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Unfortunately, after this initial policy statement he apparently fell into the clutches of Department of State miners and sappers and reversed his original position. Consequently, on December 18, 1964, after restoration of normal relations with Panama, President Johnson announced that the U.S. Government had completed an intensive policy review with respect to the present and future of the Panama Canal and that he had reached two decisions:

First, to press forward with Panama and other interested governments for a sea level canal; and second, to negotiate an entirely new canal treaty for the existing Panama Canal.

Legislation to authorize an investigation of the feasibility of a canal of sea level design was obtained-Public Law 88-609, approved September 22, 1964. Robert B. Anderson was assigned to head that study. Later, Mr. Anderson was appointed as chief U.S. Negotiator for the proposed treaty negotiations, thus holding two positions at the same time.


On June 26, 1967, President Johnson and President Marco A. Robles of Panama jointly announced that agreement had been reached on three proposed new canal treaties as follows:

The first covering the operation of the present canal would have (1) abrogated the Treaty of 1903, (2) recognized Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone, (3) made Panama an active partner in the management and defense of the Canal, (4) increased toll royalties to Panama, and (5) eventually given to Panama exclusive possession in 1999 if no new canal were constructed at U.S. expense or soon after opening of a sea level canal but not later than 2009 if a new canal were built.

The second treaty for a canal of sea level design would have given the United States an option for 20 years after ratification to start construction, 15 more years for construction and a majority membership in the canal authority for 60 years after opening or until 2067, whichever was earlier. Additional agreements to fix the specific conditions for its combinations would have to be negotiated when the United States should decide to execute its option.

The third treaty for defense would have provisions for the continued use of military bases by U.S. Forces in Panama for 5 years beyond the termination date of the proposed treaty for the operation of the existing canal. If a new canal in Panama were constructed the military base rights treaty would have to be extended for the duration of the treaty for the new canal. (Background of U.S. Decision to Resume Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations," Office of Interoceanic Canal Negotiations, State Department, 1971.)


Although President Johnson did make a press release outlining the general aims of the treaties, the governments of both the United States and Panama withheld publication of the proposed treaties apparently with the hope that they would be ratified by our Senate without adequate debate.

Ferreted out through the journalistic initiative of the Chicago Tribune and published in that paper, and later quoted in addresses to the U.S. Senate by Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina in the Congressional Records of July 17, 21 and 27, 1967, they aroused a storm of protests in both Panama and the United States as well as in Great Britain and Japan, which are large users of the Panama Canal. So strong were these protests that the proposed 1967 treaties were never signed.

SEA LEVEL RECOMMENDATIONS HINGES ON SURRENDER OF CANAL ZONE, 1970 On December 1, 1970, the Anderson panel submitted its voluminous report recommending the construction of a new canal of so-called sea level design entirely in Panamanian territory about 10 miles west of the existing canal at an initially estimated cost of $2,888,000,000 to be borne by the United States taxpayers. This figure did not include the cost of the rights of way or of the inevitable indemnity to Panama.

Meanwhile, in line with Isthmaian revolutionary history, the Constitutional government of Panama was overthrown on October 11, 1968, after only 10 days in office, by a military coup and a provisional Revolutionary Government established. This eliminated the Panama National Assembly and converted its spa

cious building into government offices. Eventually, the revolutionary government, after declaring the discredited 1967 treaties unacceptable, sought to negotiate new ones and our government acceded, with the designation of the same Robert B. Anderson as Chief U.S. Negotiator.

Here it should be explained that the construction of a canal of sea level design at Panama for many years has been an undisclosed objective of a small professional engineering-industrial group, including manufacturers of heavy earth moving machinery. The recommendation of the 1970 Anderson Report for a sea level canal hinges upon the surrender of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Moreover, the holding of the position of Chief Negotiator by the same person who headed the negotiations for the discredited 1967 treaties and the sea level study creates a serious conflict of interest to which the Congress should be fully alert.

One of the great purposes of United States policy of exclusive sovereign control over the Canal Zone was the avoidance of the never ending conflicts and recriminations that always accompany extra-territorial rights. To speak so bluntly as the gravity of the situation at Panama demands, the State Department in recent years has been dominated by those who timidly accept as valid every major claim of Panamanian radicals for the surrender by the United States of its sovereignty over the canal enterprise and its transfer to Panama. Such action would undoubtedly result in the immediate dominance of the Isthmus including the Canal Zone by Soviet powers against which Panama could not cope.


Lest there be some doubt as to the long range aims of the Panama Government as to its objectives, on April 29, 1958, Ambassador Ricardo M. Arias of Panama, in a major address at the School of Foreign Service of Georgetown University, made this significant revelation: "The foreign policy of my country during the past 50 years has been to exert every effort in order to obtain at least for Panama, conditions similar to those granted to Colombia in January 1903." (Ho. Doc. 474, 89th Congress, p. 23.)

The blackmailing and demogogic revolutionary government of Panama would have the world forget the history of that country: the Panama Revolution under the guaranty of the United States, the reasons for the 1903 Treaty under which the United States constructed and has subsequently operated and defended the Panama Canal, the transformation of Panama from a cesspool of disease and penury into a relatively healthy land of comparative prosperity, and the vast sums provided by our government for canal purposes. The net total of these sums including defense, as of June 30, 1968, was more than $5,000,000,000, all provided by the taxpayers of the United States.

All the facts just enumerated, Mr. Chairman, the present government of Panama would remove from the memory of mankind. The United States can well stand on the record that it has made at Panama in dealing with all of these matters and trust to history for vindication.

Manifestly, Panama cannot eat its cake and have it also. After the United States built the canal and successfully operated it for more than half a century, a fly-by-night and sanguinary revolutionary government would have our country neglect its duty to its taxpayers and surrender the indispensably necessary protective frame of the Canal to Panama and thus enable that country to expropriate the canal itself and drive us from the Isthmus. The present Revolutionary Government of Panama has been motivated by a complete disregard of historical verities and its policy of truculence and impossible claims has undoubtedly been induced by Soviet assurances, for Soviet experts are already in Panama. This always happens prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations.


In response to the officialdom in our government who seem determined to destroy the 1903 Treaty and surrender our just rights, power and authority at Panama, why should not such surrender be made to Colombia, which until November 3, 1903, was the sovereign of the Isthmus instead of Panama?

Any surrender of the Canal Zone and Canal is unthinkable; but if any surrender should be made it should be to Colombia, of which Panama was once a province, and not to Panama.


In the light of what has taken place it is interesting to note that Colonel John P. Sheffey, former Executive Director of the recent sea level studies and now of the Office of Interoceanic Canal Negotiations in the Department of State, made the following revealing statements before a gathering of marine scientists on March 4, 1971, at the Smithsonian Institution:

1. That the canal investigation under Public Law 88-609 calling for consideration of the long range Canal program originated with the State Department following the 1964 riots as a means for improving treaty relationships with Panama.

2. That President Nixon had accepted the final 1964 Johnson canal treaty policy.

3. That the main purpose of the sea level proposal was to obtain "better treaty relationships" with Panama.

4. That if such relationships are not obtained the project is not warranted. 5. That the sea level proposal is not justified economically and that it "may never be constructed."

6. That because of opposition in both the United States and Panama the 1967 draft treaties would not be the basis for future negotiations.

7. That the sea level proposal was recognized as “ecologically dangerous." 8. That a decision to construct one would be a "political" decision.

Could there be more shocking admissions concerning a subject of such vast importance to the entire world than those just enumerated? (Congressional Record, March 24, 1971, p. 53879.)


The latest information on the canal treaty situation is that President Nixon, on the advice of the same appeasement officials in the State Department who advised President Johnson and whom President Nixon in his 1968 campaign had avowed to replace, has established objectives similar to those of his predecessor as modified by events since 1967. This information is that the "renewal of violence in Panama, possibly more extensive than experienced in 1964, might be unavoidable if the treaty objectives considered by the Panamanian people to be reasonable and just are not substantially achieved." This is complete blackmail on the part of the Panama Government, which today is unconstitutional under Panamanian requirements.

Though averring that the United States has "no intention of yielding control and defense of the Canal to the threat of violence," the State Department view is that it is in United States interest to demonstrate again as in 1967 our "willingness to make adjustments" which do not significantly weaken our rights to control and defend the canal and that it would be difficult for the United States to "justify itself in world forums" in the event it is again forced to "commit" its armed forces against "Panamanian incursion into the Canal Zone." (Background . . ., 1971, op. c.t.) Could there be any more obvious double talk? The United States did not commit its Armed Force against anybody.

Such statements of policy, Mr. Chairman are an expression of willingness to surrender in advance. What could be more pusillanimous or unrealistic than this State Department pronouncement! No wonder the eyes of the world are watching us at Panama, for upon what we do there could well depend the freedom or the slavery of the world. Shabby sentimentality has no place in the consideration of the problems of the Canal Zone and Panama Canal. Such policy pronouncements as those just cited are about as senseless as those that involved the United States in entering the Korean and Viet Nam war.

Instead of surrendering the Canal Zone to Panama it ought to be extended so as to include the entire drainage area of the Chagres River basin as was first recommended by General Clarence R. Edwards, the Commanding General of U.S. troops on the Isthmus, as the result of World War I experience.


In public statement by the Panamanian negotiators just prior to their departure for the United States on June 29, 1971, they said that they would demand full sovereignty over the Canal Zone or that there would be no treaty and that in

event of failure to get such sovereignty they would return to Panama and explain matters to their people. In view of the anti-United States frenzy into which the people of that country have been whipped, this constitutes an open threat of violence comparable to that of January 9-12, 1964, which required the use of our Armed Forces to protect the lives of our citizens and the canal itself. Certainly there are few better examples of how appeasement begets blackmail than in the conduct during recent years of our policies at Panama. It must be borne in mind that those who made these threats overthrew by force and violence the Constitutional Government of Panama and are maintaining themselves in power by the same means. Why make treaties with the present Revolutionary Government which would in all likelihood be repudiated when Panama returns to a Constitutional government just as the present government repudiated the proposed 1967 treaties.

The greater part of the turmoil and bitterness that has evolved in Panama has been because Panamanian radicals and demagogs have failed to diagnose realistically the premises on which they base their policies and actions. Unfortunately, through continued insistence Panamanian policies now prevailing are not realistic.

Timidity and vacillation on the part of our State Department have served to induce extravagant claims and demands by Panama that have resulted in brain washing our accredited officials who have never emphasized the genesis of Panama and the Canal.

Panama is not a great power and can never be one. It is a small and weak country-the result of a Caesarian operation that was successful because the United States as a great power supported it. While Panama's frequently mentioned geographic position is an asset it is also a great liability because predatory powers covet it. The actual confrontation now occurring is not between the United States and Panama but between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The Soviet takeover of Cuba had, and still has, for its purpose the control of the Panama Canal.

Moreover, Panama at present does not have any Constitutional way to ratify treaties because the Revolutionary Government has abolished the National Assembly of Panama, which is the treaty ratifying agency of the Panamanian Government.


Here I would emphasize the importance of Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the vests the power to dispose of territory and other property of the United States in the Congress, which of course, includes the House of Representatives. This places a high degree of responsibility on the subcommittee, for as in the case of the 1967 proposed treaties and, so far as can be ascertained, at the present time, this wise Constitutional provision is being ignored by our treaty negotiators.

An examination of court decisions will disclose that the Constitutionality of this provision has been upheld many times. One example of our government complying with it was in the 1955 Treaty in which the conveyance of lands and property of the United States to Panama was "subject to the enactment of legislation by the Congress." (Chapin-Fábrega Treaty of January 25, 1955, Article V.)


As foreseen by the formulators of our major Isthmian Canal policies of site, type and control, the Panama Canal is a part of the coast line of the United States. Its protection is just as vital to national defense as the protection of Delaware Bay or San Francisco Harbor.

General plans for the major increase of capacity and operational improvements of the existing canal have been developed and are covered in pending legislation but cannot proceed until the sovereignty issue is clarified and our undiluted control and ownership of the canal and the Canal Zone fully understood and recognized, for the Canal can no more be separated from the Zone than boilers from a steam power plant.

The very moment that we surrender sovereignty over the Zone to Panama as presently planned, Soviet power will take over the Republic of Panama as it did Cuba. In fact, as previously stated, Soviet experts have already arrived in Panama and are advising the University, social security organizations, and labor offices of the Panamanian Government.

Thus, also as previously indicated, the issue is not United States control of the Canal Zone versus Panamanian but continued U.S. sovereignty versus U.S.S.R. domination.


Before any surrender to Panama to sovereignty over the Canal Zone there are many questions that must be answered satisfactorily, among them the following: Where would Panamanian political leaders flee for asylum to escape assassination such as has frequently occurred for many years?

How could the lives of our citizens and the Canal itself be defended against mob violence without the protective frame of the Canal Zone under the control of the United States?

How could the Canal be efficiently maintained and operated unless the undiluted control of the Zone with all its tremendous facilities remains with the United States?

How could the constant conflicts and recriminations that always feature extraterritoriality be avoided in the event of surrender of Canal Zone sovereignty? How could the Panama Canal be modernized without further extortions through further treaty negotiations?

Why jeopardize our present treaty rights to modernize the existing canal by "expansion and new construction" abrogating the workable 1903 Treaty?

Why should the United States abandon policies successfully tested in the operation of the existing canal based on provisions of a workable Treaty for a mere option for a new canal sea level design that even its advocates admit may never be constructed?

Why does the State Department ignore the marine ecological angle involved in constructing a salt water channel between the oceans, which recognized scientists predict would result in infesting the Atlantic with the Poisonous Pacific sea snake and the predatory Crown of Thorns starfish that would have international repercussions?

Is not the Republic of Panama a small and weak country whose independence is assured only so long as the United States remains on the Isthmus?

Is not all the talk by the Revolutionary Government of Panama about the dignity of the fatherland false and demagogic?

Why has it whipped the people of Panama into a frenzy of great expectations which when not realized may result in violence?

What would be the legal complications of ending more than six decades of United States jurisdiction and the Canal Zone Code that has been enacted by the Congress?

Would not such surrender be in violation of the 1950 Panama Canal Reorganization Act (Pub. Law 841, 81st Congress) that placed the canal on a self-sustaining basis?

Would not the surrender of the Canal Zone arouse controversy with Great Britain as violative of the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and other large maritime nations that have accepted that treaty?

Would not surrender of the Canal Zone to Panama violate the right of Colom-bia under the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914-22 in the Panama Canal and Railroad?

In view of terms of the 1903 Treaty ceding sovereignty over the Canal Zone to the United States how can it be legally surrendered except by the abandonment of the Panama Canal?

Would not such surrender revive the claim of Colombia not only to the Canal Zone and Canal but also to the entire Isthmus?

Should such surrender be made, why not make it to Colombia rather than Panama?

What reason except a determination to acquire the Panama Canal has motivated the U.S.S.R. in the takeover of Cuba, the building of bases there, and operating submarines off both coasts of Latin America?

Instead of surrendering the Canal Zone to Panama why not extend it to include the entire watershed of the Chagres River?

Would not the cession of U.S. sovereignty over the Canal Zone to Panama facilitate the expropriation of the Canal as occurred in Egypt after the surrender of the Suez Canal Zone?

Would not such expropriation be supported by the full might of Soviet power? Then who would operate and control this great artery of marine transportation and world strategy?

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