Under the terms of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty, it is clear that the Government of Panama will determine those Panamanians who will sit on the Commission. Given the nature of the present Government in Panama, that is, a military dictatorship, there is no doubt the Commission Members from Panama will be completely responsive to the dictator. I wonder whether the U.S. representatives will be as responsive to the U.S. Government. If even one is not, could the position held by a majority of the U.S. Commissioners be consistently overriden?

Perhaps this question of Commission behavior can be partially handled through U.S. legislation. But I do not think that we can underestimate the control problems associated with the majority partner being a democracy with a capital about 2,000 miles away and the other partner a dictatorship on the spot.

As legislators we are deeply aware of the division in this country over the Panama Canal issue. In addition to the obvious lack of consensus in the United States that makes a long-term agreement on the Canal very difficult, I want to suggest that the consensus in Panama may not be as monolithic as perceived or as cohesive as is necessary to make these new agreements work. There are reasons why the proposed treaties have not been greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm in Panama. Even if almost all Panamanians want some sort of new treaty relationship, they may not want these treaties.

The economic compensation package to the Panamanian Government will come at the expense of the users of the Canal and Canal employees. I know that Panamanian employees in the Canal Zone, who comprise about five percent of the Panamanian national work force, are extremely concerned about the proposed agreements because many of them will be dismissed and will cease to have reasonable employment or their terms of employment will deteriorate considerably under the new arrangements. I wonder whether these Canal employees, who have worked and many of whose forefathers have had careers in the Canal Zone, will not feel some bitterness at the United States for the deterioration of their personal position. Perhaps they will be persuaded to offer it all up for the good of the greater Panama, but I do not think so.

In addition to some of the Canal employees who may not like the agreements, there is a group in Panama that considers the absence of civil liberties and human rights to be pre-eminent issue at this time. For this group consummating a treaty which expands Panama's national property is an endorsement by the U.S. of dictatorial rule in a country which has seen greater liberty in the past. Regardless of the motives of this group that opposes the dictator, whether the motives be ones of political opposition or genuine human rights concern, the U.S. would be remiss not to evaluate the presence of this group in Panama. Also, a portion of the student community in Panama does not appear to be enthralled with the proposed treaties. I doubt that any agreements that preserve U.S. presence in any form will be endorsed by these students.

If, as has been suggested, the consent of Panama and the Panamanian people is the key to the continued safe operation of the Canal, then it seems to me we have to undertake a penetrating study of the possible effects of the proposed treaties on the attitudes of the Panamanian people as well as officials of the Government.

We should take a look at whether we are helping ourselves or whether we are in fact alienating some segments of the Panamanian populace by these treaties. I suspect that we will find that the answer is not that simple.

Irrespective of the other issues raised by the proposed Panama Canal treaties, there is one issue which must not be ignored in the deliberations on these agreements. This issue concerns the National Environmental Policy Act's requirement for an environmental impact statement for all "proposals for legislation and other major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."

The very fact that the Administration and treaty proponents have cited the need for a new treaty relationship in order to improve the operating environment for the Canal is reason enough to reference the importance of a good impact statement. I see the environmental impact statement raising both a hazard and an opportunity in the context of the deliberations of the Committee.

As you know, the purpose of an environmental impact statement is to ensure that the effects of major Federal actions on the human environment are considered in the formulation of policy for such actions. Unfortunately, all evidence

indicates that the effects of the treaties on the human environment were given no formal consideration under N.E.P.A. by the Administration in the neogtiation of the proposed Canal treaties. Surely the negotiators for the U.S. and Panama must have been constantly aware of the political ramifications of their decision, but in no event were the environmental ramifications of the treaties formally considered at the appropriate time.

According to the governing laws and regulations, a draft environmental impact statement should have been prepared when negotiations were reinitiated with Panama in 1971 or 1973. A final environmental impact statement should have been prepared and filed with the Council on Environmental Quality 30 days before the signing of the treaties on September 7. Neither of these requirements was fulfilled. It is clear that the Executive Branch has been acting in violation of N.E.P.A. and N.E.P.A.-inspired regulations to this point in time.

The Department of State's attention to these requirements may be improving, however, the deadline for comments on the draft impact statement issued a week before the treaty ceremonies has been extended. Hopefully a final adequate impact statement will be available in the future.

I stress the need for an adequate final environmental impact statement because it is possible that the courts, should they find the requirements for environmental consideration lacking, might enjoin implementation of the treaties or their effectuation upon ratification. It would be unfair to Panama and its people as well as the people of our own country to debate or pass upon the treaty which would possibly be laid aside by the courts. It would be insensitive and destructive of good relations to raise expectations and then have them dashed.

I urge the Committee to exhort the Department of State to prepare the best impact statement possible. I believe that the only adequate statement would be one that properly addresses all aspects of the treaties, including employment conditions, water quality and pollution considerations, sea-level Canal effects, the inspection of transiting vessels, and so on. If the Department of State knew the Senate would not consider the proposed treaties until a proper assessment has been completed, that would increase their attention to the task.

The environmental impact statement in connection with the treaties need not take on the hue of just an onerous obligation because the courts could be involved. It can be one of the most useful tools available to the Committee on Foreign Relations to assess the real impact of a new treaty on the Isthmus. Detractors of the treaties have said that the presentation of the agreements has been rife with hypocrisy and deceit. Since an adequate statement must be credible and take into account all relevant input, the impact statement requirement can stand as one test of the sincerity of the presentation. If those groups which are knowledgeable of the situation on the Isthmus will contribute their most puissant observations and if the Department of State makes a good-faith effort to write a responsible impact statement, then the Committee and the Senate will have available to it a body of knowledge which only months of hearings could have otherwise accumulated.

In addition to its usefulness in Senate consideration of the treaties, an impact statement would have major relevance to any Congressional consideration of the transfer of U.S. property in accordance with Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution.

For your consideration, I request that several documents relevant to the environmental impact statement requirement be inserted in the record of these hearings.

In conclusion, although I have highlighted only a few of my major areas of concern, there are many other areas of the treaties that require amendment. Given the outspoken opposition of Panama's Chief of Government to any amendment to the treaties, the most practical course may be for U.S. and Panamanian negotiators to return to the negotiating table and attempt to fashion a new agreement, one that does not follow the "8 Points", one which may do less for some of Panama's objectives, but one which will have much greater chance of acceptance in the United States.

In the future years, as the perceptions of national interest change in the U.S. and Panama, perhaps terms similar to those embodied in these proposed treaties can be agreed upon. At the present time, however, to consent to agreements that will probably never be accepted by major sectors of the populations in the U.S. and in Panama is in my view dangerous.

THE PANAMA CANAL TREATY CONTROVERSY FLUNKS NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. Leggett) is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Speaker, it is generally not known that among the most ardent critics of the proposed Panama Canal Treaty are conservationists knowledgeable about the tropical forests in Central America and the environmental dangers of a sea-level canal. These conservationists have raised disturbing questions about the impact of the proposed treaty on the environment of the Isthmus of Panama. These questions should be fully addressed before action is taken by the President and the Senate on the proposed treaty relationship with Panama. Continued preservation of the tropical forests and wildlife in the Canal Zone is one of the key goals of these conservationists. Because of the protection afforded the Canal Zone in the past, much of this important area remains forested and undisturbed. This, of course, has helped preserve an abundant variety of birds, mammal, and plant life. Under the proposed treaty to the year 2000, many of these forest areas would become dependent upon the Panamanian Government for protection. The proposed treaty, therefore, brings into question the future of these forests. This future is uncertain.

Perhaps the most spectacular forest in the Canal Zone is found along the Gamboa Pipeline Road in the uninhabited central part of the zone. The vast majority of Panamanian lowland bird species occurs near this road about an hour's drive from Panama City. Unfortunately, the larger mammals and such birds as the scarlet and great green macaws were long ago extirpated from this region by hunting and trapping. Most of the large raptors still survive, though in greatly reduced numbers. Even the caiman, a relative of the American alligator which has almost been wiped out by market hunting, may be seen in a lake just north of Gamboa.

When the Chagres River was dammed to form Gatun Lake and the northern section of the Panama Canal, a forested hilltop became Barro Colorado Island. This island has become a wildlife preserve by act of Congress, and provided the original impetus for the Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute, an international center for tropical studies-headquartered in the Canal Zone-which has contributed greatly to knowledge of tropical ecology. Today, scientists and students associated with the Institute are engaged in important research in various parts of the Canal Zone. Visitors to Barro Colorado Island, where hunting is prohibited, can expect to see a variety of mammals, including for example, the scarce tapir.

Other zone areas such as the Madden Forest Preserve are also highly valued by conservationists. Overall, the Canal Zone qualifies as one of the world's great nature study spots. On the Atlantic coast alone, participants in the Panama Audubon Society's 1976 Christmas bird count observed 333 species in 1 day-a new world record. Robert Ridgely, in his excellent "Guide to the Birds of Panama," concludes that the Canal Zone has "probably the most extensive, readily accessible lowland forests in Middle America."

It is not surprising, therefore, that conservationists and scientists are concerned about the new treaties, particularly since the tropical forests in other areas of Panama are rapidly being cleared with serious consequences for wildlife and ecology in those areas. Indeed, according to reports, if present trends continue there will be few forests left in the Republic of Panama and many of the characteristic species of birds and mammals in that nation will become extinct. Even where forests have been set aside for protection in Panama, the results have been depressing. One small forest in the central mountains, for example, has been designated a "national park," but squatters have invaded its unprotected boundaries to cut and burn the forest. On both sides of the 10-mile-wide Canal Zone, the increasingly denuded land is becoming densely populated by large and generally poor families; evidence of a growth rate that will double Panama's population in about 20 years.

Some observers remember that construction of the Darien Gap Highway through the virgin forests of eastern Panama, the last stronghold of the Cuna and Choco Indians, was halted only by a law-suit brought by U.S. conservationists under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The possible results of that highway included the spread of hoof and mouth disease into Central America and the United States, the cultural extinction of the native peoples and the loss of the largest remaining forest wilderness in Central America.

While the negotiations for the proposed canal treaties have proceeded in the last decade, the forested areas of the Canal Zone have suffered increasing environmental damage. At one point, squatters moved into the Madden Forest Preserve and the Gamboa Pipeline Road Forest, and began to illegally clear cut the giant trees and plant marginal crops. As a result, large tracts of these magnificent forests have aready been turned into an "ugly wasteland of huge felled trees and rotting vegetation," according to the Panama Audubon Society's newsletter, the Toucan.

Furthermore, during the treaty negotiations, intensive and uncontrolled hunting of wildlife-including song birds, monkeys and parrots-increased in the Canal Zone. Of course, damage to the forested areas in and around the Canal Zone can have a detrimental impact on the efficient operation of the canal as well as the ecology.

Conservationists, quite understandably, became alarmed that adequate provision be made for the protection of forest areas and wildlife during the treaty negotiations. They also became alarmed when they learned that the treaty to the year 2000 would incorporate a possible sea-level canal into its provisions. A National Academy of Sciences Panel, in 1970, warned of "grave potential dangers" that could result from such a project. They said:

Joining two oceans with a sea-level canal is a gigantic natural experiment. Its consequences are unforeseeable. To forego the relevant biological research prior to and during the construction of a new canal would be like preparing to put a man on the moon and neglecting to ask him to make scientific observations and collect samples. A new canal will affect the animal and plant life of the two oceans, but what these effects are cannot be determined unless the nature of the differences between the biota and the ecosystems of the two oceans are first carefully established through years of intensive research.

The Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission recommended, in 1970, a multiyear research program to study these dangers. This program was never begun. Instead, this summer, the White House asked the National Science Foundation to pull together available information and update these 1970 reports within 6 weeks. The results of this hurried, last minute effort are not available. When they are, they certainly will not constitute the years of research called for in 1970.

On September 6, 1977, 11 national and international environmental organizations urged the President not to agree to those portions of the treaty relating to a sea-level canal. They warned that such a canal "represents not only an economic loss, but a likely environmental disaster as well." Like the earlier recommendations of the National Academy of Science, these recommendations of the environmental community were also ignored.

The failure of the proposed treaty to address these and other concerns of conservationists stems, in part, from the Department of State's failure to comply with the provisions of NEPA. Central to NEPA's requirements is the provision that an environmental impact statement (EIS) be prepared and considered for all "proposals for legislation and other major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." NEPA requires that after an impact statement is prepared, it must be available to Congress and the public and must "accompany the proposal through the existing agency review process."

The very purpose of NEPA's procedures, and of the impact statement requirement in particular, is to insure the recognition of environmental consequences during and not after the Federal decisionmaking process. These congressional purposes are reflected in the guidelines for preparation of environmental impact statements issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which provide that impact statements be prepared "as early as possible and, in all cases, prior to agency decision."

Had the Department of State complied with NEPA, the concerns of conservationists would have at least been addressed. But, the facts show that the Department of State wholly failed to comply with these requirements. When the present round of negotiations began in 1973, a draft EIS should have been prepared. Indeed, the State Department's published procedures direct that

[i] in the case of international (sic) agreements, draft statements will, where possible, normally be prepared, circulated for comment and forwarded to the CEQ prior to the commencement of negotiations intended to produce a final agreement.

Despite this requirement, as late as July 22, 1977, an official of the Department of State admitted that the Department had not even prepared an assess

ment of the environmental implications of the treaty to determine whether or not an impact statement should be prepared. Such an assessment is also required by CEQ's guidelines to be "undertaken concurrently with initial technical and economic studies" of the proposed action. This, of course, was not done.

When a draft EIS was finally issued on August 29, 1977, the normal 45-day period for public review and comment was cut short with the explanation that the impact statement was needed "in time to be relevant to Senate consideration of the proposed treaty." This abbreviated time period for public comment had not even had a chance to run before the President signed the treaty on September 7, 1977. Obviously, NEPA had no impact on Federal decisionmaking connected with the treaty.

Normally, the preparation of an impact statement for an action of such major consequence as that of the proposed treaty is accomplished only after careful study and months of effort. Given the extraordinarily brief time taken by the Department of State to prepare the draft statement for the proposed treaty, and the failure of the Department to comply with proper procedures, it is not surprising that the draft statement which was prepared is woefully inadequate. Basic, of course, to any proper draft EIS is an adequate description of the proposed action. In this instance, however, the proposed treaty was not attached to the draft statement nor was it made available for public review and inspection at the time the draft was issued. The Congress and the public were asked to comment upon a treaty they had not seen and one which was only generally described. Moreover, the impact statement indicated that, in addition to the proposed treaty

There will be separate bilateral agreements worked out with the Panamanian Government concerning the activities of a variety of U.S. agencies in the Canal Zone.

The provisions of these other agreements, which were identified as being part of the general Panamanian settlement, were not described even though at least two of them were identified as being "of primary environmental interest."

Just as the proposed action is ill-defined in the draft impact statement, so were the impacts of the proposed treaty upon the environment. The draft statement, for example, does not describe any of the impacts of the treaty upon the human environment in Panama. The State Department's failure to discuss these impacts apparently results from its continued refusal to comply with the advice of the Council on Environmental Quality and the recent rulings of the U.S. circuit courts that the effects of Federal actions upon the quality of the human environment in foreign countries must be addressed under NEPA.

An adequate and timely analysis and disclosure of the environmental effects of the treaty upon Panama in the draft impact statement would have provided U.S. decisionmakers with a more complete picture of the environmental consequences of the proposed treaty. Such an analysis would also have contributed to the integrity of Panama's policymaking and lent support to international environmental cooperation, as directed in section 102(a) (F) and NEPA, the Stockholm Declaration and other international agreements including the Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere.

In addition to failing to discuss the impact of the treaty upon the environment of Panama, the draft impact statement also failed to adequately address important questions concerning deforestation, water conservation, soil erosion, and water pollution in the Canal Zone. The draft statement admits that there "will probably be some deforestation in Canal Zone areas turned back to Panama" but fails to indicate where these areas are located or the extent of the deforestation. The draft also fails to discuss the impact of this deforestation upon the wildlife of the area although at various points it states that one of the forest areas "contains some 216 species of birds which do not occur outside the New World Tropics," and that "5 percent of all the endangered mammals in the world and 20 percent of those in the Americas occur in these areas."

In a similar fashion, the concerns which have been raised over a new sea-level canal are dismissed in the draft statement with the comment that it "is premature to tell whether the United States will avail itself of the rights granted under the proposed treaty." No apparent effort was made to incorporate the findings of the recently initiated study of the sea-level canal by the National Academy of Sciences.

In summary, even the most cursory review of the draft impact statement demonstrates that it is little more than an after-the-fact attempt on the part of the