, I think, on that basis this committee should carefully evaluate, perhaps refer back for amendment, just in the two critical areas that historically were felt to be nonnegotiable, those vital aspects.

There are many areas of this treaty that I could spend considerable time with discussing the shortcomings and problems that are built into them. I have respect for Ambassador Linowitz and for Ambassador Bunker, as I did their predecessors.


I think this treaty was rushed into in a very short timeframe." After the Congress adjourned for its summer break, the executive branch announced to the press one day there was a treaty agreement.

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